

POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA
12-1-68

STATE DEPARTMENT SYSTEMATIC REVIEW
☐ Retain classification ☐ Change/classify to _____
☒ Declassify with no restrictions
EO 12858, 25X
FPC/HDR by TSB Date: 3/19/96
Withdrawal No: _____

0351

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MV NARA Date 10/5/00

F800006-0909

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-107

UNCLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : AF - Ambassador ~~Palmer~~

FROM : INR/RAF - Robert D. Baum ~~RB~~

SUBJECT: Official French Statements on the Nigerian Civil War: June-December 1968

DATE: December 31, 1968

As requested, attached herewith is a compilation, as complete as we could make it, of official French public statements on the Nigerian civil war since June 1968. It consists of two parts: 1) a brief summary of each statement and 2) the complete texts where available.

This document released to
public per CAC/SEA WOOD
12/31/68

Attachments:

As stated

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Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

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By: MWA Date: 10/5/05

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F800 006-0910

PART I: A SUMMARY OF OFFICIAL FRENCH GOVERNMENT
STATEMENTS ON THE NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR: JUNE-DECEMBER 1968

June 12: Foreign Minister Debre announces that France has declared a total embargo on arms shipments to both Nigeria and Biafra. He adds that France's intervention in the Nigerian-Biafran conflict is purely humanitarian.

July 16: A government spokesman "clarifies" French policy on Biafra; expresses concern over a "serious and bloody quarrel" which is, however, "essentially an African problem."

July 31: The Council of Ministers calls for Biafran self-determination; asserts that sufferings endured for over a year by the Biafran people show their will to affirm themselves as a people. The French Government believes the conflict should be settled on the basis of the right of peoples to self-determination and should entail appropriate international procedures.

August 13: General de Gaulle states that the Nigerian crisis can not be resolved militarily; the only possible solution is a political one which takes the "personality of the Biafran people" into account.

September 9: At a press conference, de Gaulle publicly mentions the possibility that France may at some future date decide to recognize Biafra. He calls for some sort of union of confederation which can reconcile Biafra's right to self-determination. He criticizes the British colonial policy of forcing different peoples into a federal framework. He accuses Lagos of using "war, blockade, extermination, and famine" to bring the Ibos back into submission, and states that France has "aided Biafra within the limit of its possibilities."

October 2: Foreign Minister Debre tells the National Assembly that the Ibos' will to resist validates their right to self-determination. He indirectly accuses Nigeria of "a kind of genocide." He says that France is giving humanitarian assistance to Biafra. The Foreign Ministry issues background statement denying that France is supplying arms to Biafra.

October 7: In speech to the UN General Assembly, Debre calls for a halt to weapons shipments that are prolonging the fighting in Nigeria. He challenges Africans to seek a solution to the Nigerian crisis and reiterates French support for Biafran self-determination.

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Biafra-Nigeria

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- 2 -

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October 22: Speaking at a meeting of Western European Union Foreign Ministers in Rome, French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lipkowski calls for an end of arms sales to Federal Nigeria and denies the French are delivering weapons to Biafra.

November 7: Debre (speaking to the French National Assembly) scores British arms sales to Nigeria and reaffirms French support for Biafran self-determination.

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(21) PART II: TEXTS OF FRENCH STATEMENTS ON NIGERIAN
CIVIL WAR, JUNE-DECEMBER 1968

A clarification of official French Policy toward Nigeria,
July 16, 1968:

An official French spokesman expressed his government's concern over the "serious and bloody quarrel" between Nigeria and Biafra, but noted that the conflict was "essentially an African problem." He also pointed out that France had banned all new arms contracts for Nigeria or Biafra in June 1967 and had declared a total arms embargo on June 21, 1968. (Source: AFP, July 16, 1968)

Statement by the French Council of Ministers, July 31, 1968:

"The human drama being played out in Biafra preoccupies and shocks the French Government. Independent of its concern to participate to the best of its ability in the humanitarian effort now going on, the Government declares that the bloodshed and sufferings that the Biafran people have endured for more than a year demonstrate their determination to affirm themselves as a people. Loyal to its principles, the French Government considers, consequently, that the present conflict should be settled on the basis of the rights of peoples to self-determination and should comprise the setting in motion of the appropriate international procedures." (Source: Le Monde, August 2, 1968 (free translation))

De Gaulle's September 9, 1968 Press Conference:

"Question: The drama unfolding in Nigeria appears daily more distressing. You have referred several times to the Biafran problem. Could you, Mr. President, give us your opinion on the problem?"

Answer: "I am not sure that the system of a Federation that sometimes replaces in certain places, in some way, that of colonization is always very good or very practical, particularly in Africa. But, not only in Africa. For, after all, that consists in an outright putting together of peoples who are very different and even opposed to one another and who, consequently, do not like it at all. One sees this in Canada. One sees it in Rhodesia, in Malaysia and in Cyprus. One sees it in Nigeria."

Indeed, why should the Ibos, who are mainly Christians, who live in the south in a certain way and who have their own language, why should they be subject to another ethnic fraction of the Federation? For that is what is happening. As soon as the colonizer withdraws his authority in an artificial federation, one ethnic element imposes its authority on the others.

PL 27 Biafra - Nigeria

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- 2 -

Even before there was the present drama of Biafra, one could wonder how Nigeria could live in view of all the crises the Federation was going through. And now that there is this heinous, shocking drama, now that Biafra has proclaimed its independence and that the Federation, in order to bring it to heel, is using warfare, blockade, extermination and starvation, how can one conceive that the peoples of the Federation, including the Ibos, will resume their life in common?

In this affair, France has helped Biafra to the extent of her capabilities. She has not taken the action which for her would be decisive: recognition of the Biafran Republic. For, she feels that the gestation of Africa is, above all, the affair of the Africans. Already some states in East and West Africa have recognized Biafra. Others seem to be pointing in this direction. That is to say that, for France, the decision which has not been taken is not excluded in the future. Besides, one can imagine that the Federation, realizing the impossibility of remaining with its present organization, may transform itself into some union or confederation in which would be established both Biafra's right to self-determination and the bonds that would remain between it and the whole of Nigeria." (Source: French Information Service)

De Gaulle statement to the press, August 13, 1968:


During the course of an August 13 appearance at the French Cabinet General de Gaulle said, commenting on events in Biafra, that considering what was happening and considering the popular response to events, it did not seem possible to him that a military solution could settle the Nigerian problem, although it could gain a foothold. Only a political solution can resolve this question, which can be settled only by taking into account the personality of the Biafran people. (Source: AFP, August 13, 1968)

Declaration of Michel Debre, before the French National Assembly, October 2, 1968:

"...Finally, a conflict with frightful human consequences has opposed the people of Biafra to the leaders of the Federation of Nigeria...

With regard to Biafra, in the presence of actions of an unprecedented brutality and a kind of genocide, our administration, with the collaboration of the French Red Cross, has been able to furnish important supplies and precious medical assistance. In collaboration with the government of Gabon, and thanks to the devotion of Frenchwomen and Frenchmen, we are establishing relief hospitals for the hundreds and even the thousands of children evacuated in a physical state that recalls the worst horrors of the last world war. This humanitarian effort is not enough. By its numerical

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- 3 -

importance, measured at more than ten millions, the Ibo people do not represent a minority in the bosom of a state. They have been an important element composing a federation, and their will to resist proves the extent to which they have the right to self-determination. We have said this. We will not stop saying it. The military events, the bloody repression, the artificial political divisions do not keep the problem from existing, and one can only regret the large supply of arms to the government of Lagos that has permitted, first of all, a great slaughter, and then the maintenance of a situation from which all of Africa will, one day, suffer.

Whether it is a question of Czechoslovakia, Vietnam, the Middle East, or Biafra, we see the same failure to recognize the right of peoples to run their own lives, the same failure to recognize the necessary cooperation among states and peoples: in other words, the same failure to recognize the rules without which there is only tension and intolerance, confrontation and conflict.

It is the call for the necessary respect for these rules that will make necessary the declaration in the name of the Republic I plan to pronounce soon at the rostrum of the United Nations, and where I will recall that there is nothing worse for peace than the maintenance of a state of things where violence pays, that is to say, where those who employ it triumph to the detriment of just law.


Certainly, there are not only danger spots in the world. An exhaustive discussion would show more happy aspects of the world situation, and recalling the whole of our diplomatic activity would permit you to appreciate the results we have obtained in the areas of economic expansion, cultural relations, and political collaboration, notably in Europe and Africa..." Source: Le Monde, October 4, 1964 (free translation)

Foreign Minister Debre's Speech to the United Nations General Assembly, October 2, 1968:

"...In Africa, the refusal to recognize the right of peoples to self-determination was marked up to now by the oppression and humiliation which certain African populations experienced. All the progress needed has not yet been made, and I will return to this later. But how could one fail to denounce the Biafra drama, the martyrdom of the Ibo people, that tragedy which the world community has contemplated and discussed--and I might say, still contemplates and discusses--without trying to put an end to it?

Of course, it is necessary that food and medication arrive as quickly as possible wherever their need is cruelly felt, and we must strongly denounce the obstacles that still continue to stand in the way of delivering assistance. But it would be even more necessary and useful if a halt were put to the shipment of weapons that are prolonging the fighting.

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- 4 -

Beyond this, we should note that, despite the inequality of the opposing forces, the determination of the Biafrans has not flagged. Each day it becomes more manifest that only a solution based on the incontestable personality of that people, and consistent with the principle of self-determination inscribed in our Charter, can settle that painful problem. The French Government desires such a solution.

Quite often, in these halls, eloquent voices have been raised to condemn the action of the colonizers at the expense of peoples who claim the right to govern themselves. These voice requested that the great movement of nationalities which has changed the face of Europe might extend throughout the globe and that the freedom of determining their destiny themselves not be the monopoly of the white peoples. The time has come when we must ask our African friends what they themselves expect to do about this principle and to remind them of what the Europeans have learned from long experience: it is that, among brothers, intolerance can reign. To remain silent too long, to remain inactive when blood is flowing and famine is spreading, undermines the new prestige of Africa. It is a constant and faithful friend of the Africans who, from this rostrum, says this with concern, but also with confidence in their forthcoming reaction." (Source: UN speech, informal translation)

Statement by Foreign Minister Debre before the French National Assembly, November 7, 1968:

Summary: Foreign Minister Debre gave no indication of any change in French policy toward Nigeria/Biafra during his reply to a critical question by a deputy during the November 7 budget session of the National Assembly and he continued to place the blame for conflict on the U.K. Debre went so far as to claim that France is the only country which has embargoed delivery of arms to both sides and then added that if England did likewise, the problem could be more easily resolved. He repeated dedication to self-determination as justification for the French position and said that the conflict has arisen because of faulty British colonial policy oriented toward idea of federation. (Source: Embassy Paris cable, November 12, 1968)

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| By | MV NARA Date 10/5/05 |

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9/11/75
This document released to
public per *J. Bishop AF*

5-C-121

December 23, 1968

Honorable George H. Fallon
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Fallon:

Secretary Rusk has asked me to reply to your inquiry dated December 9 regarding Mrs. Julia R. Emory's concern about the situation in Nigeria and the plight of the Biafran people.

The American interest in the Nigerian civil war is primarily humanitarian. We want to relieve suffering and to end the killing. Because humanitarian, political, and military factors are interwoven in this tragedy, US Government policy has been to avoid political and military involvement by channeling our support for the international relief effort through the non-political International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and cooperating agencies. The United States contribution to date, both public and private, totals nearly \$21 million. Through our AID mission in Nigeria and close liaison with the ICRC we are doing all we can to expand the existing effort. We believe that the ICRC is in the best position to cope effectively with the task because it has the support of both sides, as well as the Organization of African Unity (OAU).

In the areas of the war zone under Federal control, relief supplies are being distributed to approximately 600,000 refugees by the ICRC and cooperating agencies. In the area still under Biafran control, 80-150 tons of food and medicine are airlifted nightly from offshore islands by ICRC flights and by an airlift sponsored by a number of church groups. The ICRC estimates that it is feeding approximately 850,000 in Biafra, and Joint Church Aid estimates an additional 400,000 through its operations, but the need is much greater.

There are no reliable figures on the death rate, but it is clear that vast numbers are dying daily, particularly children. Observers have noted a decline in infant mortality recently due to the influx of protein foods, but it is now feared that local carbohydrate foods are being exhausted. If both sides continue to disagree over badly needed air and surface corridors, one of the worst famines in modern times appears inevitable.

The problem of disaster relief in Biafra is not the lack of supplies or means of transport but the lack of access, particularly by a land corridor or even by a regular daytime airlift to Biafra. The authorities on the spot, under conditions of civil war, have given higher priority to politico-military considerations than to arranging food deliveries to

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By MNA Date 10/5/05

Biafra. The Federal Military Government (FMG) was initially opposed to a daytime relief airlift into Biafra on the grounds that it would provide a cover for arms flights. The Biafrans have opposed a land corridor arguing that it could provide an avenue for military advance, and have alleged that food supplies could be poisoned while transiting FMG territory despite proposed safeguards such as policing by foreign observers.

In early November the Nigerian Government told the ICRC that it would agree to daylight relief flights to the major air strip now held by Biafra if the ICRC could give assurances that the strip would handle only relief supplies in daylight hours. We welcomed this as a constructive step by the Federal Government, which could very substantially increase the flow of relief. So far, however, the Biafran authorities have refused to agree. We find it difficult to comprehend that despite the millions of Biafran lives at stake, the Biafran leadership has not yet agreed. The Nigerian Government has also offered once again to cooperate in efforts to open a land corridor to Biafran-held territory. We hope that the Biafran authorities will respond positively.

The prevention of wholesale famine in Nigeria is more important than any political consideration. Our Government has consistently backed efforts by the OAU and the ICRC to bring about agreement on land and air corridors. President Johnson has stated that the US remains "ready to continue in every possible way to help in the humanitarian task of providing supplies to the needy." We have fully supported the Commonwealth Secretariat and the OAU in their efforts on behalf of a negotiated settlement. We are not able alone to impose a solution, but we believe the solution lies somewhere within a framework that both preserves Nigerian unity and provides realistic guarantees of the future safety and development of the Ibo people.

Approximately 40 countries together with the United Nations are contributing money and supplies for this humanitarian effort. The United States has provided thus far almost two-thirds of the global contributions. Of the \$16.5 million US Government donation, \$3.6 million in cash was given to the ICRC and largely used for chartering aircraft for the Biafran airlift; \$12.3 million in surplus high-protein foods (over 51,000 tons) was donated to voluntary relief agencies. The US Government also pays freight costs for relief supplies donated by accredited American voluntary agencies, which have donated approximately \$4.3 million.

Recapitulating, the value of the US relief effort, government and private is:

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By MVA Date 10/5/05

- 3 -

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|----------------------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| US Government | | \$ 16,527,000 |
| PL 480 Food | \$ 12,327,000 | |
| ICRC Contributions | 3,600,000 | |
| General Relief Items | 240,000 | |
| Voluntary Agency Transport Costs | 360,000 | |
| | <u>\$ 16,527,000</u> | |
| US Voluntary Agencies | | <u>4,358,000</u> |
| | | \$ 20,885,000 |

Under Secretary Katzenbach, at Brown University on December 3rd, discussed the background and issues of the Biafran tragedy in much greater detail than it is possible to do in this letter and I am enclosing a copy of his speech.

Please call upon me whenever I may be of assistance to you.

Sincerely yours,

EW
William B. Macomber, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for
Congressional Relations

Enclosures:

1. Correspondence returned.
2. Under Secretary Speech.

RM
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pr mt
7/28/92

December 24, 1968

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| Authority <i>VND 959503</i> |
| By <i>MV</i> NARA Date <i>10/5/05</i> |

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|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
| FORM DS-1563 DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT ACTION SLIP (To Remain With Correspondence) | | CONTROL NO. PCD 16047 LL |
| TO | P - Mr. Coates | |
| | | DATE 12/18/68 |
| SUBJECT Ltr to S fm Falton dtd 12/9 requesting S's comments on the enclosed ltr fm Julia Emory re Biafrans. | | |
| ACTION *Prompt handling is essential. Return basic correspondence with reply. If delayed, call telephone extension below. | | |
| | For appropriate action. | |
| | For direct reply. Comeback copy required | |
| | A response for signature by the <u>Mr. Macomber</u> | |
| XX | Prepare reply. | Clear with |
| | Prepare a | to |
| | Refer to White House request of | |
| XX | H Due in XX by | December 20, 1968 |
| | For your information. | |
| REMARKS | | |
| COPIES TO | | |
| AID - Miss Hart (w/att) U - Mr. Homme (w/att) H - Mr. Briggs (w/att) | | |
| Werner W. Brandt SECRETARIAT STAFF EXT. | | 5130 |

POL
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 BIAFRAN - NIGERIA

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 Authority VND 954503
 By MWA Date 10/5/05

S. 40

ACTION
is assigned to

P/R

16047

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C.

December 9, 1968

Honorable Dean Rusk
Secretary of State
Department of the State
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

The attached communication
is sent for your consideration.
Please investigate the statements
contained therein and forward me
the necessary information for re-
ply, returning the enclosed corre-
spondence with your answer.

Yours truly,

George H. Fallon
M. C.

I shall very much appreciate
receiving your comments on the
attached.

RECEIVED

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Pol 27 Briefing - Nigeria
Re Briefing
Julia & Mary

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By MWA Date 10/5/05

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9/11/75

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DEC 13 1968

5-C-121

Honorable Everett J. Jensen
General Secretary
Washington Northern Idaho
Council of Churches
Room 210
2005 Fifth Avenue
Seattle, Washington 98121

Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria

Dear Mr. Jensen:

President Johnson has asked that I reply to your letter of November 22 regarding the resolution by your organization concerning the situation in Biafra.

As a result of the very substantial worldwide response, a large-scale relief effort has been operating under the supervision of the ICRC in cooperation with other international relief agencies. Foods and medicines are being distributed to the suffering in the Nigerian Government-controlled areas with its cooperation, while relief supplies (80-150 tons nightly) are being flown into Biafran-held territory by irregular night flights, mainly from the offshore islands of Fernando Po and Sao Tome. The responsibility for the failure of adequate supplies to reach Biafra lies in continued disagreement on both sides over the badly needed air and surface relief corridors.

Because humanitarian, political, and military factors are interwoven in this tragedy, it has been the policy of the US Government to avoid military involvement by channeling our support for the international relief effort through the non-political International Committee of the Red Cross and those agencies, including UNICEF, operating under its aegis. At the same time we have consistently supported efforts by the OAU and the ICRC to bring about agreement on the opening of land and air relief corridors to the needy in Biafra. President Johnson has appealed to the parties to set aside the political issues of the war in the interest of reaching agreement on relief. We believe that the ICRC is in the best position to cope effectively with the task of relief because it has the support of both sides, as well as the OAU. Both the Federal Government of Nigeria and the OAU have taken the position that all international relief efforts should be coordinated through the ICRC.

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By *MN* NARA Date *10/3/05*

In the areas under the control of the Federal Government, thousands of tons of food, medicine, and other relief supplies are stockpiled in and being distributed from Lagos, Enugu, Calabar, and Agbor. Many trucks and landrovers, cargo aircraft, helicopters, barges, and coastal ships are on hand, and additional transport equipment is being acquired.

Most of the relief supplies for Biafra are being stockpiled on the off-shore islands of Fernando Po and Sao Tome for delivery by airlift. Here thousands of tons have been accumulated, and large cargo aircraft are being used for transport. The amounts of relief supplies reaching Biafra vary from about 80 to 150 tons nightly, depending upon operating conditions. There are about 260 relief personnel representing the ICRC and other relief organizations in Biafra, and additional teams are being formed. The ICRC estimates that it is feeding 850,000 in Biafra, and 600,000 in areas under Federal Government control. Additionally, Caritas and Church World Service have delivered considerable supplies of food into Biafra.

The United States Government, the largest donor, has contributed a total of \$16.5 million to this effort in cash and surplus food commodities. Of this total, \$3.6 million in cash has been provided to the International Red Cross including a \$2.5 million contribution announced by President Johnson November 8. A major part of our contribution to the ICRC is used for the chartering of aircraft for the airlift to Biafra. In addition, \$12.3 million in surplus food (dried milk, bulgur wheat, and high-protein blended food products totaling over 51,000 tons) have been donated to voluntary relief agencies. The Catholic Relief Services is receiving \$2.7 million of these foods; Church World Service is receiving \$2.6 million; and UNICEF the balance of \$6.2 million. The US Government also pays overseas transport costs of the relief supplies donated by accredited American voluntary agencies.

The private voluntary organizations of the US have made substantial donations of food and other supplies totaling about \$4.3 million on behalf of the relief effort.

RELIEF SUMMARY

| | | |
|----------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| US Government: | | \$16,527,000 |
| PL 480 food | \$12,327,000 | |
| ICRC | 3,600,000 | |
| General Relief Items | 240,000 | |
| Voluntary Agency Transport Costs | 360,000 | |
| | <u>\$16,527,000</u> | |
| US Voluntary Agencies | | 4,358,000 |
| | | <u>\$20,885,000</u> |


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By MNA Date 10/5/05

- 3 -

The feasibility and probable effectiveness of a possible referral of the problem to the UN General Assembly continues to be the subject of consultations with other governments and the UN itself. In an assessment of the prospects of success, we have been strongly influenced by the views of the Secretary General and the African states themselves that the matter should continue to be dealt with by the OAU under Article VIII of the UN Charter. It is apparent that for the moment there would not now be sufficient support among UN members for useful consideration of this question at the United Nations. However, if the Assembly were prepared to take up the matter, the US would cooperate fully in seeking UN action.

Sincerely,


Dixon Donnelley
Assistant Secretary
for Public Affairs

P/PS/PCD:LHRushfield:lae

SS #15402 12/12/68

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| By | MMNARA Date 10/5/05 |

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ACTION SLIP
WHITE HOUSE REFERRAL

CONTROL NO.

PCD
15402

LR

TO P - Mr. Coates

DATE November 27, 1968

SUBJECT Ltr to LBJ from Everett J. Jensen enclosing resolution urging all diplomatic measures be taken to help Ibo tribe of Nigerian Federal Republic.

Prepare a Read to _____
memo enclosing or containing:
_____ Draft reply for President's signature.
_____ Draft reply for signature by _____
_____ Memo for use as enclosure to reply by White House.
_____ Comment or recommendation.

Direct reply:

_____ Furnish information copy under cover of a Read to _____ memo.
_____ Comeback copy required for S/S.

XXXX Suitable acknowledgment or other appropriate handling:
_____ Furnish information copy of reply, if any, under cover of a Read to _____ memo.

_____ Refer to White House request of _____.

_____ FYI

_____ Due in S/S by _____.

NOTES

1. White House referrals must be answered within 48 hours unless otherwise noted. If deadline cannot be met, inform S/S immediately at extension given below.
2. Direct replies to White House mail must be signed at the Assistant or Acting Assistant Secretary level.
3. Unless otherwise noted, direct replies, depending upon the addressee of the incoming letter, must begin: "The President has asked me to reply" or "Mr. _____ has asked me to reply".
4. Basic correspondence should be returned when draft reply, memorandum or comment or comeback copy for the White House is requested.

Draft
2/2

REMARKS

COPIES TO:

3d
SECRETARIES
OFFICE
DEC 2 10 18 AM '68

Werner Brandt
Secretariat Staff
Ext. 5130

0367

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By NARA Date 10/5/05

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

REFERRAL

15402

To: The Secretary of State

Date: November 25, 1968

ACTION REQUESTED

- ☐ Draft reply for:
☐ President's signature.
☐ Undersigned's signature.
- ☐ Memorandum for use as enclosure to reply.
- ☐ Direct reply.
☐ Furnish information copy.
- ☒ Suitable acknowledgment or other appropriate handling.
☐ Furnish copy of reply, if any.
- ☐ For your information.
- ☐ For comment.

NOTE

Prompt action is essential.

If more than 48 hours' delay is encountered, please telephone the undersigned immediately, Code 1450.


Basic correspondence should be returned when draft reply, memorandum, or comment is requested.

REMARKS:

Description:

☒ Letter: ☐ Telegram: ☐ Other:
To: The President
From: Everett J. Jensen, General Secy, Washington Northern Idaho Council of Churches.
Date: 11/22 2005 Fifth Avenue, Seattle, Washington
Subject: Resolution urging all diplomatic measures to help supply medicines, food to Ibo tribe of Nigerian Federal Republic.


By direction of the President:


Whitney Shoemaker
Assistant to the President

(Copy to remain with correspondence)

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15
WASHINGTON NORTHERN IDAHO COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

ROOM 210, 2005 FIFTH AVENUE • SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98121 • MAIN 4-5286 • EVERETT J. JENSEN, GENERAL SECRETARY

November 22, 1968

15402

H
The Honorable Lyndon Baines Johnson,
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear President Johnson:

At the Annual Assembly of the Washington State Council of Churches held on Saturday, November 16th, here in Seattle the following resolution was passed:

WHEREAS the continued threat of famine and genocide create an intolerable situation among the Ibo tribe of the Nigerian Federal Republic,

BE IT HEREBY RESOLVED

1. That we request President Johnson to use all diplomatic measures to help provide unrestricted routes for the supplying of medicines, food and clothing to the needy, and
2. That we urge the United Nations to continue to use its efforts to work for a cessation of hostilities among the combatants.

Mr. President we know of your great interest in peace and hope that you will be able to use your efforts to do something about the situation in the Ibo section of the Nigerian Federal Republic. On the other hand, if you think there is anything we can do to create public interest to support your particular role please let us know.

Personal greetings and appreciation for all the fine things that you have done. It has been good for us to be able to look to you for your leadership.

Sincerely,


Everett J. Jensen
Everett J. Jensen,
General Secretary

EJJ/mc

0369

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

WASHINGTON STATE
COUNCIL OF CHURCHES
2005 FIFTH AVENUE - ROOM 210
SEATTLE, WASHINGTON 98121



The Honorable Lyndon Baines Johnson
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D. C.

1968 NOV 27 PM 12 00

EXECUTIVE SECRET
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Authority VND 959503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ACTION SLIP
WHITE HOUSE REFERRAL

CONTROL NO.

PCD -11/27

15402

TO P - Mr. Costes

DATE November 27, 1968

SUBJECT Ltr to LBJ from Everett J. Jensen enclosing resolution urging all diplomatic measures be taken to help Ibo tribe of Nigerian Federal Republic.

Prepare a Read to _____
memo enclosing or containing:
Draft reply for President's
signature.
Draft reply for signature by
_____.
Memo for use as enclosure to reply
by White House.
Comment or recommendation.

Direct reply:

Furnish information copy under
cover of a Read to _____
memo.
Comeback copy required for S/S.

Suitable acknowledgment or other
XXXX appropriate handling:
Furnish information copy of
reply, if any, under cover of
a Read to _____ memo.

Refer to White House request of
_____.

FYI

Due in S/S by _____.

NOTES

1. White House referrals must be answered within 48 hours unless otherwise noted. If deadline cannot be met, inform S/S immediately at extension given below.
2. Direct replies to White House mail must be signed at the Assistant or Acting Assistant Secretary level.
3. Unless otherwise noted, direct replies, depending upon the addressee of the incoming letter, must begin: "The President has asked me to reply" or "Mr. _____ has asked me to reply".
4. Basic correspondence should be returned when draft reply, memorandum or comment or comeback copy for the White House is requested.

REMARKS

COPIES TO:

Werner Brandt
Secretariat Staff
Ext. 5130

0371

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Authority VND 954503
By MW NARA Date 10/5/05



Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria
NR Pol 27-9 Biafra - Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 358

PAGE 01 ADDIS 07151 301700Z

42:

ACTION: SS: 70

INFO: CCO: 00, CIAE: 00, DODE: 00, NSCE: 00, SSO: 00, USIE: 00, 1070 W
004660

PI R: 301600Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7990
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON

S: E: C: R: E: T ADDIS ABABA 7151

LIMDIS:

REF: ADDIS 7142

1. FONMINI KETEMA TOLD AMBASSADOR THIS AFTERNOON HIM PLANNED TAKE NO FURTHER ACTION FOR TIME BEING ON POLITICAL ASPECTS NIGERIAN QUESTION. WOULD CONCENTRATE ON HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS. HIM'S PRESENT THINKING IS IN DIRECTION GENERAL APPEAL TO BOTH SIDES TO AGREE ON PROCEDURE FOR RELIEF SUPPLIES. HIM'S PROPOSAL MIGHT BE ALONG LINES SUGGESTION USE OBLIAGO AIR STRIP AS PRESENTED BY CONGR-ELECT LOWENSTEIN (PARA 6A REFTEL).

2. KETEMA WILL TALK WITH HIM AND PRIMINI TOMORROW. WILL THEN ADVISE AMBASSADOR MORE SPECIFICALLY OF IEG INTENTIONS.

3. AMBASSADOR SAID STAFF WORK BEING DONE IN WASHINGTON AND IN LAGOS. IN CONJUNCTION WITH BRITISH, AND THAT WE WOULD PASS ON TO HIM FOR HIS USE WITHOUT ATTRIBUTION ANY FEASIBLE PROPOSALS WHICH MIGHT EMERGE. AMBASSADOR EMPHASIZED THAT PARTICIPATION CONGR-ELECT LOWENSTEIN OR USG IN FURNISHING PROPOSALS MUST BE CLOSELY HELD BY RESPONSIBLE OFFICIALS CONCERNED ON BOTH SIDES. KETEMA SAID HE UNDERSTOOD AND FULLY AGREED. IEG WOULD BE GLAD TO HAVE ON THIS BASIS ANY PROPOSALS WE THOUGHT FEASIBLE.

4. AS INCIDENTAL INTELLIGENCE, KETEMA TOLD AMBASSADOR LOWENSTEIN HAD NOT MENTIONED OGUTA ALTERNATIVE (REFTEL PARA 6B) IN CONVERSATION WITH HIM. WE ASSUME THIS OVERLOOKED IN RUSH OF MEETING. ALTHOUGH THIS LOOKS LIKE NON-STARTER (LAGOS 15676)

SECRET
28

*Addis Ababa 7151
12/30/68*

2

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 ADDIS 07151 301700Z

IEG NOW AWARE REVISED OJUKWU ATTITUDEAS REPORTED BY LOWENSTEIN.

HALLI

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L I M D I S
I N C O M I N G

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POST ADDIS ABABA

(Time Received)

SERIAL 7151

1968 DEC 30 PM 2 26

534

DISTRIBUTION

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Summary ✓
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ARA 9
EA 11
EUR 10 10
NEA 8

ACDA 5
AID/EXSEC 3 ✓
AA/AFR2 ✓
AA/VN 2
AA/EA 3
AA/NEA 2

Functional

Principals

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By MW NARA Date 10/5/05



Pal 27 Bujumbura-Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE: 01 DATES: 05699 300823Z

11

ACTION: AF 16

INFO: EUR 15, IO 13, SAH 02, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00,

GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12,

RSR 01, /146, W

002505

RI 300700Z DEC 68

FM AMEMBASSY DARES SALAAM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 546#

INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY LAGOS

AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUSAKA

AMEMBASSY PARIS

UNCLAS DARES SALAAM 5699

SUBJ: NIGERIAN PEACE EFFORTS

REF: ABIDJAN 5363

Pal 27 Bujumbura-Nigeria
TANZANIAN AMBASSADOR TO ETHIOPIA, JOHN MALECELA, ARRIVED
IN DARE DEC 27 FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH PRESIDENT NYERERE.
PRESS REPORTS OF HIS ARRIVAL STATED THAT PRIOR TO HIS
DEPARTURE FROM ADDIS HE HAD BEEN CALLED IN TO SEE EMERSON
TO DISCUSS NIGERIAN SITUATION.
PICKERING

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By: MVA Date: 10/5/05



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED 695

PAGE 01 LAGOS 15689 302051Z

91

ACTION: AF 16

INFO: EUR 15, IO 13, NEA 13, SA 01, MC 01, ACDA 16, SAH 02, AID 28, SCSE 00,

SCA 01, E 15, DOT 12, SR 01, ORM 03, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02,

INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, PI 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, NSA 02, RSR 01, 193 W
----- 006200

R 301520Z DEC 68:
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4207
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LONGON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION BERLIN
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NY
USIA WASHDC
RUDSLB/AMCONSUL IBADAN 2341
AMCONSUL KADUNA

UNCLAS LAGOS 15689

USIA FOR IBS:


SUBJECT: NIGERIAN PRESS ROUNDUP DECEMBER 29 AND 30

1. LAST ROUNDUP DECEMBER 24, 1968.

2. ALL PAPERS WHICH HAVE SUNDAY EDITIONS PLUS MONDAY PILOT
REPORT ON QTE ANTI-IMPERIALIST QUOTE DEMONSTRATION DEC 28
AGAINST US, FRENCH, WEST GERMAN EMBASSIES, UK HICOM AND
CATHOLIC SECRETARIAT (LAGOS 15658 NOTAL) NEWSPAPERS
ACCOUNTS VARY IN CROWD ESTIMATES FROM 1,000 TO 10,000

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43

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 LAGOS 15689 302051Z

(EMBASSY ESTIMATE, POSSIBLY 200 INCLUDING 100 CHILDREN) AND REPORT ATTEMPTED PRESENTATION AT EACH PLACE OF SMALL CASKETS QTEI DEPICTING DEATH OF IMPERIALIST CONSPIRACIES IN NIGERIA UNQTE. NEWS ACCOUNTS ALSO ATTRIBUTE DEMONSTRATION VARIOUSLY TO NIGERIAN YOUTH SOLIDARITY COUNCIL OR NIGERIAN AFRO-ASIAN SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION, LED BY ESKOR TOYO, SPECIFIC CHARGE AGAINST US AT RALLY WAS REFUSING TO SELL ARMS TO FMG AND THEREBY AIDING DISINTEGRATION OF NIGERIAN FEDERATION. GENERAL CHARGE AGAINST NATO POWERS WAS OBSTRUCTING FMG EFFORTS TO END WAR BY DIPLOMATIC PRESSURES WHICH QTEI AMOUNTED TO STABBING FRIENDS IN THE BACK UNQTE.

2. SMALL ARTICLE IN NEW NIGERIAN DEC 27 REPORTED THAT US PLANNING TO ASSIGN SIX GLOBEMASTER AIRPLANES TO RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS TO AID IN TRANSPORT OF RELIEF SUPPLIES INTO BIAFRA. NEWS BROUGHT LONG LETTER, PRINTED IN SUNDAY TIME, FROM FIVE UNIVERSITY OF IBADAN PROFESSORS AND ONE UNIVERSITY OF LAGOS PROFESSOR. FULL TEXT LAGOS 15688 NOTALII WHICH STATES THAT SUPPLY OF THESE PLANES QTEI EYEOPENER TO ANY AGNOSTICS LEFT IN THIS COUNTRY WHO STILL CREDIT WESTERN POWERS WITH SOME GOOD INTENTIONS IN AFRICA... MEASURE ONLY UNDERLINES LONG POLICY OF SECRET AGGRESSION AGAINST NIGERIA UNQTE. LETTER CLAIMS US QTEI DISENCHANGED UNQTEI WITH BRITISH SELF-PROCLAIMED INFLUENCE IN NIGERIA AND HAS QTEI PICKED UP GAUNTLET TO PRESERVE WHAT IT CONCEIVES TO BE WESTERN INTEREST UNQTEI IN NIGERIA AND TRY TO CONTAIN SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN NIGERIA. ASKS IF US REFUSED TO SELL ARMS TO FMG TO KEEP ARMS RACE OUT OF AFRICA, WHY ARE GLOBEMASTERS BEING GIVEN TO CHURCH GROUPS TO USE FOR QTEI ARMS SUPPLIES UNQTEI TO REBELS. ACCUSES US OF BUYING ARMS FOR REBELS THROUGH CIA, ENCOURAGING FRENCH TO AID BIAFRA AND BACKING PORTUGAL IN PROVIDING LOGISTICAL SUPPORT TO REBELS. LETTER ALSO ACCUSES QTEI SOME OF PRESENT MILITARY RULLERS UNQTEI OF BEHAVING AS IF THEY WELCOME PROLONGATION OF WAR TO KEEP THEMSELVES IN POWER AND DERIVE PERSONAL FINANCIAL BENEFITS. SAYS THAT GENERAL GOWON AND ARMY CAN DO MORE TO DISCIPLINE MILITARY QTEI NO MATTER HOW HIGHLY PLACED UNQTEI. MONDAY POST FRONT-PAGE EDITORIAL TITLED QTEI HOSTILE ACT UNQTEI WHICH ATTACKS US IN STRONGEST TERMS FOR DECISION TO SUPPLY GLOBEMASTERS TO ICRC AND CHURCH ORGANIZATIONS. (FULL TEXT LAGOS 15675 NOTALII. CALLS DECISION QTEI CALCULATED ATTEMPT UNQTEI BY US TO FRUSTRATE FMG EFFORTS TO PUT DOWN

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By MVA Date 10/5/05



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PAGE 03 LAGOS 15689 302051Z


REBELLION. CHARGES THAT BEFORE BEGINNING REBELLION OJUKWU ASSURED BY US THAT NO NATO COUNTRY WOULD SELL ARMS TO FMG. STATES THAT OJUKWU HAD IN HIS POSSESSION QTE NOTORIOUS B26 AMONG OTHER WEAPONS AND WE KNOW THAT WHEREVER GOES B26 THERE GOES CIA UNQTE. CLAIMS THAT US QTE WORKS THROUGH UNQTE CIA, ICRC, CHURCH ORGANIZATIONS, CARITAS AND PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS. POINTS TO OJUKWU REFUSAL TO ACCEPT LAND CORRIDOR FOR RELIEF SUPPLIES AND CHARGES THAT RELIEF SUPPLIES BEING USED TO FEED REBEL SOLDIERS. ENDS WITH CALL TO FMG TO QTE DRAW LOGICAL CONCLUSION FROM LATEST ACTION OF USG AND REACT IN WAY PROPER AND BEFITTING INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN STATES WHICH NIGERIA IS BECAUSE IT HAS SUPREME OBLIGATION OF PRESERVING LIVES OF 56 MILLION PEOPLE WHO LIVE IN THIS COUNTRY, WHICH NO FOREIGN POWER, NOT EVEN USA, HAS RIGHT TO PUT IN JEOPARDY UNQTE.

3. SUNDAY TIMES FEATURED QTE EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEW WITH TOP FMG OFFICIAL UNQTE WHO SAID NIGERIA WOULD ATTEND COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS CONFERENCE IN LONDON, JANUARY 7, QTE ONLY ON ASSURANCE FROM BRITISH GOVERNMENT THAT IT WILL NOT BE MOLESTED IN ANY WAY BY PRO-REBEL DEMONSTRATORS UNQTE. ARTICLE STATES THAT FMG DELEGATION WILL HAVE SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS TO WITHDRAW FROM CONFERENCE ANYTIME DEMONSTRATIONS NOT CONTROLLED BY HMG, AND WILL NOT ALLOW OFFICIAL DISCUSSION OF NIGERIAN CRISIS IN CONFERENCE. MONDAY OBSERVER CARRIES REPORT FROM QTE FMG SPOKESMAN IN LAGOS UNQTE THAT DECISION ABOUT WALKING OUT OF CONFERENCE IF ATTEMPT MADE TO INTRODUCE FORMAL DISCUSSION OF NIGERIAN CRISIS INTO CONFERENCE, IS QTE TENTATIVE UNQTE AND QTE OFFICIAL THINKING ON SUBJECT NOT YET REACHED CONCLUSIVE STATE UNQTE. OBSERVER EDITORIAL EXPRESSES HOPE THAT COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE WILL ACCEPT ALGIERS RESOLUTION AND NOT DISCUSS NIGERIAN CRISIS. STATES THERE ARE MANY OTHER PROBLEMS SUCH AS RHODESIA, SOUTH WEST AFRICA AND ARMS SUPPLY TO SOUTH AFRICA WHICH ARE MORE IMPORTANT TO DISCUSS.

4. MONDAY TIMES CARRIES FIRST OF TWO PART EDITORIAL QTE LET US TAKE STOCK UNQTE IN ORDER TO SPEAK OUT FRANKLY ON PRESSING MATTERS OF MOMENT THAT ARE AGITATING MINDS OF ORDINARY PEOPLE OF THIS GREAT COUNTRY UNQTE. SAYS THAT MANY NIGERIANS NOT AS FULLY INVOLVED AS THEY SHOULD BE IN THE WAR AND BEHAVE AS IF WAR IS REMOTE. CALLS ON SUPREME

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
PAGE 04 LAGOS 15689 302051Z

MILITARY COUNCIL TO CONSIDER URGENTLY GENERAL MOBILIZATION OF ALL ABLE-BODIED NIGERIANS FOR CONSCRIPTION INTO ARMY. STATES THAT WAR MUST BE ENDED IN 1969 AND OJUKWU WILL NEVER BE PERSUADED TO RENOUNCE SECESSION. THEREFORE ALL PERSONAL SACRIFICES MUST BE MADE TO FIGHT AND WIN WAR. CALLS ON FMG TO QTE IDENTIFY OUR ALLIES AND IGNORE BLACKMAIL UNQTE OF FRIENDS OF OJUKWU. SAYS THAT NIGERIAN TRIED TO HAVING THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS DISCUSSED IN FOREIGN PARLIAMENTS AND ALSO OF HAVING THE IMPRESSION THAT OPINIONS OF BRITAIN AND US MATTER SO MUCH IN WAY NIGERIA CONDUCTS THE WAR. CALLS FOR TIGHTENING INTERNAL SECURITY AND WATCHING ACTIVITIES OF QTE PROFESSIONAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS LIKE ICRC, CARITAS AND VISITORS WHO ENTER NIGERIA PRETENDING TO BE FRIENDS ONLY TO RETURN TO THEIR COUNTRIES AND GIVE VALUABLE INFORMATION ABOUT OUR STRENGTH TO OJUKWU'S AGENTS IN EUROPE UNQTE. LASTLY, IT CALLS ON SUPREME MILITARY COUNCIL TO QTE CHECK FLARING EXCESSES OF SOME MEMBERS OF ARMED FORCES UNQTE AND COMMENDS SECTIONS OF LETTER FROM SIX UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS (PARA 2 ABOVE) CHARGING THAT SOME MILITARY BEHAVING AS IF WAR'S PROLONGATION WELCOME FOR THEIR OWN PERSONAL REASONS AND STAING THAT MORE CAN BE DONE TO DISCIPLINE THE MILITARY.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 122

PAGE 01 LAGOS 15674 301233Z

47
ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, ACDA 16, SA 01, SAH 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02,
INR 07, LI 03, NSC 10, PI 04, RSC 01, SPI 02, SS 20, USIA 12, NSA 02, SRI 01,
ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 01, RSR 01, 140 W 003455

R 301105Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4196

CONFIDENTIAL LAGOS 15674

FOLLOWING MESSAGE SENT FROM AMCONSUL KADUNA ACTION LAGOS
ON DEC 27, 1968 H/W REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO

QUOTE KADUNA 1769

SUBJECT: AN ASSESSMENT OF CURRENT MOOD IN THE NORTH

1. THERE IS GROWING DISMAY IN NORTHERN NIGERIA OVER INDICATIONS U.S. HAS BEGUN TO TAKE MORE ACTIVE INTEREST IN CIVIL WAR AND CONSIDERABLY HEIGHTENED SUSPICION OF OUR MOTIVES. ARTICLE BY NEW NIGERIAN EDITOR CIROMA (KADUNA 1765) CHARGING U.S. - BRITISH-FRENCH CONSPIRACY STRUCK RESPONSIVE CHORD AS TYPIFYING THE FEARS OF MANY THOUGHTFUL NORTHERNERS.

2. SUSPICIONS HEIGHTENED BY CONSIDERABLE FRUSTRATION AMONG NORTHERNERS NOW SEEING LITTLE HOPE FOR EARLY END TO CONFLICT. THERE IS NO TENDENCY TO BLAME FMG OR MILITARY FOR PRESENT IMPASSE. INSTEAD ACRIMONY DIRECTED TOWARD WEST WHERE PUBLIC SYMPATHY SEEMS HEAVILY DIRECTED TO REBELS. CONTINUED DISAPPOINTMENT AT OUR INITIAL DECISION NOT TO ASSIST FMG WITH ARMS COUPLED WITH MAIVE CONVICTION THAT U.S. OMNIPOTENCE COULD END CIVIL WAR IF WE WISHED.

3. IN THIS CONTEXT, NY TIMES AND BALTSUN REPORTS OF MASSIVE RELIEF PROGRAM PLANNED FOR BIAFRA FOLLOWING ABORTIVE

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 LAGOS 15674 301233Z

ATTEMPTS SPONSOR CEASE-FIRE FOLLOWING HOLIDAY TRUCE INTERPRETED HERE SIMPLY AS "AID AND COMFORT FOR ENEMY." IF OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCED, THESE PLANS WOULD SHIFT BRUNT OF BLAME FOR PROLONGING WAR, THUS FAR LARGELY AVOIDED, WHOLLY TO U.S. WIDESPREAD EXISTING SUSPICION THAT U.S. REAL MOTIVE IS TO PROLONG WAR AND PRESERVE BIAFRA WILL BE SEEN AS CONFIRMED.

4. ESPECIALLY DISASTROUS FOR NORTHERN PUBLIC OPINION WOULD BE REPORTEDLY PLANNED USE OF U.S. PLANES, ESPECIALLY PURCHASE MILITARY AIRCRAFT AND U.S. READINESS PROVIDE MILITARY AIRCRAFT TO AID REBEL POPULACE UNLIKELY TO BE MISSED.


5. ONLY CONTEXT IN WHICH SUCH ASSISTANCE PROGRAM MAY POSSIBLY WIN PARTIAL ACCEPTANCE IN NORTH WOULD BE ONE IN WHICH ASSISTANCE CLEARLY AND UNAMBIGUOUSLY DIRECTED TO WAR VICTIMS ON BOTH SIDES. THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE CLARIFIED IN EVERY STEP INCLUDING ESPECIALLY ARRANGING LANDING SITES IN FMO-HELD TERRITORY AS WELL AS IN BIAFRA. ESSENTIAL FURTHER THAT WHATEVER GUARANTEES OBTAINED THAT OPERATING AGENCIES EXCLUDING STRATEGIC MATERIALS BE WIDELY PUBLICIZED.

6. SHOULD BE EMPHASIZED, HOWEVER, THAT EVEN IF ALL ABOVE CONDITIONS MET, REACTION IN NORTH CAN BE EXPECTED TO BE EXTREMELY NEGATIVE.

GP-3
STOKES. UNQUOTE GP-3. MATHEWS

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POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA
XR POL 27-9 BIAFRA - NIGERIA 293150

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Classification

A
28 DEC 68 21 54
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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS PRIORITY

Info:

INFO: Amembassy LAGOS PRIORITY
Amembassy LONDON PRIORITY

KKK
STATE

REF: Paris 25735

SUBJECT: NIGERIA/BIAFRA

1. Despite their skittish approach to subject, it remains true French arms supply to rebel Biafra leaves them probably most influential outsider in tragic and complex Nigerian situation. On other hand, because their unique role in sustaining rebellion and because prolonged stalemate encourages them to believe their gamble will be successful, French likely continue resist arguments for any change their policy. Indeed, we see risk-gx--given recent signs war-weariness and civil unrest on Federal side--that Quai might read full-fledged US demarche on subject as indicating panic. Above all we wish avoid giving them any indication that we contemplate basic change of policy that might encourage French strengthen present policies and send wrong signals to Biafrans. Finally we do not wish find ourselves engaged in negotiating a blueprint for a Nigerian settlement with France. We therefore judge best approach to Debre is simply to draw him out in low-key manner and try as much as possible to address broad concepts and

Drafted by:

NTF:RMorris/AF:Palmer:pk 12/28/68

Tel. Ext.
2619

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

~~XXXXXX~~ The Secretary

Clearances:

NTF: R.P. Smith

M - Mr. Rostow

EUR/FBX - Mr. Tanguy

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Classification

FORM DS-322
8-65

0382

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Authority: VND 954543
By: MWA Date: 10/5/05

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Origin

ACTION:

Info:

Page 2 to Amembassy PARIS

2. In this tone you should take following line in response to Fonmin's presentation:

A. Clear to us that a civilian disaster of major proportions is in the making in Nigeria/Biafra. The longer the war lasts, the more people--most of them Biafrans--will die. We most interested French view of specific magnitude starvation problem inside Biafra.

B. On humanitarian problem, do French have specific thoughts on most promising channel and methods to meet pressing relief needs? Specifically, luncheon conversation with de Gaulle and subsequent talks with Quai have broached idea internationally-policed land corridor or equivalent to which we attach critical importance. What are latest French views on this and problem of Biafran acceptance daylight flights?

C. We well aware French position on Biafra self-determination within confederal framework. They equally aware of our public support

f0kxnnn0k1a1k1nnn0xam0n0x0ak1k1nn0w1k1k1n0xfam0w0k1k10f0nn1f10n0N1g

for prompt end of fighting and negotiations among parties within framework

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext. _____

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Clearances:

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FORM 8-65 DS-322

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Authority VND 959503

By MN NARA Date 10/3/05

Page 3 of telegram to Amembassy PARIS

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of single Nigeria with internal arrangements to be agreed among Nigerians themselves. We concerned that tragic continuation of struggle contrary to interests both France and U.S. French believe FMG, under present conditions unable to win militarily. But combination continued Soviet support for FMG and mounting civilian deaths in Biafra make even more implausible rebel military victory as French themselves may recognize.

D. Time thus running out for everyone. As frustration and tribal strains build in FMG, latter will turn increasingly to Soviets who thereby cast in role of saviors. For example, it common knowledge that, at propitious moment, Moscow could provide mercenary pilots to interdict Biafran arms supplies. On Biafran side, war can be continued only at hideous cost in starvation and disease. All too likely outcome is gruesome tragedy with Russians the only gainers.

E. We wonder extent to which French agree with this perspective. What is their view of the chances for prompt end of fighting and negotiations among parties? Specifically, what do they see as the most promising channel to pursue: the OAU, third party, etc?

END

RUSK

FORM DS-322A
8-63
CONTINUATION SHEET

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification

0384

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND959543
By MM NARA Date 10/5/05

| DEPT. DISTRIBUTION | | | | DEPARTMENT OF STATE | |
|------------------------------|--------|-------|----------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------|
| ORIGIN/ACTION AF-5 | | | | AIRGRAM | |
| | | | | <i>Pol 27 Biafra-Nigeria</i> | |
| RS/R | REP | AF | ARA | Original to be Filed in _____ | Decentralized Files. |
| EUR | FE | NEA | CU | FILE DESIGNATION | |
| INR | EL | P | IO | CONFIDENTIAL | |
| 3 | FBO | AID | | RECEIVED A-551 NOV 30 11 03 AM 1968 | |
| MC | USAN | ADA | | <i>File 1-3-69</i> | |
| 1 | 4 | 17 | | <i>1-3-69</i> | |
| AGR | COM | FRB | INT | DATE: December 27, 1968 | |
| LAB | TAR | TR | XMB | 1-3-69 | |
| AIR | ARMY | NAVY | OSD | FROM : Amembassy ABIDJAN | |
| 5 | 3 | 5 | 3 | SUBJECT : Exchange of Notes between British and Ivorians | |
| USIA | NSA | CIA | DOT | on Airport Inspection | |
| 10 | 3 | 20 | 10 | REF : Abidjan 4932, 5343 <i>af</i> | |
| SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION | | | | [On November 15 Ivorian Foreign Minister Arsène Assouan USHER, speaking to the press in London (and as reported in Abidjan's semi-official <u>Fraternité-Matin</u>), "categorically denied that his country had authorized the transit of arms destined to Biafra, and invited all countries which have Ambassadors in Ivory Coast to charge them with inspecting day and night Ivorian ports and airports in order to verify this affirmation." (See Abidjan 4932.) | |
| POST ROUTING | | | | Her Majesty's Government took Usher up on this offer, with the following results (reported Abidjan 5343) -- we quote for the record (in unofficial English translation) the text of the exchange of notes: | |
| TO: | Action | Info. | Initials | British Embassy to Foreign Ministry, November 27, 1968 | |
| AMB/PO | | | | "(The Embassy) . . . has the honor to draw the attention of the Ivorian Government to the following declaration which, according to 'Fraternité-Matin' of November 15-16/sic; it was really Nov. 16-17/, was made to the British press by H. E. the Minister of Foreign Affairs during his visit to London: [Text as quoted above]" | |
| DCM | | | | "Her Majesty's Government has charged the Embassy with informing itself as to the precise nature of this offer and as to the manner in which it may be applied to its representatives in Abidjan. The Government would like to know, for example, if this offer extends to all ports and air fields of Ivory Coast and if a continuous | |
| POL | | | | Group 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals-not automatically declassified | |
| ECON | | | | FORM 10-64 DS-323 | |
| CONS | | | | CONFIDENTIAL | |
| ADM | | | | For Department Use Only | |
| AID | | | | In Out | |
| USIS | | | | Drafting Date: 12/27/68 | |
| Action Taken: | | | | Contents and Classification Approved by: DCM: LG Dorros | |
| Date: | | | | Clearances: | |
| Initials: | | | | Drafted by: POL: HCMacDougal:jaw | |
| Drafted by: | | | | Phone No.: | |
| POL: HCMacDougal:jaw | | | | 12/27/68 | |

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Authority: NND 9503
By: MMARA Date: 10/5/05

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Abidjan A-551
Page 2

inspection might be permitted."

Foreign Ministry to British Embassy, December 19, 1968

"The declaration attributed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs by a journalist of Fraternité-Matin and relating to a supposed offer of inspection of Ivorian ports and airports by the foreign Ambassadors in Ivory Coast does not correspond to the words really spoken by His Excellency Arsène Usher Assouan during his recent press conference in London.

"In the course of his interview with the journalists the Minister, to a question posed by one of them, replied that there existed in Ivory Coast a total freedom of circulation for all and in particular for foreign diplomats. He specified that this freedom of circulation was certainly the largest which can exist in the world. He concluded by declaring that the Ambassadors accredited in Ivory Coast circulate freely to the port, to the airport, and can even come to stroll (se promener) up to his personal residence.

"This being clarified, it is evident that there can be no question of interpreting these words as recognizing a right of inspection to foreign diplomats, a situation which would obviously be incompatible with the sovereignty of the Ivorian State.

"If Ivory Coast does not have the means to deliver arms to Biafra, the Minister of Foreign Affairs has nevertheless stressed that it (Ivory Coast) appreciated the gesture of those who could furnish them to that country, in order to aid it to resist the massacre of its inhabitants, facilitated by the massive deliveries of arms to the Government, and to prevent a victory of communism in this region of Africa."

COMMENT: Usher's remarks thus appear to have been rhetorical. Moreover, if he was as badly misquoted as the Ministry says, the correspondent of Fraternité-Matin must be in rather hot water. As for Usher's "revised" declaration about freedom to circulate, it is perhaps worth noting that like many other countries Ivory Coast requires diplomats to notify the Foreign Ministry before undertaking official travel in the interior, and requires special access cards to enter the port and non-public areas of Abidjan airport. Port access cards are issued quite freely to diplomats, but airport cards are more closely restricted.

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| Authority | VND959503 |
| By | MNARA Date 10/5/05 |

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Abidjan A-551
Page 3

It may be further noted that no public correction of the Usher interview has been issued -- so that to the general public (and to us, were it not for the courtesy of our British colleagues) the generous offer would appear to stand.

Finally, one wonders how the Foreign Ministry would respond if HMG were to request clarification of the last paragraph of its Note of December 19; just whose gesture is it that Ivory Coast appreciates?

MORGAN

[Handwritten signature]

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| DECLASSIFIED | |
| Authority | VND954503 |
| By | MN |
| DATE | 10/5/05 |

(21)



Department of State

POL 27 Biafra Nigeria

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED 608

PAGE 01 ROME 10165 241857Z

89-S

ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, RSR 01, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,
NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, ABCE 00, SAH 02,

AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, /144 W

114004

R 240910Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9271
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON

UNCLAS ROME 10165

SUBJ: PAPAL STATEMENT ON NIGERIAN TRUCE

REF: STATE 290923

1. DURING CHRISTMAS TALK TO COLLEGE OF CARDINALS YESTERDAY MORNING, DECEMBER 23, POPE PAUL SUPPORTED HIM'S REQUEST FOR NIGERIAN TRUCE.

2. QTE. IN THESE DAYS WE HAVE REPEATED TO THOSE RESPONSIBLE ON BOTH SIDES OUR PLEA THAT THEY DO ALL IN THEIR POWER TO RENEW PEACE NEGOTIATIONS, WITHOUT BEING DISCOURAGED BY FAILURE THUS FAR, BUT USING GOOD WILL, IMAGINATION AND HEART. AND WE ALSO SUGGESTED, IN UNEXPECTED BUT HAPPY COINCIDENCE WITH EMPEROR OF ETHIOPIA, WHICH HAS BEEN SUPPORTED BY GOI, THAT THIS BEGIN WITH A GESTURE WHICH COULD HAVE GREAT IMPORTANCE, EVEN FOR ITS SYMBOLIC VALUE, THAT IS AN AGREEMENT OVER THE HOLY DAYS OF CHRISTMAS FESTIVAL TO INDULGE NOT IN ACTS OF WAR BUT IN PRAYER AND LONGING FOR PEACE. UNQTE.
ACKLEY

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND959503
By MVA Date 10/5/05



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 046

PAGE 01 NIAMEY 03096 251112Z

22
ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10,

P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 02, IO 13, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03

PC 04, SCS 04, SCA 01, RSR 01, /155 W

116712

R 241300Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2556
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA 158
AMEMBASSY PARIS

CONFIDENTIAL NIAMEY 3096

SUBJECT NIGERIA WAR

1. IN DISCUSSION OF CURRENT SITUATION IN NIGERIA ON DECEMBER 28, 1968, PRESIDENT DIORI PRAISED US POLICY AND RELIEF EFFORTS TO WAR VICTIMS. NOTED MOST FAVORABLY PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S DECEMBER 21 STATEMENT.
 2. DIORI SAID HE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT A PEACE SETTLEMENT WAS NEAR. EVEN IF THE CEASE FIRE WAS PROLONGED, IN HIS OPINION THERE WERE NO NEW ELEMENTS IN CHEMISTRY OF SITUATION. BOTH SIDES STILL HOLD FAST TO THEIR POSITIONS ON FUTURE STATUS BIAFRA AND NO CHANGES IN ATTITUDE OF FRANCE AND AFRICAN STATES WHO RECOGNIZED BIAFRA TO CAUSE BIAFRA ALTER POSITION.
 3. DIORI PLANS ISSUE STATEMENT SOON SUPPORTING CEASE FIRE.
 4. ALTHOUGH HE HAD NO CONFIRMATION YET FROM EMPEROR, DIORI SAID MEETING OF OAU CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE ON NIGERIA SUPPOSED BE HELD MONROVIA IN JANUARY LOOK AT WHAT INITIATIVES, IF ANY, OAU COULD TAKE AT THIS POINT.
- GP-3 ADAMS

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Authority VND 959503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

(21)

POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET *H2*
Classification

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21 DEC 68 01 38 Z

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy ROME PRIORITY

Info

INFO: Amembassy ADDIS ABABA
Amembassy LAGOS
Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy PARIS

STATE _____

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: Nigeria-Peace Initiatives

REF: A) Addis Ababa 7847
B) London 15225

1. Embassy requested convey following to appropriate Vatican official.
2. Emperor today addressed appeal (reported Ref A) to both sides in Nigerian conflict for one-week truce starting Dec. 23. Subsequent news reports indicate Gowon has issued orders for two-day unilateral cease fire Dec. 24-25.
3. We believe strong support by Pope for Emperor's appeal, as suggested by British to Vatican (ref B) would have beneficial effect, accompanying, as it would, intended

5

Drafted by: AF/W:GBSherry:crj 12/20/68 Tel. Ext. 5462 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: U - Nicholas DeB. Katzenbach
Clearances: AF - J. Palmer 2nd (draft) S/S-Mr. Walker
EUR/AIS - C.K. Johnson (substance)

SECRET

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 954503
By: MWA Date: 10/5/05

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET - Page 2
Classification

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Origin ~~XXXXXX~~

Info:

high level US statement of support. We believe it would also be helpful if Pope's statement could express hope that Christmas truce would contribute to prospects for peace and relief of suffering.

4. We will forward proposed US statement when cleared but meanwhile desire you make approach without awaiting it.

GP-1

END.

RUSK

Drafted by:

Tel. Ext.:

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Clearances:

SECRET

Classification

FORM
8-65 DS-322

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND954543
By MNA Date 10/5/05

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET - LIMDIS
Classification

POL 27 Biafra Nigeria
290288

POL 27-9 Biafra Nigeria
20 DEC 68 16 55z

Origin ACTION: Amembassy, ROME
Info: INFO: Amembassy, ADDIS ABABA
Amembassy, LAGOS
Amembassy, LONDON
Amembassy, PARIS
US Mission GENEVA
US Mission USUN NY

STATE

1. Italian Ambassador Ortona, on instructions from ForMin Nenni, called on AsstSec Palmer December 18 to discuss Nigerian situation and inform him of Italy's ~~interest in an~~ ^{intention to make} appeal to two sides for end of year truce. Ortona also emphasized his government's willingness to associate in any joint venture other governments might be considering to alleviate suffering and end conflict. In addition to humanitarian grounds, Ortona mentioned growing tendency in Italy to equate Lagos Government with far right and Biafra with democratic left as reason for GOI's interest in promoting early settlement.
2. Palmer replied that we share Italy's preoccupation with situation in Nigeria and present analysis suggests that it will undoubtedly worsen. He mentioned US efforts to secure both land corridor approaches and daylight flights to alleviate situation and Biafran unwillingness to cooperate. He also alluded to more recent

Drafted by: EUR/AIS:RWTaylor, Jr. 12/19/68
Clearances: x 4537
Tel. Ext.:
Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: AF - Joseph Palmer 2nd

EUR/AIS - Mr. Stabler

AF/W - Mr. Melbourne

SECRET - LIMDIS
Classification

FORM DS-322
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Authority: VND 954503
By: MNA Date: 10/5/05

Page 2 of telegram to ~~SECRETXXXTIMDIS~~ AMEMBASSY, ROME

~~SECRET - LIMDIS~~
Classification

recent UK efforts in Lagos and in ~~XXXX~~ Addis to secure a possible truce. These efforts too were being impeded by negative positions being taken by both sides. Nevertheless possibility remains Emperor may make effort.

3. In response to Ortona's query whether the GOI might usefully intervene with the Emperor, Palmer responded affirmatively, stressing the importance we attach to the truce proposal ~~origin~~ originating with the Africans with ensuing encouragement and support by ourselves and others. While it would be helpful to encourage the Emperor's initiative in calling for a truce, it was important that we not convey impression we ganging up on him.

4. Palmer also agreed with Ortona's suggestion that an Italian approach to the French might be useful and suggested approach might be far better received if it focused on humanitarian grounds rather than a suspension of arm supplies.

5. Ortona said he would advise his government to discuss the matter in both Addis and Paris.

END

RUSK

FORM DS-322A
8-63
CONTINUATION SHEET

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Classification

0393

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND959543
By MWA Date 10/5/05

21



POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 222

PAGE 01 ROME 10057 171847Z

45
ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, SR 01, SAH 02, SCS 04, SCA 01, CIAE 00, DODE 00, EPM 04,

H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, NSA 02,

ACDA 16, MC 01, HEW 07, NIC 01, ORM 03, RSR 01, /148 W

075576

R 171817Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9211
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION USUN

C O N F I D E N T I A L ROME 10057

SUBJECT: BIAFRA.

1. ACCORDING ITALIAN PRESS SERVICE ANSA, UNDEL CHIEF VINCI DECEMBER 10 CALLED ON UNSYG TO "CONFIRM" GOI'S BELIEF THAT NEW EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO END NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR AND TO URGE U THANT TO BRING MORAL FORCE ON HIS OFFICE TO BEAR ON POSSIBLE SUSPENSION OF ARMS DELIVERIES. VINCI SAID OAU PROGRAM COULD BE ACCEPTABLE BASIS FOR POLITICAL SOLUTION TO A PROBLEM WHOSE HUMANITARIAN ASPECTS, THAT IS, SHORTAGES OF FOOD AND MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR THOUSANDS OF SUFFERERS, WERE MAKING NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT INCREASINGLY URGENT.

2. FOREIGN MINISTRY'S DIRECTOR OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS DECEMBER 16 CONFIRMED TO EMBOFF VALIDITY OF ANSA'S ACCOUNT AND SAID U THANT HAD MADE FOLLOWING POINTS IN REPLY TO VINCI: (A) ARMS SHIPMENTS BEING MADE OPENLY BY UK AND USSR TO FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, CLANDESTINELY BY PORTUGAL AND FRANCE TO BIAFRA. AN EMBARGO OR IMPOSED SUSPENSION WOULD THUS WORK TO DISADVANTAGE OF ONE PARTY (LAGOS) AND TO ADVANTAGE OF OTHER (BIAFRA); (B) UN COULD NOT TAKE ANY POSITION SEEMING TO FAVOR A SECESSIONIST MOVEMENT. IT HAD NOT DONE SO IN CASES OF IRAQ, BURMA OR INDIA. MOREOVER, IT HAD TO TAKE OAU'S CONDEMNATION OF SECESSIONISM INTO CONSIDERATION; (C) IN HIS OPINION THERE WOULD BE NO ALIMENTARY OR MEDICAL CRISIS IF BIAFRANS HAD COOPERATED WITH RELIEF EFFORTS INSTEAD OF

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44

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Authority VND959503
By MNA RA Date 10/3/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 ROME 10057 171847Z

PLACING OBSTACLES IN THEIR WAY. HE THEREFORE ASKED VINCI TELL
GOI THAT WHILE HE SYMPATHIZED WITH ITS MOTIVES, HE OBLIGED
BASE HIS POSITON ON ABOVE FACTORS.

3. COMMENT: AS REPORTED A-1563 OCTOBER 24, ITALIAN GOVERNMENT
UNDER CONSIDERABLE PARLIAMENTARY PRESSURE "DO SOMETHING" ABOUT
NIGERIA. VINCI'S DEMARCHE IS ONE RESPONSE TO THIS PRESSURE,
AND FACT THAT HE DID NOT ACCOMPLISH ANYTHING WITH U THANT
DOES NOT DETRACT FROM DOMESTIC BENEFITS OF HIS HAVING TRIED.
HOWEVER, SHOULD WE BE CONSIDERING "NEW EFFORT" TO END WAR, AS
PRESS ALLEGES, BELIEVE IT POSSIBLE ITALIANS MIGHT BE WILLING
ASSOCIATE THEMSELVES WITH IT.

MELOY

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| Authority | VND 959503 |
| By | MVA |
| Date | 10/5/05 |

37



POL 27 BIAFRA NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 ABIDUA 05363 281133Z

11
ACTION: AF 16.

INFO: EUR 15, IO 13, SAH 02, AID 28, SRI 01, ORM 03, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00,

GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12,

RSR 01, 146 W

128757

R: 271712Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDUAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3435
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ABIDUAN 5363

SUBJ: NIGERIAN PEACE EFFORTS:

1. AGENCY FRANCE PRESS CARRIED STORY FROM ADDIS DECEMBER 25 WHICH BROADCAST IVORIAN RADIO, SAYING AMBASSADORS IN ADDIS OF IVORY COAST, TANZANIA, AND ZAMBIA HAD MET SEPARATELY CHRISTMAS DAY WITH HIM TO DELIVER MESSAGES FROM RESPECTIVE PRESIDENTS, REQUESTING EMPEROR CONTINUE EFFORTS FIND SOLUTION NIGERIAN CRISIS.

2. ON DECEMBER 27 IVORIAN FONMIN ISSUED FOLLOWING STATEMENT (OUR SUMMARY): FOR SEVERAL MONTHS GOIC HAS SOUGHT, WITH GOVERNMENTS OF GOOD WILL OF SEVERAL COUNTRIES, TO OBTAIN "UNCONDITIONAL STOPPING" OF FRATRICIDAL NIGERIAN-BIAFRAN WAR. THUS, IVORIAN PEOPLE WELCOMED BIAFRAN OFFER OF EIGHT DAY TRUCE, AND HOPES THIS OFFER ACCEPTABLE TO ALL, AND THAT GREAT POWERS NOW FURNISHING ARMS TO NIGERIA WILL ALSO OBSERVE IT. AFTER SEEKING VERIFY DECEMBER 25 NEWSSERVICE STORY THAT IVORIAN AMBASSADOR ADDIS HAD MADE DEMARCHE TO EMPEROR, GOIC CAN NOW ANNOUNCE THAT AMBASSADOR ONLY VISITED PALACE AT INVITATION GOE TO RECEIVE MESSAGE FROM

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*Abidjan 5363
12-27-68*

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND959503
By MVA Date 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 ABIDUA 05363 281133Z

HIM TO HOUPHOUET. NEVERTHELESS, GOIC ADDS THAT EVERYTHING IN
FAVOR PEACE CAN ONLY MEET WITH ITS FULL COMPREHENSION.
DECON 1/1-70. MORGAN.

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Authority VWD959503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

66

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
ARSOC 12-2 IRE 293023

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Classification

27 DEC 68 23 49 z
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Origin ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS PRIORITY
Info INFO : Amembassy DUBLIN PRIORITY

STATE

SUBJECT: Irish Missionaries
REF: Dublin 1100 Pol 27 Biafra Nigeria
ARSOC 12-2 IRE

1. In call of Irish Ambassador on Asst Secy Palmer November 13, Palmer at request of Ambassador assured him that USG would put in a good word for Irish missionaries within context of urging FMG humane treatment of civilians of all nationalities.
2. Dept believes USG provision of good offices on behalf of Irish missionaries in Biafra, as suggested by Aiken, might be ineffectual or regarded with some suspicion. It might also complicate US position in Nigeria in view of deep Nigerian suspicions of Irish religious personnel in Biafra and FMG nervousness about USG decision provide aircraft to Joint Church Aid of which Caritas is major component.
3. However, Embassy LAGOS should take advantage of any opportunities available with FMG officials to encourage FMG restraint with regard to all foreign missionaries, including Irish. Embassy can point out dangers of indiscriminate criticisms of missionaries in government

3

12/27/68
Drafted by: AF/W:DFS:11 12/27/68 Tel. Ext. 2946
Clearances: EUR/BMI:WWalter Nigeria Task Force:RPA
AF-Joseph Palmer 2nd
classification approved by: [Signature]

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FORM 8-65 DS-322

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Authority VND 954503
By MNA Date 10/5/05

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy LAGOS Priority

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and press statements as contributing to environment in which welfare
of missionaries could be endangered.

4. Dublin may wish inform Extaff of Dept's view and instructions
to Lagos.

END

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FORM DS-322A
8-63
CONTINUATION SHEET

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Authority VND959503
By MW NARA Date 10/5/05

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

POL 27 ARAB-ISR
KRSTR 12-3 ROM-FB 293024

CONFIDENTIAL 37

Classification

27 DEC 68 23 52z

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Origin

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS PRIORITY

Info:

LIMDIS

Subject: Ambassador's Possible with
Debre FORTHCOMING Meeting/FonMin
POL 17 ARAB-ISR

Refs: Paris 25735 and 25736

separately over weekend
You will be receiving/guidance on Middle East, Nigeria,
and French computers for your meeting with Debre. In
view of importance and complexity of these subjects
to
we presume you will not have opportunity/discuss any
others.

END.

RUSK

Drafted by:

EUR:FBX:CR Tanguy:msa

12/2

Telegraphic transmission and

Classification approved by:

EUR/FBX - Mr. Tanguy

Clearances:

EUR - Mr. Leddy

IAI - Mr. Bahti

XXXXXX S/S - Mr. Shepard

AFW - Mr. Robert Smith

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

FORM DS-322

0400

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND959503
By MNARA Date 10/5/05

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Classification

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
291729

24 DEC 68 17 02 Z

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Origin

ACTION: NIAMEY

Info:

INFO: ABIDJAN
LAGOS
LONDON
PARIS

STATE

REF: Niamey 3083 - POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

Subject: NIGERIA

Dept will include Niamey as addressee on Nigerian sitreps and other pertinent messages. Addressee posts should also repeat to Niamey appropriate messages.

END

RUSK

⑤

RECEIVED BY 12/24/68

Drafted by:

AF/W:DFS:dh:djw 12/24/68

Tel. Ext.

Telegraphic transmission and
classification approved by:

Robert P. Smith - Nigeria
Task Force

Clearances:

FORM 8-65 DS-322

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Classification

0401

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MVA Date 10/5/05



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED 273

PAGE 01 DUBLIN 01102 241445Z

52
ACTION: AFI 16

INFO: EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,
NSC 10, PI 04, RSC 01, SPI 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SR 01, ORM 03, AID 28, SA 01,

SAH 02, SCS 04, SCA 01, ABCE 00, RSR 01, 150 W

RI 241420Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1077

UNCLAS DUBLIN 1102

SUBJECT: NIGERIAN HOLIDAY CEASE-FIRE

REF: STATE 291099; DUBLIN 1100

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT GIVEN EXTAFF ASSISTANT SECRETARY
GALLAGHER. AS DEPT. AWARE, GOI HAS TAKEN KEENEST
INTEREST IN RETURN OF PEACE TO NIGERIA.

SHERIDAN

UNCLASSIFIED

0402

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MVA Date 05/05



POW 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
XR POW 27-9 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 516

PAGE 01 PARIS 25735 241929Z

51
ACTION AF 16

INFO: EUR 15, IO 13, ACDA 16, ABCE 00, CCO 00, SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00,
CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,
RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, SR 01, ORM 03, AID 28, SAH 02, SCS 04, SCA 01,
RSR 01, /153 W

P R 241844Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9349
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON

CONFIDENTIAL PARIS 25735

REF: STATE 291099

1. IN ABSENCE OF ALPHAND AND BEAUMARCHAIS AND AT QUAI'S SUGGESTION, DCM YESTERDAY (DEC 23) CALLED ON DEBRE'S CHEF DE CABINET HABERER TO ASK ABOUT FRENCH GOVERNMENTS' INTENTIONS RE SUPPORT FOR HIM APPEAL. DCM GAVE HABERER COPY OF PRESIDENT'S AND HIM'S APPEAL. HABERER SAID HE WOULD DISCUSS MATTER WITH FOREIGN MINISTER AND CALL BACK. TODAY (DEC 24) HE INFORMED DCM THAT WHILE IT WAS A LITTLE LATE FOR FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO ISSUE CEASEFIRE APPEAL ITSELF, FRANCE WOULD GIVE FULL SUPPORT TO HIM'S AND PRESIDENT'S APPEAL THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

2. DCM SAID USG VERY WORRIED ABOUT MOUNTING ARMS SUPPLY TO CONTENDING FACTIONS IN NIGERIA AND PARTICULARLY CONCERNED WITH DIFFICULTIES WHICH SEEMED TO PREVENT MAKING HUMANITARIAN AID AVAILABLE TO BIAFRA. DCM NOTED THAT PRESIDENT DE GAULLE IN RECENT TALK WITH AMBASSADOR SHRIVER HAD SUGGESTED AFRICAN NATIONS MIGHT PLAY ROLE IN THAT REGARD. WHAT HAD BEEN DONE TO CARRY OUT DE GAULLE'S THINKING.

3. HABERER SAID THAT QUAI STILL STUDYING PROBLEM, AND IS CONSIDERING WHICH AFRICAN NATIONS MIGHT MAKE USEFUL CONTRIBUTION. ONLY AFRICAN COUNTRY HABERER MENTIONED WAS TUNISIA. SAID, HOWEVER,

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0403

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Authority VND 959503
By MVA Date 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 PARIS 25735 241929Z

THAT IMPORTANT ADDITIONAL EFFORTS MUST NOW BE MADE TO INCREASE AND BETTER COORDINATE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF AND DEBRE WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THIS MATTER WITH AMBASSADOR SHRIVER IN COMING WEEK. SAID GREAT EFFORTS MUST ALSO BE MADE FOR SOLUTION OF POLITICAL-MILITARY PROBLEMS NIGERIAN CONFLICT, ADDING DEBRE WOULD PROBABLY HAVE SOME IDEAS ON THIS CORE.


4. HABERER CHARACTERIZED RECENT FRENCH TALKS WITH BRITISH ON BIAFRA AS OF LITTLE VALUE. SAID BRITISH STILL DID NOT UNDERSTAND THAT MILITARY VICTORY FOR FMG WAS NOT RPT NOT POSSIBLE.

5. COMMENT: I WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S SUGGESTIONS OF ANY POINTS I MIGHT MAKE TO DEBRE DURING UPCOMING MEETING, PARTICULARLY ON ORGANIZATION OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF FOR BIAFRA AND ROLE AFRICAN STATES MIGHT PLAY IN THIS EFFORT.

SHRIVER

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
 AF SOC 12-2 IRE
 Department of State **TELEGRAM**

Dublin 1100
 12-24-68

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PAGE 01 DUBLIN 01100 241149Z

22
 ACTION EUR 20

INFO AF 10, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,
 PI 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SCS 04, SCA 01, IO 13, AID 28,
 SAH 02, RSR 01, 144 W

112167

PI R 241059Z DEC 68
 FM AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1076
 INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE DUBLIN 1100

ON INSTRUCTION OF MINEXTAFF AIKEN, ASST SECY BRIAN GALLAGHER TODAY (MONDAY 23RD) CALLED IN DCM (CHALKER) TO MAKE STRONG PLEA FOR USG GOOD OFFICES IN ATTEMPTING DISPEL SERIOUS ILL WILL TOWARD AND CRITICISM OF IRISH CATHOLIC MISSIONARIES IN LAGOS ITSELF AND IN GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA ADMINISTRATIVE CENTER. GALLAGHER SAYS EXTAFF AND GOI HAVE BEEN DEEPLY DISTURBED BY REPORTS FROM ISISH AMBASSADOR THAT IRISH CATHOLIC MISSIONARIES SEEMINGLY MORE THAN OTHER CHRISTIANS HAVE BEEN SUBJECT OF CRITICISM AND SEEM TO BE BLAMED FOR SLOWNESS OF WARI BEING BROUGHT TO SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. CARITAS RELIEF PROJECT, MOUNTED MOSTLY FROM SAN TOME BY LARGELY IRISH-MANAGED CARITAS HAS BEEN ACCUSED OF CARRYING ARMS, AND EVEN MERCENARIES INTO BIAFRA. ALSO, FEELING SEEMS TO BE THAT RELIEF SHIPMENTS ONLY PROLONG THE AGONY BY STIFFENING RESISTANCE AND EXTENDING THW AR. SUCH ACCUSATIONS ARE STOUTLY DENIED BY IRISH MISSIONARY BODIES IN NIGERIA WHO CITE THEIR JOINT PRESS RELEASE OF DECEMBER 7 STRESSING THEIR IMPARTIALITY AND APPEALING FOR PEACE, AID AND IMMEDIATE STEPS TOWARD RECONCILIATION

11

UPON LEAVING, DCM ENCOUNTERED AIKEN WHO EMPHASIZED APPEAL FOR USG GOOD OFFICES, ADDING THAT SOME IN LAGOS WHO ARE POLITICALLY MOTIVATED OR FRUSTRATED AT LENGTHY WAR, ARE SEEKING SOME SCAPEGOAT AND HAVE SIMPLY FASTENED ON THE IRISH CATHOLIC MISSIONARY PERSONNEL AS MOST CONVENIENT. AIKEN POINTS OUT

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PAGE 02 DUBLIN 01100 241149Z

THAT NIGERIANS THEMSELVES HAVE MOST TO GAIN BY RETAINING THESE
MISSIONARIES AS RELIEF AND REHABILITATION AGENCY. ADDITIONALLY,
AIKEN STATED THAT WESTERN AND FREE WORLD WILL NEED THEM AS
IRREPLACEABLE POINTS OF CONTACT AND COMMUNICATION WITH
CONFIDENCE OF BROAD SPECTRUM OF NIGERIAN PEOPLE. SHERIDAN

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

Rel 27 Biafra Nigeria

(35)

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PAGE 01 DAR ES 05658 241037Z

11
ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, SAH 02, SA 01, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02,

INR 07, LI 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28, RSR 01,

/143 W

111848

R: 240730Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5446
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY PARIS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE DAR ES SALAAM 5658

SUBJ: NIGERIA-BIAFRA: OKPARA ARRIVES IN DAR

DEC 24 "STANDARD" REPORTS THAT DR. MICHAEL OKPARA,
ENVOY OF SECESSIONIST LEADER COL. OBUKWU, ARRIVED
IN DAR DEC 23 FOR "BRIEF VISIT." PAPER SAID HE
WOULD HAVE BRIEF TALKS WITH TANZANIAN GOVERNMENT
LEADERS ON LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN NIGERIAN CIVIL
WAR.

EXEMPT PICKERING

*Rel 20 Salaam 5658
12-24-68*

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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23 DEC 68 21 50z

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy LAGOS

Info:

INFO: Amembassy ADDIS ABABA
LONDON
PARIS
US MISSION GENEVA
USUN
CINCSRIKE
Amconsul IBADAN
KADUNA

SUBJECT: Nigeria Press Summary - Dec. 22-23

1. Balt Sun Dec 22 carries twin stories AP Lagos and Joe Sterne Washington headed Nigerian Cease-Fire Prospects Welcomed. Lagos AP piece covers FMG Saturday cease fire announcement, adds qualified sources expressed belief truces proclaimed unilaterally by Gowon could lead to prolonged suspension 18-month civil war. Lord Brockway and Congressman Lukens who talked with Gowon both said they felt cease-fire could be extended. Sterne reports Senator Kennedy welcomed prospect week-long holiday truce saying it could be used profitably for QTE a massive mission of mercy UNQTE. What he envisaged it was learned was chartering US transport planes to voluntary agencies. He this week wrote Secretary Clifford urging release of C-97G aircraft to Catholic Relief Services. As of late Saturday no reply from Clifford. Washington authorities clearly on cautious side as they anxiously awaited outcome two new developments - FMG proclamation 2-day cease fire and appeal by Emperor for week-long holiday truce. President

Drafted by:

AF/P:RLPerkins:mb 12/23/68

Tel. Ext. 2105

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: Nigeria Task Force:RPSmith

Clearances:

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By MNARA Date 10/5/05

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Origin

ACTION: Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy LAGOS

Info:

Johnson today urged Biafra reciprocate in kind federal cease fire and asked ~~XXXXXX~~ both sides accept Emperor's truce plan. He also appealed other nations to join with US in promoting truce. QTE A cease-fire, however brief, will be a precious respite from bloodshed and destruction that have stricken Nigeria UNQTE President declared. Other quotes President's statement given. Washington authorities believe there still room for agreement on relief supplies. Lagos has offered permit daylight flights food and medicine to Uli provided all nighttime flights - including suspected arms shipments - are halted. So far, however, Biafra, has not responded - position US has described as QTE incomprehensible UNQTE in view fast-spreading starvation. There is general agreement daylight flights would materially expand relief capabilities but that only opening land corridors - another Lagos offer not yet accepted by Biafra - would really relieve higher crisis.

2. Balt Sun carries Charles Flowers story London headed French arms aid to Biafra may be ended - possible policy shift based on fear over Soviet, British say. ~~JB~~ British officials believe France may be ready discontinue policy providing arms Biafra. Possible shift France's relations with several rebel regime in Nigeria has been indicated ~~several~~ ways, govt spokesman said today, but he would not explain. QTE Just say there are straws in

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Origin

ACTION: Page 3 of telegram to Amembassy LAGOS

Info:

the wind UNQTE. Britain believes France which doesn't admit its involvement wants extricate self from civil war for two main reasons. First, France worried about relations with Russia and second France really no nearer exploiting oil reserves in Biafra than it was last summer when arms supplies became substantial. According to British source both British and French worried about possibility increased Soviet involvement Nigeria if war drags on.

3. NYTimes Dec 22 carries Ben Welles story headed Johnson asks end of war in Nigeria - also praises 2-day truce arranged by Selassie. President appealed yesterday from his sickbed for permanent end fighting in Nigerian civil war. He also praised as statesmanlike appeal issued by Emperor urging both sides observe seven-day truce starting today. Senator Kennedy also praised Ethiopian Emperor's appeal, also urged Johnson appoint special representative to help mobilize immediately our vast resources in support international humanitarian alliance for relief.

4. NYTimes Dec 23 reports AFP Lagos headed Biafra planning 8-day cease fire - says Xmas pause will last through Jan 1. Quotes Ojukwu in radio broadcast monitored Lagos. In announcing pause in civil war Col. Ojukwu refused permit daylight mercy flights into Uli airport. But he offered facilities

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8-65 DS-322

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By MNA Date 10/5/03

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Origin

ACTION: Page 4 of telegram to Amembassy LAGOS

Info:

to build another airstrip for after-dawn relief shipments. He called on members of international humanitarian groups based in Biafra carry out independent observations both sides' forces during truce period. In Reuters Lagos report FMG troops went back to war Dec 22 after observing first of two one-day truces. **R** First, Saturday marked end Id-El-Fitr; second will be on Wednesday, Xmas Day. Despite truce declaration, official Biafran report yesterday charged Nigerian jet aircraft had pounded Umuahia, killing 43 persons. FMG denied report. AFP report Umuahia said Nigerian AF planes bombed three churches in Umuahia Dec 22, killing at least 28 persons according to a Biafran report.

5. Christian Science Monitor Dec 20 in special report from Lagos headed Nigerian optimism fading to nothing. As Nigerian civil war drags on there is reluctant acceptance some govt circles here outright military victory may not be possible. It remains govts avowed objective, nonetheless, it being unthinkable in govt circles speak for publication about cease fire. Meanwhile Biafra limiting counterattacks, apparently in order stockpile arms. Lagos assumes Biafrans plan offensive retake either Port Harcourt or Calabar. Latter harbour while less important, would make possible reopening land frontier with Cameroon. But govt Lagos also contronts variety nonmilitary

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By MWA Date 10/5/05

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Origin

ACTION: Page 5 of telegram to Amembassy LAGOS

Info:

problems, involving diplomacy, civilian and troop morale, and dangers to govt of cease fire. On diplomatic front fear in some high govt quarters American policy toward civil war may be at point major change. Until now Washington has kept hands off war while continuing support Nigeria's territorial integrity. However, Under Secretary recently called on both sides end conflict for sake suffering civilians on both sides. He expressed American impatience at endless QTE bickering UNQTE and urged QTE credible and workable UNQTE federal guarantees to Ibo secessionists. Govt circles here now feel concern this may be approach Nixon. They worry he may bring pressure force cease fire. They see major power leaders concerned at degree degenerating Nigerian situation has become arena cold war politics. These moves come concurrently with sustained support Biafra from other quarters in West. De Gaulle widely believed supplying Czech arms to Biafrans through Gabon. Willy Brandt reported sympathetic to secessionists. Caritas International flying food Biafra from Sao Tome. There also problem troop morale, reported flagging at front. Behind lines discipline has weakened. According Amembassy Cotonou, federal soldiers manning road block recently relieved group Peace Corps vols all their money.

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Origin

ACTION: Page 6 of telegram to Amembassy LAGOS

Info

Japanese diplomat traversing same route delightedly reported he had only lost wristwatch. In addition discontent noticeable among civilian population. Antitax riots at Ibadan, headquarters of movement for independent Yoruba nation. Rumors of planned coups circulate widely. Added to these problems are dangers cease fire. To govt eyes these lie in search permanent solution and future Lagos politics. Expected that UN will insist on referendum for future of war area. Presumably constitutional referendum would be forthcoming as well, since present govt has changed Nigerian constitution. American sources say Washington will not officially lobby for referendum. Pressures for this must come from African supporters ideal of self determination. Peace will also make necessary decisions what men will govern Nigeria. Most observers attribute political ambitions to field commanders of Gowon. At same time they see people as weary military ~~rule~~ rule and desirous return to civilian govt.

END

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Authority VMD 954543
By MWA Date 10/5/05



POL 27 Biafra-Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 207

PAGE 01 ROME 10139 211050Z

22:
ACTION: SS: 70

INFO: CIAE 000/070 W

100457

RI 211020Z DEC 68:
FM AMEMBASSY ROME:
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9252
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY PARIS

S E C R E T ROME 10139

LIMDIS:

REF: STATE 290288

SUBJECT: NIGERIA

EMBOFF DECEMBER 21 DISCUSSED PEACE INITIATIVES WITH DIRECTOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS AT FONMINISTRY. REGARDING ORTONA'S MENTION OF POSSIBLE ITALIAN DEMARCHE TO FRENCH, MINISTRY REPRESENTATIVE SAID SUCH AN APPROACH NOT LIKELY BECAUSE CHANCES OF ITS ACCOMPLISHING SOMETHING WERE NIL. ASKED WHETHER HE HAD HEARD ANYTHING OF POSSIBLE VATICAN APPEAL, MINISTRY REPRESENTATIVE SAID HE HAD NOT BUT THOUGHT IT GOOD IDEA. HOWEVER, GOV CONSIDERING UNILATERAL APPEAL FOR CEASE-FIRE TO BE MADE IN LAGOS DECEMBER 22 OR 23 AND PUBLICIZED AFTERWARDS.

GP-3.

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SECRET

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By: MNA Date: 10/5/00

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POST Rome

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SERIAL 10139

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MilRep 3
Summary 3
Task Force 3

Principals

ES 2
S 1
U 1
M 2
G 1
S/NL 1
SIG 1
S/AH 3
S/AL 1
SA 1
S/CPR 1
S/GOV 1
S/IL 1
S/P 1
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S/FW 1
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M/WP 1
G/PM 1

Geographic

AF5 action pending
ARA9 to AF 12-23-68
EA11 10
EUR10 10
NEA8 10

Functional

CU 1
E2 1
H 1
IGA 1
INR6 1
IO4 1
L2 1
O3 1
OPR 1
OC 1
SY 1
WLG 1
P2 1
SCA 1
SCS 1
SCI 1

OTHER AGENCIES

WH10 10
CIA 1
DOD 1
USIA4 1
NSA 1

Other

ACDA5 5
AID/EXSEC3 3
AA/AFR2 2
AA/VN2 2
AA/EA3 3
AA/NESA2 2

PC 1
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FAA 1

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Authority VND954503
By MMNARA Date 10/5/05



POC 27 Biafra - Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 330

PAGE 01 ROME 10142 211401Z

47
ACTION SS: 70

INFO CIAE 00, SSO 00, 7070 W

101054

PI R 211310Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9254
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON

MEMBASSY PARIS 2185

SEE CIRCLET ROME 10142

LIMDIS

REF: STATE 290923

SUBJECT: NIGERIA-PEACE INITIATIVES

1. EMBOFF CONVEYED SUBSTANCE REFTEL TO VATICAN SECRETARIAT OFFICIAL THIS MORNING DECEMBER 21. OFFICIAL SAID POPE WOULD BE INFORMED OF OUR APPROACH EARLY THIS AFTERNOON. HE WAS HOPEFUL THAT APPROPRIATE MESSAGE COULD BE INCLUDED IN POPE'S NOON ADDRESS TOMORROW DECEMBER 22.

2. OFFICIAL SAID VATICAN WOULD BE INTERESTED KNOWING WHO WOULD MAKE U.S. STATEMENT, BUT THAT PRIOR COPY OF TEXT NOT NECESSARY.

GP-1.

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SECRET
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1968 DEC 21 PM 2 11

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Secretariat

Geographic

Other

S/S-S 1
S/S-O 1
S/S-Screener 33
S/S-EX
S/S-CMS
S/S-O DIR
MilRep
Summary
Task Force

AF5 X
ARA 9
EA 11
EUR 10
NEA 8

ACDA 5
AID/EXSEC 3
AA/AFR 2
AA/VN 2
AA/EA 3
AA/NESA 2

Functional

Principals

ES 2 4
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M 2
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S/AH 3
S/AL
SA
S/CPR
S/GOV
S/IL
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OTHER AGENCIES

WH 10
CIA
DOD
USIA 4
NSA

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 LIBREV 02028 021612Z

49
ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, NEA 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07
L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SR 01, SAL 01, SAH 02,
AID 28, IGA 02, NIC 01, PC 04, RSR 01, 169 W
----- 120895

R 021530Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2146
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIBREVILLE 2028

SUBJ BIAFRA

1. ACCORDING MEDIA REPORTS HERE PRES BONGO, IN 29 NOV
PARIS PRESS CONF, ADDED TO RATIONALE OF GABONESE STANCE
RE BIAFRA THE DANGER OF COMMUNIST ENTRENCHMENT IN AFRICA
SHOULD BIAFRA LOSE ITS STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE. HERE-
TOFORE MAIN GABONESE ARGUMENTS HAVE BEEN THAT NIGERIANS BENT
ON GENOCIDE, NIGERIAN FEDERATION PROVEN UNVIABLE, AND,
WHILE UNITY OF NATIONS SHOULD BE UPHELD, RIGHT OF PEOPLE
TO SELF DETERMINATION IS SUPERIOR.

2. BONGO CITED HERE AS SAYING IN PARIS: "COLLAPSE
OF BIAFRA WOULD MEAN IMPLANTATION OF COMMUNISM IN AFRICA
AND THIS WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE FOR WHOLE CONTINENT. TODAY
THREE GREAT POWERS HELP NIGERIA FIGHT BIAFRAN SECESSION:
USSR, UK AND OUR BROTHERS THE EGYPTIANS. IF BIAFRA
VANQUISHED TOMORROW, RUSSIANS WILL SAY IT THEY WHO PROVIDED
MAIN EFFORT AND EGYPTIANS WILL SAY SAME. UK WILL
BE BEATEN AND WILL HAVE LOST NIGERIA". GP 3 BANE

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0418

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Authority VND 959503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. POL 50-11

DATE: 12/21/68 MSG NO.: A-1011 TYPE: AI
FROM: Lagos TO: State
SUBJECT: British Discussion w/ General Alexander
DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: ☒ OTHER: ☐


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| L | FBO | AIO | SP | TO : Department of State | | DEC 25 | |
| | | | 45 | INFO : LAGOS, LONDON | | RS/R | |
| AGR | COM | FRB | INT | FROM : Amembassy ABIDJAN | | DATE: December 20, 1968 | |
| LAB | TAR | TR | XMB | SUBJECT : Biafran Press Release Attacks President Johnson; | | | |
| AIR | ARMY | NAVY | OSO | Embassy Calls to Attention of GOIC | | | |
| USIA | NSA | CIA | USC | REF : | | | |
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| SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION | | | | <p>At the beginning of November, the "Special Representative of the Republic of Biafra" in Ivory Coast distributed a press release (in English) containing the text of a statement issued by the "Commissioner for Information" Dr. Ifegwu Eke on October 28, 1968, datelined Enugu (sic).</p> <p>The text contained the following significant references to the United States: "(The war)...is an imperialist war inspired by colonialist Britain's Harold Wilson and supported by the decadent Johnson administration of the United States and revisionist Soviet Union." "...criminal minded Harold Wilson and the gangster, Johnson Administration in the United States have already hatched a new plan for escalating the war..." The release also referred to the "British and American Imperialists."</p> <p>The Embassy showed a copy of this release to the Director of the Ivorian Press Agency, Jean Baptiste SAMPAH, who expressed concern and promised to have it translated and called to the attention of Information Minister Mathieu EKRA.</p> <p>Though we have had no further reaction from the Information Ministry, the Biafran press releases have made no further insulting references to the United States and, indeed, appear to have ceased altogether in the last few weeks. Furthermore,</p> | | | |
| POST ROUTING | | | | | | | |
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| Date: | | | | Enclosure: Biafran Press Release | | | |
| Initials: | | | | LIMITED OFFICIAL USE | | | |
| Drafted by: | | | | For Department Use Only | | | |
| POL: HCMacDougall:jaw | | | | In <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Out <input type="checkbox"/> | | | |
| Drafting Date: | | | | Contents and Classification Approved by: | | | |
| 12/18/68 | | | | DCM: LGD:ros | | | |
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| USIS: R Mix(draft) | | | | | | | |

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 954/503
By: M. NARA Date: 10/5/05

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Abidjan A-545

Page 2

we have learned that Okuchekwu Mezu, the Biafran Representative, has returned to Biafra and been replaced by one Peter Chigbo (Abidjan 5194).

COMMENT: This is not the type of literature which the GOIC wants circulating in Ivory Coast, and we expect that it took steps to prevent its recurrence (possible including Mezu's departure). Ivorian media have generally edited overly defamatory (or too pro-Chicom) Biafran statements picked up from Agence France Presse, and have not attacked the United States on the Nigerian issue.

MORGAN

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| Authority | VND 959503 |
| By | MV NARA Date 10/5/05 |

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Enclosure to
Abidjan A- 545

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
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

ISSUED BY:

THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
REPUBLIC OF BIAFRA

B.P. 8861

ABIDJAN, IVORY COAST.



The Colonialist Britain's Harold Wilson supported
by the decadent Johnson Administration wage war of
Genocide against the Progressive People of Biafra.

STATEMENT BY THE COMMISSIONER FOR INFORMATION
DR. IFEGWU EKE:

ENUGU, BIAFRA, MONDAY OCTOBER 28, 1968 - "Biafrans have always stated that the Biafra/Nigeria war is an imperialist war inspired by colonialist Britain's Harold Wilson and supported by the decadent Johnson Administration of the United States and revisionist Soviet Union. The Nigerians and the vandal Regime of Gowon are mere pawns. Recently a Journal called the "Private Eye" exposed one of the clandestine methods adopted by Harold Wilson in waging his war of genocide. All the talk by the British and American imperialists and those of their stooges who turned up at the O.A.U. Summit in Algiers about their dreamed collapse of the Peoples Government of Biafra was based on a mischievous plan by the British imperialists to weaken our peoples resistance by preventing much needed ammunition from getting to the gallant armed forces of Biafra. In a vital two week period the enemy succeeded in entering Aba, Owerri and Okigwi because the British Commonwealth Office bought over Hank Wharton, an American who hitherto had made millions of pounds from Biafra through his monopoly of the airlifting of goods into Biafra. Apart from Wharton's refusal to fly ammunition into Biafra, he also emptied a cargo of ammunition and Biafran currency notes into the atlantic. The determination of the people of Biafra has defeated this most recent British war strategy. Since the failure of the British sabotage effort, the British Commonwealth Office has collected a bunch of disreputable British journalists to charge France with supplying Biafra with arms. Because Britain has failed the Government and people of France must be made to bear the responsibility. Under the cover of this British fabricated French involvement, criminal minded Harold Wilson and the gangster, Johnson Administration in the United States have already hatched a new plan for escalating the war and for continuing the cold-blooded murder of hundreds of thousands of innocent Biafran children.

It should be recalled that an earlier British treachery cost Biafra the Republic of Benin. It was all part of the abortive Banjo coup d'tat. Britain will not be tired of hatching new plots against the Progressive People of Biafra until neo-colonialism has been finally defeated in battle by the brave and determined people of Biafra".

0422

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

9 AIRGRAM

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 NR P0427 BIAFIA-715
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A-108
NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : IBADAN, LAGOS

FROM : Amconsul KADUNA

DATE: December 20, 1968

SUBJECT : Report by British High Commission Officer on the former Benue Province

REF :

The Consulate transmits herewith a copy of a confidential report on the former Benue Province of Benue-Plateau State prepared by W. Turner, First Secretary of the British High Commission in Kaduna.

Mr. Turner has noted the dislocations occasioned by the presence in Benue of large numbers of military personnel en route to the war front in the south as well as the loss of markets for Benue produce which have been cut off by hostilities in the former Eastern Region. According to the report, the danger of guerrilla activity in three southern districts of the Idoma Division has resulted in the virtual evacuation of populations from these districts. Even the rudimentary road network in Benue has deteriorated rapidly under the heavy load of civilian and military traffic on the Jos-Makurdi road, while access roads are almost non-existent.

According to Turner, the creation of states met with the approval of the people in Benue who have eagerly awaited an opportunity to escape from Hausa/Fulani domination. However, Benue-Plateau State is seething with tribal rivalries between the Tiv and Idoma tribes and with continuing resentment against the Hausa traders who have replaced the Ibos in some market places in Benue.

Mr. Turner concludes that although the war has affected the former Benue Province to a greater extent than any other sector of the Northern States, this area has "survived the trauma of the last two years remarkably well." He gives considerable credit to the stabilizing influence of Christian missionaries who provide educational, health and welfare facilities for the people of the area.

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year intervals,
 not automatically declassified.

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FORM DS-323

CONFIDENTIAL

Drafted by:

HMHutcheson: dal 12-17-68

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Birney A. Stokes

Clearances:

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DECLASSIFIED
 Authority VND 959503
 By MVA Date 10/5/05

CONFIDENTIAL

Kaduna A-108
2

The Consulate will provide a further analysis of the situation in this border area following a visit by a Consulate Officer during the month of January, 1969.

STOKES *[Signature]*

Enclosure: *att*
Report on Benue Province

CONFIDENTIAL

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| DECLASSIFIED | |
| Authority | VND 959503 |
| By | MV NARA Date 10/5/05 |



ORG 7 AF
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Department of State **TELEGRAM**
POL 27-9 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

CONFIDENTIAL 137

PAGE 01. PARIS 25640 201900Z

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ACTION SS 70

INFO CCO 00,SSO 00,NSCE 00,USIE 00,CIAE 00,1070 W 096251

O R 201840Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9292
AMEMBASSY LONDON
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 25640

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE VISIT BY DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOORE

REF: STATE 289522

1. GIVEN RECENT DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN FRENCH AND BRITISH OVER QUESTION OF DISCUSSING NIGERIA, WE RAISED WITH QUAT AFRICA DIRECTOR LEBEL POSSIBILITY OF ASKING DEPUTY ASST SEC MOORE STOP BY PARIS IF FRENCH THOUGHT IT WOULD BE USEFUL. LEBEL MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE NOT AT ALL KEEN ON IDEA, SAYING FRENCH "HAD NO NEW IDEAS TO CONTRIBUTE" TOWARDS SOLUTION OF HUMANITARIAN RELIEF PROBLEM. LEBEL SAID HE WOULD OF COURSE BE PLEASED TO RECEIVE MOORE SHOULD HE COME TO PARIS, BUT WE INTERPRET THIS AS COURTESY GESTURE.

2. IN LIGHT OF LEBEL'S REPLY WE DO NOT THINK MOORE VISIT ADVISABLE. FRENCH APPEAR UNUSUALLY SKITTISH ON NIGERIA/BIAFRA QUESTION AT PRESENT TIME, ESPECIALLY WHEN IT COMES TO TALKING ABOUT NEW SOLUTIONS.

SHRIVER

CONFIDENTIAL

0425

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 950503
By MVA Date 10/3/05

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. POL 50-12

DATE: 12/20/68 MSG NO.: 15496 TYPE: TE

FROM: Lagos TO: State

SUBJECT: Alidjo's Views on Nigeria

DOCUMENT ORIGINATOR: DEPT. OF STATE: ☒ OTHER: ☐

BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:


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
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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 249

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ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, P 04, USIA 12, IO 13, INR 07, RSR 01, RSC 01, /069 W
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R 200900Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2548
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L NIAMEY 3083

SUBJECT: NIGERIA

1. PRES DIORI COMMENTED TO VISITING BRITISH CHARGE MCMULLEN (RESIDENT ABIDJAN) THAT HIS ONLY SOURCES INFORMATION ON WHAT IS REALLY HAPPENING IN NIGERIA/BIAFRA ARE AMERICANS AND FRENCH, AND HE DUBIOUS ABOUT SLANTED FRENCH INFO.

2. WE ALREADY RECEIVING WIRELESS FILE ITEMS AND DEPT'S UNCLASSIFIED NIGERIAN PRESS ROUNDUPS. WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING WHENEVER APPROPRIATE ANY CURRENT SITREPS, ANALYSES, OR ANY OTHER INFO WHICH I MAY BE AUTHORIZED TO PASS TO DIORI.
ADAMS

12-20-68
NIAMEY 3083

CONFIDENTIAL

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Authority VMD 950503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

SOC 10 NIGERIA

POL 27 BIAFRA-
FOR RM USE ONLY

NIGERIA

A 1006

CONFIDENTIAL

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : department of State

INFO: London, Geneva, USUN, Ibadan, Kaduna

FROM : Amembassy LAGOS

DATE: DEC 19 1968

SUBJECT: NIGERIAN RELIEF - Conditions in South-Eastern State

REF :

We attach a copy of the British High Commission's report on relief conditions in the South-Eastern State which is based on the comments of Colonel KIRBY (protect), the Canadian Salvation Army team leader at Abak, who has now completed his ICRC assignment. Kirby makes two points: Firstly, that the refugee position in the South-Eastern State has improved in the last two to three weeks, and secondly, that local foodstuffs were found to be available for sale in some villages recently taken by Federal troops.

Enclosure: Relief: South East State

MATHEWS

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12 year intervals
not automatically declassified

FORM 4-62 DS-323

CONFIDENTIAL

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☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by:

ECON:RKKuchel:kmc 12-18-68

Contents and Classification Approved by:

ECON:ROBlucker

Clearances:

0428

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 954503
By: MVA Date: 10/5/05

Enclosure to Lagos A- 1006

CONFIDENTIAL

December 11, 1968

Relief: South East State

Mr. Elliott of the Canadian High Commission passed on to me this morning some remarks made to him by Col. Kirby, the Canadian Salvation Army team leader from Abak, who has now withdrawn from ICRC relief work to return to his ordinary job.

Col. Kirby told him there had been a great improvement in the relief position in the South East State in the last two to three weeks. There had been a steady move home and of the 119,000 refugees, registered with his team three weeks ago, 80,000 were now back in their own villages and feeding at home. They still needed some help from the Red Cross but Col. Kirby reckoned that by the end of January these people should all be fully self-sufficient.

Secondly, during a recent Federal Army push north in the Ikot-Ekpene area, Col. Kirby surveyed the area immediately behind the troops, and found one group of villagers who were prepared to sell gari to the Red Cross at normal pre-war prices. Col. Kirby told Mr. Elliott that he had always suspected that the horrific tales of starvation inside "Biafra" were grossly exaggerated but nevertheless he was quite surprised to find, at least in one spot, that there was an actual surplus of food.

We reckoned of course that the ICRC estimates of the numbers of refugees they would have to continue to feed were greatly exaggerated but it is interesting to have confirmation like this. It is not information the ICRC will want spread abroad and Mr. Elliott has therefore asked that we treat it as confidential and protect the source.

CONFIDENTIAL

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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US Mission GENEVA - PRIORITY

STATE

LIMDIS

FOR AMBASSADOR

SUBJECT: Possible Visit by Deputy Assistant Secretary Moore

1. Request your view re desirability Deputy Assistant

Secretary Moore visiting Paris for discussion with French on Nigerian situation at appropriate level (perhaps Lebel) after his current conversations Geneva. If Moore did come, he would focus his discussion with French on humanitarian relief problem, explaining our concern at deteriorating conditions and inviting French views on what might be done to alleviate suffering in Biafra.

2. Uncertain how this would mesh with Moore's projected schedule in view his planned departure from Geneva December 19

Drafted by: AF/W:RMMelbourne/JPalmer2nd
Clearances: 12/18/68

Tel. Ext. 2619

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:

JPalmer2nd

EUR - Mr. Tanguy (subs)

SECRET

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 959503
By: MNARA Date: 10/5/05

37



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

POL 1 AFR-US

CONFIDENTIAL 393

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45
ACTION: AF 16

INFO: EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 01,

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FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3403
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ABIDJAN 5289

LE MONDE ARTICLE DECEMBER 17 MENTIONS NEW YORK TIMES BENJAMIN WELLES STORY REPORTING U.S. DECISION PLAY MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN SETTLING NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR. SINCE QUITE LIKELY HOUPHOUET OR USHER MAY ASK ABOUT THIS, WOULD APPRECIATE DEPT'S GUIDANCE.

GP-3. MORGAN

*Abidjan 5289
12-19-68*

(2)

CONFIDENTIAL

REPRODUCED BY 65/8

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959/503
By MWA/ARA Date 10/3/05

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

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SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION

Original to be Filed in _____ Decentralized Files.

FILE DESIGNATION

UNCLASSIFIED

A-5229

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO : LAGOS

FROM : Amembassy LONDON

DATE: DECEMBER 18, 1968

SUBJECT : Nigeria: Speech in Commons by MP Dunwoody
After Visit to Biafra

REF : LONDON 15106

The Embassy transmits herewith for the information of addressees the text of a speech by Labour MP Dr. John Dunwoody in the House of Commons December 12, 1968 during the course of a general debate on foreign policy (Reftel).

Dr. Dunwoody, who is a medical doctor, gives his impressions of the state of health of the Ibo population, and present and future relief requirements. He believes these requirements can only be filled when hostilities have been terminated and calls for a ceasefire, renewed negotiations and a compromise settlement. Without defining precisely the compromise he has in mind, Dr. Dunwoody implies that some form of confederation may be the best solution. He states:

"We must face the realities of the situation. After nearly 18 months of war, there can be no going back completely to the pre-war situation. It is not realistic to expect people to forget completely everything that has happened in the last eighteen months. It is as utterly unrealistic for Biafra to attempt to become an independent state completely divorced from those around it. A compromise must be reached somewhere between these two extremes."

BRUCE

Enclosure: as stated

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For Department Use Only

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Initials:

FORM 10-64 DS-323

Drafted by:

POL/EX/A:MS

Drafting Date:

12/13

Phone No.:

Content and Classification Approved by:

POL/RISpiers

Clearances:

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Authority VND 959503
By MN NARA Date 10/5/05

P6-2

A-5229

Dr. John Dunwoody (Falmouth and Camborne): I want to restrict myself to considering some aspects of the Nigerian civil war, not because I consider the other subjects mentioned so far to be unimportant, but because I believe that they all pale into insignificance when compared with the magnitude and urgency of the humanitarian problems which we and the rest of the world face in Nigeria. I want to give the House a factual account of what I saw myself during the last ten days or so when visiting Biafra.

Many of our debates in the House and much of the discussion in the country have taken place in a vacuum only partially filled by propaganda from both sides in the conflict. There are many facts about the situation which may not be fully appreciated. I spent some six days inside Biafra, a short time, but sufficient to travel around the limited area which is this beleaguered and besieged country. During that time, I was allowed to go where I wished and to meet whomever I wanted. I met the leadership of the Biafran people and I met many ordinary people, missionaries and expatriates. I went to Biafra knowing West Africa where I lived for two years some time ago, and I went with the advantage of a medical qualification which has given me some understanding of the humanitarian problems being faced.

I want first to talk about the nutritional problem which the people living within the area controlled by the Biafran forces are facing, a problem which is shared by others living in areas controlled by the Nigerian federal forces. It is difficult to talk about these problems without being emotional. The pitiful sights which one sees, arouse a violent emotional response in anyone, even one used to seeing disease and death in childhood, but we have to look at this as realistically and as practically as possible.

There is no doubt that the present nutritional condition of the people in Biafra is slightly improved on what it was three or four months ago. The harvest is in and the yams and cassava have been gathered and some local fruit is available. There is no doubt that the

death rate from starvation is lower and probably significantly lower than it was in August and September. That is not to say that there are not many people dying of starvation today. I saw some both dying and about to die. It is not to say that there are not many thousands of children throughout the country suffering severely from diseases like the protein deficiency disease kwashiorkor and other deficiency diseases. The situation is somewhat improved, however, but only temporarily.

Already in large stretches of the country, an area which I estimated to be populated by 20 to 25 per cent. of the population, there is now no local food available. The population there is surviving on the protein brought in by the relief organisations and the carbohydrates transported by the same organisations from other parts of the country. Inevitably and inexorably, in the weeks ahead, perhaps in the next four to six weeks, the population faces complete elimination of all local food supplies. A small amount is being, and presumably will continue to be, smuggled across the firing line, and the Biafrans have hopes of recapturing some farm land where food is available, but these two things together could have only a marginal effect on the situation.

This means that the prospect of starvation increasing is real. The people are eating the seed yams. There is little or no agricultural work being done and the area in which between 7 million and 8 million people are trapped is an area which is normally food importing. This means that over the next three or four months, considering the present poor nutritional condition of many of the population, at least one quarter of the community will probably die. In numerical terms, this means about 1,500,000 to 2 million people. The deaths will concentrate among the children and among the old, because these are the groups in the community least able to sustain starvation.

There are other factors which affect this estimate. Many responsible people would suggest a higher figure. There is particularly the unpredictable possibility of epidemic disease. It is remarkable that in this war situation there has been no epidemic disease on either side of the fighting line, but there is a grave risk.

7 0 45

There is a very grave risk of measles among the children, a disease much more virulent in an African community than with us, a disease which, with a debilitated group of children such as the Biafran children today, could carry a very high mortality.

There is a serious risk of an outbreak of smallpox. Little or no vaccination has been carried out in the last 18 months and public health measures are not at their normal level. If there were to be an outbreak of smallpox, it would not only affect those in Biafra, not only those under Federal control, but be at least something of a risk to world health.

I want to mention the relief organisations whose work on the ground is truly remarkable. At a higher level there may be a certain amount of bickering and difference among the various organisations and in practice there may be difficulties, but the humanitarian assistance which they are providing in a civil war situation should not be underestimated. But organisations are getting supplies in and distributing them. The work which I saw was very impressive. The International Red Cross, the church organisations, particularly the Scandinavian and German church organisations, Caritas, Oxfam and U.N.I.C.E.F. are all playing a part. The food gets to those people who need it. I did not see any evidence anywhere in the country of food going astray. Everyone to whom I spoke said that food reached the people in the community. At every one of the feeding centres which I visited where I saw people being fed *en masse* the food which reaches them is acceptable. When a person is starving, it matters little what sort of food he is offered; he will eat it.

The food which the relief organisations provide is mainly concentrated protein foodstuffs. They carry in on their night flights, medical equipment, drugs and a certain amount of fuel for the relief organisations. The flights carry between 40 and 200 tons of material each night. The amount depends on the military situation and on the amount of bombing of the one airstrip which is used. If we are not to see the collapse of the domestic carbohydrate food supplies which I fear is inevitable if the war continues, the amount of food required by the community to give them just 8 oz.

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Authority VND 959503
By MNARA Date 10/5/05

P6 3
A-5229

[DR. DUNWOODY.]

of food each, with perfect distribution, is over 2,000 tons a day. It is utterly and completely impossible for the relief organisations to manage this in a war situation, irrespective of the question of daylight flights or land corridors.

I do not suggest that the position about daylight flights and possible land corridors is satisfactory. It is not satisfactory. But in the war situation which people in this region are facing, it is understandable that there are objections. The objections raised are military and strategic objections and have no other origin.

I am convinced that it is impossible to solve this humanitarian problem or to make any progress towards a solution unless we can make some progress towards a military and political settlement. I should like to say a few words about the military situation.

There is near stalemate. In recent months there has been a considerable improvement in morale on the Biafran side due to increased supplies of arms, increased fire power and to the fact that the Biafrans have regained certain limited stretches of countryside. They are obtaining two to three times as many recruits as they require. They are intensively training them and some civilians, not only in orthodox warfare, but in guerilla warfare. There is no chance of a military collapse. These people mean it when they say that they will fight on. When I met Biafrans, as I did on many occasions, and they said that they would rather starve to death than surrender, they were telling me the truth. Perhaps what they say is based on a certain amount of false optimism about future food supplies and the continuation of arms supplies, but the fact is that these people are prepared to starve to death rather than surrender.

The civilian population is undergoing very considerable privations. I have mentioned the food situation, the near starvation and the threat of real starvation in the weeks ahead. Air raids occur frequently. In a military sense, they are not of very great significance. The number killed in the air raids is infinitesimal compared with the numbers killed in the fighting or who die from lack of food. But the impact on the African community, to whom even an aeroplane is strange, unusual and unreal, cannot be

underestimated. The impact which the air raids have made on the people is remarkable.

Over half of the community in this packed area are refugees who, in most cases, have lost all their possessions and wealth and things which mean much to the Ibo people. There is almost complete economic disruption. There is virtually no money economy. Inflation is rife. While wages and salaries have remained much the same, a box of matches costs 5s., a small tin of meat £2 10s., cigarettes 1s. 6d. each, and a gallon of petrol, if one can buy it £10.

Despite the considerable burdens which the population is having to undergo, there is an air of normality. There is law and order. The courts are sitting. Traffic moves about to a certain extent. There is even a railway running. The public services attempt to operate. Perhaps the overwhelming impression with which I have come back from this area is the determination of these people to continue what they believe to be their just fight. There is mass popular support for this war. It is no good anybody in this country talking in terms of this being a small group of people leading the great mass of the population against their will. There is mass support for the régime in Biafra, and morale is high.

This is not just a tribally-based movement. There is room for a great deal of argument about the opinion of minority groups in the area which Biafra claims as part of its territory. There are different opinions among the minorities, their leaders and the ordinary people, but many of the minority people and their leaders are just as deeply committed to the Biafran cause as the large majority, virtually all, of the Ibo people. As I have said, I see no prospect of a military solution to this conflict. Colonel Ojukwu is representative of the leadership of his country and of the people as a whole. To suggest that he is unrepresentative reduces our chances of approaching this problem in a realistic manner.

I wish to try to be constructive and to put forward some suggestions about where we should be moving. I found a degree of flexibility and a willingness to face some of the realities of the situation which surprised me. I never heard from any of the leaders or from the ordinary

0434

PG. 4
A-5229

people to whom I spoke in Biafra the word "secession". Everyone to whom I spoke accepted, sometimes unwillingly, the inevitability of co-operation in many fields with the Federation. People said, "We live next door to each other". Economic co-operation, common services, co-operation in social policy and similar fields, customs policy, and so on, are obviously areas for discussion and negotiation.

What these people insist on, rightly or wrongly, is that they should have a guarantee of their physical, economic and political security. After their experiences in recent years, they believe that they cannot be guaranteed this unless they have control of their armed forces. This immediately produces a much more difficult subject for negotiation than the points which I have mentioned. Nevertheless, I do not believe that it is impossible. In each State of the United States there is a militia, controlled by the governor of the State, which is probably armed to a much higher level than the Biafran soldiers.

We must face the realities of the situation. After nearly 18 months of war, there can be no going back completely to the pre-war situation. It is not realistic to expect people to forget completely everything that has happened in the last eighteen months. It is as utterly unrealistic for Biafra to attempt to become an independent state completely divorced from those around it. A compromise must be reached somewhere between these two extremes.

The urgent, essential need is for a ceasefire as soon as possible. It should be unconditional and followed immediately by negotiations over a limited field. The negotiations should cover positioning of the troops, the rôle of a peace-keeping force, which will be essential, and the co-ordination of relief to both sides.

At the same time, I would like to see an international moratorium on arms supplies to this area, if not on a permanent basis at least on a temporary basis. If this cannot be achieved I ask the Government to reconsider their position on arms supplies, since the political, economic and military justifications for this policy in the early days of the war are to a considerable extent now proven to be untrue. The war did not end in a

few weeks. The régime is not unrepresentative of the people in the country. I am dubious whether the continuation of our policy is causing us political and economic damage throughout this area. One of my hon. Friends said that at least there has been no change in the amount of military aid we have been offering. May we have this assurance from the Front Bench?

The more difficult problems of economic co-operation and the military and political solution of the conflict will obviously take a much longer time; very much more detailed discussion and negotiation are necessary. This I found to be accepted on the Biafran side, and I believe it would also be accepted on the Federal side. I think that there are sufficient political courage, foresight and ability on both sides to reach a settlement; the difficulty is in achieving the first few steps towards a negotiated position.

There is extreme urgency about this. I have already spoken of the humanitarian problem and of how a large number of people will starve to death in the months ahead. There is another reason why we should look at this matter very urgently, and that is the real and increasing risk of external involvement. Many people are prepared to fish in these troubled waters, some of whom are much less responsible even than those fishing in these waters today.

We are seeing unfolded before us possibly the greatest preventable human tragedy the modern world has known. I appeal to my colleagues in the Government to exert any and every pressure they can. I appeal to my colleagues on this side of the House and to hon. Members opposite to do all that they can, if they have any influence whatsoever on the people on either side of this conflict. I ask all men of good will in Africa and in the rest of the world to think of the innocents on both sides, the people who are suffering and dying. For many of them, if we do not do something about this in the next few weeks, this will be the last Christmas that they will ever see.

0435



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 901

PAGE 01 LAGOS 15403 182016Z

45
ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, SSO 00, NSCE 00, CCO 00, USIE 00, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02,
INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, AID 28, SR 01,
SCS 04, SCA 01, SAH 02, ACDA 16, RSR 01, 150 W

082720

P R 181233Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4046
INFO AMZMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 916
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION GENEVA
RUEHDUXUSMISSION USUN NEW YORK 732
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCMCSUL KADUNA
CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA
DIA

CONFIDENTIAL LAGOS 15403

SUBJ: BBC CORRESPONDENT'S ENCOUNTERS WITH GOWON AND ADEKUNLE

REF: LAGOS 14036 *PH 27 Biafra Niger*

1. EMBOFF HAS BEEN GIVEN ACCOUNT BY NEW BBC CORRESPONDENT OSMAN OF HIS INTERVIEW WITH HEAD OF STATE GOWON, AS WELL AS HIS EXPULSION FROM PORT HARCOURT BY COL. ADEKUNLE.

2. AS DEPARTMENT PROBABLY AWARE, BBC CARRIED STORY OSMAN EXPULSION FROM PORT HARCOURT, ALONG WITH SPANISH AND GZ MAN NEWSMEN. ADEKUNLE, IN EFFECT, PUT ON DELIBERATE PERFORMANCE, INSULTING NEWSMEN AND REFUSING ALLOW THEM MAKE SCHEDULED VISIT HIS AREA. FOR GOOD MEASURE, ADEKUNLE BEAT AND KICKED FEDERAL SOLDIERS IN PRESENCE OF NEWSMEN, UNSYG PERSONAL REP GUSSIC, AND CAULFIELD, MEMBER U THANT'S LEGAL ADVISORY STAFF. WHILE SUCH ACTIONS MAY HAVE SALUTARY EFFECT IN DISCIPLINING FMG TROOPS, REACTION NEWSMEN AND UN REPS OBVIOUSLY UNFAVORABLE.

CONFIDENTIAL

46

0436

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By MN NARA Date 10/5/05



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PAGE 02 LAGOS 15403 182016Z

3. OSMAN HAD ONE-HOUR INTERVIEW WITH GOWON MORNING DECEMBER 17. HE FOUND GOWON CALM, RELAXED, CONFIDENT. GOWON HOPES TO ATTEND COMMONWEALTH PRIME MINISTERS' CONFERENCE JANUARY 7, BUT TBKD OSMAN QTE EVERYTHING DEPDNDS ON MILITARY SITUATION AT THAT TIME. UNQTE OSMAN SAID GOWON WAS IN REFLECTIVE, ALMOST PENSIVE MOOD AND TOLD HIM QTE YOU KNOW I AM NOT AFRAID TO GO, BUT AS I TOLD YOU, THE MILITARY SITUATION IS OVERRIDING UNQTE.


4. WHEN ASKED ABOUT POSSIBILITIES FURTHER TALKS WITH REBELS, GOWON MADE IT CLEAR AS REPORTED LAGOS 15311 (NOTAL), THAT FMG POSITION ON THIS ISSUE IS PUBLIC, AND THERE LIKELY BE NO REPEAT NO CHANGE.

GP-3

MATHEWS

CONFIDENTIAL

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED 697

PAGE 01 LAGOS 15407 181720Z

53
ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, SA 01, SAH 02, SR 01, ORM 03, AID 28,

PC 04, SCSE 00, SCA 01, ACDA 16, RSR 01, 156 W

081738

R 181528Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4050
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA UNN
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA UNN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA UNN
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW UNN
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY UNN
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE UNN
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NY YORK
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UNCLAS LAGOS 15407


SUBJECT: NIGERIAN PRESS ROUNDUP DECEMBER 18

1. ALL PAPERS EXCEPT TIMES REPORT STATEMENTS MADE BY COMMISSIONER INFO AND LABOR CHIEF A. ENAHORO TO TWO VISITING SOVIET NEWSMEN THAT QTE PEOPLE OUTSIDE NIGERIA WANTED REBELS TO BE APPEASED BUT NIGERIANS SEEK PEACE IN UNITY UNQTE. ENAHORO STATED THAT APPEASEMENT HAD NOT WORKED IN EUROPE AS PROVED BY SECOND WORLD WAR, AND THAT NO PEACE WOULD BE ACHIEVED IN NIGERIA AS LONG AS REBELS CONTINUED TO DEMAND QTE SEPARATE EXISTENCE UNQTE. ENAHORO ALSO SAID THAT STARVATION WAS OJUKWUS FAULT SINCE ARMS STOCKPILED BY REBELS BUT PROVISIONS FOR FOOD HAD BEEN NEGLECTED. ALSO CLAIMED THAT FIGURES GIVEN ON NUMBERS STARVING WERE OVERESTIMATED.

2. POST AND TIMES REPORT OPENING OF NIGERIAN CATHOLIC BISHOPS' CONFERENCE IN LAGOS DEC 17 TO DISCUSS WAR AND HEAR REPORT FROM

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PAGE 02 LAGOS 15407 181720Z

DELEGATION THAT WENT TO ROME TO SPEAK WITH POPE ABOUT NIGERIAN
CRISIS.

3. SKETCH REPORTS AT LENGTH ABOUT SHOWING ON US NBC TELEVISION
OF FRENCH TV FILMS MADE IN BIAFRA INCLUDING KILLING OF ONE OF
BIAFRAS FOREIGN MERCENARIES.
MATHEWS

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| Authority | VND 959503 |
| By | MV NARA Date 10/5/03 |

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 15396 181316Z

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ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, SR 01, ORM 03, NSA 02, ACDA 16, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04,

H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 02,

RSR 01, 134 W

080426

R 181139Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4043
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL KADUNA
AMCONSUL IBADAN

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LAGOS 15396

SUBJ: FMG DENIES VOA AND BBC REPORTS ON REBEL GAINS

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESS RELEASE (UNNECESSARY WORDS OMITTED) ISSUED DEC 17 BY FMG:

A. QUOTE FMG TODAY EMPHASISES THAT FEDERAL FORCES ARE IN FIRM CONTROL OF ALL AREAS WHICH HAVE BEEN LIBERATED SINCE CIVIL WAR BEGAN.

B. ALL IMPORTANT TOWNS LIBERATED BY FEDERAL TROOPS IN THREE EASTERN STATES - ABAKALIKI, IKOM, OBUBRA, OGOJA, CALABAR, ORON, UYO, EKET, ABAK, IKOT EKPENE, ITU, YENAGOA, OPOBO, BONNY, PORT HARCOURT, OKRIKA, DEGEMA, OBONNEMA, BAKANA, BUGUMA, TOMBIA, BRASS, ABA, OWERRI, ONITSHA, ENUGU, OKIGWI, NSUKKA, UDI, AWGU, OJI RIVER - ARE STILL SECURE IN FEDERAL HANDS.

C. ANY COUNTER-ATTACKS BY REBELS HAVE BEEN REPULSED PROMPTLY WITH HEAVY REBEL LOSSES IN MEN AND WAR EQUIPMENT.

D. REBEL REGIME, WHICH OCCUPIES LESS THAN 4,000 SQUARE MILES, MAKES FANTASTIC ANNOUNCEMENTS OF PHONEY VICTORIES TO RAISE FALSE HOPES AMONG ITS FOREIGN COLLABORATORS, IN ORDER TO OBTAIN POLITICAL SUPPORT OVERSEAS.

E. THERE IS DEFINITELY NO TRUTH WHATEVER IN TODAY'S BROADCAST BY BBC AND VOA OF REBEL GAINS, BECAUSE THERE IS

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Authority VND 959503
By MVA Date 10/5/09



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NO EVIDENCE OF THIS SITUATION IN ANY SECTION OF WAR FRONTS
UNGTE.

2. COMMENT: INTERESTING THAT RELEASE DOES NOT
MENTION TOWNS OF OGUTA AND AWKA. WHILE FMG ANNOUNCED
LIBERATION OF OGUTA IN SEPTEMBER, IT HAS NEVER OFFICIALLY
ADMITTED REBELS RETOOK TOWN SHORTLY THEREAFTER. AWKA IS
UNDERSTOOD TO BE MORE OR LESS CONTROLLED BY FMG BUT
SITUATION DIFFICULT WITH BIAFRAN TROOPS IN BUSH NEARBY
ON BOTH SIDES OF ONITSHA-ENUGU ROAD. OBSERVERS GROUP ALSO
SCHEDULED THIS WEEK TO VISIT AWKA AMONG OTHER TOWNS.
EXEMPT MATHEWS

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| Date | 10/5/05 |

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

NR POL 7 UK

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PAGE 01 KADUNA 01739 181434Z

51
ACTION AFI 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, ACDA 16, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07,

LI 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SR 01, ORM 03, SCSE 00,

SCA 01, AID 28, RSR 01, 161 W

080809

R 181330Z DEC 68
FM AMCONSUL KADUNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 996
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
INUFUC/AMEMBASSY PARIS 113
AMCONSUL IBADAN

UNCLAS KADUNA 1739


SUBJECT: NEW NIGERIAN ON RECENT SHEPARD VISIT

1. FULL PAGE FEATURE ARTICLE IN DECEMBER 18 NEW NIGERIAN BY EDITOR ADAMU CIROMA GIVES CIROMA'S ANALYSIS OF REASON FOR RECENT VISIT TO LAGOS BY LORD SHEPARD. CIROMA PRESENTS FANTASTIC PIECE OF INTRIGUE BY BRITAIN, FRANCE AND U.S. INTENDED TO FORCE NIGERIA TO ACCEPT CEASEFIRE IN HOPES OF LESSENING DOMESTIC PRESSURES ON THOSE GOVERNMENTS WHILE SIMULTANEOUSLY COUNTERBALANCING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN NIGERIA. CIROMA'S THESIS IS THAT SHEPARD CAME TO NIGERIA TO PAVE WAY FOR VISIT BY PRIMIN WILSON AT WHICH WILSON WOULD ATTEMPT NEGOTIATE CEASEFIRE BEFORE CHRISTMAS. WILSON WAS ASSURED OF PRESIDENT DEGAULLE'S SUPPORT IF MISSION SUCCESSFUL. THIS SUPPORT HAD BEEN OFFERED BY IVORY COAST FONMIN ASSOUAN DURING RECENT VISIT TO LONDON. U.S. ALSO SUPPORTED MOVE CIROMA SAYS, AND DECIDED TO SWITCH TO FIRM SUPPORT OF OBUKWU IF NIGERIA REFUSED COOPERATE. THIS WAS MADE CLEAR DECEMBER 16, THE DAY ON WHICH GOWON-SHEPARD COMMUNIQUE PUBLISHED, WHEN U.S. ANNOUNCED THAT IT WAS "PREPARED TO OFFER A MASSIVE AID OF 20 MILLION DOLLARS TO OBUKWU" (THIS PRESUMABLY REFERENCE TO WELLES NY TIMES ARTICLE DECEMBER 15).

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PAGE 02 KADUNA 01739 181434Z


2. EDITORIAL IMPLIES SHEPARD MISSION FAILED DUE NIGERIAN DETERMINATION PUT DOWN REBELLION. A FACT WHICH BRITISH HAVE NEVER BEEN ABLE UNDERSTAND. ACCORDING TO "INFORMED SOURCES" IN LAGOS NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT TOLD SHEPARD THAT SINCE WILSON "NOT EXACTLY CONSIDERED BY THE NIGERIAN PUBLIC AS THE MOST POPULAR FRIEND OF NIGERIA AT THE MOMENT" A VISIT BY WILSON WOULD NOT BE WISE AT PRESENT. NOW THAT SHEPARD MISSION HAS FAILED CIROMA SPECULATES THAT BRITISH MAY SUCCUMB TO DOMESTIC PRESSURE AND STOP SELLING ARMS IN WHICH CASE "WE HAVE TO TURN TO OTHER SOURCES." BUT THERE IS STILL A CHANCE THAT BRITISH SUPPORT WILL CONTINUE. "DEPENDING ON WHAT U.S. DOES THE COLD WINDS OF THE COLD WAR MAY BLOW STILL MORE STRONGLY IN OUR DIRECTION."

3. COMMENT; THIS IS THE MOST FANCIFUL AND INCOHERENT PIECE OF RHETORIC WHICH ADAMU CIROMA HAS COME UP WITH IN SOME TIME.
DECON 12/18/69
STOKES

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
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PAGE: 01 ABIDJA 05265 180956Z

20
ACTION: AFI 16

INFO: EUR 15, NEA 13, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, NSA 02, RSR 01, AID 28,
SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 01, SAH 02, 7164 W

079493

R: 180930Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
TO: AMEMBASSY LAGOS
INFO: VUECSTATE WASHDC 3391
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
QSTATE GRNC

S: EIC R E T ABIDJAN 5265
NOFORN

REF: LAGOS 15375

WE HAVE NO FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT INITIATIVES ON BIAFRA
INVOLVING IVORY COAST.

GP: 1. MORGAN

*Abidjan 5265
12-18-68*

*per FR UK
xP
Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria*

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SECRET

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Authority VND 959503
By MW NARA Date 10/5/05

Globe and Mail
December 14, 1963

OTTAWA A-1063

Oxfam, Presbyterians buy Biafra relief plane

A Super Constellation to fly food and medicine into Biafra was bought yesterday by Oxfam of Canada and the Presbyterian Church in Canada.

The cost of the plane, bought from Nordair in Montreal, was less than \$100,000, according to Delbert McKenna, director of public relations for Oxfam. To charter it would have been considerably more expensive, Mr. McKenna said.

The plane's interior will be stripped to accommodate about 45,000 pounds of cargo. Overhauling will take about two weeks, said Capt. J. S.

Patterson, one of a six-man crew taking leave of absence from Nordair to operate the aircraft.

The plane will take on supplies for Biafra in Toronto and will then fly to Sao Tome, which will be its base. Two trips a night will be made into Biafra, Mr. McKenna said.

To finance the operation, Oxfam and the Presbyterian Church will be launching an appeal under the name Can-aidrelief.

"We hope the other churches will join us," Mr. McKenna said.

The crew is on a contract to fly a minimum of three months.

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| By | MV NARA Date 10/5/05 |

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| 5 | | | INFO: GENEVA, LAGOS, LONDON, MONTREAL, USUM, MACOUNDE | | | | | |
| NEA | CU | INR | FROM : Embassy OTTAWA | | | DATE: 12-18-68 | | |
| 5 | | | SUBJECT: NIGERIA/BIAFRA RELIEF: Purchase of Plane by OXFAM | | | | | |
| E | P | IO | REF : | | | | | |
| 4 | | | The Toronto Globe and Mail of December 14 reported that the | | | | | |
| L | FBO | AID | Canadian chapter of the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief | | | | | |
| | | | (OXFAM) and the Presbyterian Church of Canada had bought a | | | | | |
| AGR | COM | FRB | Super Constellation to fly food and medicine to Biafra from | | | | | |
| | | | Sao Tome. The article said that the overhauling of the air- | | | | | |
| INT | LAB | TAR | craft would be completed in about two weeks. An official of | | | | | |
| | | | Nordair, a charter airline based in Montreal, confirmed that | | | | | |
| TR | XMB | AIR | OXFAM had made an offer to purchase a Constellation, but the | | | | | |
| | | | transaction is not yet complete. | | | | | |
| ARMY | CIA | NAVY | A copy of the press article is enclosed with this airgram. | | | | | |
| 3 | 20 | 5 | LINDER | | | | | |
| OSD | USIA | NSA | Enclosure: att 81 | | | | | |
| 34 | 10 | 3 | Article from Globe and Mail | | | | | |
| | | | dated 12/14/68. | | | | | |
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| Drafted by: POL:GBChristianson:bja 12/18/68 | | | Contents and Classification Approved by: DCM:RZSmith | | | | | |
| Clearances: WMJohnson WFCollopy | | | | | | | | |

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Authority: VND954503
By: MNA Date: 10/5/05

ORIGIN: ACTION

AF-5

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

B/L 27 Biafra Nigeria

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Original to be Filed in _____ Decentralized Files.

FILE DESIGNATION

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A-5229

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

INFO : LAGOS

FROM : Amembassy LONDON

DATE: DECEMBER 18, 1968

SUBJECT : Nigeria: Speech in Commons by MP Dunwoody
After Visit to Biafra

REF : LONDON 15106

The Embassy transmits herewith for the information of addressees the text of a speech by Labour MP Dr. John Dunwoody in the House of Commons December 12, 1968 during the course of a general debate on foreign policy (Reftel).

Dr. Dunwoody, who is a medical doctor, gives his impressions of the state of health of the Ibo population, and present and future relief requirements. He believes these requirements can only be filled when hostilities have been terminated and calls for a ceasefire, renewed negotiations and a compromise settlement. Without defining precisely the compromise he has in mind, Dr. Dunwoody implies that some form of confederation may be the best solution. He states:

"We must face the realities of the situation. After nearly 18 months of war, there can be no going back completely to the pre-war situation. It is not realistic to expect people to forget completely everything that has happened in the last eighteen months. It is as utterly unrealistic for Biafra to attempt to become an independent state completely divorced from those around it. A compromise must be reached somewhere between these two extremes."

BRUCE

Enclosure: as stated

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Authority: VNP 959/503
By: MVA Date: 10/5/05

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A-5229

Dr. John Danwoody (Palmouth and Camborne): I want to restrict myself to considering some aspects of the Nigerian civil war, not because I consider the other subjects mentioned so far to be unimportant, but because I believe that they all pale into insignificance when compared with the magnitude and urgency of the humanitarian problems which we and the rest of the world face in Nigeria. I want to give the House a factual account of what I saw myself during the last ten days or so when visiting Biafra.

Many of our debates in the House and much of the discussion in the country have taken place in a vacuum only partially filled by propaganda from both sides in the conflict. There are many facts about the situation which may not be fully appreciated. I spent some six days inside Biafra, a short time, but sufficient to travel around the limited area which is this beleaguered and besieged country. During that time, I was allowed to go where I wished and to meet whomever I wanted. I met the leadership of the Biafran people and I met many ordinary people, missionaries and expatriates. I went to Biafra knowing West Africa where I lived for two years some time ago, and I went with the advantage of a medical qualification which has given me some understanding of the humanitarian problems being faced.

I want first to talk about the nutritional problem which the people living within the area controlled by the Biafran forces are facing, a problem which is shared by others living in areas controlled by the Nigerian federal forces. It is difficult to talk about these problems without being emotional. The pitiful sights which one sees, arouse a violent emotional response in anyone, even one used to seeing disease and death in childhood, but we have to look at this as realistically and as practically as possible.

There is no doubt that the present nutritional condition of the people in Biafra is slightly improved on what it was three or four months ago. The harvest is in and the yams and cassava have been gathered and some local fruit is available. There is no doubt that the

death rate from starvation is lower and probably significantly lower than it was in August and September. That is not to say that there are not many people dying of starvation today. I saw some both dying and about to die. It is not to say that there are not many thousands of children throughout the country suffering severely from diseases like the protein deficiency disease kwashiorkor and other deficiency diseases. The situation is somewhat improved, however, but only temporarily.

Already in large stretches of the country, an area which I estimated to be populated by 20 to 25 per cent. of the population, there is now no local food available. The population there is surviving on the protein brought in by the relief organisations and the carbohydrates transported by the same organisations from other parts of the country. Inevitably and inexorably, in the weeks ahead, perhaps in the next four to six weeks, the population faces complete elimination of all local food supplies. A small amount is being, and presumably will continue to be, smuggled across the firing line, and the Biafrans have hopes of recapturing some farm land where food is available, but these two things together could have only a marginal effect on the situation.

This means that the prospect of starvation increasing is real. The people are eating the seed yams. There is little or no agricultural work being done and the area in which between 7 million and 8 million people are trapped is an area which is normally food importing. This means that over the next three or four months, considering the present poor nutritional condition of many of the population, at least one quarter of the community will probably die. In numerical terms, this means about 1,500,000 to 2 million people. The deaths will concentrate among the children and among the old, because these are the groups in the community least able to sustain starvation.

There are other factors which affect this estimate. Many responsible people would suggest a higher figure. There is particularly the unpredictable possibility of epidemic disease. It is remarkable that in this war situation there has been no epidemic disease on either side of the fighting line, but there is a grave risk.

There is a very grave risk of measles among the children, a disease much more virulent in an African community than with us, a disease which, with a debilitated group of children such as the Biafran children today, could carry a very high mortality.

There is a serious risk of an outbreak of smallpox. Little or no vaccination has been carried out in the last 18 months and public health measures are not at their normal level. If there were to be an outbreak of smallpox, it would not only affect those in Biafra, not only those under Federal control, but be at least something of a risk to world health.

I want to mention the relief organisations whose work on the ground is truly remarkable. At a higher level there may be a certain amount of bickering and difference among the various organisations and in practice there may be difficulties, but the humanitarian assistance which they are providing in a civil war situation should not be underestimated. But organisations are getting supplies in and distributing them. The work which I saw was very impressive. The International Red Cross, the church organisations, particularly the Scandinavian and German church organisations, Caritas, Oxfam and U.N.I.C.E.F. are all playing a part. The food gets to those people who need it. I did not see any evidence anywhere in the country of food going astray. Everyone to whom I spoke said that food reached the people in the community. At every one of the feeding centres which I visited where I saw people being fed *en masse* the food which reaches them is acceptable. When a person is starving, it matters little what sort of food he is offered: he will eat it.

The food which the relief organisations provide is mainly concentrated protein foodstuffs. They carry in on their night flights, medical equipment, drugs and a certain amount of fuel for the relief organisations. The flights carry between 40 and 200 tons of material each night. The amount depends on the military situation and on the amount of bombing of the one airstrip which is used. If we are not to see the collapse of the domestic carbohydrate food supplies which I fear is inevitable if the war continues, the amount of food required by the community to give them just 8 oz.

0448

P6 3
A-5229

[DR. DUNWOODY.]

of food each, with perfect distribution, is over 2,000 tons a day. It is utterly and completely impossible for the relief organisations to manage this in a war situation, irrespective of the question of daylight flights or land corridors.

I do not suggest that the position about daylight flights and possible land corridors is satisfactory. It is not satisfactory. But in the war situation which people in this region are facing, it is understandable that there are objections. The objections raised are military and strategic objections and have no other origin.

I am convinced that it is impossible to solve this humanitarian problem or to make any progress towards a solution unless we can make some progress towards a military and political settlement. I should like to say a few words about the military situation.

There is near stalemate. In recent months there has been a considerable improvement in morale on the Biafran side due to increased supplies of arms, increased fire power and to the fact that the Biafrans have regained certain limited stretches of countryside. They are obtaining two to three times as many recruits as they require. They are intensively training them and some civilians, not only in orthodox warfare, but in guerilla warfare. There is no chance of a military collapse. These people mean it when they say that they will light on. When I met Biafrans, as I did on many occasions, and they said that they would rather starve to death than surrender, they were telling me the truth. Perhaps what they say is based on a certain amount of false optimism about future food supplies and the continuation of arms supplies, but the fact is that these people are prepared to starve to death rather than surrender.

The civilian population is undergoing very considerable privations. I have mentioned the food situation, the near starvation and the threat of real starvation in the weeks ahead. Air raids occur frequently. In a military sense, they are not of very great significance. The number killed in the air raids is infinitesimal compared with the numbers killed in the fighting or who die from lack of food. But the impact on the African community, to whom even an aeroplane is strange, unusual and unreal, cannot be

underestimated. The impact which the air raids have made on the people is remarkable.

Over half of the community in this packed area are refugees who, in most cases, have lost all their possessions and wealth and things which mean much to the Ibo people. There is almost complete economic disruption. There is virtually no money economy. Inflation is rife. While wages and salaries have remained much the same, a box of matches costs 5s., a small tin of meat £2 10s., cigarettes 1s. 6d. each, and a gallon of petrol, if one can buy it £10.

Despite the considerable burdens which the population is having to undergo, there is an air of normality. There is law and order. The courts are sitting. Traffic moves about to a certain extent. There is even a railway running. The public services attempt to operate. Perhaps the overwhelming impression with which I have come back from this area is the determination of these people to continue what they believe to be their just fight. There is mass popular support for this war. It is no good anybody in this country talking in terms of this being a small group of people leading the great mass of the population against their will. There is mass support for the régime in Biafra, and morale is high.

This is not just a tribally-based movement. There is room for a great deal of argument about the opinion of minority groups in the area which Biafra claims as part of its territory. There are different opinions among the minorities, their leaders and the ordinary people, but many of the minority people and their leaders are just as deeply committed to the Biafran cause as the large majority, virtually all, of the Ibo people. As I have said, I see no prospect of a military solution to this conflict. Colonel Ojukwu is representative of the leadership of his country and of the people as a whole. To suggest that he is unrepresentative reduces our chances of approaching this problem in a realistic manner.

I wish to try to be constructive and to put forward some suggestions about where we should be moving. I found a degree of flexibility and a willingness to face some of the realities of the situation which surprised me. I never heard from any of the leaders or from the ordinary

0449

people to whom I spoke in Biafra the word "secession". Everyone to whom I spoke accepted, sometimes unwillingly, the inevitability of co-operation in many fields with the Federation. People said, "We live next door to each other". Economic co-operation, common services, co-operation in social policy and similar fields, customs policy, and so on, are obviously areas for discussion and negotiation.

What these people insist on, rightly or wrongly, is that they should have a guarantee of their physical, economic and political security. After their experiences in recent years, they believe that they cannot be guaranteed this unless they have control of their armed forces. This immediately produces a much more difficult subject for negotiation than the points which I have mentioned. Nevertheless, I do not believe that it is impossible. In each State of the United States there is a militia, controlled by the governor of the State, which is probably armed to a much higher level than the Biafran soldiers.

We must face the realities of the situation. After nearly 18 months of war, there can be no going back completely to the pre-war situation. It is not realistic to expect people to forget completely everything that has happened in the last eighteen months. It is as utterly unrealistic for Biafra to attempt to become an independent state completely divorced from those around it. A compromise must be reached somewhere between these two extremes.

The urgent, essential need is for a ceasefire as soon as possible. It should be unconditional and followed immediately by negotiations over a limited field. The negotiations should cover positioning of the troops, the rôle of a peace-keeping force, which will be essential, and the co-ordination of relief to both sides.

At the same time, I would like to see an international moratorium on arms supplies to this area, if not on a permanent basis at least on a temporary basis. If this cannot be achieved I ask the Government to reconsider their position on arms supplies, since the political, economic and military justifications for this policy in the early days of the war are to a considerable extent now proven to be untrue. The war did not end in a

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few weeks. The régime is not unrepresentative of the people in the country. I am dubious whether the continuation of our policy is causing us political and economic damage throughout this area. One of my hon. Friends said that at least there has been no change in the amount of military aid we have been offering. May we have this assurance from the Front Bench?

The more difficult problems of economic co-operation and the military and political solution of the conflict will obviously take a much longer time; very much more detailed discussion and negotiation are necessary. This I found to be accepted on the Biafran side, and I believe it would also be accepted on the Federal side. I think that there are sufficient political courage, foresight and ability on both sides to reach a settlement; the difficulty is in achieving the first few steps towards a negotiated position.

There is extreme urgency about this. I have already spoken of the humanitarian problem and of how a large number of people will starve to death in the months ahead. There is another reason why we should look at this matter very urgently, and that is the real and increasing risk of external involvement. Many people are prepared to fish in these troubled waters, some of whom are much less responsible even than those fishing in these waters today.

We are seeing unfolded before us possibly the greatest preventable human tragedy the modern world has known. I appeal to my colleagues in the Government to exert any and every pressure they can. I appeal to my colleagues on this side of the House and to hon. Members opposite to do all that they can, if they have any influence whatsoever on the people on either side of this conflict. I ask all men of good will in Africa and in the rest of the world to think of the innocents on both sides, the people who are suffering and dying. For many of them, if we do not do something about this in the next few weeks, this will be the last Christmas that they will ever see.

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Authority VND 959503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 15366 181613Z

43
ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, SCA 01, SCSE 00, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20,

RSR 01, SAH 02, /135 W

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R 171200Z DEC 68
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4026.
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA
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AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
USIA WASHDC

UNCLAS LAGOS 15366

USIA FOR IBS

SUBJ NIGERIAN PRESS ROUNDUP DECEMBER 17

1. ALL PAPERS CARRY STRAIGHT NEWS REPORTS OF COMMUNIQUE
ISSUED AT END OF LORD SHEPHERDS VISIT (LAGOS 15333 NOTAL).

2. SKETCH, TIMES AND POST REPORT FMG PRESS RELEASE DEC 16
WARNING CIVILIANS IN REBEL-HELD AREAS TO KEEP AWAY FROM QTE
STRATEGIC MILITARY TARGETS SUCH AS AMMUNITION DEPOTS, MILITARY
VEHICLES, REBEL TROOP CONCENTRATIONS AND TRAINING CAMPS UNQTE
BECAUSE AIR RAIDS OF NAFI HAVE BEEN SUCCESSFULLY STEPPED UP.
INCREASE ALSO ANNOUNCED IN AIR PATROLS OVER REBEL-HELD AREAS
IN ORDER TO INTERDICT ARMS FLIGHTS.

3. SKETCH, TIMES AND POST REPORT THAT MILGOV LAGOS STATE JOHNSON

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By MVA Date 10/5/05



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
PAGE 02 LAGOS 15366 181613Z

URGENT INTERNATIONAL OBSERVERS TO STAY ON IN NIGERIA. OBSERVERS PAID COURTESY CALL ON MILGOV DEC 16. JOHNSON ALSO EXPRESSED VIEW THAT OBSERVERS IN NO WAY INTERFERING IN CONDUCT OF WAR AND PRAISED OBSERVERS ROLE IN EXPOSING REBEL PROPAGANDA. IN REPLY HEAD OF OBSERVER TEAM GENERAL MILROY EXPRESSED TEAMS WILLINGNESS TO STAY ON AS LONG AS FMG AND THEIR OWN COUNTRIES AND ORGANIZATIONS AGREED.

4. POST REPORTS STATEMENTS OF LORD BROCKWAY IN LONDON ON RETURN FROM VISIT TO BIAFRA. LORD BROCKWAY REPORTEDLY SAID HE WAS QTE DISAPPOINTED UNQTE IN OJUKWU FOR PLACING POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS ABOVE HUMANITARIAN ONES THUS BRINGING SUFFERING TO HIS PEOPLE. POST EDITORIAL, QTE DISAPPOINTMENT OF FENNER BROCKWAY UNQTE, CRITICIZES BROCKWAY FOR NOT REALIZING SOONER THAT OJUKWU PLAYING POLITICS AND LESS CONCERNED WITH RELIEF THAN ARMS. STATES THAT LORD BROCKWAY ALWAYS KNOWN AS QTE CHAMPION OF LOST CAUSES UNQTE BUT STILL SURPRISING THAT AFTER ALL INFORMATION AVAILABLE ABOUT ARMS POURING INTO BIAFRA, OBSERVERS' REPORTS AND FINDINGS THAT GENOCIDE NOT FMG POLICY, BROCKWAY HAD TO MAKE QTE ILLEGAL FLIGHT UNQTE INTO BIAFRA TO HAVE QTE SCALES FALL FROM HIS EYES UNQTE. STATES THAT HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD REALIZE THEY HAVE BEEN QTE CASTING THEIR PEARLS BEFORE SWINE (AND)... RISE UP IN ONE VOICE AND TELL OJUKWU TO GIVE UP SECESSION. WAR WILL END INSTANT HE DOES THAT. UNQTE MATHEWS

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 LIBREV 02079 180808Z

20

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INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04,

RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, NSA 02, RSR 01, SCA 01, SCS 04, AID 28,

SR 01, ORM 03, SAH 02, SA 01, 152 W

078993

R 171415Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2187
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIBREVILLE 2079

REF LIBREVILLE 2073 — *POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA*
XR POL 27-9 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

SUBJ BOMBING OF FRENCH OPERATED HOSPITAL IN BIAFRA

IN PROVIDING FURTHER CLARIFICATION HOSPITAL BOMBING, MERLE INFORMED EMBOFF HOSPITAL FRENCH OPERATED UNDER ICRC AUSPICES. ATTACK MADE IN DAYLIGHT AT 200 METERS ALTITUDE BY TWO ILUYSHINS, FIRST WITH BOMBS AND SECOND WITH MACHINE GUN FIRE. MERLE SHOWED EMBOFF PICTURES OF DAMAGE AND WOUNDED SOME OF WHOM DISMEMBERED. THREE KILLED AND ABOUT 20 WOUNDED, APPARENTLY ALL BIAFRANS. MERLE QUITE DISTURBED OVER ATTACK WHICH HE CONSIDERS DELIBERATE. SAID HOSPITAL, 17 KILOMETERS FROM AIRPORT AND 20 KILOMETERS FROM NEAREST FIGHTING FRONT, CLEARLY MARKED WITH RED CROSSES. MERLE SAID SIMILAR ATTACK MADE ON UMUAHIA HOSPITAL NEXT DAY. GP 3 BANE

MICROFILMED BY NSA

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Authority VND 954503
By MN/ARA Date 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

31

Pol 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria

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PAGE 01 LONDON 15223 171936Z

51

ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CCO 00, SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00,

GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20,

SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 01, AID 28, SAH 02, RSR 01, 137 W
075912

P 171902Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7834
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION GENEVA
USUN NEW YORK 1530

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LONDON 15223

SUBJECT: NIGERIAN RELIEF

REF: STATE 288069- *Pol 27-9 Biafra-Nigeria*

1. WE WILL BE GLAD TO SEE AMB MOORE BACK IN LONDON. AS DEPT AWARE, SENIOR BRITISH OFFICIALS, FROM PRIMIN ON DOWN, ARE SPENDING CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF TIME ON NIGERIAN CRISIS. NEW BRITISH INITIATIVES ARE BEING CRANKED UP AS QUICKLY AS OLD ONES BECOME NON-STARTERS. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE CANNOT GUARANTEE THAT RESPONSIBLE SENIOR OFFICIALS WILL BE AVAILABLE IN ALL CASES. WE ARE HOWEVER SETTING UP APPOINTMENT FOR NOON FRIDAY (DEC 20) WITH FO ASST UNDERSECTY DONALD TEBBIT AND STAFF AND LUNCH WITH PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECTY MAURICE FOLEY. IF NECESSARY, AND TIME PERMITS, TALKS CAN CARRY OVER INTO AFTERNOON. THIS SHOULD ENABLE MOORE TO LEAVE ON PAA 1 AT 1830.

2. RESERVATIONS BEING MADE FOR MOORE AND PROVISIONALLY FOR NORTH AT EUROPA HOTEL NIGHT OF THURSDAY, DEC 19.
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Authority VNP 959503
By MVA/ARA Date 10/5/05

37



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 Department of State ^{XR POL 27 BIAFRA NIGERIA} **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 15375 171551Z

51
ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, NEA 13, IO 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07,

L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03,

SCS 04, SCA 01, SAH 02, SSR 01, 164 W

074657

R 171523Z DEC 68
 FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4032
 INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
 AMEMBASSY LONDON
 AMEMBASSY PARIS

S E C R E T LAGOS 15375

NOFORN

SUBJ: ANGLO-FRENCH TALKS ON AFRICA AND MIDDLE EAST

1. WE GATHER FROM VARIOUS BRITISH MESSAGES THAT THE TALKS SCHEDULED FOR LONDON THIS WEEK HAVE BEEN CALLED OFF BECAUSE OF DEC. 12 ARTICLE IN FINANCIAL TIMES, WHICH HAD ANNOYED DEBRE.

2. ACCORDING MESSAGES, DEBRE WAS READY THEREAFTER TO HOLD TALKS ONLY IF BIAFRA NOT DISCUSSED. BRITISH GAVE ASSURANCES ARTICLE NOT INSPIRED BY HMG AND THEN TOOK POSITION THEY WERE NOT INTERESTED IN TALKS WHICH WOULD NOT INCLUDE NIGERIAN PROBLEM.

3. DEBRE APPARENTLY REJOINED THAT BRITISH COULD SEND OFFICER TO PARIS TO DISCUSS BIAFRA BUT STUCK BY REFUSAL TO DISCUSS IT IN LONDON.

4. FCO CONCLUDES THAT FRENCH LINE AGAIN RIGID, THAT HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY STILL WHOLEHEARTEDLY WITH BIAFRA, AND THAT OJUKWU NOT INTERESTED IN NEGOTIATIONS AT PRESENT. THIS SUGGESTS TO THEM THAT INITIATIVE THROUGH IVORY COAST UNPRODUCTIVE AT THIS TIME.

SECRET

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 Authority VNP 959503
 By MVA Date 10/5/05

| ACTION | | | DEPARTMENT OF STATE | | | SAC 10 NIGERIA | | |
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TO : Department of State

INFO: Ibadan, Kaduna, London, Geneva

DATE: DEC 17 1968

FROM : Amembassy LAGOS

SUBJECT: Nigerian Relief - Seed Yams

REF :

In light of various and sometimes conflicting reports on the extent of consumption of seed yams in Biafra, the following extract from a British message furnished us by the UK High Commission in Lagos may be of interest to the Department. The comments quoted below are by the High Commission's agricultural adviser who has had long experience of Nigerian agriculture.

QUOTE. Yams (which are staple food of most southern Nigerians) are propagated by planting either cut portions of larger yams or by the planting of small yams. Small 'seed yams' are often produced by uncovering the yam in Aug/Sept while the above-ground portion (the vine) is still green, removing the bulk of the yam tuber for food but leaving a small portion (about 10% of the yam) attached to the vine which is then again covered with earth and allowed to grow on until the vine dies. The 'seed yam' is then harvested (November) and kept for planting or for food. No part of the unsprouted seed yam is inedible. The seed yams thus produced are subsequently planted during the period November to March (when rains begin) and then harvested from July to November.

Recent references to the consumption of 'seed yams' in the rebel held areas of Eastern Nigeria could be regarded as a dramatic way of saying that no planting material of yams is being retained for the establishment of the next crop.

In normal times the East is short of food between February and June. The shortage now being anticipated in January 69 is therefore not unexpected in view of the increase in population within the rebel held areas caused by refugees, and unless relieved, will continue until

GROUP 4 - Downgraded at three-year intervals. Declassified 12 years after date of origin.

FORM 4-62 DS-323

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Drafted by: ECON:ROBlucker:kmc 12-17-68

Contents and Classification Approved by: ECON:ROBlucker

Clearances:

POL - Mr. Ramsaur

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 959503
By: MNARA Date: 10/5/05

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the next harvest which would be jeopardised if planting material is now being consumed. Unless therefore planting material or food yams can be imported, which seems unlikely until the end of the war, the shortage of yams within the rebel enclave could be very prolonged, i.e. about 18 months from now. Information available does not indicate the position within the rebel enclave of the availability of other foodstuffs such as cassava and cereals, etc.

UNQUOTE.

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| DECLASSIFIED | |
| Authority | VND 959503 |
| By | MV NARA Date 10/5/05 |



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

21

*Pol 27 Biafra -
Nigeria*

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PAGE 01 LONDON 15222 172000Z

49
ACTION EUR 20

INFO: AF 10, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 02, SR 01, NIC 01,

AID 28, PC 04, MC 01, ACDA 16, RSR 01, /162 W

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P 171908Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7833
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS

UNCLAS LONDON 15222

SUBJ: STEWART ON NIGERIA

1. IN COMMONS YESTERDAY (16 DEC.) FONSEC STEWART IN RESPONSE TO MPS QUESTIONS MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

2. LORD SHEPARD MET AGAIN WITH GEN. GOWEN DEC 16. AND WILL RETURN SHORTLY TO LONDON.

3. ALTHOUGH NOTHING DEFINITE CAN BE SAID ABOUT POSSIBILITIES OF CHRISTMAS TRUCE (SINCE BIAFRA INSISTS ON GOING TO CONFERENCE TABLE AS INDEPENDENT NATION), TRUCE WOULD BE MEANS OF GETTING BEGINNINGS OF CEASE-FIRE.

4. HMG WOULD BE WILLING TO COOPERATE IN ANY PEACE-KEEPING FORCE ARRANGED, BUT PROGRESS ON SUCH MATTER HAS BEEN HARD TO MAKE.

5. HMG WOULD BE READY TO COOPERATE IN ANY ENFORCEABLE INTERNATIONAL ARMS EMBARGO WHICH COULD BE ARRANGED IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGREEMENT TO END THE FIGHTING, BUT RUSSIANS HAVE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE FEDERAL GOVT. IN ANY EVENT, AND IF EMBARGO IS TO BE EFFECTIVE IT MUST BE POLICED AND BE CONNECTED TO CEASE-FIRE.


6. AGENDA OF COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE CANNOT BE PRE-EMPTED BY UK DEMAND FOR DISCUSSION OF NIGERIA.

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*London - 15222
12/17/68*

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 LONDON 15222 172000Z

7. IN RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION, STEWART STATED HMG
HAS HAD "SEVERAL DISCUSSIONS" WITH FRENCH ABOUT NIGERIA AND
ARMS SUPPLIES, BUT FRENCH DENY SUPPLYING ARMS TO IBOS.
BRUCE

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| Authority | VND 959/503 |
| By | MVA |
| Date | 10/5/05 |

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POL 15 NIGERIA
TR POL 3 OAU
Department of State **TELEGRAM**
TR POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

CONFIDENTIAL 526

PAGE 01 LAGOS 15333 161615Z

47
ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, SSO 00, NSCE 00, USIE 00, CCO 00, CIAE 00, DODE 00,

GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25,

AID 28, SAH 02, SR 01, ORM 03, SCS 04, SCA 01, RSR 01, /142 W
..... 068368

O P 161516Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4008
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L LAGOS 15333

SUBJ: UK-FMG COMMUNIQUE

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF UK-FMG COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT 1300 GMT TODAY:

A. BEGIN TEXT (UNCLASSIFIED) TALKS BETWEEN MAJOR-GENERAL GOWON, HEAD OF THE FEDERAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT, AND LORD SHEPHERD, THE BRITISH MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, WERE HELD ON WEDNESDAY, 11 DECEMBER AND FRIDAY, 13 DECEMBER. LORD SHEPHERD HANDED OVER TO GENERAL GOWON A LETTER FROM MR. HAROLD WILSON, THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER. HIS LETTER AND THE DISCUSSIONS THEMSELVES FORMED PART OF THE CONTINUING EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE NIGERIAN AND BRITISH GOVERNMENTS ON THE PRESENT SITUATION AND ON MATTERS OF COMMON CONCERN.

B. LORD SHEPHERD REAFFIRMED THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND THEIR DESIRE TO SEE AN EARLY SETTLEMENT OF THE PRESENT CONFLICT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A UNITED NIGERIA. HE STATED THAT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ATTACHES THE GREATEST IMPORTANCE TO THE O.A.U. EFFORTS TO BRING THIS ABOUT AND STRESSED THE INTENTION OF THE

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By MVA/ARA Date 10/5/05

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| By | MMARA |
| Date | 10/5/05 |



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

XR POL 27-9 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

CONFIDENTIAL 753

PAGE 01 LIBREV 02073 142023Z

43:
ACTION: AF 16

INFO: EUR 15, SR 01, ORM 03, AID 28, SCS 04, SCA 01, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00,

GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25,

USIA 12, SAH 02, RSR 01, /154 W

062619

P 141530Z DEC 68:
FM AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE:
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2181
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L LIBREVILLE 2073

SUBJ: BOMBING OF FRENCH HOSPITAL IN BIAFRA


1. EMBOFFI VISITED FRENCH MILITARY ATTACHE LTCOL JEAN MERLE THIS MORNING WITH AMERICAN FREE-LANCE PHOTOGRAPHER BOB RICHARDS, NO ONI ASSIGNMENT FOR "NEW WORLD", TO OBTAIN AUTHORIZATION FOR LATTER TO TAKE PHOTOS OF BIAFRAN CHILDREN AT LIBREVILLE FRENCH MILITARY FIELD HOSPITAL. WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION READILY GIVEN.

2. MERLE SEEMED IN EXCITABLE MOOD AND EXPLAINED THAT HIS ALREADY HEAVY RESPONSIBILITIES WITH RESPECT TO CURRENT AIR SUPPLY OPERATIONS TO BIAFRA WERE COMPOUNDED AS RESULT OF YESTERDAY'S BOMBING OF FRENCH MILITARY (SIC) HOSPITAL IN BIAFRA BY FEDERAL GOVT. HE SAID 44 PERSONS--MOSTLY CHILDREN-- WERE SERIOUSLY WOUNDED AND AT LEAST 3 KILLED. HE QUALIFIED ATTACK AS INTENTIONAL AND SAVAGERY, SINCE HOSPITAL WELL MARKED WITH RED CROSSES AND SITUATED 12 MILES FROM NEAREST AIRPORT. ATTACK INVOLVED TWO AIRCRAFT WHICH BOMBED AND MACHINE GUNNED INSTALLATION FROM HEIGHT OF 600 METERS. TO COMPLICATE MATTERS, FRENCH HEAD OF HOSPITAL LATER INVOLVED IN UNRELATED VEHICLE ACCIDENT IN WHICH, IT IS BELIEVED, HE KILLED.

3. FRENCH BIAFRAN HOSPITAL APPARENTLY BIG OPERATION--2000 BEDS, MOSTLY FOR CHILDREN, AND ATTENDING 2000 ADDITIONAL

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**


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PAGE 02 LIBREV 02073 142023Z

PERSONS DAILY. MERLE STATED LIBREVILLE AIRLIFT CURRENTLY
RUNS AT LEAST ONE FLIGHT EVERY 5 DAYS TO SUPPLY HOSPITAL
WITH FOOD, SUPPLIES, AND MEDICINES. ANOTHER EXCLUSIVE TODAY
FLIGHT SUPPLIES CARITAS. REST AIR LIFTED SUPPLIED FROM
LIBREVILLE GO TO BIAFRAN RED CROSS. LAST WEEK, HE NOTED, 50
TONS SUPPLIES WERE SHIPPED. GP 3 BANE

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| ORIGIN/ACTION | | | DEPARTMENT OF STATE | | POL 3 OAK | |
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| RM/R | REP | AF | AIRGRAM | | FOR RM USE ONLY | |
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| ARA | EUR | FE | UNCLASSIFIED | | KR-DOL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA | |
| 5* | | | NO. 993 | | HANDLING INDICATOR | |
| NEA | EUR | INR | TO : Department of State | | | |
| 5/R | OR | 5 | DEPT PLEASE PASS WITH ENCLOSURE: ACCRA*, ADDIS ABABA*, ALGIERS*, IBADAN*, | | | |
| 5/R | 2 | 5 | KADUNA*, KINSHASA*, LAGOS* (12), LONDON*, MONROVIA*, NIAMEY*, | | | |
| SCS | FBO | AID | OTTAWA*, STOCKHOLM*, WARSAW*, OSD* FOR CINCSTRIKE/CINCMCAFSA | | | |
| 20 | | | FROM : Amembassy LAGOS | | | |
| SP | 5/S | ACD | DATE: December 14, 1968 | | | |
| 10 | | 17 | SUBJECT: Final Report of OAU Observers Covering October 5 to December 10, 1968 | | | |
| AGR | COM | FRB | REF : Lagos 15191 - of (LOU17) | | | |
| INT | LAB | TAR | On December 10, 1968, the OAU Observers (Commandant Sliman Hoffmann of Algiers and Brig-Gen. Negga Teghegn of Ethiopia) presented their separate report to Head of State Gowon. The full text is transmitted as an enclosure to this airgram. | | | |
| TR | XMB | AIR | The OAU Observers note that, "Although the main mandate of the International Observers to Nigeria was to witness the conduct of Federal troops regarding charge of genocide of Ibos and systematic wanton destruction of their properties in the war affected areas, it is the Observers' belief that some additional basic information on the crisis could be useful to the Organisation of African Unity. This report, therefore, reflects, among other things, findings of the Organisation of African Unity observers during their stay." | | | |
| ARMY | CIA | NAVY | The report, after making this distinction between the OAU and the other observers, goes on to a historical treatment entitled "Background to the Nigerian Crisis." This review is generally sympathetic to the FMG's version of the background and immediate causes of the present civil war. It is interesting to note that in the course of this review, the OAU Observers state that "the military superiority of the Federal Government became inevitable." | | | |
| 3 | 20 | 5 | In Section III of the report, "Conduct of Observation," the OAU Observers make a distinction between their role and that of the representatives of Canada, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, indicating that these four observers had somehow lumped the OAU members with the four, without taking note of their OAU sponsorship. | | | |
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Authority: VND 959503
By: M. ARA Date: 10/5/05

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Lagos A- 993

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Turning to the substance of the report, on genocide the OAU found that "Observers have neither seen nor heard any evidence of act of genocide perpetrated by Federal troops against either the Ibo tribe or against any other tribe of the Federation. After several visits and intensive investigations of these allegations, they were convinced that, apart from unavoidable losses of lives and destruction to property in the prosecution of the war, Federal troops have not engaged in any act of genocide against the Ibo tribe."

With reference to destruction of property, they found that they "have not seen any sign of systematic destruction of property be it private or public by the Federal troops." The observers note that committees have been founded in Benin City, Kano, Zaria, Kaduna and Jos to look after Ibo property. They also note that "those Ibos who returned recently to some of the above mentioned cities have reclaimed their properties."

With reference to the conduct of Federal troops, the observers found "The discipline and good behaviour of the Federal troops are commendable. They make genuine efforts in helping the displaced people. Their kind disposition has created an atmosphere of relaxation among the civilian population and the rebirth of mutual trust. Observers have noted with satisfaction signs of good relationship and cooperation between the military and the civilian population." The observers also noted "a remarkable sense of brotherhood and solidarity between elements of different regions and tribes in the Federal Army, which is the true embodiment of Nigerian unity." Concerning the civilian population in federally held territory, the observers found that many displaced persons were coming out of hiding and were taken to refugee camps. The observers said "The greater part of the adult population in the refugee camps are in good health and fairly well looked after. However, the majority of children in the camps are suffering from malnutrition. The Federal authorities found a solution in opening several relief, rehabilitation and treatment centres in the region." The above findings apply to the area under the jurisdiction of the Third Nigerian Marine Commando Division.


In the region of the Second Nigerian Infantry Division (Onitsha, Benin City, Warri, Kwale, Asaba), the observers noted that life had returned to normal for Ibos living west of the River Niger. However, in Onitsha, there was no civilian life "except in the refugee camp." The internees in this sector are "satisfactorily looked after."

In the north and eastern front (First Nigerian Division) around Enugu, Awgu, Afikpo, and Abakaliki, the observers found the civilian population in reasonably good condition. Some were coming out of hiding, although in rather poor health. Children are suffering from malnutrition and diseases. School activities have not resumed except in Enugu.

The observers visited POW and preventive detention camps at Asaba and Kwale in the Mid-West, and Ikoyi and Kirikiri in Lagos. The prisoners

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| INR | E | P | IO | TO : Department of State | | <i>Barre</i> <i>RR</i> <i>RS/R</i> <i>7/26/68</i> | | |
| L | FBO | AID | IO | INFO: LAGOS, LIBREVILLE, LONDON, PRETORIA, CINCSTRIKE. | | | | |
| S/P, 6/10/4, 1, RS/AN-McGOWEN | | | | ANALYSIS BRANCH | | | | |
| AGR | COM | FRB | INT | FROM : Amconsul SALISBURY | | DATE: December 13, 1968 | | |
| LAB | TAR | TR | XMB | SUBJECT : Interview with Mercenary from Biafra | | | | <i>RS/R</i> <i>7/26/68</i> |
| AIR | ARMY | NAVY | OSD | REF : | | | | |
| USIA | NSA | CIA | 34 | <p>Enclosed is an interview with a British-born mercenary, Lt. Barrie ST. JOHN, who was recently expelled from Biafra after serving for three months. The article, which gives details on mercenary operations and on how and why St. John and five other mercenary officers were arrested and deported, appeared in the "Sunday Mail" for December 8, 1968.</p> <p>Also enclosed is a news item from the same paper for December 1 which notes the departure from Salisbury of ex-Biafran mercenaries Colonel Rolf STEINER and Major Alexander R. GAY after alleged recruiting activities in Rhodesia.</p> <p style="text-align: center;">O'NEILL <i>Wm</i></p> <p>Enclosures:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Sunday Mail article of Dec. 8. 2. Sunday Mail article of Dec. 1. | | | | |
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| Clearances: | | | | Phone No.: | | | | |
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| | | | | W. Paul O'Neill, Jr. | | | | |
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0466

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Authority *VND 959503*

By *MM* Date *10/5/05*

Sunday Mail Reporter

BRITISH-BORN mercenary Lieut. Barrie St. John (23), who was expelled from Biafra last month, said in Salisbury yesterday: "After three months of carnage and chaos I'm fed up with war. I want to settle down and find a job."

Lt. St. John described how he and five other mercenary officers were arrested, handcuffed and flown out of Biafra on the orders of Col. Ojukwu. The group included the mercenary brigade commander, Col. Rolf Steiner, who left Salisbury last Saturday and is now in Paris.

In Salisbury, Col. Steiner denied that the mercenaries had been expelled.

Said Lt. St. John: "We were put on the aircraft at gunpoint. Col. Steiner and the rest were handcuffed and placed in leg irons. I had my ankles and hands tied with cord."

"We were separated and an armed guard sat with each of us during the 40-minute flight to Libreville in Gabon. A black officer patrolled the gangway with a drawn pistol. Most of us believed they intended to kill us by opening the doors and pushing us out."

Before they were put on the aircraft, the group spent three days in a Biafran jail, he said.

Twice during the first night they were taken outside and stood against a wall to face a firing squad.

"We were certain they intended to shoot us. The wall was heavily pitted with bullets and had obviously been used for executions before, but nothing happened."

He said the group had been arrested after weeks of growing tension between the Biafran high command and the mercenaries.

"Apart from anything else, the only successful operations carried out by the Biafrans have been led by white mercenaries. This had become an increasing embarrassment to Ojukwu."

Attempts had been made to undermine confidence in Col. Steiner. Individual white officers had been approached and asked whether they were happy with his leadership.

Finally the white mercenaries, including Col. Steiner, a former officer in the French Foreign Legion, were called to State House, Col. Ojukwu's headquarters in Umuahia.

"Col. Steiner arrived later and was promptly searched by a black aide. The aide found a small tricolour flag in his pocket, tore it up, and ground the pieces into the ground."

"There was a scuffle and Col. Steiner was immediately taken away under guard."

"The rest of us were told the Biafrans were very dissatisfied with the conduct of the mercenaries. If we wished to stay on we would have to agree to serve under black officers."

"We immediately got up and walked out, but they were waiting to arrest us at the door."

The group was imprisoned at Airport Annabelle and at first were refused food or

water. Grinning guards threatened them with sub-machine guns through the bars.

Next day Nigerian aircraft attacked the airfield and their guards fled.

"There was absolute chaos. Everyone was just milling around not knowing what to do. Finally Col. Steiner took charge and restored some sort of order. It was a completely ludicrous situation."

On his second night in jail the guards allowed Lt. St. John's batman to visit him.

"He had tucked an Italian sub-machine-gun and 200 rounds of ammunition under his coat and suggested I break out. He said the rest of my unit were waiting a mile down the road with two jeeps and a 30mm. machine-gun."

"The trouble was there was nowhere to go if we did break out. The Nigerians would have shown us little mercy. We all had a price on our heads."

Chaotic

Lt. St. John, a former Royal Marine who served as a mercenary in Venezuela and Bolivia, went to Biafra three months ago and was put in command of a 250-strong marine unit. He found conditions chaotic.

The mercenaries were given the job of crossing the Niger River and capturing the twin towns of Onitsha and Assaba, but the supplies promised for the offensive failed to arrive.

"In my own unit there were only 15 weapons among 250 men. The only way we could get supplies was to set up roadblocks and stop and strip other Biafran units of their arms and ammunition."

The mercenaries captured three-quarters of Onitsha be-

fore they ran out of ammunition and were forced to withdraw.

The mercenaries found that the supplies intended for them had been diverted to another Biafran division in the same sector. The division had 13,000 weapons for 7,000 men.

"One night Col. Steiner with 20 men, including 15 white mercenaries, attacked the division's headquarters and stole back some of our supplies."

"We had to use similar desperate measures to secure supplies being airlifted in to Airport Annabelle. If you didn't get it first the stuff ended up on the black market. Cigarettes fetch £3 10s. for 20 and petrol was between £18 and £25 a gallon."

"We got most of our fuel by syphoning it out of the aircraft."

The second attack on Onitsha was a complete failure. The boats carrying the 2,000 strong invasion force were machine-gunned as they crossed the Niger. Lt. St. John lost 130 of his men in the attempted crossing.

Soon afterwards the mercenaries were called to State House and expelled.

"Now all I want to do is settle down and get a job. Fighting as a mercenary pays well (he earned 1,000 U.S. dollars a month as a lieutenant), but you never know whether your next contract will be your last."

0467

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Authority VND 954503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

SUNDAY MAIL, Dec. 1, 1968

Page 1 of 1
Enclosure 2
Salisbury A-403

Recruits for Biafra fighting?

Sunday Mail Reporter

TWO mercenary soldiers left Salisbury yesterday after what is thought to have been a 12-day campaign to recruit Rhodesians to fight for Biafra.

When he was interviewed 10 days ago, one of the mercenaries, Colonel Rolf Steiner, a 38-year-old German, said he was on holiday in Salisbury and on his way to South Africa for a rest after 12 months of fighting in Biafra.

It is understood, however, that Col. Steiner left Rhodesia for Zurich yesterday.

When he booked into a Salisbury hotel 12 days ago, he was accompanied by a Major A. R. Gay.

Major Gay is known to have been recruiting in Salisbury during his stay. He also booked out of his hotel and left for Salisbury airport yesterday afternoon.

A former mercenary, Mr. Allan Stevens, now a Salisbury night-club manager, said yesterday he knew Major Gay had been recruiting here and had had "a limited success".

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Authority VND 954503
By MN NARA Date 10/3/05

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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Origin
Info:

ACTION: Amembassy THE HAGUE

INFO : Amembassy LAGOS

Ref: Hague 8266

Subj: Nigeria

1. USG has not rpt not sent observer to Biafra and its attitude toward Biafra remains unchanged. Congressman Lukens and possibly other Congressmen may visit Biafra but in purely unofficial capacity which in no way involves executive branch.
2. Embassy should so inform Dankert and supplement with description of US policy on Nigeria, drawing on December 3 Katzenbach speech carried wireless file (Deptel 281466) as appropriate.

RUSK

NOTIFIED BY 68/1

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| Drafted by: | AF/W:ALogen:ba 12/13/68 | Tel. Ext. | 6402 | Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: | Roy M. Melbourne Nigeria Task Force Rm |
| Clearances: | EUR/FBX-Miss Jean (sub) H-Amb. Torbert (sub) | | | | |

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 15276 140859Z

22
ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

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USMISSION USUN
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA

CONFIDENTIAL LAGOS 15276

SUBJECT: FORMAL FMG PROTEST TO HMG CONCERNING DEBATE ON
NIGERIA IN BRITISH PARLIAMENT

REF: LAGOS 15191, PARA

1. UKHICOM (PROTECT) HAS PASSED TO US COPY OF REPORT TO
LONDON ABOUT FORMAL PROTEST PRESENTED DEC 9 TO HICOMER
BY PERMSEC MINEXTAFF BABA GANA ABOUT CONTINUING DEBATE
IN BRITISH PARLIAMENT ON NIGERIAN CRISIS. BABA GANA WAS
ELABORATELY FORMAL IN PRESENTING PROTEST AND EMPHASIZED
THAT HE WAS SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF HIS SUPERIOR ARIKPO, WHO
WAS TEMPORARILY ABSENT.

2. BABA GANA SAID WHILE HE WAS AWARE OF IMPORTANCE OF FREE
SPEECH IN PARLIAMENT HMG ASKED TO CONSIDER EFFECT ON
NIGERIANS OF QTE CONSTANT DISCUSSION OF THEIR AFFAIRS NOT
TO MENTION HOSTILE CRITICISM UNQTE IN PARLIAMENT.
EXPRESSED FEELING THAT MANY MP'S SPOKE AS IF NIGERIA STILL
COLONY AND BRITISH HAD QTE BOTH RESPONSIBILITY AND RIGHT

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By MWA Date 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 LAGOS 15276 140859Z

TO TAKE ACTION WHEN NIGERIANS DID SOMETHING THEY DISAPPROVED OF. UNQTE. STATED THAT WHILE FMG QTE THOROUGHLY APPRECIATED AND WERE DEEPLY GRATEFUL UNQTE FOR HMG SUPPORT, FMG WAS BEING ATTACKED AT HOME BY QTE RADICALS UNQTE FOR PARTIALITY TO BRITAIN WHO USED PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES TO SHOW BRITAIN QTE BASICALLY UNFRIENDLY UNQTE. POINTED TO BBC COVERAGE WHICH ONLY SELECTED PRO BIAFRAN MP'S FOR INTERVIEW AND TREATED THEM QTE MOST SYMPATHETICALLY UNQTE.

3. IN REPLY HICOMER AGREED WITH POINTS ON BBC BUT STATED NOTHING COULD BE DONE SINCE BBC NOT CONTROLLED BY HMG. ALSO MADE POINTS THAT DEBATES WERE ON OPPOSITION TIME AND HMG COULD NOT PREVENT THIS AND SECONDLY QTE SOME ADVANTAGE UNQTE ACCRUED TO FMG FROM ATTACKS IN THAT HMG GIVEN OPPORTUNITY TO PUT ITS POINT OF VIEW ON RECORD AND SUPPORT FMG QUITE EXPLICITLY. IN REPLY TO BABA GANA'S COMPLAINT THAT NOBODY BLAMED OJUKWU FOR SUFFERING OF EASTERNERS, HICOMER POINTED OUT THAT PM HAD MADE THIS VERY POINT AT LEAST FOUR TIMES IN DEC. 3 DEBATE ALONE.

4. HICOMER'S COMMENT TO LONDON WAS THAT WHILE HE DID NOT KNOW EXACTLY WHAT TO MAKE OF QTE STRONG AND STRANGELY FORMAL COMPLAINT UNQTE, LIKELY REASON CLOSE TO WHAT BABA GANA HAD SAID, I.E. CERTAIN NIGERIANS IN IMPORTANT PLACES BITTERLY RESENT, SOME ON IDEOLOGICAL GROUNDS, OTHERS ON NATIONALISTIC GROUNDS, QTE COMMON ASSUMPTION AMONG PROBIAFRAN MP'S THAT BRITAIN HAS SOME KIND OF RIGHT AND DUTY TO INTERVENE UNQTE. FMG THUS TRYING TO PROTECT ITSELF AGAINST THESE PEOPLE BY SHOWING THEY HAVE FORMALLY COMPLAINED TO HMG.

5. COMMENT: AS DEPT WILL HAVE NOTED, ENAHORO'S STATEMENTS (LAGOS 15219) AND NEWSPAPER COMPLAINTS ABOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE IN NIGERIAN INTERNAL PROBLEM (LAGOS 15260) HAVE REACHED PEAK WHICH APPEARS TO BE ORCHESTRATED DRIVE TO MAKE THESE EXACT POINTS TO ALL IN BRITAIN AND ANYWHERE ELSE IN THE WORLD AS WELL AS TAKING INTERNAL PRESSURE OFF FMG BY SHOWING IT HAS PROTESTED BRITISH QTE ATTITUDE UNQTE. GPC-1.
MATHEWS

CONFIDENTIAL

0471

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND954503
By: MNA Date: 10/5/05



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED 274

PAGE 01 LAGOS 15260 131806Z

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3966
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA UNN
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA UNN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA UNN
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY UNN
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE UNN
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NY
USIA WASHDC

UNCLAS LAGOS 15260

USIA FOR IBS

SUBJECT: NIGERIAN PRESS ROUNDUP DECEMBER 13

1. POST EDITORIAL TITLED QTE WELL DONE, CANADA UNQTE
PRAISES QTE UNSTINTED SUPPORT FOR NIGERIAS CORPORATE
EXISTENCE UNQTE WHICH PM TRUDEAU AND CANADIAN GOVERNMENT
HAVE EXTENDED. OPINES THAT OBSERVERS REPORTS PLUS
VISIT OF ENAHORO TO CANADA AND
MINEXTAFFARIKPOS SPEECH IN UNGA HAVE ALL HAD
TREMENDOUS IMPACT ON WORLD UNDERSTANDING
OF NIGERIAN CRISIS. STATES THAT SUPPORT NOT SOLICITED
FOR NIGERIA AS SUCH BUT RATHER SUPPORT ASKED FOR QTE

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Authority VND959503
By MM NARA Date 10/5/05



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PAGE 02 LAGOS 15260 131806Z

TRUTH AND JUSTICE AND FOR CONDEMNATION OF BAD FAITH, DISHONESTY AND OUTSIZED AMBITION UNQTE. GOES ON THEN TO CRITICIZE BRITISH MP S WHO QTE BELIEVE THEY CAN SOLVE OUR INTERNAL CRISIS ON FLOOR OF BRITISH HOUSE OF COMMONS UNQTE. STATES NIGERIA QTE NO LONGER APPENDAGE OF BRITAIN UNQTE.

2. OBSERVER EDITORIAL RATHER GRUDGINGLY EXPRESSES QTE APPRECIATION FOR CANADA'S NEW POSTURE BUT (OBSERVER SAYS) WE CANNOT HELP TELLING HER LEADERS WHAT WE TOLD BRITAIN YESTERDAY. NIGERIANS WANT AN END TO DEBATES OF NIGERIAN CRISIS IN FOREIGN PARLIAMENTS, ESPECIALLY THOSE OF COMMONWEALTH UNQTE. MAKES PARTICULAR POINT THAT NIGERIAN CRISIS SHOULD NOT BE BROUGHT UP AT COMMONWEALTH PMS MEETING NEXT JANUARY BECAUSE QTE PROBLEM DOES NOT CONCERN THEM UNQTE.


3. TIMES EDITORIAL TITLED QTE MATTER OF SOVEREIGNTY UNQTE SUPPORTS ENAHORO STATEMENT OF DEC 11 THAT QTE MANY PEOPLE IN BRITAIN ERRONEOUSLY THINK NIGERIA STILL COLONY OF BRITAIN UNQTE. STATES THAT CALLS FROM BRITISH MPS FOR HMG TO USE QTE SPECIAL INFLUENCE UNQTE WITH FMG TO END WAR MAKE IT QTE HARD TO RESIST ALLEGATION OF NEO-COLONIALISM. NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT SHOULD INSIST THAT BRITAIN OBSERVES ALL DIPLOMATIC PROPRIETIES IN HER RELATIONS WITH NIGERIA UNQTE.

4. TRIBUNE EDITORIAL ALSO CRITICIZES OUTSIDE QTE INTERFERENCE UNQTE IN NIGERIA'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. STATES QTE IT WILL BE MEDDLESOME IF MAURICE FOLEY MISSION TO ADDIS ABABA AND LORD SHEPHERD'S TRIP TO LAGOS WERE NOT SOLICITED, BUT PURELY INITIATED BY LONDON. BUT IF BRITAIN HAS BEEN SPECIFICALLY COMMISSIONED TO INTERVENE IN CRISIS, THEN THAT MUST HAVE BEEN GREAT MISTAKE SINCE IT SUGGESTS IMMATURITY AND INABILITY TO COPE WITH AN INTERNAL PROBLEM. THAT WILL ALSO AMOUNT TO TELLING WORLD NIGERIA IS STILL UNDER TUTELAGE OF COLONIAL RULE UNQTE. SAYS THAT ANY ATTEMPT TO ASK FMG TO NEGOTIATE PEACE CAN SERVE NO USEFUL PURPOSE BECAUSE QTE ANY PEACE OVERTURE MUST COME FROM REBELS ...THESE ARE PEOPLE TO BE PREVAILED UPON TO STOP BEING INTRANSIGENT AND SEE REASON UNQTE. STATES THAT QTE FOREIGN FRIENDS SHOULD CEASE TO SHOW UNDUE CONCERN IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF NIGERIA IF THEIR ACTUAL MOTIVE IS NOT TO WHIP UP EMOTION OR ENLIST SYMPATHY FOR REBELS OR EVEN CREATE AN IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE THEIR PROTEGE UNQTE.

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
PAGE 03 LAGOS 15260 131806Z

5. MOST PAPERS REPORT PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS TO GOWON BY NEW GERMAN AMBASSADOR. GOWON CALLED FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF BASIC ISSUES INVOLVED IN WAR AND STATED IBO LIKE ALL NIGERIANS HAS ROLE TO PLAY IN NIGERIAS FUTURE. GERMAN AMBASSADOR EXPRESSED HOPE THAT SOLUTION WOULD BE FOUND TO CRISIS AND EXPRESSED FRG READINESS TO CONTINUE PAST COOPERATION AND TO HELP IN TASK OF RECONSTRUCTION.

6. SKETCH HEADLINES STORY WHICH MAKES IT APPEAR AT FIRST GLANCE ISRAELIS INVOLVED IN QTE CONSPIRACY UNQTE WITH IVORY COAST TO AID REBELS. ARTICLE SUPPOSEDLY BASED ON BOOK BY FRANCOIS DEBRE, SON OF FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER. RELATES THAT OJUKWU ASKED MILITARY AID FROM HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY WHO DECLINED. H-B OFFERED INSTEAD TO GET ISRAELIS TO AID REBELS BECAUSE QTE HE KNEW ISRAELI FAVORED MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO BIAFRA UNQTE. ISRAELIS ALLEGEDLY COULD NOT GIVE IMMEDIATE AID BECAUSE THEY DID NOT WISH TO QTE RISK OFFENDING USE UNQUOTE. THEREFORE ISRAELIS WERE TO LAUNCH CAMPAIGN IN ISRAEL WHICH WOULD MAKE IT APPEAR THAT ISRAELI PUBLIC OPINION WAS FORCING GOI TO AID REBELS. ALL THIS CAME TO NAUGHT BECAUSE REBELS COULD NOT WAIT FOR ARMS AND SO TURNED TO SOUTH AFRICANS AND PRIVATE FRENCH SOURCES WHICH OPERATE WITH FRENCH GOVERNMENTS TACIT PERMISSION. MATHEWS

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 121

PAGE 01 COPENH 07597 131634Z

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ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, SCA 01, SCS 04, NSA 02, CIAE 00,

DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25

USIA 12, RSR 01, 154 W

055995

R 131330Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2154
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

CONFIDENTIAL COPENHAGEN 7597

SUBJECT: REPORTED BIAFRAN REQUEST FOR OBSERVERS

REF: LAGOS 14291

NIELS BOEL OF FON MIN, AFTER CHECKING WITH DEPUTY
UNDER SECRETARY OLDENBURG, SAID BIAFRANS HAD NOT
RPT NOT APPROACHED DANES FOR MILITARY OBSERVERS.
GP-3. BLANKINSHIP

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POL 27 BIAFRA- NIGERIA
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PAGE 01 THE HA 08266 131452Z

41
ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, HI 02, INR 07, LI 03, NSC 10,

PI 04, RSC 01, SPI 02, SS 25, USIA 12, IO 13, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, RSR 04

/149 W

055309

R 131210Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3276
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE THE HAGUE 8266

SUBJECT: NIGERIA

1. NETH LABOR PARTY INTERNATIONAL SECRETARY DANKERT INFORMED EMBOFFS DEC. 9 THAT BIAFRA REPRESENTATIVE VISITING NETHERLANDS TOLD HIM US HAS SENT OBSERVER TO BIAFRA. BIAFRAN OFFICIAL APPARENTLY USED THIS AS INDICATION US HAS DECIDED COOPERATION WITH BIAFRA REQUIRED I.E. PRESENCE OF US OBSERVER WAS CONCESSION BY US.

2. DEC. 11 DE VOLKSKRANT ARTICLE ON STARVATION THREAT IN BIAFRA (INCLUDING INTERVIEW WITH DANKERT) QUOTED HIM AS SAYING "I FIND IT IMPORTANT THAT GOVT IN WASHINGTON HAS NOW SENT AN OBSERVER TO BIAFRA. DEPT. COMMENT WOULD BE APPRECIATED."


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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
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PAGE 01 TUNIS 08043 131210Z

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ACTION AF 16

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P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SR 01, ORM 03, AID 28, RSR 01, IO 13,
/149 W

054406

R 131000Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7582
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

C O N F I D E N T I A L TUNIS 8043

SUBJECT: TUNISIAN VIEWS ON BIAFRA

REF: TUNIS 6687 — POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
POL 30 AU

1. DURING CALL BY CONGRESSMAN FRASER, DAS QUIMBY, AND
ROBERT SMITH (AID/AFRI), FONMINI BOURGUIBA, JR. EXPRESSED
VIEWS ON BIAFRAN SECESSION WHICH REPRESENT COMPLETE
REVERSAL OF POSITION REPORTED IN TUNIS 6687 PRIOR OAU
SUMMIT. FRASER SAID BIAFRA QUESTION WAS OF TREMENDOUS
INTEREST IN US. FONMIN REPLIED THIS LARGELY RESULT OUT

STANDING PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFORT WHICH HAD ITS EFFECT OUTSIDE
US AS WELL. HEI SAID TUNISIA HAD COME TO CONCLUSION MAJORITY
AFRICANS WERE RIGHT IN CONSIDERING BIAFRAN PROBLEM IN OVER-
ALL AFRICAN CONTEXT. THERE WERE MANY BIAFRAS, I.E., SOUTH
SUDAN WHERE BLOODY TEN-YEAR STRUGGLE CONTINUES WITHOUT MAKING
HEADLINES, PERHAPS BECAUSE THEY CANNOT AFFORD PUBLIC
RELATIONS FIRM.

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PAGE 02 TUNIS 08043 131210Z

2. BOURGUIBA, JR. SAID OJUKWU IS OVERPLAYING FAMINE AND GENOCIDE ANGLES FOR POLITICO-MILITARY PURPOSES. GENERAL SENTIMENT IN AFRICA IS AGAINST ANY SECESSION. FEAR IS RAMPANT THAT SECESSION IS VIRUS AND COULD SPREAD TO OTHERS AND MOBUTU RECENTLY TOLD TUNISIANS CONGO COULD AGAIN BLOW UP IF BIAFRA SUCCEEDED. HOUPHOUET-BOIGNY FEARED DANGER OF SECESSION DESPITE HUMANITARIAN POSITION IN SUPPORT OF BIAFRA. BOURGUIBA, JR. ASKED WHAT KIND OF A FUTURE BIAFRA COULD EXPECT IN A CONTINENT THAT FEARED ITS EXAMPLE MIGHT BE CONTAGIOUS?

GP-3. RUSSELL

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PAGE 01 LONDON 15106 131413Z

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ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, AID 28, SR 01, ORM 03, SCA 01, SCS 04, RSR 01, USIE 00,

CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04,

RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, SAH 02, HEW 07, SSO 00, CCO 00, NSCE 00, ACDA 16,

E 15, /180 W

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O P 131259Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7753
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA

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SUBJECT: FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEBATE: NIGERIA

1. NIGERIA DOMINATED FOREIGN POLICY DEBATE IN HOUSE OF COMMONS LAST NIGHT DEC 12. AS IN PREVIOUS DEBATES ON THIS SUBJECT FRONT BENCH SPEECHES REVEALED SIGNIFICANT AGREEMENT ON ESSENTIALS. BACK BENCH OPINION ON BOTH SIDES OF HOUSE TENDED AS USUAL TO BE CRITICAL OF GOVERNMENT'S ARMS SUPPLY POLICY, BUT EVEN AMONG BACKBENCHERS THERE WAS GREATER RECOGNITION OF COMPLEXITY OF PROBLEM AND LESS DISPOSITION TO GIVE ALL OUT SUPPORT TO BIAFRANS. SINCE CONCLUDING ADJOURNMENT VOTE WAS ON ISSUE OF FALKLAND ISLANDS RATHER THAN NIGERIA, SEVERAL OF STRONGEST CRITICS OF GOVERNMENT'S NIGERIAN POLICY STATED DURING COURSE OF DEBATE THAT THEY WOULD DRAMATIZE THEIR POSITION BY ABSTAINING AND CALLED ON OTHER MEMBERS WHO OPPOSED GOV'T TO DO LIKEWISE. MAXIMUM OF 20 LABOR MP'S JOINED BY LIBERALS, NATIONALISTS AND AT LEAST ONE CONSERVATIVE, TOOK THIS ADVICE AND ABSTAINED. AT DIVISION TIME GOV'T, THEREFORE, EMERGED FROM DEBATE WITH ITS NIGERIAN POLICY MORE OR LESS INTACT AND LESS VISIBLY ON

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DEFENSIVE THAN AFTER EMERGENCY DEBATE ON NIGERIA IN AUG (LONDON 12157).


2. SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME, LEADING OFF FOR OPPOSITION, DISCUSSED NIGERIAN PROBLEM IN CONTEXT AFRICAN TRIBAL RIVALRIES AND DANGER OF BALKANIZATION. HE ASSERTED THAT HE HAD NEVER "FELT JUSTIFIED IN ASKING GOV'T TO CUT OFF TRADITIONAL SUPPLIES OF ARMS" TO FMG AND STILL DID NOT FAVOR UNILATERAL ACTION BY BRITISH. GENERAL CUTOFF OF ARMS FROM ALL EXTERNAL SUPPLIERS WAS NEEDED AND SEC'TY GENERAL OF UN WAS ONLY PERSON WHO COULD TACKLE JOB. SINCE SOVIET UNION WAS INVOLVED, TASK WOULD ADMITTEDLY BE VERY DIFFICULT. NEVERTHELESS, SIR ALEC BELIEVED GOV'T SHOULD TAKE INITIATIVE WITH UTHANT TO SEE WHETHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED. ON SUBJECT OF RELIEF, DOUGLAS-HOME SAID IT WAS CLEAR THAT AIRLIFT OF EMERGENCY SUPPLIES COULD NOT ALONE AVERT FAMINE IN WAR STRICKEN AREAS. WHAT WAS REALLY NEEDED WAS LAND CORRIDOR TO WHICH AIRLIFT WOULD BE USEFUL SUPPLEMENT. HE CALLED ON GOV'T TO DEVOTE PRIORITY ATTENTION TO ESTABLISHMENT OF LAND CORRIDOR, PERHAPS WITH INTERNATIONAL POLICING.

3. FONSEC STEWART FOR GOV'T OUTLINED STEPS BEING TAKEN TO ACCELERATE FLOW OF RELIEF SUPPLIES AND TO BRING ABOUT TERMINATION OF HOSTILITIES. CONCEDED THAT "UNIVERSAL STOPPING OF ARMS SHIPMENT WAS BY NO MEANS IMPOSSIBLE CONCEPT", HE SAID IT WAS NEVERTHELESS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE AND "ANY MULTI-LATERAL CONTROL OF ARMS WOULD ONLY BE SATISFACTORY...IF THERE WAS EFFECTIVE CONTROL ON PRIVATE SHIPMENTS AS WELL AS THOSE APPROVED BY GOVERNMENTS." THERE COULD NOT IN ANY EVENT BE PROGRESS TOWARD MULTI-LATERAL CONTROL OF ARMS WITHOUT CONCURRENT PROGRESS TOWARD CEASEFIRE. EFFECTIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR GETTING ADEQUATE AMOUNTS OF RELIEF TO THOSE WHO NEEDED IT WERE ALSO GREATLY HAMPERED BY CONTINUED HOSTILITIES. FOR THIS REASON "LORD SHEPHERD'S VISIT TO LAGOS WAS CONCERNED NOT ONLY WITH RELIEF BUT POSSIBILITY OF CEASEFIRE."

4. STEWART ANNOUNCED THAT FOLLOWING VISIT OF ICRC REP RUEGGER, GOV'T HAD DECIDED, SUBJECT PARLIAMENTARY APPROVAL, TO MAKE ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTION OF 700,000 POUNDS TO RED CROSS, BUT MORE THAN FUNDS HAD TO BE PROVIDED. REAL PROBLEM WAS HOW TO GET FOOD RELIEF TO WAR-RAVAGED AREAS. AIR AND LAND CORRIDORS AS WELL AS AIRDROPS AND OTHER MEANS OF DISTRIBUTION HAD BEEN PROPOSED. ON QUESTION OF AIRDROP, GOV'T WOULD BE PREPARED

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TO USE RAF BUT THIS COULD NOT BE DONE UNLESS BOTH SIDES AGREED. DAYLIGHT AIR CORRIDOR MIGHT BE MORE FEASIBLE. FMG HAD AGREED TO DAYLIGHT FLIGHTS INTO BIAFRA BUT OJUKWU STILL MAINTAINED OBJECTIONS. IN STEWART'S VIEW, LAND CORRIDOR WAS GREATEST NEED IF SUFFICIENT SUPPLIES WERE TO BE MOVED. FMG HAD AGREED SOME TIME AGO TO "MERCY CORRIDOR" BUT BIAFRANS OBJECTED THAT IT MIGHT BE USED FOR MILITARY INVASION. LORD SHEPHERD WAS EXPLORING THIS SUBJECT IN LAGOS AND PARTICULARLY WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO ARRANGE INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARD THAT LAND CORRIDOR WOULD NOT BE USED FOR MILITARY PURPOSES. MUCH WOULD DEPEND, SAID STEWART, ON THE ATTITUDE OF OJUKWU AND BRITISH HAD ASKED AND WOULD CONTINUE ASK ALL THOSE IN CONTACT WITH HIM TO URGE HIM TO ADOPT MORE FLEXIBLE ATTITUDE AND "NOT TO HOLD HIS OWN PEOPLE TO RANSOM".


5. TURNING TO MAURICE FOLEY'S MISSION TO ADDIS, FONSEC SAID IT WAS VITAL TO ACT IN CONCERT WITH ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AND PARLIAMENTARY UNDERSECITY WAS VISITING ADDIS TO ASSURE THAT BRITISH EFFORTS WERE IN HARMONY WITH THOSE OF OAU.

6. MOST INTERESTING OF BACKBENCH CONTRIBUTIONS TO DEBATE WAS BY LABOR MP DR. JOHN DUNWOODY WHO HAD JUST RETURNED FROM 6 DAYS IN BIAFRA. DUNWOODY WHO IS MEDICAL DOCTOR SAID HE WAS IMPRESSED BY HIGH MORALE AND EFFECTIVE ORGANIZATION HE FOUND IN BIAFRA. FOOD SITUATION WAS CRITICAL "ALTHOUGH DEATH RATE FOR STARVATION WAS LOWER AND PROBABLY SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER THAN IT WAS IN AUG AND SEPT." HE WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED ABOUT MENACE OF MEASLES EPIDEMIC AND SAID THERE WAS SERIOUS RISK OF SMALL POX. DUNWOODY PAID TRIBUTE TO WORK OF ICRC, CARITAS, OXFAM, UNICEF, SCANDANAVIAN AND GERMAN CHURCH ORGANIZATIONS. NOTING THAT RELIEF FLIGHTS WERE CARRYING BETWEEN 40 AND 200 TONS OF SUPPLIES PER NIGHT, HE ASSERTED THAT IF WAR CONTINUED "AMOUNT OF FOOD REQUIRED (BIAFRAN) COMMUNITY TO GIVE EACH OF THEM JUST 8 OZ. OF FOOD...WOULD BE OVER 2000 TONS PER DAY." IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS TO MANAGE THIS AS LONG AS HOSTILITIES CONTINUED. ON POLITICAL SIDE HE THOUGHT COMPROMISE OUGHT TO BE POSSIBLE. BIAFRAN LEADERS WITH WHOM HE TALKED HAD NOT INSISTED ON COMPLETE SEPARATION FROM NIGERIA AND HE WAS ENCOURAGED TO HEAR REPORTS THAT FMG WOULD NOT PRECLUDE CONFEDERATION AS BASIS FOR SETTLEMENT. DUNWOODY'S SPEECH WAS MOST BALANCED THAT HAS BEEN MADE BY ANY RECENT VISITOR TO BIAFRA (TEXT BEING POUCHED). IN AN OTHER NOTEWORTHY STATEMENT BY

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GOV'T BACKBENCHER LEFT WING CATHOLIC HUGH DELARGY SAID THAT UNTIL RECENTLY HE HAD BEEN STRONGLY OPPOSED TO GOV'T POLICY ON NIGERIA. AFTER STUDYING SITUATION CAREFULLY HE HAD COME TO CONCLUSION THAT OUKWU UPRISING WAS "CAREFULLY PREPARED CAMPAIGN TO SECURE POWER ALL OVER NIGERIA." AND NOT "HOLY WAR OF INDEPENDENCE."

7. SUMMING UP FOR GOV'T, MINISTER OF STATE MULLEY REAFFIRMED THAT "PRIORITIES IN NIGERIA SHOULD FIRST BE RELIEF AND CEASEFIRE," FOLLOWED BY ACTION TO ACHIEVE ARMS EMBARGO BY ALL COUNTRIES AND PRIVATE AGENCIES SUPPLYING ARMS. HE SAID ARMS SUPPLIES FROM BRITAIN WERE "LESS THAN 15 PER CENT BY VALUE OF TOTAL ARMS SUPPLY GOING TO FMG AND RATHER LESS THAN 50 PER CENT OF WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION GOING TO GROUND FORCES." HE CONCLUDED THAT "IT WAS CLEAR THAT UNILATERAL DECISIONS (TO END ARMS SHIPMENTS) COULD NOT BRING ABOUT CEASEFIRE AND WOULD NOT HELP RELIEF AT THIS TIME." THEREFORE, GOV'T WOULD CONTINUE TO SUPPLY ARMS ON SAME BASIS AS BEFORE AND ASSERT EVERY POSSIBLE EFFORT TO MAINTAIN EFFECTIVE RELIEF PROGRAM.
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| By | MV NARA Date 10/5/05 |



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PAGE 01 LONDON 15145 131924Z

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ACTION: AF 16

INFO: EUR 15, DOD 01, NSA 02, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04,

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EA 10, SAH 02, /162: W

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R 131816Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7779
INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY PARIS

UNCLAS: LONDON 15145

SUBJECT: NIGERIA: BRITISH PRESS DISCUSSES FRENCH POSITION

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF FINANCIAL TIMES ARTICLE, DEC. 12 DATE
LINED PARIS BY CORRESPONDENT GUY DE JONQUIERES TITLED "FRANCE
REVIEWS BIAFRAN STAND":

"FRENCH GOV'T IS SERIOUSLY RECONSIDERING ITS FAVORABLE
ATTITUDE TO BIAFRA'S SECESSION AND THERE ARE NOW INDICATIONS
THAT IT MAY TRY PERSUADE COL. OJUKWU RESTART NEGOTIATIONS FOR
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT WITH FEDERAL GOV'T.

"WHILE FRENCH AUTHORITIES APPARENTLY HAVE NOT COMMITTED
THEMSELVES TO DECISIVE CHANGE OF POLICY AS YET, WELL INFORMED
SOURCES HERE SAY THAT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NIGERIAN WAR HAVE
LED THEM TO VIEW SITUATION IN NEW LIGHT.

"MOST SOURCES ARE CAUTIOUS ABOUT POSSIBILITY OF IMMEDIATE
FRENCH PEACE INITIATIVE ON BIAFRAN SIDE. BUT IT POINTED OUT
IF ONE WAS MADE IN REASONABLY NEAR FUTURE, COULD BE TIED IN
WITH RENEWED EFFORTS OF LORD SHEPHEARD AT PRESENT IN LAGOS, AND
OF MR. MAURICE FOLEY, IN ADDIS ABABA, TO BRING FEDERAL GOV'T TO
NEGOTIATING TABLE AGAIN.

"THIS CHANGE OF HEART BY FRENCH GOV'T, WHICH HAS UNTIL NOW

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PAGE 02 LONDON 15145 131924Z

EXPRESSED OPEN SUPPORT FOR COL. OJUKWU'S CAUSE, APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY DISAPPOINTMENT AT LACK OF PROGRESS IN BIAFRAN MILITARY OFFENSIVE.

"IT IS FELT HERE THAT, ALTHOUGH BIAFRANS HAVE WON FEW LOCAL ADVANTAGES AND NOW SEEM TO HAVE ADEQUATE SUPPLY ARMS, THERE ARE SMALL PROSPECTS OF MAJOR REDRESSMENT ON MILITARY BALANCE.

"TURNING POINT APPEARS TO HAVE COME WITH EJECTION FROM BIAFRA LAST MONTH OF MERCENARY LEADER STEINER, ON WHOSE TALENTS AS STRATEGIST FRENCH WERE COUNTING FOR IMPROVEMENT IN BIAFRAN MILITARY SITUATION.

"FURTHERMORE, IT NOW FEARED THAT SOVIET UNION MAY EXTEND ITS ASSISTANCE TO FEDERAL SIDE BY SUPPLYING THEM WITH PILOTS AS WELL AS ARMS. THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT BIAFRANS WOULD BE INCAPABLE RESISTING SOVIET-LED AIR ATTACKS FOR VERY LONG.


"INDEED, WITH FAMINE NOW RIFE AMONG BIAFRAN POPULATION, THERE ARE DOUBTS AS WHETHER THERE WILL BE ENOUGH IBOS LEFT BY END OF NEXT YEAR TO MAKE SERIOUS CLAIM TO INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGNTY.

"ON DIPLOMATIC SIDE, TOO, FAILURE OF ANY MORE FRENCH AFRICAN STATES TO RECOGNIZE COL. OJUKWU'S REGIME HAS BEEN TAKEN AS BAD SIGN, AND FRENCH OFFICIALS FEEL THAT BIAFRAN CAUSE IS LOSING FAVOR AMONG NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES, WHICH NOW BELIEVE IT IS MORE IMPORTANT PUT AN END TO HUMAN SUFFERING THROUGH NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT THAN TO DEFEND SECESSIONIST PRINCIPLE."

2. GUARDIAN DEC 13 CARRIES SHORT ITEM STATING "SCOUTS FRESH FROM UMUHIA" REPORT REBELS NOW USING CHINESE ARMS WHICH THEY RECEIVED FROM DAR ES SALAAM VIA LUANDA. ARTICLE CONTINUES "THIS--AND OTHER SIGNS OF RENEWED CHINESE INTEREST IN AFRICA--ALARMING EVEN FRENCH. THERE ARE HINTS IN PARIS THAT GENERAL DEGAULLE IS WANING IN HIS SUPPORT FOR BIAFRA, MAY STOP HIS OWN ARMS SUPPLY THROUGH GABON AND MAY JOIN BRITAIN IN URGING SETTLEMENT." BRUCE

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AIRGRAM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

POL 27. BIAFRA NIGERIA

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HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : Department of State

DEPT PASS WITH ENCLOSURE: ADDIS ABABA, ALGIERS, IBADAN, KADUNA, LAGOS (12), LONDON, OTTAWA, WARSAW, STOCKHOLM, USMISSION USUN NY, OSD FOR CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA

FROM : Amembassy LAGOS

DATE: December 12, 1968

SUBJECT: NIGERIA: Consolidated Report of International Observer Team

REF :

Enclosed is the full text of the report of the International Observer Team to Nigeria, dated November 25, 1968, presented to Head of State Gowon December 5, 1968, and publicly released the next day.

The report, which covers the period September 24 - November 23, 1968, is in effect a wrap-up of the team's activities since its inception. There are no surprises in the consolidated report, which records the excellent cooperation the team received from the FMG, and in effect clears the FMG of any charge of "genocide."

Enclosure:
As stated

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Drafted by: POL:FPicard:mjr 12/10/68

Contents and Classification Approved by: POL:EERamsauri

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Authority VND 959503
By MNARA Date 10/5/05

Encl. No. 1 to
H-987 from Lagos

Copy No.....

LAGOS, NIGERIA

25th November, 1968

To: The Federal Government of Nigeria
The Government of Canada
The Government of Poland
The Government of Sweden
The Government of the United Kingdom

Copies to: The Organisation of African Unity
The Representative of the Secretary-General of
the United Nations

OBSERVER TEAM TO NIGERIA

REPORT ON ACTIVITIES DURING THE PERIOD 24 SEP - 23 NOV 1968


NOT TO BE RELEASED TO THE PUBLIC UNTIL NOTIFICATION IS RECEIVED
FROM THE OBSERVER TEAM TO NIGERIA

INTRODUCTION

1. On 6th September, 1968, the Federal Military Government of Nigeria (FMG) invited a group of Observers to visit Nigeria for a period of two months in the first instance to inspect Federal Military operations in the war affected areas of the country.
2. The invitation was issued because of allegations that the Government was conducting a planned programme of systematic and wanton destruction of the Ibo people and their property.

/Canada

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Canada, Poland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Secretary-General of the United Nations were each invited to nominate an Observer. By 19th September, 1968 the representative of the Secretary-General of the U.N., Mr. N-G Gussing, Major-General Arthur Raab of Sweden, Major-General Henry Alexander of the United Kingdom and Major-General William A. Milroy of Canada were in Lagos. On 23rd September, 1968 they met with the Head of State and on 24th September they started their first visit. Colonel Alfons Olkiewicz of Poland joined the group on 1st October, 1968. The OAU representatives, Major-General Sliman Hoffman of Algeria and Brigadier-General Negga Teghegn of Ethiopia, joined on the 3rd and 5th of October, 1968 respectively. Major-General Alexander was replaced on 30th October, 1968 by Brigadier Sir Bernard Fergusson. Each Observer was accompanied by a Deputy or Assistant. (See list at Annex 'A')

3. Because the representative of the Secretary-General of the U.N. and the representatives of the OAU report separately, the term "Observer Team" has been applied in practice only to the representatives of the four countries involved.

4. During the period 24th September, 1968 to 6th November, 1968 the Team issued three interim and three special reports. Each of these covered a specific visit. As the Observers' stay in Nigeria has been extended by the FMG until 14th December, 1968 and may be extended further, it is considered appropriate to summarise all the team's activities for the past two months.

AIM

5. The aim of this report is to describe the activities and findings of the Observer Team to Nigeria consisting of the
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representatives of Canada, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom, for the period 24th September-23rd November, 1968.

METHOD OF OPERATING


6. The procedures under which the team has been operating are a combination of the terms of reference given in the FMG letter of invitation and agreements made at the conference with the Head of State and his advisers. These procedures are as follows:-

- (a) The Observers will visit all war affected areas and newly liberated areas on the Federal controlled side to witness the conduct of Federal troops - re charges of genocide, etc.
- (b) Such visits may be undertaken at their own instance or at the instance of the FMG.
- (c) The FMG will take all necessary precautions to guarantee the personal safety of the Observers.
- (d) The team will be based in Lagos. The FMG will provide transport, board and accommodation.
- (e) The Observers representing the four countries will address their reports to the FMG and the Governments of the countries concerned. The representative of the Secretary General of the U.N., on the other hand will address his to the Secretary General, who will in turn release it to the FMG and the public. The representatives of the OAU will report in a like manner.

(The result of this decision was that the Observers became three separate groups in so far as reports and, to some degree, operations were concerned. For this reason the terms "Observers and Observer

/Team"

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Team" have been used hereafter to include only the Observers representing Canada, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom)

(f) In so far as the "Team" is concerned:

- (1) An inspection will not normally be carried out by fewer than two Observers representing different countries though one may be an Assistant Observer.
- (2) Each report will normally be signed by the four Observers. An Observer can, if he so desires, append a minority report, or in special cases, he may submit a separate report.
- (3) Reports will normally be made available to the press and public by the team 24 hours after they have been handed to the FMG and to representatives in Lagos of the countries concerned.
- (4) Representatives of the press may accompany the Observers on their visits.

The members of the team agreed that each Observer would act as Chairman of the team for a week in turn.

7. In deciding on a method of operation the team made use of statements made by the FMG concerning its policies towards the treatment of the Ibos and their property; specifically the FMG claimed that:

- (a) The treatment of secessionist troops and civilians by Federal troops was in accord with the instructions contained in the directive "Operational Code of Conduct for Nigerian Armed Forces", the contents of which were to be read and explained to every member of the Armed Forces.

/(b) The

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- (b) The Army provides food and medical care for displaced persons until the civilian administration and the volunteer agencies can take over the responsibility.
- (c) Abandoned Ibo property in non-Ibo parts of the country is being maintained awaiting their return.
- (d) Ibos are returning to the Northern part of the country.
- (e) Ibos are serving in the Federal Government and Forces.
- (f) The war is being waged in a manner to cause a minimum of loss of life and damage in so far as is possible.

8. For its definition of genocide the team used the one given in the United Nations pamphlet "The Crime of Genocide" (sixth revised edition, dated October 1965) which states "genocide is the committing of certain acts with intent to destroy - wholly or in part - a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such".

AREA INVOLVED

9. The term "war affected areas" was taken by the team to mean the area of the former "Eastern Region" and any other areas inhabited largely by Ibos, including the Eastern half of the Mid-Western State. This area involves about one tenth of Nigeria. The area actually held by the secessionists in September 1968 when the team started its work measured approximately 70 miles across by 50 miles deep.

10. Notwithstanding the above definition, the team considered itself entitled to visit any other part of Nigeria to check on Prisoners of War or on statements involving the treatment of Ibos and their property made by the FMG.

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- 6 -

11. For the purpose of arranging visits the area was broken down into nine sectors as follows:-

- (a) In the area of the First Division:
 - (1) ENUGU - AWKA - OKIGWI Sector
 - (2) NSUKKA Sector
 - (3) ABAKALIKI - AFIKPO Sector
 - (4) AGOJA - IKOM Sector
- (b) In the area of the Second Division:
 - (1) ASABA - ONITSHA Sector
 - (2) BENIN CITY - KWALE - WARRI Sector
- (c) In the area of the Third Marine Commando Division:
 - (1) PORT HARCOURT - ABA - OGWERRI Sector
 - (2) CALABAR - UYO - ITU - IKOT EKPENE Sector
- (d) That part of Nigeria outside of the Divisional Areas.

VISITS

12. The Observers first visited each of the three Divisional Areas in turn as a group. In each Divisional Area the Observers split into two groups, each visiting a different sector of the area. An investigation of the incident at Okigwi also took place during this phase.

13. When this phase had been completed, the Observers split into small groups, visiting sectors in all Divisional areas and made two visits outside the operational zone. A list of all visits, giving dates and locations visited, is at Annex B.

14. During the tours of Divisional Areas the team visited Divisional, Brigade and Battalion Headquarters and Company positions, POWs, displaced persons camps, Red Cross medical and food distribution centres, food stores, villages, and markets which had been re-established as inhabitants emerged from the bush.

/15. The

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15. The Observers spoke to officers, NCOs and men of the Federal Forces, to Military Governors and civil administrators, to teachers, priests and missionaries, to Red Cross personnel and to the indigenous inhabitants of all walks of life.

16. During all investigations and visits the team had unrestricted freedom of movement, made up its own programmes and could and did make last minute changes to these plans.

17. On all of its visits the team was accompanied by members of the press, Nigerian and foreign.

REPORTS

18. To date the team has issued three interim reports, one on each Divisional Area, two reports on special incidents and one report on a visit to Prisoners of War in the Lagos Area. The representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations issued four reports during the period. The representatives of the OAU issued three reports during the period. A list of all these reports is given in Annex C.

SITUATION IN RESPECT OF CIVILIANS

19. The Observers found that the "war affected areas" as defined contained several peoples. The Ibos inhabited the area within the rough circle of NSUKKA, ABAKALIKI, AFIKPO, ABA, OGUTA, KWALE and AGBOR. Most of the people in the Rivers State are Ijaws while those in the South-Eastern State are Efiks, Ibibios, Ekois and minority tribes.

20. The pattern appears to be that as the fighting approached an area the inhabitants either retreated with the dissidents, voluntarily or otherwise, or they fled into the bush. Very few stayed in the fighting zone.

/21. Discussions

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21. Discussions with village leaders and other displaced persons emphasize that while all the people were frightened by the fighting, the Ibos in particular were also frightened by the secessionist claims that if they fell into the hands of the Federal troops they would be killed. This fear of being killed by the Federal troops is real and as a result the Ibos in the bush in Federal occupied areas are very slow to come out of hiding. They usually do so only after one of their numbers has made contact with the Federal troops and is able to re-assure the others they will not be harmed. When they do decide to come out they sometimes appear suddenly and in hundreds. Once they are in camps or back in their villages most of them do not display any fear of the Federal troops.

22. The actual situation of the civilian population varies between the areas affected:

- (a) In the Rivers and South Eastern States life is returning to normal except in the areas near the front. Displaced persons who retreated with the secessionists are still returning in considerable numbers. The relationship between these people and the Federal troops appears to be good. On the other hand investigations indicate that the relationship between these people and the Ibos is strained.
- (b) In the Ibo-speaking area in the Mid-Western State life appears to have returned to normal except in the areas on the west bank of the Niger River. These areas are on occasion infiltrated by the secessionists and the inhabitants of some villages are kept in camps for security reasons.

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- 9 -

- (c) In the Ibo provinces of ABAKALIKI and NSUKKA which have been held by Federal troops for a relatively long time and, where the fighting was not very heavy, the inhabitants appear to have returned in large numbers. The civil administration is taking over. There appears to be plenty of staple food in these areas.
- (d) In the areas more recently taken by the Federal troops both north (AWKA - AWGU - OKIGWI - AFIKPO) and south (O'ERRI - ABA - ITU) of the secessionist held area most of the inhabitants are still hiding or with the secessionists. The Army, Civil Administration, the National Committee for Rehabilitation and the volunteer agencies are providing food and medical care on an emergency basis and endeavouring to establish the confidence that will bring people out of hiding.
- (e) The cities and large towns are still quite empty although their populations are increasing slowly. It is assumed that their former inhabitants are either with the secessionists or in their home villages.

23. Displaced persons found in camps appear to belong to one or other of the following categories:

- (a) Non-Ibo people who were removed compulsorily from their homes when the secessionists were withdrawing under Federal military pressure.
- (b) Ibos and non-Ibos who were frightened into hiding by the secessionist claims that they would be killed by the advancing Federal Forces.

/(c) Ibos

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By MVA Date 10/5/03

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- 10 -

- (c) Ibos normally living in non-Ibo areas which have been retaken. These prefer to remain in camps while the war is still on.
- (d) Ibos living near the present front line who have been detained because of their potential alliance with the secessionists.
- (e) Ibos in areas in which infiltration is taking place. These have been placed in camps for security reasons.

24. It should be noted that there are many Ibos now living in war affected areas held by Federal Forces (see paragraph 22). Some of these Ibos state that among their numbers are some who fear reverses to the Federal Force, as they might result in them being harmed by the Federal troops or being treated as collaborators by the secessionists.

25. The team noted that it encountered few well educated Ibos, the majority of whom are assumed to be in the secessionist held territory.

26. The team saw many cases of malnutrition, most of them caused by a lack of protein, among the displaced persons in the camps and at the Red Cross clinics. The condition of the refugees seemed to depend on how long they had been in hiding. Those in the worst condition were the elderly people, women and children who had been in the bush for ten months or more. The most common complaints mentioned by doctors were malnutrition, anaemia and dysentery. At present the greatest concentration of displaced persons needing help appears to be in the UYO- IKOT EKPENE area. Here the Red Cross estimates that, in mid-November, up to 350,000 were receiving a weekly ration sufficient to provide a meal every other day.

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27. It is the Observers' belief that a large number of people are still hiding in the bush in areas held by the Federal troops. If these people should come out of hiding all at once their numbers will present a tremendous requirement for food and medical care.

REHABILITATION OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION

28. The programme for rehabilitating the civilian population of areas occupied by the Federal Forces is as follows:-

- (a) Immediate provision of food, medical care and shelter.
- (b) Return of displaced persons to their villages, where possible, with food and medical care continuing to be provided on an emergency basis.
- (c) As the people get settled into their homes and are able to do something for themselves, the withdrawal of emergency assistance.
- (d) Return of normal peace time conditions.

29. The Observers found that the provision of shelter is not normally a problem as there are many buildings available in most parts of the country.

30. In many of the areas local foodstuffs are still available, the critical shortages being in protein, vitamins and salt. It should, however, be noted that the problem of malnutrition caused by a shortage of protein existed in the area even in peacetime.

31. The Observers noted that when an area is first occupied the Army provides the displaced persons with food, and, as far as possible, with medical care. This responsibility is then taken over wholly or in part by the National Committee for Rehabilitation and the volunteer agencies, mainly the Red Cross, assisted in many cases by soldiers.

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- 12 -

32. When the Observers first arrived this arrangement was not in operation in all areas and where it was operating the Civil Administration and volunteer agencies suffered from a lack of personnel, medical supplies and transport. Since then a considerable improvement has been noticed. The Nigerian Red Cross has moved into the PORT HARCOURT Sector. More relief personnel and transport have been provided. The co-operation in the field between the Army and the volunteer agencies seems to be good. However, shortages of medical personnel, drugs and transport still exist and in some areas such as UYO relief supplies were still inadequate in mid November because of transportation difficulties.

33. The effectiveness of the emergency care being given impressed the team very much. The death rate drops rapidly once the displaced persons come under the care of those involved in providing emergency aid. The majority of persons suffering from malnutrition are returning to good health.

34. The next stage, in which the civil administration takes over from the Army and the volunteer agencies, is underway in those areas most distant from the front. The Observers consider that if more areas were put under civilian control the return of the population might be expedited. However, where the civil administration is taking over its effectiveness is hampered by lack of qualified officials and of transport.

35. Part of the problem of acquiring adequate staff in the East Central State appears to be an understandable desire to fill positions with Ibos from the State. The lack of educated Ibos in Federal hold territory makes this a difficult goal to achieve, at least until the war is ended.

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36. A comment on the problems which are likely to arise when the war ends would appear appropriate. It has already been pointed out that a sudden increase in the number of refugees could overwhelm the facilities at present available to handle them. If the war ends as a result of a negotiated peace, it may be possible to handle the situation by utilizing the resources of the Armed Forces. If, however, the war ends through military action the Armed Forces will probably be required for purely military tasks and the civil administration and the volunteer agencies may have to handle the problem without their assistance. Whichever situation occurs, quick action will be required to ensure the survival of a maximum number of the people needing help.

SITUATION WITH RESPECT TO PROPERTY

37. In any war, civil or otherwise, damage and destruction of property is inevitable and this war is no exception. The damage is the result of deliberate destruction of public facilities and installations, damage from the fighting, the inevitable looting as well as deterioration caused by neglect and weather.

38. Most of the damage to public facilities appears to have been done by the secessionist troops in an effort to delay or inconvenience the advancing Federal troops. In most of the Federal held portions of the war affected areas roads have been cratered and bridges destroyed on both roads and railways. Electric generating plants and water supply systems have been put out of action. Communication systems have been seriously damaged.

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- 14 -

39. In so far as buildings are concerned, most of the damage has taken place in the areas affected by the fighting. Villages visited that were not in the areas affected by the fighting were undamaged. While the percentage of buildings totally destroyed is small, a large number in the towns and cities in the area east of the Niger have suffered damage. In addition, in some areas it is evident that materials including corrugated iron sheets have been taken from buildings to construct the small section posts along the roads. This is understandable in view of the condition which prevails during the rainy season.

40. Most of the damage to buildings appears to have been caused by small arms or artillery fire. The team has not found that the Federal Forces are following a policy of wantonly destroying Ibo property.

41. The team has noted that a number of buildings that have been left empty are partially exposed to the elements because of missing doors, broken windows, etc. These include public buildings.

42. Many of the buildings in the area are completely unguarded and as a result there has been considerable looting. From the evidence the Observers consider that this looting has been carried out by civilians and the military of both sides.

43. Another category of Ibo property is that in regions of Nigeria outside the war affected zones which was abandoned by Ibo families moving back to the East Central State. The handling of this property is dealt with in the next section.

CARE AND RESTORATION OF PROPERTY

44. The repair of damage to property caused by the war or associated factors is considered under three categories:

/(a) Restoration

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- (a) Restoration of public services and facilities.
- (b) Care of Ibo property outside the war affected areas.
- (c) Repair of property in the war affected area


45. The Army carries out emergency repairs to those public facilities it requires, in particular the roads, where it has constructed temporary bridges, by-passes, etc. The repair of public services, such as light and water, is handled by the civil administration, which is just now coming to grips with the problem. Progress is slow and is hindered by a lack of resources. There is a great deal to be done.

46. The care of Ibo property outside the war affected areas seems to be well in hand. In the Mid-Western State a committee has been set up to take care of all abandoned property. It has compiled a detailed register of all such property indicating its value and the extent of the damage, supported in most cases by a photograph of the property. Caretakers are appointed and rents, less expenditures such as repairs and taxes, are credited to the absentee owners. Similarly, movable property is stored by the Police and a register maintained.

47. In the North there is a similar arrangement although the situation differs slightly in that the Ibos carried their movable property away with them. They also transferred their bank balances to banks within the secessionist held area. The team inspected records and property at KANO, KADUNA and ZARIA and interviewed a cross section of owners of abandoned houses who had returned to KANO, claimed their property and received the rents which had been collected on their behalf. Of approximately 5,000 abandoned properties in KANO, 54 had been reclaimed, and a similar situation prevailed in the other Northern towns visited.

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- 16 -

48. Little appears to have been done as yet to repair damaged buildings in the war affected areas. The State Administrator for the East Central State has a plan for attacking the problem. In the meantime the Observers consider an immediate problem is that of protecting buildings and their contents from looting and the weather. Some efforts have been made to protect movable property; in ENUGU for example the civil administration has collected some such items for safe keeping.

CONDUCT OF THE FEDERAL TROOPS

49. The Observers found that the Federal troops were for the most part aware of the instructions in "The Code of Conduct" and were following these instructions. They neither saw nor heard any evidence that the Federal Forces were committing acts with intent to destroy the Ibo people. The Observers did see considerable evidence that the troops were assisting the civilian population, in particular by feeding them and providing medical assistance until the civil administration and volunteer agencies could take over. In some areas the Army still operates the camps for displaced persons, the actual standard of care varying from very good to fair.

50. The troops seen by the Observers appeared to be under the control of their officers. The Observers noted that most of the officers are young and that the number of NCOs with pre-war experience is small in comparison with the size of the Army.

51. While the majority of soldiers have displayed a correct, tolerant and helpful attitude towards the civilian population the Observers did receive complaints of abuse at the hands of soldiers. Those incidents appeared to be most frequent at road blocks in the afternoon and they may be attributable
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to the seemingly large supplies of beer available to the troops.

52. An initial meeting was held with the Chief of the Air Force to discuss the conduct of air operations. A copy of the Nigerian Air Force Code of Operations, dated 14 January, 1968 was obtained. It states that non-military targets will not be bombed and that any gathering of civilian population will be avoided. Arrangements were made to obtain mission reports as required. Further investigation on Air Force activities will have to await advances by Federal Forces.

53. The Air Force is continuing to drop Safe Conduct Passes. The team encountered some displaced persons who had made use of these passes.

PRISONERS OF WAR


54. Few POWs were found in the operational areas, for two reasons. First, any prisoners taken were evacuated with a minimum of delay and secondly, because many accessionist soldiers, when capture was imminent, discarded their uniforms and passed themselves off as villagers and were often treated as displaced persons.

55. The Observers visited Prisoners of War at several locations. They reported that at PORT HARCOURT and at KIRI-KIRI and IKOYI prisons in LAGOS there was considerable room for improvement. These improvements should include providing the following conditions laid down in the Geneva Convention:

- (a) Prisoners of War must have freedom of movement within their camp.
- (b) Officers must be separate from other ranks.
- (c) Prisoners of War have the right to communicate by letter with their families, subject always to censorship.

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- (d) Red Cross must have constant access.
- (e) Reasonable amenities, such as exercise, games and reading material, must be available.
- (f) Medical attention must be constant.

56. The situation at the Prisoners of War camp at MAKURDI, which a team visited on 17th November, 1968 is similar to those at the other camps that have already been reported upon.

57. The Observers consider that a form of screening tribunal would be of value in reducing the numbers of prisoners of war and therefore the strain on the system and in promoting good will.

58. Some action has been taken by the Federal Army and more is planned. The Observers will be checking on the actions taken. The Red Cross should, of course, have the continuing responsibility for observing and reporting on Prisoners of War conditions.

SPECIAL ALLEGATIONS

59. When the Observer Team was formed it was anticipated that a considerable part of its function would be to investigate international allegations concerning the behaviour of Federal troops. In point of fact, there have been only two that were sufficiently substantiated to merit investigation by the Observers.

60. The first concerned the incident at OKIGWI on 30th September, 1968 in which two members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and two members of the World Council of Churches were killed. This was investigated at the request of FMG. The report was critical of the behaviour of some Federal soldiers and of the ICRC procedure in the event of their personnel and buildings becoming
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- 19 -

involved in the fighting. The Commander on the spot also ordered his own inquiry into the incident. The Observers were informed that its findings will be issued by the FMG.

61. The second allegation concerned press reports in CANADA that approximately 500 civilians had been shot by Federal troops when they entered the village of URUA INYANG on 4th October, 1968. After interviewing local elders and other inhabitants and a clergyman who was in the area at the time, and inspecting the market place involved, the team was unanimous in its opinion that no such massacre took place.

VOLUNTEER AGENCIES

62. There is little question that when the Observers arrived there were officers and men of the Federal Army who classed the members of the volunteer agencies working with the secessionists, particularly those belonging to the Red Cross, as mercenaries. This could be attributed partly to the well publicised activities of these agencies in flying relief supplies to the secessionists while their activities in Federal held areas seemed less extensive and received less recognition.

63. During the past two months the activities of the volunteer agencies in the Federal held areas have expanded considerably. The Nigerian Red Cross and the ICRC have moved into federal held areas not previously covered. There has been an increase in the number of personnel deployed in the operational areas and in the transport available for moving supplies. The co-operation in the field between the Federal troops, the civil administration and the volunteer agencies is reported as being good. In summary, the situation is improving although shortages still exist. It is to be hoped that this improvement has convinced those who questioned the activities of the volunteer agencies that their

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work is essential to the survival of Nigerians on both sides of the battle line.

SUMMARY


64. During the period 24th September - 23rd November the Observers representing Canada, Poland, Sweden and the United Kingdom visited all the Federal held sectors of those parts of Nigeria that can be classed as "war affected areas" as well as some parts of Northern Nigeria. They were able to go where they wanted when they wanted. They were free to approach and speak to a wide variety of people. Most areas were visited more than once. The Observers were accompanied on most visits by representatives of the Nigerian and foreign press.

65. The Observers found that in the areas visited during the period under report the FMG was following its declared policies for protecting Ibo people and Ibo property in Federal held areas. Specific findings for the period under report are:-

- (a) Genocide: The United Nations definition of genocide was used. It is the committing of certain acts with intent to destroy - wholly or in part - a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such. The Observers neither saw nor heard evidence that the Federal Army is following such a policy towards the Ibo people. There is evidence that the Federal Military Government and the Nigerian Army have a programme to assist all persons affected by the war, including Ibos. Based on what the Observers saw and heard they are of the opinion that the use of the term "genocide" is unwarranted.

/(b) Attitude


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- (b) Attitude of Civilians: The Ibo inhabitants of the war affected areas have a real fear that they will be killed if they fall into the hands of the Federal troops. The evidence is that this fear in most cases is dispelled by the treatment they receive when they do encounter Federal troops. The people from the Rivers and South-Eastern States who also live in the areas affected do not seem to suffer from this particular fear.
- (c) Care of Displaced Persons: The combined efforts of the Army, the civil administration and the volunteer agencies, which are increasing steadily, appear adequate in most but not all areas to cope with present demands for emergency care of displaced persons. The emergency care being given is saving the lives of a large number of people and all those concerned are to be commended for their work.
- (d) Rehabilitation of Population: The part of the war affected areas west of the Niger River and those on the periphery of the area east of the Niger have returned, or are returning, to near normal conditions with the civil administration in charge or in the progress of assuming responsibility. The takeover by the civil administration is slow, being hampered by a lack of qualified officials and transport.
- (e) Prisoners of War: While there are not a great number of prisoners of war, the Observers reported that the conditions under which they lived were not of an adequate standard. It is understood that action is being taken to correct the situation.
- /(f) Care

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



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- (f) Care and Repair of Property: The FMG and civil administration have programmes for caring for and repairing damaged property, both public and private. Progress is being made in implementing these plans, but it is slow and there is much to be done. Help from outside the war affected areas will be required to ensure a rapid return to normal conditions. Measures have been taken to care for the property outside the war affected areas.
- (g) Conduct of Federal Troops: The troops of the Nigerian Army are aware of the instructions in "the Code of Conduct" and they appear to be observing them. The troops seen by the team appear to be under control of their officers. They are taking positive action to obtain the confidence of the local population by assisting them in re-establishing a normal life.

66. Future: The general situation as reported here is unlikely to change as long as the fronts remain relatively static. A change in the form of the war, and in particular an end to the war, will undoubtedly produce a sudden increase in the numbers of persons requiring food and medical assistance. This increase could overwhelm the facilities available to handle it unless additional assistance is available very quickly. In addition outside technical assistance may be needed to help restore the public facilities essential for a rapid return to normal life, particularly in the cities.


Major-General W.A. Milroy
CANADA


Colonel Alfons Olkiewicz
POLAND


Major-General A. Raab
SWEDEN


Brigadier Sir Bernard Fergusson
UNITED KINGDOM

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ANNEX 'A'
TO OBSERVER TEAM REPORT ON
ACTIVITIES 24 SEP - 23 NOV 68

LIST OF MEMBERS OF OBSERVER TEAM

CANADA

Major General William A. Milroy (from 17 Sep 68)
Lieutenant Colonel E. B. M. Pinnington (from 27 Sep 68)

POLAND

Colonel Alfons Olkiewicz (from 1 Oct 68)
Mr Tadeusz Kumanek (from 1 Oct 68)
Lieutenant Michal Byczy (from 1 Oct 68)

SWEDEN

Major General Arthur Raab (from 14 Sep 68)
Lieutenant Colonel Carl Areskoug (from 19 Sep 68)

UNITED KINGDOM

Major General Henry T. Alexander (from 11 Sep - 24 Oct 68)
Brigadier Sir Bernard Fergusson (from 30 Oct 68)
Lieutenant Colonel Douglas J. Cairns (from 11 Sep 68)
Major The Honourable W. D. Arbuthnott (from 30 Oct 68)

ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

| | | |
|---------------------------------|------------|-----------------|
| Brigadier General Negga Teghegn | { Ethiopia | (from 5 Oct 68) |
| Captain O. Yilma | | (from 5 Oct 68) |
| Major General Sliman Hoffman | { Algeria | (from 3 Oct 68) |
| Mr Omar Lefgoun | | (from 3 Oct 68) |

UNITED NATIONS

Mr N-G Gussing (from 18 Aug 68)
Mr Erik Jenson (from 18 Aug 68)
Mr D. W. Caulfield (from 6 Oct 68)

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ANNEX 'B'
TO OBSERVERS TEAM REPORT ON
ACTIVITIES 24 SEP - 23 NOV 68

SUMMARY OF VISITS

1. First Nigerian Division 25 - 30 Sep 68
ENUGU, ANGU, ISHLAGU, UDI, OBILAGU, ABAKALIKI, AFIKPO
Major General Milroy, Major General Raab, Major General
Alexander, Lieutenant Colonel Areskoug, Lieutenant Colonel
Cairns
2. Third Nigerian Marine Commando Division 5 - 10 Oct 68
PORT HARCOURT, ABA, OWERRI, CALABAR, UYO, IKOT EKPENE
Major General Milroy, Major General Raab, Major General
Alexander, Colonel Olkiewicz, Lieutenant Colonel Pinnington,
Lieutenant Colonel Areskoug, Mr Kumanek, Lieutenant Byczy
3. Second Nigerian Division 15 - 18 Oct 68
BENIN, ASABA, OGWASHI-UKU, ONITSHA, KWALE, WARRI, UGHELLI,
OZORRO, SAPELE
Major General Milroy, Major General Raab, Major General
Alexander, Colonel Olkiewicz, Lieutenant Colonel Pinnington,
Lieutenant Colonel Cairns, Mr Kumanek, Lieutenant Byczy
4. Special Investigation - OKIGWI 3 Oct 68
Major General Alexander, Colonel Olkiewicz, Lieutenant Colonel
Areskoug
5. First Nigerian Division 23 - 27 Oct 68
ENUGU, ABAKALIKI, AFIKPO, OKIGWI
Colonel Olkiewicz, Lieutenant Colonel Areskoug
6. Third Nigerian Marine Commando Division 23 - 27 Oct 68
PORT HARCOURT, OPOBO, ABAK, AZUMINI, UYO, URUA INYANG, ABA
Major General Raab, Lieutenant Colonel Pinnington, Lieutenant
Colonel Cairns, Mr Kumanek
7. Prisoners of War in Lagos 1 Nov 68
KIRI-KIRI and IKOYI
Major General Milroy, Major General Raab, Brigadier Sir
Bernard Fergusson, Colonel Olkiewicz
8. KANO and NORTH CENTRAL STATES 4 - 7 Nov 68

/KANO

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KANO, ZARIA, KADUNA

Major General Raab, Colonel Olkiewicz, Lieutenant Colonel Cairns

9. First Nigerian Division 4 - 7 Nov 68

NSUKKA, AWKA

Major General Milroy, Major Arbuthnott, Mr Kumanch

10. Second Nigerian Division 4 - 7 Nov 68

BENIN, ASABA, KWALA, WARRI

Brigadier Sir Bernard Fergusson, Lieutenant Byczy

11. First Nigerian Division 13 - 19 Nov 68

MAKURDI, AGOJA, IKOM, OBUDU

Major General Raab, Lieutenant Colonel Pinnington, Major Arbuthnott, Mr Kumanch

12. Third Marine Commando Division 13 - 17 Nov 68

PORT HARCOURT, ABA, OWERRI, AHOMDA

Major General Milroy, Brigadier Sir Bernard Fergusson, Colonel Olkiewicz, Lieutenant Colonel Areskoug, Lieutenant Byczy

NOTE:-

On some of the visits listed above the Team was accompanied by the Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations and/or his Assistants and Observers representing the Organisation of African Unity. In addition these other observers made separate visits to different sectors.

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ANNEX 'C'
TO OBSERVER TEAM REPORT ON
ACTIVITIES 24 SEP - 23 NOV 68

REPORTS

1. The Observer Team have issued six reports. These are:-
 - a. Three interim reports, as follows:
 - (1) First Interim Report - "Visit to First Nigerian Division" dated 2 Oct 68
 - (2) Second Interim Report - "Visit to Third Nigerian Marine Commando Division" dated 14 Oct 68
 - (3) Third Interim Report - "Visit to Second Nigerian Division" dated 23 Oct 68
 - b. Two reports on allegations involving special incidents, as follows:
 - (1) Report of Investigation into the circumstances of deaths at OKIGWI, dated 4 Oct 68
 - (2) Report on Investigation into allegations of the massacre of civilians at URUA INYANG, dated 2 Nov 68
 - c. A report on the visit to Prisoners of War at KIRI-KIRI and IKOYI, dated 3 Nov 68.

(The activities of the Observers for the period since the Third Interim Report are covered in this report).
2. The other Observers have produced the following reports:-
 - a. The representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations:
 - (1) First Interim Report by the representative of the Secretary-General to Nigeria on Humanitarian Activities on his visit to the Northern Front, issued 9 Oct 68
 - (2) Second Interim Report by the representative of the Secretary-General to Nigerian on Humanitarian Activities on visits to the Southern and Western Fronts, issued 30 Oct 68

/(3)

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- (3) Third Interim Report of the representative of the Secretary-General to Nigeria on Humanitarian Activities, issued 2 Nov 68
 - (4) Report of the representative of the Secretary-General to Nigeria on Humanitarian Activities on an incident at OKIGWI, issued 8 Oct 68
- b. The Organisation of African Unity
- (1) Report No. 1 on the Visit to Third Nigerian Marine Commando Division, issued on 14 Oct 68
 - (2) Report No. 2 on the Visit to Second Nigerian Division, issued on 22 Oct 68
 - (3) Report No. 3 on the Visit to First Nigerian Division and to Prisoners of War Camps in LAGOS, issued 15 Nov 68
 - (4) A composite report on the activities of the Organisation of African Unity Observers during the period of their stay in NIGERIA is in course of preparation.

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Pol 27 Biafra - Nigeria
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C O N F I D E N T I A L ADDIS ABABA 6952

LIMDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y

REF: ADDIS ABABA 6925

1. MINSTATE MOFA TESFAYE CONFIRMED INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY GHANA AMBASSADOR, SAID HIM CONSIDERED REPLY INDIRECT "NO" BY GOWON ON IEG PROPOSALS. (FOR GENERAL CONSUMPTION, HOWEVER, APPEARS NTEG TAKING LINE THAT GOWON LETTER "INTERIM REPLY", AS HIM DID WITH FOLEY DURING THEIR CONVERSATION TODAY.)

2. TESFAYE SAID FOLEY TOLD HIM TODAY BRITISH PROPOSE APPROACH OUUKWU IN EFFORT OBTAIN HIS AGREEMENT RENEWAL NIGERIAN TALKS UNDER OAU AUSPICES (FULL REPORT FOLEY CONVERSATION FOLLOWS). TESFAYE NOT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT OUTIZHO BUT BELIEVED IT WORTH TRYING IF ONLY TO RELIEVE PRESSURES FOR SETTLEMENT ON BIAFRAN TERMS. NOTE: BRITISH HAVE SINCE INFORMED US THAT FOLEY WHEN HE LEFT ADDIS TODAY PLANNED HIMSELF PROCEED TO BIAFRA VIA PARIS, DOUALA, SAO TOME AND ICRC FLIGHT. ASSUMING NO WORD TO CONTRARY REACHED HIM IN PARIS, WOULD BE LEAVING PARIS TOMORROW MORNING (DEC 13).

4. TESFAYE SAID IEG IMPRESSION FMG EXTREMELY WAR WEARY AND WAR NOW STALEMATED. THUS HE SAW LITTLE HOPE AVOIDING TRAGIC STARVATION EVEN IF RELIEF MACHINERY OPERATING. HE ASKED IF US HAD ANY SUGGESTIONS ON OTHER APPROACHES. I

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
PAGE 02 ADDIS 06952 131243Z

TOLDHIM WOULD RELAY QUERY BUT BUT MY IMPRESSION FROM WASHINGTON VISIT WAS WE HAD NO ADDITIONAL PROPOSALS TO OFFER.

5. TESFAYE COMMENTED UNDER SECRETARY'S SPEECH HELPFUL IN PUTTING WEU IN PERSPECTIVE. HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD AND SYMPATHIZED WITH DEPARTMENT'S PROBLEM IN AVOIDING PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURE FOR ACTION WHICH WOULD VIOLATE SOUND PRINCIPLES SO FAR FOLLOWED. HALL

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FROM : Amembassy LONDON

DATE: Dec. 11, 1968

SUBJECT : Colin Legum Discusses Nigerian Conflict in
Observer

REF :

The Embassy transmits herewith for the information of addressees an article by Colin Legum, Commonwealth Correspondent of the Observer, on the Nigerian conflict. It appeared December 8. Legum concludes that Ojukwu's strategy in refusing to accept a land-corridor for relief supplies is to create the impression that Lagos is waging a war of genocide; he opposes independence for Biafra on the grounds it would lead to a balkanized Nigeria; he believes that the British would not be justified in stopping unilaterally the supply of arms to the FMG; and, finally, he favors a British initiative in the UN that might lead to a Security Council Resolution calling for an arms embargo, an internationally supervised cease-fire and a resumption of negotiations.

Comment: The British Government has consistently opposed UN consideration of the Nigerian conflict, partly because the British, like the Nigerians themselves, consider it an internal problem that does not fall within the UN mandate, partly because they think it likely that a UN call for an arms embargo would tie British hands but not those of the Soviets or those supplying military aid to the Biafrans.

BRUCE

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THE OBSERVER, 8 DECEMBER 1968

BIAFRA/IS BRITAIN WRONG?

Hundreds of thousands of Ibos have already died, and the figure may soon reach millions. Nigeria's civil war goes on, with Britain still selling arms to one side. Moral revulsion is rising. Here, COLIN LEGUM answers questions raised by Britain's involvement in the war. He argues that to stop the killing is as much a matter of politics as of morality, and proposes a way out.

0519

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By MN NARA Date 10/3/05

People are no longer willing to stand by helplessly and watch possibly millions of Ibos die in the next few months. Is there nothing we in this country can do to stop the killing?

Certainly, there are things Britain can and should do. But we cannot stop the killing on our own. Effective policy requires collective action to achieve five objectives: an early cease-fire; a total arms embargo on both sides; political negotiations about Nigeria's future; massive relief; aid for economic reconstruction.

But why must Britain wait for other countries before acting herself? Why don't we stop selling arms to the Federal side now?

If it were only a question of relieving Britain of any further moral responsibility in the civil war, there would be no argument against stopping the supply of arms now. But it's not simply a moral question; it's a question of doing something effective.

Why must a moral gesture of this sort be derided as useless? How can a ghastly chain of events, created by selfish national and international interests, ever be broken if no one is prepared to make a moral gesture?

Moral gestures are by no means useless. Often they are all that's possible, for example, over Czechoslovakia. But when moral gestures, however emotionally satisfying, become mere substitutes for effective policies, or when they might even help to worsen a particular situation, they are robbed of moral validity.

Are you saying that stopping British arms to Nigeria will do more harm to the Ibos than if we continued to arm the Federals?

Yes, if we did it unilaterally. It would make it even more difficult to negotiate. Worse: it would widen the dangers facing Nigeria after the war.

Britain is not the only supplier of arms to the Federals; not even the only supplier of ground arms: these come from several European countries, openly and clandestinely. All the air weapons come from Russia and the pilots from Egypt.

Because the Federal side is now suspicious of a possible British change of policy, it's rapidly diffusing its sources of supply. So British arms could be quickly replaced — especially by the Russians.

The old Russian bogey again: Why? If world opinion succeeds in stopping Britain from selling arms, should it not stop Russians too? After all, somebody must give a lead; why not Britain? The British Government did try to give a lead at the start of the war: its original position was

to continue with only the peace-time monthly delivery of arms under contract to the Federal regime, which Britain, in common with every other African country at that time, recognised as the legitimate authority. The British quota—based on Nigeria's peace-time needs—was hardly enough to sustain a war. Nevertheless, THE OBSERVER, among others, argued then that Britain's policy was mistaken, and that we should keep out of the war, thereby encouraging others as well.

If that was the right policy at the time, why isn't it right now?

I'm not saying it's right to go on selling arms, but . . .

Oh, so you agree that Britain should stop selling arms?

Yes—but not unilaterally. The situation has grown in complexity with the enlargement of the war. At the time of secession the Biafrans were not getting arms, so it was just possible to stop an arms escalation. But once the Biafrans began to get arms and support (mainly with the connivance of the Portuguese and French), the Federals began to shop around for more arms.

The turning point came when the Federals, having been firmly refused British and American aircraft and weapons, turned successfully for these to the Russians.

It was then that the Russians—proclaiming wholehearted support for a campaign to 'crush Biafra'—entered the arena, contributing directly to enlarging the scale of the war. There is now international involvement on both sides, with France, Tanzania, Zambia, Gabon, the Ivory Coast and China, all openly supporting Biafra; and the Russians, British, Americans and most of the Afro-Asian countries supporting the Federals. If we want to see the killing stopped, we must be concerned with stopping arms delivery to both sides.

But wouldn't it be easier to bring pressure on the Russians and the rest if Britain were to take the lead?

How much regard did Russia pay to world opinion over Czechoslovakia—or the French over their flaunting of the UN arms embargo on South Africa?

What makes some people suspicious is that the Government has all along been arguing that to stop arms deliveries would remove British influence with the Federals. But where is that influence now—if it ever existed?

British influence was always limited. So long as she supported the objective of restoring unity, it was possible to caution restraint and to urge conciliation in Lagos. Nevertheless, the

British Government's limited achievements have not been unimportant. It was largely instrumental in getting agreement for the mercy land-corridor offer. It helped to hold back the invasion of the Ibo heartland for some months while several efforts for a peaceful settlement were first tried. And when it could no longer restrain the Federals, it did succeed in getting approval for international observers to report on possible misbehaviour by the troops—possibly the only time in history this has been done.

You say that to stop arms would not stop the war, and imply that we would then be losing out to the Russians' influence. Surely this only has force if we really are working, publicly and privately, for a settlement. Are we doing so?

Yes. It's arguable that much more could have been done to restrain the Federals before the war actually began; both the British and the Federals misjudged Ibo ability to resist. But ever since the fighting started, British policy must be credited with working to get it stopped and with promoting negotiations. It has done so—wisely—through the OAU and the Commonwealth Secretariat, rather than on its own initiative. This is the reason its efforts have not been publicised. Nevertheless, it was largely instrumental in helping the Commonwealth initiative to get both sides to the peace talks in Kampala in June 1968. More recently, it tried to get the Federals to talk with a peace-party from Biafra.

How then do you account for the suspicions that the British have been behind the Federals' notion of 'a quick kill'?

There's some confusion here, through events being telescoped. The 'quick kill' theory developed only after the capture of Port Harcourt earlier this year, when the Biafrans became trapped in their heartland. It was then thought that an all-out attack on the heartland would bring down the Biafran leader, Colonel Ojukwu. Whether this would have occurred had the French not come to Biafra's rescue, we'll never know. But even when the 'quick kill' operation was being mounted, Britain still refused to step up its supplies significantly.

0520

Well, what do you think would happen if Britain decided tomorrow to stop arms to Nigeria?

One thing is sure: the Federal side wouldn't collapse, and the war wouldn't stop. The Federals won't submit to this kind of British pressure to give up all they have been fighting for up to now. It's a mistake to underestimate the fierce passion for unity among Federal supporters. It's just as much of a political reality as the Ibos' commitment to Biafra's self-determination. It's safe to predict that if Britain stopped arms the Federals would increase their supplies from Russia and other European sources.

Even if this is true—and many people would dispute it—why do you suppose the Russians would fill the breach?

Because of their record. There was no reason—other than opportunism—to sell aircraft to the Federals. Since then, they have agreed to increase their commitment not only in arms but in long-term reconstruction.

What possible interests could there be for Russia to get so deeply involved?

Like all Powers, Russia is always interested in extending her influence more than ever since Czechoslovakia and the consequent decline of Soviet influence in the Third World. If the cause of uniting Africa's largest State—having been rejected by Britain and the Western countries—could triumph largely through Russian help, one could foresee great advantages for Moscow. Already, there are signs of some Nigerian leaders hitching their political star to the Russians. Remember what happened when Lumumba took this line in the Congo to break the central coalition, thereby deepening the crisis there. This could easily happen in Nigeria through a wrong move now by Britain.

Are you really saying that British policy should be influenced by these considerations at a time when Biafra is being turned into a graveyard and we know that things will get even worse next month? Isn't this dangerously like the arguments of those who closed their eyes to the plight of Europe's Jewry in Nazi times?

Moral concern does not free us from the necessity of examining political realities, with all their complexity, which must be understood if there is to be any chance of stopping the killing. The immediate issue is how to get a quick ceasefire. Stopping British arms won't achieve this.

I myself have seen the dying in Nigeria. I witnessed the massacre of Ibos in 1966. But it's not enough to be shocked and concerned; we must be prepared to think through the problems raised by this tragedy. Unlike the Jews in Nazi Europe, the Ibos have a way out of their present condition. They don't face genocide as the Jews did.

How can you say that when at least two million Ibos, even now, face death?

The Federals—unlike the Nazis—have no deliberate intention of destroying all Ibos, or even of making their future life unbearable. We should be careful not to debase the use of the word 'genocide.' Admittedly, there were distinct elements of genocide in the 1966 massacres, as I wrote at the time. But the civil war is a struggle of conflicting political aims, not a war of extermination. The international team of observers has repeatedly said the situation does not justify allegations of genocide. If millions of Ibos are to die in the months ahead, it will be due as much—perhaps even more—to Ojukwu's policies than to the Federal leaders. If Ojukwu were to agree to the Federal offer of a 'mercy' land-corridor, total famine could immediately be averted. A terrible responsibility rests on those who have chosen not to accept this offer.

But if the Biafran leaders were to accept the corridor, would not the Federal Army use it to move in their troops?

There are two issues here. First, the Federal offer to get food to the Biafrans, under approved international supervision, at least demonstrates they are not trying to kill off the Ibos wholesale, or to starve them into submission. Second, it's possible to mine and defend the outlet of the corridor.

What possible reason do you suggest there is for Ojukwu to condemn his own people to die?

The great international pressures built up around the propaganda of genocide, and reinforced by the damaging evidence of starvation, are an important aspect of Biafra's strategy for changing Western policies. While this is a perfectly understandable tactic, it doesn't acquit Biafra's leaders of direct responsibility for contributing towards disaster.

Furthermore, if Ojukwu were to agree to a cease-fire—even on the hard terms offered by the Federals—he could at once save millions of lives, and avert permanent damage to the mental development of the younger generation of Ibos. (By the way, no such offer was ever open to the Jews.) If Ojukwu refuses to do this, it's for two reasons: He and his supporters still go on believing they can win their fight for independence by simply holding out

long enough whatever the cost in lives; and the Ibos fear that the alternative to winning is a future of second-class citizenship. Are you suggesting that an Ojukwu clique is compelling an unwilling people to submit to a policy of mass deaths?

No. Many Ibos genuinely believe it's better to die than to submit. Even among the seven million Ibos in Federal territory—who at least know they don't face genocide—many continue to believe in Biafra's cause. But there are others who now accept that the time has come to adopt a different approach. These include a number of prominent Ibos. I'm not saying they are a decisive element now, but at least one should not accept the view that all Biafrans are hard-liners. Many Ibos, in fact, are already associated with the Federal cause—incidentally another difference which falsifies the Ibo-Jewish analogy.

Can anybody really believe after all that's happened that the Ibos can ever again live on equal terms with other Nigerians?

This is perhaps the hardest question of all to answer. There's no doubt—as the Federal leader, General Gowon, confirmed a few days ago—that bitterness against the Ibos is widespread and deep.

I certainly do not think they can rely on equality of treatment as a matter of right. But this does not rule out the possibility of getting a political settlement, with rigidly-enforceable guarantees through effective local institutions. Do you remember how many people said after the massacres in the Congo that the Lunda, the Baluba and the rest would never again be able to live together—but after only a few years this has proved possible.

Anyway, why should the Ibos not be independent? Why should they be forced back into a united Nigeria against which they've fought with their lives?

Now we are approaching the heart of the tangled crisis. Had the Ibos—when they first seceded—restricted themselves to their own territory, instead of including five million non-Ibos in their breakaway republic, one might have faced a quite different situation. It's these non-Ibo territories that have proved to be their greatest weakness.

LONDON A-5175
ENCLOSURE
Page 3 of 4

0521

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Authority VND 954503
By NARA Date 10/5/05

unlikely that if they agreed to negotiate they could in fact get support from others on the Federal side, especially among the Yoruba and Hausa leaders for a confederal system. Within such a system it would be possible to ensure that the Ibos got the security and opportunities they need; but any chance of getting it depends on Ibo willingness to enter into political negotiations before they are totally weakened.

If this were remotely possible, why won't they negotiate?

Because there is no absolute guarantee that they would achieve a confederal system to their taste. The Ibo 'peace party' leaders obviously think they can get acceptable terms by negotiating now. It's certainly a more hopeful prospect than pursuing the present 'apocalyptic' and self-destructing approach to their future. I have heard Dr. Ennio Njokuwu, one of Africa's finest academic minds—says that he would prefer to see the bulk of Ibos killed off rather than give up. What remained of us would continue our work at some point in the future. Against this attitude, it's impossible to argue, but should outsiders acquiesce in it?

What you have been saying all along presupposes it's possible for Nigeria to remain united.

Of course one cannot provide evidence, but it wasn't so long ago that we were engaged in a very dissimilar controversy over Katanga's secession from the Congo. Then, too, we heard that the Congo could never be effectively united—yet only a few years after the cruel events in the Congo, it is now operating effectively as a united country.

What, then, do you propose could be done in time to avert the approaching disaster?

We must start, I'm afraid, by acknowledging that both sides are equally inflexible over their basic principles. The Federals won't accept an unconditional ceasefire and will insist on getting at least token recognition of the objective of a united Nigeria—the point Ojukwu and his people won't budge from.

This deadlock can be broken, if at all, only by introducing an external factor. The OAU and the Commonwealth have both tried and failed. The Security Council remains the Security Council.

A group of countries, deeply committed to either side—Canada and Uganda—could take the initiative in starting a lobby to get an agreed Security Council resolution calling for an arms embargo, an internationally supervised ceasefire and a resumption of negotiations.

Their task would be to get those countries with most influence on both sides—Britain, the United States, and the OAU on the Federal side; Tanzania, Zambia and the Ivory Coast on Biafra's side—to build sufficient support to ensure Security Council agreement. This was how the Council was persuaded in 1967 to adopt an agreed resolution on the Middle East, an even more intractable problem than Nigeria's.

There's no reason for doubting that the Russians and the French would accept such a resolution if there were enough Afro-

Asian backing for it. If all the major Powers voted for it, the Nigerians and Biafrans would have to heed the appeal.

I'm not saying it will be easy, but since it seems to be the only way of breaking the deadlock, and of avoiding the terrible disasters foretold for early next year, it seems the best policy worth fighting for.

What of Britain's role in all this?

Because Britain is a partisan, she cannot initiate such a move; but, working through the Commonwealth, the OAU and her other allies, Lord Caradon could play a decisive role.

You say Britain cannot take an initiative at the UN because we are partisan—but if we gave up arms deliveries wouldn't we then be non-partisan, and thus be able to take such an initiative?

No, for if we suddenly announced we were stopping arms we would at once be treated—quite rightly—as hostile by the Federals. There would be no advantage from such a move. But there is something the British Government can—and should—do: to announce right away that the Security Council ordered an arms embargo on both sides it would at once comply with it. It is this strong card that Britain can't play—and she should not throw it away in a useless and damaging gesture. By tying her decision to a Security Council agreement on an arms embargo, she could avoid provoking the Federals mentioned earlier.

This is why I believe that Britain should not unilaterally insist and insist she is in a strong position to use her present position to contribute importantly to achieving an effective international decision.

But seeing what has happened in South Africa, how could one guarantee that an arms embargo would work?

Well, a ceasefire and an effective operation would be international supervision. That would mean teams of international observers on both sides of the line who could report on breaches.

After all, if an agreed framework for negotiations and a Jarring mission could be reached in the Middle East crisis, there's no reason for thinking that it cannot be achieved for Nigeria. Even if it were only temporary, it would at least stave off the disaster.

Our rightly felt moral passions could be constructively used in campaigning to persuade British and other amenable Governments to take the problem to the Security Council. Otherwise, I'm afraid, we'll waste our time in moral protests that will do nothing to stop the killing.

One final point: the war in Nigeria is not strictly between right and wrong. There are rights on both sides. Faced with such a conflict, one should seek for compromise and not for outright victory by either side. It's a lesson for the friends of both the Biafrans and the Federals.

You see, the main thrust of the civil war did not—as is still wrongly maintained—come from the Muslim Hausas. It came as much from the minority peoples whose leaders—such men as Ekegharo, Tarka, Arikpo, Gowon—resented the Ibo attempt to impose their independence on them.

The Biafra tragedy is not confined to the Ibos alone, and here one must remember two facts. First, only about half of Nigeria's 50 million people belong to the three dominant groups. Second, all three have had a very poor record indeed in their treatment of minorities.

By a series of accidents, members of the minorities found themselves in control of the military regime after the dominant groups had killed each other in the two army coups. It's they who have been most active in wishing to end the domination of all three major groups—not just of the Ibos. They want to recreate a Nigeria in which, for the first time, the minorities will have equal rights with their former dominators.

But what is the case against giving the Ibos their independence within their own territory?

First, it's always difficult simply to correct the mistakes of history and to go back to square one. Second, the minorities fear that if the Ibos can have their own independent state, then the Yorubas and Hausas will insist on theirs, too—and there's considerable evidence to justify this fear. A balkanised Nigeria would offer no future worth striving for the minorities.

Finally, if the Ibos were to get independence within their own traditional area they would be hopelessly overcrowded—a considerable proportion have always found it necessary to work outside the area. To drive them all back into it would leave them with an unviable State, deprived of any considerable resource (mainly oil), that would continuously threaten the security of the rest of the country.

Are you arguing that the only solution is for the Ibos to return to a unified Nigeria?

Yes. But such a State could be unitary, a centralised federation, or a confederation; the last was what the Ibos demanded before secession. It's by no means

0522

46



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 320

PAGE 01 YAOUNDE 02550 111227Z

17
ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,
NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SA 01, RSR 01, 116 W
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2706
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AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USUN NY 91
STATE GRNC

C O N F I D E N T I A L YAOUNDE 2550

SUBJECT: NIGERIAN PEACE INITIATIVES

REF: ADDIS 6838

PRIOR HIS DEPARTURE DECEMBER 8 FOR UDEAC SUMMIT, PRESIDENT AHIDJO
TOLD LIBERIAN AMBASSADOR THOMAS THAT HIS VIEWS ON NIGERIAN
SITUATION WERE VERY CLOSE TO THOSE OF PRESIDENT TUBMAN AND THAT
CAMEROON WOULD BE REPRESENTED IF CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE
UNDERTOOK NEW INITIATIVE. AHIDJO DID NOT INDICATE IF HE WOULD
ATTEND PERSONALLY OR SEND A REPRESENTATIVE. PAYTON

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POL 27 BIAFRA - NIGERIA

Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 236

PAGE 01 LAGOS 15195 112346Z

88

ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, MC 01, ACDA 16, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07,

LI 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, NSA 02, SR 01, ORM 03,

SCS 04, SCA 02, AID 28, SAH 02, RSR 01, 174 W

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RI 11635Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3933
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
/USMISSION USUN 748
CINCSSTRIKE/CINCEAFSA
DIA

CONFIDENTIAL LAGOS 15195

NOFORN

SUBJECT: VIEWS OF BIAFRAN REPRESENTATIVE IN LONDON

1. CANADIAN HIGH COMMISSION HERE (PROTECT) HAS LET US SEE MESSAGE THEY HAVE RECEIVED FROM LONDON BASED ON EXTENSIVE CONVERSATIONS WITH KOGBARA BIAFRAN QTE REPRESENTATIVE UNQTE IN BRITAIN.

2. KOGBARA WHO REPORTEDLY MAKING APPROACHES VARIOUS COMMONWEALTH MISSIONS IN LONDON AND TO ARNOLD SMITH ASKED CANADIANS IF TRUDEAU WOULD SEE LEADER BIAFRAN DEL IN LONDON AT TIME OF PRIME MINISTERS CONFERENCE. KOGBARA COULD OR WOULD NOT SAY WHO BIAFRAN LEADER WOULD BE BUT HE WOULD BE OF QTE MINISTERIAL RANK UNQTE. CANADIANS NONCOMMITAL BUT PASSED REQUEST TO OTTAWA.

3. ON MILITARY SIDE KOGBARA CLAIMED BIAFRAN POSITION IMPROVED BECAUSE OF INCREASED ARMS AND AMMUNITION. HE DID NOT MENTION SOURCE ARMS. KOGBARA CLAIMED BIAFRANS HAD STALLED FMG AND THAT IBO LEADERS CONVINCED THEY COULD

CONFIDENTIAL

41

0524

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MVA Date 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LAGOS 15195 112346Z

RESIST FMG MILITARY EFFORTS QTE INDEFINITELY UNQTE.
HE CLAIMED INSTABILITY ON FEDERAL SIDE PRECLUDED A
PROLONGED WAR AND THAT FEDERAL MORALE LOW.

4. KOGBARA ADMITTED PROSPECTIVE FOOD STORAGES IN BIAFRA
BUT SAID IBOS WOULD NEVER SURRENDER AND EVEN IF DEFEATED
CONVENTIONALLY WOULD ADOPT GUERRILLA TACTICS.

5. BIAFRANS INSIST ON UNCONDITIONAL CEASE FIRE AS
PRECONDITION REOPENING ANY TALKS.

6. KOGBARA SAID SINCE OAU HAD QTE REJECTED BIAFRA AT
AT ALGIERS UNQTE IT UNACCEPTABLE MEDIATOR. BIAFRANS APPRECIATED
ARNOLD SMITH'S PAST EFFORTS BUT SAID SECRETARIAT'S ROLE
LIMITED BECAUSE IT SUBJECT PRESSURES FROM BRITAIN AND
NIGERIA.


7. CANADIANS ASKED KOGBARA WHY OJUKWU FAILED
RESPOND
PRIME MINISTER'S APPEAL TO PERMIT DAYLIGHT FLIGHTS TO ULI.
HE SAID NO SUCH APPEAL HAD REACHED OJUKWU AND THEREFORE
THERE NOTHING TO REPLY TO. KOGBARA PERSONALLY BELIEVES
OJUKWU WOULD PROBABLY REJECT ICRC DAYTIME FLIGHTS BUT
MIGHT PERMIT CANADIAN DAY FLIGHTS.

8. CANADIANS LEFT WITH IMPRESSION THAT FOR THE PRESENT
POSSIBILITY OF RENEWED NEGOTIATIONS IS QTE VERY
REMOTE UNQTE.

GP-1
MATHEWS

CONFIDENTIAL

0525





POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 791

PAGE 01 LAGOS 15190 111846Z

42.
ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01

SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, NSA 02, SA 01, AID 28, PC 04, RSR 01, T50 PW
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R 111513Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3930
INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
USMISSION USUN
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA
CINCSSTRIKE/CINCEAFSA
DIA

COINFI D EINT I A L LAGOS 15190

SUBJECT: EXTENSION INTERNATIONAL OBSERVER TEAM

1. BRITISH HERE (PROTECT) HAVE HAD FORMAL LETTER FROM MINEXTAFFI INFORMING THEM THAT QTEI AFTER MOST CAREFUL CONSIDERATION FMG HAS DECIDED TO FURTHER EXTEND PERIOD OF STAY IN THIS COUNTRY OF OBSERVER TEAM FROM DECEMBER 14 UNTIL SUCH TIME AS MAY BE DETERMINED BY FMG UNILATERALLY OR BY MUTUAL CONSULTATION WITH RESPECTIVE GOVTS OR ORGANIZATIONS UNQTE.

2. DESPITE RECENT PRESS FULMINATIONS AGAINST BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY CONSIDERATION NIGERIAN QUESTION LETTER ALSO AKS THAT FMG DECISION BE CONVEYED HMG AND BRITISH REACTION BE GIVEN MINEXTAFFI QTE AT AN EARLY CONVENIENT UNQTE TIME. GP-1.
MATHEWS

CONFIDENTIAL

72

0526

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND954503
By MNA Date 10/5/05



Department of State

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
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TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED 714

PAGE 01 LAGOS 15191 111728Z

40

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R 111520Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3931
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA UNN
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA UNN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA UNN
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY UNN
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE UNN
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NY
USIA WASHDC

UNCLAS LAGOS 15191

USIA FOR IBS


SUBJECT: NIGERIAN PRESS ROUNDUP DECEMBER 11

1. ALL PAPERS EXCEPT TRIBUNE FEATURE NEWS ON PRESENTATION OF OAU OBSERVERS' FINAL REPORT TO GENERAL GOWON. GOWON AGAIN EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR WORK OF OBSERVERS. OBSERVERS REPORTEDLY CALL FOR NIGERIAN RED CROSS TO TAKE OVER AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR DIRECTION RELIEF WORK IN NIGERIA FOR ICRC SINCE RELIEF EFFORTS HAVE NOW REACHED STAGE WHERE THEY COULD BEST BE HANDLED BY NIGERIANS. UNQUOTE REPORT ALSO CALLS FOR OAU MEMBERS TO PARTICIPATE MORE IN NIGERIAN RELIEF BECAUSE OF ABSENCE OF HUMANITARIAN ACTIVITY MIGHT GIVE GROUND TO DETRACTORS POISED TO UNDERMINE ROLE OF THE ORGANIZATION UNQUOTE. ALSO RESTATES FINDINGS THAT GENOCIDE AGAINST IBOS NOT TAKING PLACE. FULL REPORT WILL BE DISTRIBUTED BY OAU SECRETARIAT IN ADDIS.

UNCLASSIFIED

32

0527





Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 LAGOS 15191 111728Z

2. ALL PAPERS REPORT ARRIVAL DEC 11 OF LORD SHEPHERD FOR QTE TALKS UNQTE WITH FMG. IN REPLY TO QUESTION IF HIS VISIT CONCERNED POSSIBLE PEACE TALKS, SHEPHERD REPLIED QTE ONE ALWAYS HOPES IT WILL BE POSSIBLE FOR ADDIS ABABA TALKS TO RECONVENE BECAUSE IT IS IN INTEREST OF ALL NIGERIANS THAT TRAGIC WAR SHOULD COME TO END WITH NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT UNQTE.

3. ALL PAPERS EXCEPT PILOT REPORT GENERAL GOWON HAS SENT NOTE IN REPLY TO NOTE FROM ETHIOPIAN EMPEROR, REAFFIRMING FMGS WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN ANOTHER ROUND OF


PEACE TALKS BASED ON OAU ALGIERS RESOLUTION.

4. TIMES, POST AND OBSERVER REPORT THAT FMG HAS FORMALLY PROTESTED TO HMG THROUGH BRITISH HICOM LAGOS AGAINST QTE FURTHER DISCUSSION OF NIGERIAN SITUATION UNQTE IN BRITISH PARLIAMENT. NOTE REPORTEDLY STATED THAT DISCUSSION OF CRISIS IN BRITISH PARLIAMENT GIVES REBELS QTE FALSE SENSE OF HOPE RESULTING IN PROLONGATION OF WAR TO END REBELLION. UNQTE AND WARNED THAT CONTINUED DISCUSSION COULD LEAD TO QTE STRAIN UNQTE IN NIGERIAN-BRITISH RELATIONS. MATHEWS

UNCLASSIFIED

72

0528





POL 27 BIAFR - NIGERIA
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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 532

PAGE 01 PARIS 25189 111917Z

47
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R 111755Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8986
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 25189

L I M D I S

SUBJECT: DE GAULLE LUNCH - BIAFRA

AS THE SECRETARY SUGGESTED DURING MY VISIT TO WASHINGTON, I ASKED DE GAULLE WHETHER HE THOUGHT ANY SOLUTION WAS POSSIBLE TO PROBLEM OF GETTING FOOD TO THOSE STARVING IN BIAFRA. I POINTED OUT THAT PLENTY OF FOOD AVAILABLE BUT NO ONE YET FIGURED OUT HOW TO OVERCOME POLITICAL OBSTACLES TO DELIVERING IT. I MENTIONED THAT I HAD BEEN STRUCK DURING MY BRIEF STAY IN THE UNITED STATES BY THE INTENSITY OF PUBLIC INTEREST IN THIS PROBLEM, AND THAT SENATOR KENNEDY, AS A MEMBER OF THE SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON REFUGEES, AS WELL AS SECRETARY RUSK, HAD EXPRESSED A SPECIAL INTEREST IN THE PROBLEM TO ME.

DE GAULLE'S FIRST REPLY TO THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COULD NOT PERMIT FOOD TO GO THROUGH TO BIAFRA. I SAID THAT THIS WAS NOT MY IMPRESSION. FORTUNATELY AMBASSADOR LUCET AND LEBEL OF THE QUAI WERE PRESENT AND AGREED WITH ME, SAYING THAT THE DIFFICULTY WAS THAT THE IBOS WERE CONVINCED THAT ANYTHING WHICH CAME THROUGH FEDERAL TERRITORY WOULD BE POISONED. DE GAULLE NEXT RAISED POSSIBILITY OF PORT HARCOURT WHICH I, WITH APPROVAL OF LUCET AND LEBEL EXPLAINED WAS ALSO NO SOLUTION BECAUSE PORT OUT OF OPERATION.

DE GAULLE THEN DROPPED THE RELIEF ISSUE AS SUCH AND OBSERVED THAT THE DEEP-SEATED HOSTILITIES IN NIGERIA BLOCKING NEARLY ALL EFFORTS AROSE FROM BRITISH ATTEMPT TO CREATE A FEDERATION OF PEOPLES WHO WERE COMPLETELY DISUNITED CULTURALLY, LINGUISTICALLY AND SO FORTH. WHEN THE BRITISH WERE THERE, HE SAID, THEIR RULE

CONFIDENTIAL

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Authority VNP 959503
By MVA Date 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 PARIS 25189 111917Z

WAS ACCEPTED BECAUSE IT CAME FROM THE OUTSIDE, BUT SINCE IN-
DEPENDENCE THE NIGERIANS COULD NOT AGREE AMONG THEMSELVES ON
WHICH TRIBAL GROUP WOULD GOVERN THE FEDERATION, THUS THE FEDERATION
WAS "ARTIFICIAL".

I SAID WHAT CONCERNED US NOW AND URGENTLY BECAUSE OF IMMINENT
STARVATION WAS THE RELIEF PROBLEM AND THAT AMPLE FOOD SUPPLIES
WERE AVAILABLE AND AGAIN ASKED HIM WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT BE DONE
TO GET THESE SUPPLIES THROUGH TO WHERE THEY WERE NEEDED. DE
GAULLE THEN SEEMED TO AGREE THAT SOMETHING OUGHT TO BE DONE AND
SUGGESTED THAT OFF-LOADING DELIVERY OF THE FOOD COULD BE MANAGED
UNDER RED CROSS OR OTHER INTERNATIONAL AUSPICES THUS ALLAYING
IBO FEARS. THINKING ALOUD ABOUT THE PROBLEM HE THEN SUGGESTED
DESIRABILITY OF UTILIZATION MAXIMUM AFRICAN PERSONNEL AND LEADER-
SHIP AND HE VISIBLY WARMED TO CONCEPT OF PLACING RESPONSIBILITY
ON AFRICAN COUNTRIES WHO COULD BE ASSISTED BY FRENCH AND US BUT
NOT BY BRITISH OR RUSSIANS. HE SPECIFICALLY MENTIONED IVORY COAST
AND CAMEROON IN THIS REGARD. HE ALSO PROPOSED NIGER AND THEN RE-
JECTED IT. HE DID NOT CLOSE DOOR TO OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS BUT
SPECIFICALLY RULED OUT OAU WHICH BIAFRA WOULD NOT ACCEPT BECAUSE
OF RESULTS ALGERIAN MEETING. DE GAULLE REITERATED THAT ONE OR
THE OTHER SIDE WOULD CONSIDER UNACCEPTABLE RELIEF ARRANGEMENTS IN
WHICH THE BRITISH OR THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE INVOLVED.


IN A LATER CONVERSATION WITH LEBEL I ASKED IF THE FRENCH WOULD BE
INTERESTED IN CONTRIBUTING OR ASSISTING SOME KIND OF RELIEF
EFFORT. LEBEL SAID THAT THEY WOULD AND WOULD BE WILLING TO WORK
WITH THE OTHER FRANCOPHONE COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY THE IVORY COAST.

COMMENT: I THINK THE SUM OF THESE COMMENTS BY DE GAULLE AND
LEBEL GIVE US AN OPENING AND SUGGEST THAT THE EMBASSY BE AUTH-
ORIZED TO FOLLOW UP WITH LEBEL OR HIGHER LEVEL AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE. I ASSUME DEPARTMENT WILL WISH KNOW BRITISH PLANS (STATE
285236) BEFORE AUTHORIZING FURTHER APPROACHES HERE.

SHRIVER

CONFIDENTIAL

0530



L I M D I S
I N C O M I N G

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Principals

ES 2
S ✓
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M 2
G ✓
S/NL ✓
SIG ✓
S/AH 3
S/AL ✓
SA ✓
S/CPR ✓
S/GOV ✓
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Geographic

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Functional

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By MVA Date 10/5/05



Pol 27 BIAFR- NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 573

PAGE 01 PARIS 25157 01 OF 02 111530Z

44

ACTION SS 70

INFO CIAE 00, /070 W

041790

P 111445Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8971
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 PARIS 25157/1

LIMDIS/NOFORN (EXCEPT UK)

SUBJECT: FRANCE AND BIAFRA

REF: PARIS 25079

1. QUAI DESK OFFICER FOR NIGERIA (PIERRET) TOLD EMBOFF DEC 9 THAT FRENCH RECONSIDERING THEIR POSITION ON NIGERIA/BIAFRA IN PREPARATION FOR TALKS WITH BRITISH DEC 17. BRITISH AMBASSADOR'S TALK WITH SECSTATE LIPKOWSKI DEC 7 ALSO POINTED IN THIS DIRECTION. FINALLY, ISRAELI DCM INFORMED US DEC 9 THAT HE HAD HEARD FROM QUAI AFRICA DIRECTOR LEBEL THAT FRENCH HOPING TO WORK OUT WITH BRITISH NEW, COMPROMISE SOLUTION TO NIGERIA/BIAFRA PROBLEM.

2. BRITISH HAVE NOT AS YET BEEN TOLD BY FRENCH WHAT THEY HAVE IN MIND, AND FRENCH HAVE PROBABLY NOT AS YET COME TO ANY DEFINITE CONCLUSIONS. TALKS IN LONDON BEGINNING DEC 17 SHOULD PRODUCE DETAILED EXPOSE FRENCH THINKING, AND BRITISH MAY OBTAIN MORE INFO HERE FROM LEBEL ALTHOUGH THEY ARE NOT PRESSING FOR FRENCH VIEWS PRIOR LONDON TALKS. BASED ON WHAT WE AND BRITISH HAVE HEARD DURING MANY TALKS WITH VARIOUS FRENCH OFFICIALS OVER PAST FEW WEEKS WE CAN PRODUCE REASONABLE GUESS AS TO PRINCIPAL FRENCH MOTIVATIONS FOR APPARENT POLICY SHIFT AND SOME OF ELEMENTS WHICH ARE LIKELY TO BE INCLUDED IN WHATEVER NEW PROPOSALS THEY MAY MAKE FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTION. THIS MIGHT BE USEFUL IN TALKING WITH BRITISH (AND POSSIBLY FMG) PRIOR TO DEC 17.

SECRET

32

PARIS-25157
12-11-68

0532

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Authority VND 959503
By MNA Date 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 PARIS 25157 01 OF 02 111530Z

3. PRINCIPAL MOTIVATIONS FOR POLICY SHIFT.

A. REALIZATION THAT BIAFRA UNABLE DO MORE MILITARILY THAN HOLD WHAT IT HAS AND THERE IS NO LONGER ANY HOPE OF SPECTACULAR OFFENSIVE ACTIONS. (PIERRET ADMITTED THIS WAS IMPORTANT FACTOR IN FRENCH DECISION RECONSIDER). COUPLED WITH THIS IS PROBABLY RECOGNITION THAT STARVATION MAY SOON WEAKEN PRESENT BIAFRAN ABILITY KEEP FEDERAL ARMY AT BAY. (PIERRET RECOGNIZES THAT IF BIAFRA ACCEPTS FMG TERMS FOR MASSIVE DAYLIGHT AIRLIFT OR GROUND CORRIDORS, IT WOULD PROBABLY MEAN END OF MOST CLANDESTINE NIGHT ARMS FLIGHTS WHICH WOULD NO LONGER HAVE "COVER" OF LEGITIMATE RELIEF FLIGHTS).

B. APPREHENSION OVER GROWING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN NIGERIA WHICH, COUPLED WITH STRONG AND WORRISOME SOVIET PRESENCE IN ALGERIA (EMBASSY AIRGRAM A-2955) COULD PROVIDE SOVIETS WITH SPRING-BOARD FOR FURTHER MOVES IN WEST AFRICA. (LIPKOWSKI TALK WITH BRITISH AMBASSADOR AND ISRAELI DCM'S REPORT OF HIS TALK WITH LEBEL BOTH INDICATE INCREASED FRENCH APPREHENSION OVER SOVIETS AS ONE MOTIVE FOR NEW LOOK. IN OUR OWN TALKS WITH QUAI OFFICIALS DURING PAST TWO WEEKS THEY HAVE BEGUN TO INDICATE REAL CONCERN OVER SOVIETS IN NIGERIA.

C. FUTURE FRENCH COMMERCIAL INTEREST IN NIGERIA, ESPECIALLY WITH STEADILY DIMMING FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR ALGERIAN OIL.

D. PERSISTENT INABILITY OF FRANCE, BIAFRA AND FOUR AFRICAN STATES WHICH RECOGNIZE IT TO PERSUADE OTHER COUNTRIES TO SUPPORT BIAFRA OPENLY.


E. POSSIBLY CONCERN OVER FUTURE BAD EFFECT ON PUBLIC OPINION OF OB DURATE OUKWU POSITION AGAINST PERMITTING DAYLIGHT RELIEF FLIGHTS QILE STARVATION RATE ABOUT TO HIT NEW PEAK. ONCE MASS STARVATION BEGINS, FAVORABLE IMAGE OF BIAFRA (AND FRANCE) MIGHT TARNISH RAPIDLY.

SHRIVER

SECRET

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

SECRET 575

PAGE 01 PARIS 25157 02 OF 02 111530Z

44

ACTION SS 70

INFO CIAE 00, /070 W

041793

P 111445Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8972
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 PARIS 25157/2
LIMDIS

F. CONTINUING UNFAVORABLE REACTION TO FRENCH POSITION
BY SOME OF OCAM STATES.

G. FRENCH DESIRE MAKE PEACE WITH UK FOR OTHER REASONS. POL COUNSELLOR
WAS TOLD BY LIPKOWSKI DEC 8 THAT HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED DEVOTE
SPECIAL EFFORT TO IMPROVE FRENCH RELATIONS WITH UK.

4. SOME PROBABLE ELEMENTS OF NEW FRENCH POSITION. ALTHOUGH
WE CANNOT TELL IN WHAT FORM FRENCH WILL PRESENT TO BRITISH
THEIR NEW THINKING ON NIGERIA/BIAFRA, WE BELIEVE FOLLOWING
ELEMENTS LIKELY TO FIGURE IN THEIR THINKING:

A. FACESAVING FORMULA FOR DEGAULLE, HOUPHOUET AND
BIAFRANS. PIERRET ON DEC 8 CLARIFIED EARLIER FRENCH COMMENTS
ABOUT POSITION OF IVORY COAST BY SAYING THAT FRENCH TRYING
TO FIND NEW FORMULA WHICH THEY COULD SELL TO HOUPHOUET.
LATTER WOULD NOT NECESSARILY BE RESPONSIVE TO NEW FRENCH
POSITION SINCE HE HAS MADE BIAFRA ISSUE A PERSONAL ONE. WE
ASSUME THAT PIERRET'S REMARKS ABOUT FACE-SAVING FORMULA FOR
HOUPHOUET ALSO APPLIES TO DEGAULLE WHO HAS PERSONALLY IDENTI-
FIED HIMSELF WITH BIAFRAN SELF-DETERMINATION. WE HAVE NO
MORE PRECISE IDEAS AS TO WHAT THIS MIGHT BE.

B. CEASE FIRE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, PRESUMABLY ACCOMPANIED
BY MASSIVE RELIEF EFFORT. FRENCH HAVE REPEATEDLY REFERRED TO
NECESSITY FOR CEASE-FIRE. PIERRET AGAIN DID SO DEC 8 BUT
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT FMG COULD NEVER AGREE TO IT UNLESS OUKWU
AGREED RENOUNCE FOR BIAFRAN SOVEREIGNTY.

SECRET

88

0534

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By MM NARA Date 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 PARIS 25157 02 OF 02 111530Z

C. EFFECTIVE GUARANTEES FOR SECURITY AND RIGHTS OF IBOS. THIS ALSO LIKELY BE MAJOR POINT IN FRENCH APPROACH AND IS ONE WHICH QUAI HAS BEEN STUDYING FOR SOME TIME. PIERRET SAID ON DEC 8 THAT LACK OF ANY REALLY EFFECTIVE PEACEKEEPING SCHEME AND MEANS GUARANTEE RIGHTS OF IBOS HAS BEEN MAJOR OBSTACLE TO PAST EFFORTS AT REACHING PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

D. CONFEDERAL SCHEME ALSO LIKELY TO BE MAJOR POINT OF NEW FRENCH APPROACH. THIS, TOO HAS LONG BEEN IN FRENCH MIND. PIERRET MENTIONED IT AGAIN DEC 8 AND NOTED THAT FMG MININFO ENAHORO HAD STATED IN PARIS THAT CONFEDERATION WAS POSSIBLE OUTCOME AND HAD NOT BEEN REJECTED IN ADVANCE BY FMG. SEVERAL CHIEFS OF STATE FROM FRANCOPHONE AFRICA (E.G. SENEGAL, UPPER VOLTA AND DAHOMEY) WHICH DO NOT RECOGNIZE BIAFRA HAVE ENDORSED THIS SOLUTION IN PAST. PIERRET SUGGESTED THAT IN CONFEDERATION DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE TASK OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BUT MOST OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES SHOULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO REGIONS.

E. FRENCH MAY RETAIN THEIR SELF-DETERMINATIONS PROPOSAL, BUT AS FACE-SAVING DEVICE, PERHAPS ON BASIS NATION-WIDE PLEBISCITE. PIERRET, AT LEAST, RECOGNIZES THAT THERE IS NO HOPE OF OBTAINING AGREEMENT OF FMG TO ANY SORT OF PLEBISCITE FOR IBOS ALONE.

F. ANOTHER ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN FMG AND BIAFRA TO WORK OUT AGREEMENT ON PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

5. FRENCH HAVE MADE NO RECENT REFERENCE TO WHAT OJUKWU MIGHT THINK ABOUT THEIR POLICY REASSESSMENT. OUR GUESS IS THAT THEY WILL APPROACH BIAFRA INDIRECTLY, PROBABLY THROUGH HOUPHOUET, WHEN IT COMES TO PRESENTING ANY NEW APPROACH. THIS WOULD EXPLAIN REPEATED EXPRESSIONS OF FRENCH CONCERN OVER WHAT HOUPHOUET THINKS ABOUT SETTLEMENT OF CONFLICT.


6. THIS TELEGRAM HAS BEEN ENDORSED BY BRITISH EMBASSY HERE AT WORKING LEVEL AND THEY REQUEST THAT IT BE PASSED TO PONOFF BY OUR EMBASSY IN LONDON.

GP-2 SHRIVER

SECRET

28

0535



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Geographic

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EUR 10 12
NEA 8 8

Other

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AID/EXSEC 3
AA/AFR2
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Functional

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Principals

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OTHER AGENCIES

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USIA 4
NSA

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By MV NARA Date 10/5/05

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G/PM 1

Geographic

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EUR 10
NEA 8

Functional

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NSA

Other

ACDA 5
AID/EXSEC 3
AA/AFR 2
AA/VN 2
AA/EA 3
AA/NEA 2

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59

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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Department of State TELEGRAM

SECRET 732

PAGE 01 ADDIS 06925 111753Z

49

ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SAH 02, SR 01, AID 28,

NIC 01, MC 01, ACDA 16, RSR 01, 166 W

042515

R 111530Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7840
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON

SECRET ADDIS ABABA 6925

SUBJECT: NIGERIA INITIATIVES

1. GHANIAN AMBASSADOR AMONOO TOLD ME TODAY GOWON LETTER
REPLYING TO HIS PROPOSAL FOR VISIT BY OAU SUBCOMMITTEE TO
LAGOS AND UMAHIA, SEEN AS RELATIVELY UNHELPFUL BY IEG. GOWON
SAID TO ARGUE HE CANNOT GUARANTEE SAFETY OF OAU TEAM IN
BIAFRAN TERRITORY AND THUS COULD NOT RECOMMEND PROPOSED VISIT
TO OJUKWU. SUGGESTED THAT OAU GET IN TOUCH WITH FOUR COUNTRIES
THAT RECOGNIZE BIAFRA IN EFFORT END ARMS SUPPLIES FROM THESE
SOURCES, THIS EFFORT TO PRECEDE VISIT TO LAGOS.
2. AMONOO SAYS FOLEY WAS TO SEE HIM TODAY. WE WILL TALK
WITH BRITISH AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND REPORT. HAL

ADDIS ABABA 6925
12-1168SECRET
32

0538

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Authority VND 959503
By MVA Date 10/5/05



POB 27 BIAFRA- NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET 675

PAGE 01 PARIS 25079 091846Z

46
ACTION SS 70

INFO CIAE 00, /070 W

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P 091816Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8909
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY

S E C R E T PARIS 25079

L I M D I S Y N O F O R N

SUBJECT: FRANCE AND BIAFRA

REF: PARIS 24878; STATE 282944

1. EMBOFF TALKED AGAIN TO PIERRET DEC 9 AND WAS TOLD THAT FRANCE DEFINITELY RECONSIDERING ITS POSITION. VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES CURRENTLY BEING EXPLORED AND NOT DECISIONS FREACHED. FRENCH PLAN TO HAVE NEW PROPOSALS READY FOR REGULAR SEMI-ANNUAL MEETING DEC 17 IN LONDON BETWEEN QUAI AFRICA DIRECTOR LEBEL AND HIS BRITISH COUNTERPARTS.

2. THIS INFO CONFIRMS CONVERSATION DEC 7 BETWEEN BRITISH AMBASSADOR SOAMES AND SECSTATE FOR FONAFAIRS LIPKOWSKI DURING WHICH LATTER TOLD SOAMES IT WAS USELESS FOR FRENCH AND BRITISH TO FIGHT ONE ANOTHER IN NIGERIA WHILE REAL ENEMY FOR BOTH IN AFRICA IS RUSSIA AND CHINA. LIPKOWSKI SUGGESTED FRENCH MIGHT HAVE NEW PROPOSALS TO PRESENT WHEN LEBEL GOES TO LONDON.

3. ACCOUNT OF LIPKOWSKI-SOAMES TALK REPORTED TO LONDON AND WASHINGTON BY UK EMBASSY. DETAILS ON TALK WITH PIERRET AND OTHER INFO RE APPARENT FRENCH SHIFT WILL FOLLOW SEPTEL.

GP-2: BLAKE

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PARIS-25079
12-9-68

EXEMPTED BY E.O.

0539

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By MNA Date 10/5/03

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AA/NESA 2 2

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IGA 6
INR 6 6
IO4 6
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O 3 6
OPR 6
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WLG 6

PC 6
VP 6

Principals

ES 2 6
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SIG 6
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S/GOV 6
S/IL 6
S/P 6
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S/FW 6
S/PM 6
M/WP 6
G/PM 6

P 2 6
SCA 6
SCS 6
SCI 6

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NSA 10

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59
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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 ADDIS 06872 091306Z

52
ACTION AF 16

INFO CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02,

SS 25, USIA 12, NSA 02, AID 28, IO 13, PC 04, RSR 01, 134 W
-----028677

R 091250Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7807

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE ADDIS ABABA 6872

SUBJECT: UNDER SECRETARY'S SPEECH ON NIGERIA

REACTION IEG OFFICIALS AND OAU REPS UNIVERSALLY FAVORABLE
SPEECH AND FOLLOW-UP STATEMENTS. AFRICANS DISCOURAGED THEIR
OWN ABILITY COME GRIPS WITH SITUATION, HOWEVER.

HALL!

*Addis Ababa 6872
12-9-68*

Q
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0541

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Authority VMD 9503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

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INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Classification

Origin

ACTION: Amembassy PARIS PRIORITY

Info:

INFO: Amembassy LAGOS "
" LONDON "

STATE

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: France and Biafra

REF: Paris 24878

1. Dept. greatly appreciates reftel. Emboff's dialogue with Pierret valuable and should be continued purely on basis exchange of views. During next conversation, Emboff should attempt draw out Pierret further along lines reftel. (FYI: We remain concerned at French arms supply to rebels but Emboff should avoid direct reference any French involvement. END FYI)

2. Emboff may use as peg our growing concern at impending tragedy in Biafra and our conviction that only quick end to war will allow effective relief to avert threatening three to four million people. widespread famine/ He should give ~~XX~~ Pierret our view of food situation in Biafra, citing our own estimate that perhaps 10,000 tons of food per week might soon be required in Biafra. This contrasts sharply with present level of only a few ~~five hundred~~ hundred tons now getting through in airlift. We doubt that intensified airlift, even if combined with air drops, could really meet problem as long as fighting continues. Would appreciate French views of relief needs and problems of access.

Drafted by:

AF/W:RPSmith:emb 12/5/68

Ext. 8711

Telegraphic transmission end classification approved by:

Roy M. Melbourne

Nigeria Task Force

Clearence:

U - Mr. Heymann (subs) AF - Amb. Moore

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

FORM DS-322 8-65

0542

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Authority VMD 9503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy PARIS PRIORITY

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Classification

3. While using relief problem to initiate exchange with Pierret, Emboff should of course seek discreetly to obtain further info on both Biafran and French attitudes re prospects and terms for end to fighting.

GP-3

END

RUSK

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FORM DS-322A
8-63
CONTINUATION SHEET

0543

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Authority VND 954503
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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
TR POL NIGERIA-USSR
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 233

PAGE 01 LAGOS 15008 051500Z

49

ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SAH 02, SAL 01, NIC 01,

AID 28, SR 01, PC 04, E 15, MC 01, ACDA 16, STR 08, COM 08, TRSY 11,

RSR 01, /211 W

009606

P R 051241Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3824
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L LAGOS 15008

SUBJ: GOWON ON NIGERIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

1. ARIKPO INFORMED ME YESTERDAY MORNING THAT GOWON WISHED SEE ME AT 1000. TODAY. PURPOSE OF MEETING TURNED OUT TO BE TO GIVE USG RENEWED ASSURANCES THAT FMG NOT GOING COMMUNIST. ARIKPO AND BABA GANA WERE PRESENT.


2. GOWON BROACHED SUBJECT BY SAYING HE UNDERSTOOD CONCERN WAS BEING EXPRESSED IN U.S. OVER ECONOMIC AGREEMENT BETWEEN FMG AND USSR AND OTHER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NIGERIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS. HE WISHED ONCE AGAIN ASSURE USG THROUGH ME THAT FMG NOT SWAYED BY IDEOLOGY IN ITS DEVELOPING RELATIONSHIP WITH USSR. NECESSITY HAD DICTATED ARMS PURCHASES. ECONOMIC AGREEMENT HAD BEEN PENDING FOR SOME TIME AND HAD BEEN CONCLUDED NOW AS MANY PEOPLE BELIEVED FMG WOULD NEED TO TAP ALL POSSIBLE SOURCES FOREIGN ASSISTANCE WHEN CIVIL WAR ENDS. GOWON SAID FMG PROCEEDING CAUTIOUSLY AND QTE WITH EYES WIDE OPEN UNOTE. HE EMPHASIZED DEVELOPMENT RELATIONS WITH USSR WOULD IN NO WAY AFFECT TRADITIONAL CLOSE TIES WITH U.S.

3. GOWON ASKED ARIKPO WHETHER HE WISHED COMMENT. ARIKPO SAID THAT IDEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS NEVER AROSE IN DISCUSSIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 LAGOS 15008 051500Z

AMONG CIVILIAN COMMISSIONERS OR IN FEDERAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL. RELATIONS WITH USSR WERE CONSIDERED IN PRACTICAL TERMS. AS FAR AS GENERAL SUSCEPTIBILITY OF NIGERIA TO COMMUNISM CONCERNED, ARIKPO OPINED FEDERAL STRUCTURE OF COUNTRY WOULD MILITATE AGAINST SPREAD ANY IDEOLOGY. HE REMARKED SITUATION MIGHT HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT IF IRONSI HAD SUCCEEDED IN ESTABLISHING UNITARY GOVERNMENT. THIS LED GOWON TO COMMENT THAT STATE GOVERNMENTS WERE RAPIDLY DEVELOPING OWN PERSONALITIES AND PRESSING OWN INTERESTS. HE THOUGHT THIS WAS GOOD AND THAT STATES SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERABLE AUTONOMY WITHIN FEDERAL STRUCTURE ALTHOUGH MAJOR POWERS WOULD HAVE TO REST WITH CENTER.

4. I SAID WASHINGTON WOULD WELCOME GOWON'S RENEWED ASSURANCES OF FMG'S NON-COMMUNIST POSTURE. SOME PRESS REPORTS OF U.S. REACTIONS TO RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN NIGERIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS HAD PROBABLY BEEN OVERLY DRAMATIC. IN ANY CASE USG CONCERN WAS NOT ABOUT IDEOLOGY; WE THOUGHT IT HIGHLY UNLIKELY PRESENT LEADERSHIP OR ANY SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER NIGERIANS WOULD BE ATTRACTED TO COMMUNISM AS WAY OF LIFE. REAL DANGER AS WE SAW IT CAME FROM SOVIET SUBVERSION, OPPORTUNITIES FOR WHICH HAD BEEN INCREASED CERTAINLY BY ACCEPTANCE SOVIET MILITARY ATTACHE AND POSSIBLY BY ECONOMIC AGREEMENT. I POINTED OUT SOVIET SUBVERSION WENT FAR BEYOND PLANTING SECRET AGENTS AND INCLUDED SUCH DEVICES AS DISTORTING ECONOMIES OF TARGET COUNTRIES. WE WANTED FMG TO BE FULLY AWARE OF THESE HAZARDS SO THAT IT COULD WEIGH EACH STEP IN NIGERIAN-SOVIET RELATIONS TO ENSURE ADEQUATE SAFEGUARDS FOR NIGERIAN SECURITY AND INTERESTS. THIS WAS NIGERIAN PROBLEM WHICH NIGERIANS WOULD HAVE TO SOLVE. GOWON AGREED AND SAID EMPHATICALLY THAT FMG WAS AWARE OF HAZARDS OF DEALING WITH COMMUNISTS.

5. WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO ECONOMIC AGREEMENT, I REMARKED THAT SOME MISGIVINGS, NOT ONLY ABROAD BUT ALSO IN NIGERIA, COULD BE PUT TO REST IF AGREEMENT WERE PUBLISHED. I SAID I UNDERSTOOD AGREEMENT WAS NOT SECRET. GOWON AND ARIKPO INDICATED MY UNDERSTANDING WAS CORRECT BUT DID NOT COMMENT ON PUBLICATION.

6. I TOOK ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITY TO LEAVE COPIES OF UNDERSECRETARY'S DECEMBER 3 SPEECH WITH GOWON AND ARIKPO.

GP-3. MATHEWS

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| Authority VND 959503 |
| By MVA Date 10/5/05 |

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
POL 33-1 NIGER RIVER
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 251

PAGE 01 IBADAN 00725 051512Z

53

ACTION AF 16

INFO NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04,

RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SA 01, AID 28, ACDA 16, IO 13, RSR 01,

/147 W

009731

R 050800Z DEC 68
FM AMCONSUL IBADAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 698
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMCONSUL KADAUNA
CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA

C O N F I D E N T I A L IBADAN 725

SUBJECT: NIGER RIVER BRIDGE

REF: IBADAN 652, 618 AND A-139

1. NIGHT OF DEC 5 COLONEL OBASANJO, CHIEF NIGERIAN ARMY ENGINEERS
AND CO IBADAN GARRISON, TOLD CONOFF THAT SHORTLY AFTER FIRST OF
YEAR HE EXPECTED GO ONITSHA IN ORDER SUPERVISE REPAIR NIGER
RIVER BRIDGE. HE INDICATED HE WOULD ALTERNATE WEEKS BETWEEN
IBADAN AND ONITSHA UNTIL WORK COMPLETED (PREVIOUSLY ESTIMATED TO
TAKE ONE MONTH).

2. WHEN ASKED IF THIS MEANT HIS MEN WOULD UNDERTAKE JOB "WITH
SPANNERS IN ONE HAND AND RIFLES IN OTHER," OBASANJO ADMITTED
THIS WAS HOW HE WAS GOING TO HAVE TO OPERATE. HE SAID IN SPITE
REASSURANCES TO CONTRARY, HE INTENDED SET UP HIS OWN DEFENSE
PERIMETER. HE AWARE ONCE WORK COMMENCES HIS MEN WILL BE PRIMARY
TARGETS FOR REBELS.

3. COMMENT: FROM REMARKS ABOUT NIGER BRIDGE IT SEEMED APPARENT
OBASANJO HAD SOME RESERVATIONS ABOUT UNDERTAKING REPAIR JOB
UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES OF CLOSE REBEL ACTIVITY. HOWEVER, AS
MILITARY MAN HE CAN BE EXPECTED TO DO BEST POSSIBLE JOB IF TOLD
PROCEED BY HIS SUPERVISORS.
STRONG

POL 33-1 NIGER RIVER

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Authority VND959503
By MNARA Date 10/5/05

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL
Classification (33)

Origin ACTION: Amembassy LONDON PRIORITY
Info: INFO: LAGOS PRIORITY
PARIS
ADDIS ABABA
USUN NY

5 DEC 58 22 46 3

XL POL 27 BIAFRA-
NIGERIA

STATE

Subject: British Policy on Nigeria

1. Dept has learned from press sources that New York Times article on December 5 based on press backgrounder by Max Maurice Foley "Parliamentary Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs who has just taken over supervision of Nigerian policy from Lord Shepherd." Speculation among pressmen is that Foley "more flexible thinker" than Shepherd who is "hawk" on Nigeria. They consider appointment of Foley as hint of shift in British strategy of supporting FMG militarily in hopes of quick victory. British said to have concluded that military victory likely to lead to "interminable guerrilla warfare" so UK will continue arms aid but not in "decisive" amounts.
2. Foley apparently told newsmen that French arms aid to Biafra has tapered off and that stalemate now exists which

Drafted by: AF/W:BTWach:vcs:12/5/68 Tel. Ext. 2946 Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: Nigeria Task Force: RMMelbourne

EUR/BMI: Mr. Cheslaw (substance)

CONFIDENTIAL

Classification

FORM DS-322 8-65

0547

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Authority VND 959503
By MVA Date 10/3/05



POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED 716

PAGE 01 LAGOS 14974 041715Z

45

ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, INR 07, P 04, RSC 01, E 15, SR 01,

ORM 03, ACDA 16, RSR 01, 7092 W

003636

R 041235Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3804
INFO AMEMBASSY ACCRA UNN
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA UNN
AMEMBASSY LISBON
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MONROVIA UNN
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY UNN
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE UNN
USMISSION GENEVA
USMISSION USUN NY
USIA WASHDC

UNCLAS LAGOS 14974

USIA FOR IBS

SUBJECT: NIGERIAN PRESS ROUNDUP DECEMBER 4

1. IN CONTINUING CRITICISM OF OXFAM AND CARITAS, BOTH TIMES AND TRIBUNE CARRY EDITORIALS NOT ONLY ATTACKING THEM FOR ALLEGED ARMS AID TO REBELS BUT ALSO FOR SPREADING REBEL PROPAGANDA QTE HORROR STORIES UNQTE IN WESTERN NEWSPAPERS. TRIBUNE OPENING SENTENCE QTE OXFAM AND ITS ALLIES ARE A NUT CASE UNQTE SUMS UP VIEWS.

2. TIMES, POST AND OBSERVER REPORT VISIT TO LAGOS OF AMILCAR CABRAL, LEADER OF LIBERATION MOVEMENT IN PORTUGUESE GUINEA AND CAPE VERDE ISLANDS. CABRAL ATTACKED PORTUGUESE INVOLVEMENT IN AID TO BIAFRAN REBELS AND IN TURN WAS ASSURED OF NIGERIA'S CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR HIS MOVEMENTS QTE STRUGGLE FOR LIBERATION OF GUINEA UNQTE

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PAGE 02 LAGOS 14974 041715Z

EM POST AND TIMES FEATURE NEWS FROM REUTERS REPORT ON BROADCASTS OF BIAFRAN RADIO THAT FMG TROOPS INCREASING PRESSURE ON REBELS PARTICULARLY IN AFIKPO SECTOR. POST ALSO REPORTS LORD BROCKWAY AND JAMES GRIFFITHS LEAVING LONDON FOR VISIT TO SEE OJUKWU IN BIAFRA AND HOPE TO VISIT GENERAL GOWON AFTERWARD. VISIT AIMED AT QTE ASSESSING PROSPECTS FOR STOPPING THE FIGHTING UNQTE.

4. TIMES AND POST REPORT ARRIVAL OF ORIGINAL UK OBSERVER GENERAL ALEXANDER TO PARTICIPATE IN PRESENTATION OF OBSERVERS' FINAL REPORT TO GENERAL GOWON DEC 5.

5. POST REPORTS NIGERIAN RAILWAYS INVESTIGATING DAMAGE TO FACILITIES IN ENUGU WITH VIEW TO RESTARTING RAIL SERVICE FROM ENUGU TO MAKURDI. ALSO REPORTS THAT ELECTRIC CORPORATION QTE WORKING ON PLANS UNQTE FOR PUTTING OJI RIVER POWER STATION BACK INTO SERVICE. MATHEWS

UNCLASSIFIED

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| DECLASSIFIED | |
| Authority | VND 959503 |
| By | MV NARA Date 10/5/05 |



Poh 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
XR Poh 27-9 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 986

PAGE 01 PARIS 24878 042049Z

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ACTION SS 70

INFO CIAE 00,070 W

004774

R 041840Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8771
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 24878

LIMDIS

SUBJECT: FRANCE AND BIAFRA

1. IN CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF DEC 4, QUAI DESK OFFICER FOR NIGERIA (PIERRET) HINTED THAT OJUKWU MIGHT BE CONSIDERING SETTLEMENT OF CONFLICT ON TERMS SHORT OF SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE FOR DIAFRA.
2. IN COURSE OF DELIVERING TO QUAI COPIES OF SPEECH BY UNDERSECRETARY (STATE 281467) CONVERSATION WITH PIERRET TURNED TO FRENCH SUPPORT FOR SELF-DETERMINATION AND OUR SUPPORT FOR "NIGERIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND UNITY". PIERRET REITERATED THAT FRENCH DO NOT REPEAT NOT CONSIDER THESE INCOMPATIBLE. EMBOFF REPLIED THAT THERE MIGHT CONCEIVABLY BE HOPE FOR PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IF OJUKWU WOULD SAY AS MUCH. LACKING SUCH A CLEAR SIGNAL FROM OJUKWU, THERE WOULD APPEAR TO BE LITTLE REASON EVEN TRY WORK OUT IN DETAIL WHAT FORM GUARANTEES MIGHT BE REQUIRED FOR "FUTURE SAFETY AND DEVELOPMENT OF IBO PEOPLE". PIERRET ADMITTED THIS SO BUT WENT ON TO SAY THAT SUCH SIGNAL MIGHT BE FORTHCOMING "BEFORE END OF YEAR". HE WOULD NOT ADD ANYTHING TO THIS OBLIQUE REMARK.
3. PIERRET ALSO SAID FRENCH FAVORABLY IMPRESSED BY PRIME MINISTER WILSON'S LATEST STATEMENT ON NIGERIA WHICH THEY INTERPRET AS SHOWING MORE FLEXIBILITY THAN HERETOFORE.
4. COMMENT: WE CONSIDER PIERRET'S REMARKS TO BE OF SOME

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PARIS-24878
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Authority VND 959503
By MWA Date 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 PARIS 24878 042049Z

SIGNIFICANCE, GIVEN THEIR DEPARTURE FROM PAST QUAI READINGS OF OJUKWU'S POSITION AND PIERRET'S USUAL RELIABILITY AS A SOURCE. HOWEVER, PIERRET WAS CAREFUL NOT TO MAKE ANY FIRM PREDICTION THAT BIAFRA MIGHT CHANGE ITS POLICY AND SAID NOTHING TO INDICATE FRANCE CONSIDERING DOING SO.

GP-4 SHRIVER

CONFIDENTIAL

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| Authority | VND 959503 |
| By | MN/ARA Date 10/5/05 |

L I M D I S
I N C O M I N G

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(Time Received)

DISTRIBUTION

MONTHLY COUNT 19

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S/S-S 1
S/S-O 1
S/S-Screener 3
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S/S-CMS 3
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MilRep 3
Summary 3
Task Force 3

Principals

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S 2
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M 2
G 2
* S/NL 2
SIG 2
S/AH 3
S/AL 3
SA 3
S/CPR 3
S/GOV 3
S/IL 3
S/P 3
S/R 3
S/FW 3
S/PM 3
M/WP 3
G/PM 3

Geographic

AF5 5
ARA 9
EA 11
EUR 10
NEA 8

Functional

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OTHER AGENCIES

WH 10
CIA 10
DOD 10
USIA 10
NSA 10

Other

ACDA 5
AID/EXSEC 3
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AA/EA 3
AA/NEA 2

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Authority VND 954503
By MV NARA Date 10/5/05

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

Origin

ACTION: AmEmbassy LAGOS PRIORITY

Info

RPTD INFO: AmEmbassy LONDON
AmEmbassy PARIS
AmEmbassy ADDIS ABABA
US MISSION GENEVA
USUN NY
GINGSTRIKE

Following is text of speech to be delivered evening December 3 at Providence
R.I. by Under Secretary:

QTE I am glad to be at Brown.

It is always a most enjoyable event for a retired academic to return to the campus, especially when it is so distinguished as the one that sits atop this beautiful old New England hill.

I am going to resist the temptation to lecture you on that overworked subject of the generation gap, or what students should or should not be doing. But as a former professor about to close out eight years in government, I cannot fully resist the temptation of leaving a message or two with you.

One message is this: decisions of public policy are a good deal more difficult to make when one actually has the responsibility of making them. They are far harder to make than when one is just preparing lecture notes or sitting around a coffee table for a bull session.

For what you do or say when you are charged with the responsibility of acting in behalf of two hundred million Americans can and often does have major

Drafted by:

AF:AF/P:RLPerkins:al 12/3/68

Tel. Ext.

2105

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by:

Roy M. Melbourne
Nigeria Task Force

Clearance:

S/S - Mr. Brown

CLASSIFIED BY 22/1

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

0553

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Authority VND 954503
By M. NARA Date 10/5/05

37

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

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Classification

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3 DEC 68 22 40Z

Origin ACTION: Amembassy BAMAKO
Info INFO : Amembassy LAGOS
Amembassy ACCRA
Amembassy TEL AVIV
USUN NY
U S Mission GENEVA

REF: Bamako 2611-*Re 27 Bafra, Niger*

Subject: Helicopter Flight to Nigeria

1. Two helicopters reported reftel owned by Robards Enterprise, Inc. which has contract with UNICEF to furnish helicopters for relief operations in Nigeria. Dept. and UNICEF not rpt not apprised of itinerary and not rpt not aware of ^{intention} ~~intention~~ transit Mali. UNICEF New York has had difficulties in coordination with Robards but will endeavor inform Dept. of future ~~itinerary~~ itinerary three remaining helicopters which, incidentally, not yet purchased. Dept. conveyed to UNICEF concern for safety of aircraft and operators ~~which~~ ^{may land} ~~which~~ unannounced in Bamako. We also stressed advisability of proper visas for all crew.

2. Posts will be advised as to itinerary remaining three helicopters if UNICEF able to provide but unannounced transit African countries remains a possibility. All helicopters ^{BUSK!} being ferried to Lagos for relief operations Nigeria, not rpt not to Biafra as pilot stated.

END

Drafted by:

AF/NW:WMilam:oc 12/3/68

Tel. Ext. 4414

Telegraphic transmission and

classification approved by: AF/NW - Mr. King

Cleanances:

AF/AFW - Mr. Sherry *per Wm*
E/OA/AVP - Mr. Diedrich *per Wm*

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Classification

FORM 8-65 DS-322

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Authority VND 954503
By MWA Date 10/3/05



Department of State

TELEGRAM

*Pol 27 Benfra - Nigeria
XR DEF 19-6 CHICOM BIAFRA*

CONFIDENTIAL 710

PAGE 01 LIBREV 02033 031347Z

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ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SA 01, SAH 02, ACDA 16,

EA 10, MC 01, NIC 01, AID 28, RSR 01, 176 W

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FM AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2149

INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS:

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

CONFIDENTIAL A L LIBREVILLE 2033

SUBJECT ARMS FOR BIAFRA

REF LAGOS 14824

PARA 3 REFTEL BEARS OUT WHAT GERMAN CHARGE TOLD ME OF ROLF STEINER'S COMMENTS TO HIM RE CHICOM ARMS FOR BIAFRA (LIBREVILLE 2007). REVELATION THIS INFO, WHICH PLACES FRENCH IN UNHAPPY COMPANIONSHIP WITH CHICOMS IN SUPPORT OF BIAFRA, PLUS STEINER CONFIRMATION ARMS SHIPMENTS BIAFRA VIA GABON OBVIOUSLY AMPLE REASON FOR EFFORTS FRENCH MADE HERE INHIBIT STEINER AND PUT OFF DAY WHEN PRESS WOULD HAVE ACCESS TO HIM. GP 3 BANE

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Authority VND 959503
By MN NARA Date 10/5/09

ORIGIN/ACTION

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

PL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

XR POL NIGERIA-US

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DEC 6 11 44 AM 1966

ANALYSIS BRANCH

DATE: December 2, 1968

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : IBADAN, LAGOS

FROM : Amconsul KADUNA

SUBJECT : BCNN "Spotlight" Commentary Show Accuses United States,
West Germany of Secretly Aiding Rebels

REF :

JOINT CONSULATE/USIS MESSAGE

"Spotlight," a regular commentary feature of Radio-Television Kaduna (Broadcasting Corporation of Northern Nigeria) radio service in its November 26 program (FBIS 437AF) took an unprecedentedly anti-American line in flatly accusing the United States, together with West Germany, of secretly supplying arms to the Nigerian rebels and "indirectly encouraging armed rebellion." The charge, as stated in the program, is based wholly on alleged revelations in an East German weekly, "Horizon."

The broadcast classifies as "hard facts" the following charges: "Before the Nigerian crisis the Americans had seen their hope of economic domination of the whole of the Federation of Nigeria dwindling away and secondly, it was their burning desire to oust the British, their undesirable rivals, by a successful partition." It later mentions "the latest revelation by the Horizon that arms and armored tanks being used by the rebels in prosecuting the war against their fatherland are from the United States," (although whether this "fact" is "hard" or not is not made clear).

The broadcast went on to tie to these charges "the frequent unwarranted utterances of certain respected American figures who, under the so-called humanitarian consideration, have always tried to win a negotiated victory for the Nigerian rebels." This would appear to be their own editorial addition to the East German "revelations." It concludes from this array of invective that "there is no iota of doubt that America and West Germany are among the countries which have indirectly been encouraging the armed rebellion and thereby helping to further the cause of secession."

Decontrolled following December 2, 1971.

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FORM 4-62 DS-323

Drafted by:

USIS:BPAC:Kaduna:dal 12-2-68

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Birney A. Stokes

Clearances:

DEC 6 PM 3 57

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While "Spotlight" has always been sensational in tone and fiery in its super-patriotism, and has from time to time taken an anti-American stance, this is the first time in many months that a distinct anti-American tone has reappeared. Moreover, the documentation of charges by BCNN, although never celebrated for precision, would appear to have fallen to a new low with this edition.

Because of the gratuitous nature of these charges, the obvious bias of the source quoted and the originality of the program's apparent definition of "hard facts," it was the Consulate's judgment that this particular broadcast should not go unchallenged.

Accordingly, the reporting officer called on the general manager of BCNN, Alhaji Abba Zoru, a man who, in the Consulate's experience, has shown no significant biases one way or the other in the Cold War spectrum and who has generally maintained a policy of fair and balanced coverage in BCNN's radio and TV news and feature material.

Alhaji Abba had just returned from leave and claimed ignorance of the specific broadcast, but read the FBIS transcript which had been brought along. When he was finished, he was bluntly asked whether he thought it was fair comment. He agreed it was not. He claimed he had cautioned the program's producer before on his "flamboyant" material and made a note to get the script and see the producer.

It was made clear that the objection was not to criticism of the United States--something we were used to--but to basing such virulent name-calling on such an obviously biased source and to characterizing the flimsy allegations as "hard facts." It was added that even if such material were to be used, it was our notion of responsible journalism--and we had thought it was his--to check in advance with the accused and allow them an opportunity to state their case. Alhaji Abba appeared to fully understand and agree. He was told that no public action was requested, but we thought he might want to take some sort of action internally. He said he would and that we would hear from him.

COMMENT: We are less than confident that we will.

STOKES *MS*

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| Authority | VND959503 |
| By | MM NARA Date 10/5/05 |

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 14893 021439Z

53

ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, SA 01, AID 28, PC 04, RSR 01,

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R 021415Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3758
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL IBADAN
AMCONSUL KADUNA

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SUBJECT: NORTHERN NIGERIAN RADIO STATEMENTS ON PM
TRUDEAU'S COMMENTS

DECLASSIFIED BY 6562

1. NOV 28 BROADCASTING COMPANY NORTHERN NIGERIA IN
QTE SPOTLIGHT COMMENTARY UNQTE PRAISED STATEMENTS MADE
BY PM TRUDEAU IN PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE QTE NOV 26 UNQTE
POINTING OUT GOC WOULD NOT INTERVENE IN NIGERIAN CRISIS
BECAUSE IT WAS NOT ONLY INTERNAL MATTER BUT ALSO
AFRICAN ISSUE WHOSE SOLUTION LIES ONLY WITH AFRICA.
COMMENTARY STATED THAT GOC HAD IN PAST BEEN DECEIVED BY
REBEL PROPAGANDA BUT THESE STATEMENTS SHOWED QTE MATURE
JUDGEMENT AND GOOD UNDERSTANDING UNQTE NOW.

2. COMMENT: AFTER TORRENT OF CRITICISM IN PAST
CANADIANS GETTING BETTER PRESS.
DECON UPON RECEIPT
MATHEWS

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By MVA Date 10/5/05

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POL 15-1 NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

NR POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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PAGE 01 KADUNA 01645 021417Z

44
ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10,

P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, CU 04, IO 13, RSR 01, 121 W
120224

R 021315Z DEC 68
FM AMCONSUL KADUNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 972
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL IBAOAN

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REF LAGOS 14871 - 3-3-69

SUBJECT: GOWON SPEECH AT AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY

1. PRESENTATION FOLLOWED ADVANCE TEXT (REFTEL).

2. GOWON APPEARANCE ABU IS FIRST REAL OFFICIAL VISIT IN NORTH (APART FROM SOKOTO AND MAIOGURI STOPOVERS ENROUTE NIGER REPUBLIC AND CHAD) SINCE GOWON ACCEDED TO POWER TWO AND HALF YEARS AGO. DELIVERY MADE BEFORE UNUSUALLY LARGE CONVOCATION CROWD ATTRACTED BY REPORTS THAT GOWON WOULD APPEAR AT CONVOCATION. CROWD DISPLAYED GENUINE FEELING OF WARMTH AND AFFECTION FOR GOWON THROUGHOUT HIS TWO HOUR APPEARANCE. ALTHOUGH HIS REMARKS ON RECONCILIATION WITH THE IBOS WERE RECEIVED QUIETLY AND WITHOUT APPLAUSE, THERE WAS NO FEELING OF RESENTMENT OR DISAPPROVAL EVIDENT IN THE CROWD. THERE WAS APPLAUSE WHEN GOWON REFERRED TO HISTORIC PRECEDENT FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION BETWEEN SECESSIONISTS AND UNIONISTS IN U.S. FOLLOWING "FOUR YEAR BLOODY CIVIL WAR" AND AGAIN WHEN HE SAID THERE HARDLY AN AMERICAN WHO NOT GRATEFUL TODAY TO "UNIONIST LEADERS FOR KEEPING USA TOGETHER BY FORCE OF ARMS." LOUDEST APPLAUSE CAME WHEN GOWON, HAVING CALLED ON PEOPLE TO FORGIVE AND FORGET IN AFRICAN FASHION, SAID "IF ONLY WORLD WILL LEAVE US ALONE TO FIND AN AFRICAN SOLUTION TO OUR PROBLEM."

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12-2-68

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By MVA Date 10/5/05



POL 27 BIAFRA NIGERIA
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 14905 021853Z

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ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, ACDA 16, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 25, USIA 12, AID 28, PC 04,

RSR 01, 163 W

121763

PIR 021555Z DEC 68
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3769
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
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SUBJECT: VOA INTERVIEW WITH COMMISSIONER ARIKPO.
VOA CORRESPONDENT KELLY HAD INTERVIEW TODAY WITH COMMISSIONER
FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS ARIKPO. FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS:

1. ARIKPO SEES LITTLE ROOM FOR COMPROMISE WITH BIAFRA SINCE
NIGERIA QTE MUST REMAIN INVIOLEATE SOVEREIGN AND
INDIVISIBLE UNQTE. IT WAS DIFFICULT HE SAID TO QTE
FORESEE A SOLUTION THROUGH NEOGITIATION UNQTE. BIAFRANS
QTE SEEM PREPARED AT ANY TIME TO COMPROMISE WHAT THEY SAY
THEY BELIEVE UNQTE. THEY ARE NOW PREPARED TO QTE SELL
THEIR BIRTHRIGHT UNQTE TO PEKING IN HOPE OF MILITARY VICTORY
QTE WHICH OF COURSE THEY CANNOT DO UNQTE.

2. ON SOVIET PRESENCE IN NIGERIA ARIKPO DENIED THAT THIS
REPRESENTED CHANGE IN FOREGIN POLICY. QTE THE FACT THAT WE
HAVE HAD TO BUY OUR MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM THE SOVIET
UNION DOES NOT IN ANY WAY CHAGE THE LONG ESTABLISHED
RELATIONS OF DEALING WITH EACH OTHER ON TERMS OF EQUALITY
WHICH HAD ALWAYS CHARACTERIZED OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET

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UNION AS INDEED WITH MOST COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD. UNQTE


3. ON REPORTED FRENCH MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO BIAFRA, ARIKPO SAID: QTE WE HAD ALWAYS BELIEVED THAT FRANCE WAS A FRIEND OF NIGERIAN AND ALTHOUGH WE HAVE HAD ALL THESE REPORTS AND ALL THIS EVIDENCE WE HAVE KEPT OUR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS UP IN THE HOPE THAT FRANCE WILL PROVE THE WORLD WRONG AT LEAST THOSE PARTS OF THE WORLD WHICH SAY THAT FRANCE IS ENCOURAGING REBELLION AND SECESSION IN THIS COUNTRY. UNQTE

4. ARIKPO DENIED BIAFRAN CHARGE THAT NIGERIAN RULED BY ONE SECTION OF COUNTRY STRESSING NEW TWELVE STATE SETUP AND BALANCED REPRESENTATION OF ALL PARTS OF COUNTRY.

5. ASKED HOW PEACE MIGHT BE RESTORED TO NIGERIA ARIKPO SAID: QTE AT SOME STATE OUR FRIENDS ON THE OTHER SIDE WILL BE CONVINCED THAT IT IS MUCH BETTER FOR THEM TO ACCEPT WHAT WE ARE PUTTING BEFORE THEM: A FREE COUNTRY IN WHICH EVERY COMMUNITY HAS THE RIGHT TO DEVELOP ITSELF AND IN WHICH THE FRUITS OF THE COUNTRY WILL BE SHARED BY ALL AND IN WHICH ALL LINGUISTIC GROUPS BE THEY LARGE OR SMALL WILL FEEL SAFE UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT UNQTE
DECON UPON RECEIPT
MATHEWS

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POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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PAGE 01 LAGOS 14894 021509Z

44
ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, NSA 02, ACDA 16, MC 01, AID 28, SA 01, SR 01, ORM 03,

EA 10, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01,

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AMEMBASSY KINSHASA UNN
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AMEMBASSY NIAMEY UNN
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
SUBJECT: - NIGERIAN PRESS ROUNDUP NOVEMBER 30, DECEMBER 1 AND 2

1. RISING NEWSPAPER DENUNCIATION OF CATHOLIC CHURCH AND ESPECIALLY CARITAS CONTINUES. NOV 30 TRIBUNE AND POST AND DEC 1 OBSERVER ALL CONTAIN HARSH EDITORIALS AGAINST CHURCHS ALLEGED INVOLVEMENT IN PROCURING ARMS FOR REBELS UNDER COVER OF RELIEF SUPPLIES. ALL DEC 2 PAPERS BANNER NEWS THAT CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF LAGOS AND BISHOPS OF IBADAN AND CALABAR WILL LEAVE FOR ROME DEC 4 TO SEE THE POPE AND CONFERENCE OF ALL NIGERIAN CATHOLIC BISHOPS WILL BE HELD DEC 1 QTE TO REVIEW WHAT MEASURES SHOULD BE TAKEN IN VIEW OF SITUATION. UNQTE BISHOP OF IBADAN QUOTED AS STATING DEC 4 DELEGATION WILL URGE POPE QTE TO RESTRAIN MILITARY ACTIVITIES OF MISGUIDED PEOPLE AND ORGANIZATIONS... WHICH

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PAGE 02 LAGOS 14894 021509Z

HAVE CAUSED MUCH PAIN AND EMBARRASSMENT TO OUR CATHOLIC PEOPLE. UNQTE SEVERAL OTHER ARTICLES AND QTE NEWSTALKS UNQTE APPEARING IN PAPERS AND ON NIGERIAN RADIO BROADCASTS DENOUNCING CARITAS.


2. DEC 1 PAPERS DEVOTE MUCH SPACE TO GOWON SPEECH AT GRADUATION CONVOCATION AHMADU BELLO UNIVERSITY (LAGOS 14871). FULL TEXT OF SPEECH CARRIED BY TIMES AND POST WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS GIVEN TO STATEMENTS THAT NEW TIMETABLE FOR RETURN TO CIVILIAN RULE TO BE SET AFTER END OF WAR, STATEMENTS ON REINTEGRATION OF IBOS AND WARNING THAT BAN ON POLITICS STILL IN FORCE.

3. DEC 1 PAPERS REPORT COL. ADEKUNLE NEWS CONFERENCE AT LAGOS AIRPORT DENOUNCING QTE RUMOR MONGERS UNQTE WHO SPREADING STORY HE HAD BEEN DETAINED. ADEKUNLE STATED RUMORS BEING SPREAD BY QTE CERTAIN INFLUENTIAL PEOPLE UNQTE IN LAGOS WHO AFRAID OF HIS BECOMING INFLUENTIAL AFTER WAR IS OVER. STATED THAT SUCH RUMORS DAMAGE TROOP MORALE. HE ALSO ALLEGED MORE CHICOM MERCS ON THE WAY SOON TO BIAFRA. DEC 2 PILOT CARRIES EDITORIAL SUPPORTING ADEKUNLE AND ALSO DENOUNCING RUMORS AND CALLING ON FMG TO BE MORE VIGILANT AGAINST PEOPLE WHO SPREAD SUCH STORIES. MATHEWS

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AIDAC

SUBJ: ABA TEXTILE MILL

REF: A) STATE 279913; B) LAGOS 14816

JOINT EMBASSY/USAID

IN OUR JUDGMENT AND IN VIEW CONDITIONS CITED REF B, DO NOT
RPT NOT BELIEVE INTENSIVE SURVEY OF REHABILITATION COSTS
FEASIBLE AT THIS TIME. WHEN MILITARY SITUATION CLARIFIES IN
ABA AREA; IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN MILITARY CLEARANCE TO
CARRY OUT SURVEY, POSSIBLY COMMUTING OUT OF PORT HARCOURT.

DECON FOLLOWING NOV 30, 1969.

MATHEWS

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By MVA Date 10/3/05



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31

*Pol 27 Biafra -
Nigeria*

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PAGE 01 LONDON 14691 271846Z

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ACTION AF 16

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, SR 01, ORM 03, SA 01, SAH 02, AID 28, NSA 02, CIAE 00,

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USIA 12, RSR 01, 152 W

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R 271820Z NOV 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7476
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS

S E C R E T LONDON 14691

SUBJ: BRITISH EFFORTS TO ASSIST IN BIAFRAN SETTLEMENT

1. FONOFF'S WILSON (HEAD, WEST AFRICAN DEPT.) ASKED EMBOFF TO CALL TODAY TO PASS ON REPORT OF HMG'S RECENT EFFORTS TO FACILITATE PEACE IN NIGERIA.

2. WILSON SAID THAT EARLY THIS MONTH CRITICS OF HMG'S NIGERIAN POLICY, AMONG THEM, LORD BROCKWAY, LADY ASQUITH, JAMES GRIFFITHS, AT A MEETING WITH THE PRIMIN AND FONSECT STEWART URGED HMG TO ARRANGE FOR A MEETING BETWEEN CHIEF ENAHORO AND FORMER NIGERIAN PRESIDENT AZIKIWE. FOLLOWING UP THIS SUGGESTION THE FONOFF GOT IN TOUCH WITH ENAHORO WHO SAID HE WOULD BE WILLING TO MEET AZIKIWE. NO MEETING, HOWEVER, TOOK PLACE. AROUND NOV 14 LORD SHEPHERD SOUGHT OUT AZIKIWE WITH WHOM HE DISCUSSED THE PROBLEM OF PEACE IN NIGERIA AT CONSIDERABLE LENGTH.

3. WILSON DESCRIBED LORD SHEPHERD'S MEETING WITH ACIKIWE AS AN INCOHERENT SESSION BUT ONE REVEALING FOR LIGHT IT CAST ON AZIKIWE'S VIEWS. AZIKIWE WAS OUTSPOKEN IN HIS CRITICISM OF OJUKWU, SAYING THAT THE WRONG PEOPLE WERE RUNNING BIAFRA WHICH HE CALLED A POLICE STATE. AZIKIWE ASSERTED THAT OJUKWU IS IN COMPLETE CHARGE AND ONE CAN ONLY DEAL WITH HIM. IN THE COURSE OF THE MEETING AZIKIWE SUGGESTED THAT UK REPS TRY TO MEET WITH OJUKWU POSSIBLY IN THE IVORY COAST BUT THE MEETING ENDED WITHOUT PRODUCING CONCRETE RESULTS.

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14/11/68

*London - 14691
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By M. ARA Date 10/5/05



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PAGE 02. LONDON 14691 271846Z

4. FONOFF THINKS AZIKIWE IS ANXIOUS SEE SETTLEMENT IN BIAFRA BUT THAT HE FEELS TOO EXPOSED (HIS FAMILY IS IN THE COUNTRY) TO TAKE INITIATIVES. FONOFF REPS MADE CLEAR TO AZIKIWE THAT THEY ARE ANXIOUS TO BE HELPFUL AND ARE READY TO PLAY ANY USEFUL PART THEY CAN IN SETTLEMENT. FONOFF EXPECTS AZIKIWE WILL HAVE PASSED THIS ON TO OJUKWU. FONOFF HAS NO INDICATIONS AT THIS TIME THAT OJUKWU WILL NEGOTIATE OR WILL AGREE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF A UNITED NIGERIA. ACCORDING TO WILSON, ENAHORO SAID RECENTLY TO THE BRITISH THAT EVERYTHING ELSE IN THE NIGERIAN-BIAFRAN CONTROVERSY IS NEGOTIABLE.

5. AT THIS POINT THE BRITISH ARE SITTING TIGHT WAITING FOR ANY SIGNS THAT THEIR HELP MAY BE DESIRED. BRUCE

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PAGE 01 ADDIS 06737 280624Z

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INFO EUR 15, IO 13, NSA 02, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,
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AID 28, RSR 01, 151 W

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7725
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AMEMBASSY ACCRA
AMCONSUL ASMARA
AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
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AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

RECEIVED BY NSR

CONFIDENTIAL ADDIS ABABA 6737

SUBJECT: NIGERIAN PEACE INITIATIVES

1. ACCORDING MALAWI EMB SOURCE, OAU SEC GEN DIALLO
TELLI, DURING BRIEFING AFRICAN AMBASSADORS IN ADDIS NOV 22,
STATED SUDAN, UPPER VOLTA AND MALI HAD EACH TRIED THEIR
HANDS AT MEDIATING NIGERIA-BIAFRA CONFLICT. TELLI
REPORTEDLY ASKED AMBASSADORS URGE THEIR CHIEFS OF STATE
MAKE SIMILAR EFFORTS.

2. COMMENT: THIS IS FIRST EITHER EMBASSY OR AFRICAN
DIPLOMATS WITH WHOM WE HAVE DISCUSSED TELLI'S REMARKS.

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PAGE 02 ADDIS 06737 280624Z

HAVE HEARD OF PEACE MAKING INITIATIVES BY MALI, UPPER VOLTA
AND SUDAN. APPRECIATE ANY COMMENTS ADDRESSEES MAY HAVE. HALL

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By MN NARA Date 10/5/05

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

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*Intelligence
Note* - 339

October 25, 1963

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes *TH*
Subject: NIGERIA: A New Round of Peace Talks?

Emperor Haile Selassie's current attempt to bring the warring Nigerian factions to the conference table under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) seems likely to succeed since neither side wishes to tarnish its international image by refusing to negotiate. Neither Federal Commander-in-Chief General Yakubu Gowon, nor Biafran leader Colonel C.O. Ojukwu, however, is yet ready to make concessions which might lead to a peaceful settlement in the 16-month-old Nigerian civil war. Even so, a continuing OAU effort could open and keep open a channel of communication which either side might use to signal changes in its negotiating position.

Biafra Still Demands... Though a handful of Biafran diplomats have privately advocated a negotiated surrender, Biafran leader Ojukwu still commands overwhelming Ibo support for his hard-line policy of armed resistance. He insists that Biafran sovereignty is not negotiable and refuses to discuss a ceasefire except on the basis of Federal withdrawal from Biafran territory. Ojukwu is apparently convinced that the recent, substantially increased airlift of arms--some of them indirectly supplied by France--foreshadows massive outside intervention which will enable Biafra to enforce a military stalemate and eventually to negotiate from a position of strength.

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Carded
This report was produced by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Aside from normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, it has not been coordinated elsewhere.

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

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By: *MM* NARA Date: *01/5/03*

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...What Lagos Won't Give. The leaders of the Federal Military Government in Lagos are equally determined to crush the Biafran rebellion, regardless of cost. Though Federal officials have promised a general amnesty and other concessions in return for rebel surrender, they are willing to bargain with Ibo leaders only after Biafra renounces secession and accepts the concept of Nigerian unity. Lagos is concerned about its inability so far to overrun remaining Biafran territory and about signs of growing French support for the rebel cause. However, hard-lining Nigerian federalists remain convinced that outside aid for Biafra has come too late to change the course of the war and that it is only a matter of time before organized rebel resistance collapses under the weight of repeated Federal attacks.

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12/1/68

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY

SUBJECT: U.S. Alternatives in the Nigerian Crisis

Attached is our response to your instruction to make a rapid and comprehensive review of the Nigerian crisis. It represents the views only of the individual members of the Task Force.

At TAB A are (1) a discussion of the major political problems and (2) a recommended diplomatic initiative involving Presidential emissaries.

At TAB B is a recommended public information offensive, including (1) specific points we think you should make in your December 3 speech at Brown University and (2) a recommendation for a major Presidential statement on Nigerian relief.

At TAB C are our recommendations on options open to us to increase the present flow of relief, including a possible land corridor from Port Harcourt.

At TAB D is a concise appraisal of other less promising options.

At ANNEX 1 is a detailed study of the entire Nigerian relief picture prepared by AID and AF.

SUMMARY CONCLUSION:

After an intensive review of all the options available to us, we have recognized that there are risks and difficulties -- some of them serious and perhaps insurmountable -- in the various initiatives we are recommending. But we are convinced that the magnitude of the tragedy gathering in Biafra justifies taking risks. The Task Force has concluded

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GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

NODIS REVIEW

Cat. A - Caption removed; transferred to O/FADRC
Cat. B - Transferred to O/FADRC with additional access controlled by S/S
Cat. C - Caption and custody retained by S/S

Reviewed by: Ambassador W. Witman, II
Date: 12-4-78

Pol 27 Biafra-Nigeria

Lot 700-83
Box 2878

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By: M. ARA Date: 10/5/05

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-2-

that the odds are probably against the success of any initiative to end the war before an even greater tragedy strikes Biafra. We nevertheless believe that the effort must be made.

Col. Richard Kennedy, DOD/ISA
Mr. Roger Morris, NSC
Mr. W. Haven North, AID/AFR
Mr. Robert P. Smith, STATE/AFW

Roy M. Melbourne
Roy M. Melbourne
Chairman, Nigeria Task Force

cc: The Under Secretary (3)
Assistant Secretary Palmer (1)
Deputy Assistant Secretary Moore (1)
Mr. Oliver Troxel, INR/RAF (1)
Nigeria Task Force (6)

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| By | W. NARA Date 10/5/05 |

TAB A

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By MN NARA Date 10/5/05

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TAB A

PROBLEM: Famine within Biafra may reach massive proportions in the months ahead. However, the exact dimensions cannot be determined conclusively. The Task Force has been guided by the judgment that American policy should be prepared for the worst.

BASIC REALITIES

1. While the present relief effort can and will be intensified to the maximum extent possible, there is no practicable means of reaching more than a portion of the millions in need as long as hostilities continue.

2. Our first priority should therefore be an end to the fighting as the only way to save most of the lives now threatened. This means an end to the war, not just a cease fire.

3. If the war continues we may soon face a situation in which the public outcry and other pressures will be vociferous in favor of some unilateral relief action which, if adopted, might well have the effect of shoring up the secession we oppose as a matter of policy. In short, we may find within weeks that the few options we have now have been reduced still further.

4. The essential steps in any effort to end the war quickly are (a) cessation of arms shipments to Biafra; and (b) solid guarantees of Ibo protection.

BASIC POLICY CONSIDERATION

Neither our national interest nor our national security justifies direct U.S. military involvement in the Nigerian situation. We see no prospect that U.S. military intervention in the Nigerian civil war--with the political disaster that would create--would solve the immediate relief problem. We should avoid, if at all possible, direct political involvement.

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| NODIS REVIEW | |
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| <input type="radio"/> Cat. B | Transferred to O/FADRC with additional access controlled by S/S |
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| Reviewed by: Ambassador W. Witman II | |
| Date: 2/24/76 | |

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By: MVA Date: 10/5/05

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TAB A

PROPOSED COURSES OF ACTION

The following approaches are submitted for consideration:

1. Diplomatic offensive -- A major but initially quiet U.S. diplomatic offensive to work toward a resumption of negotiations under OAU auspices which hopefully would lead to (a) a quick end to the fighting and facilitation of relief; and (b) a settlement in which Biafran sovereignty would be exchanged for guarantees (in the first stage internationally-policed) of Ibo protection.

Presidential emissaries could be sent to (a) de Gaulle (b) the four African states supporting Biafra and (c) Haile Selassie and perhaps other African leaders. We would emphasize to those parties the harsh realities that: (1) only an end to the fighting will permit millions of Biafrans to be saved from starvation; (2) immediate negotiations are therefore imperative; and (3) that their active support in pushing the two sides to the table is crucial on sheer humanitarian grounds. Our diplomatic effort would complement a current OAU peace initiative. We would quietly renew our standing offer to the Emperor of logistic support -- including if necessary communications equipment inside Biafra -- for the work of the OAU peace mission, as well as future support for an OAU peace keeping operation.

We would also (1) keep the UK fully informed of this initiative; (2) in concert with the UK and other concerned governments, pressure Biafran representatives directly both here and abroad; and (3) take the line outlined above with the Portuguese through our Embassy in Lisbon.


PROS:

1. Our efforts to save lives and end the fighting -- circumscribed as they are by the facts of the situation -- simply will not be complete unless we explore fully this diplomatic approach.

2. This approach goes to the heart of the arms problem (de Gaulle), emphasizes OAU responsibility for the ultimate solution, and keeps the modalities of the settlement in African hands.

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TAB A

3. It follows a middle course between, on the one hand, an open intervention which would alienate the FMG and other Africans and, on the other, our inaction in the face of the fact that the Africans have proven unable or unwilling to do the whole job by themselves.

4. Because this approach leads primarily to pressures on the Biafrans and emphasizes OAU and the belligerents' responsibility for a solution, we lessen the chances of an adverse reaction by the FMG. We believe Gowon would tolerate this approach if we make clear to him that we are pursuing an early end to the war in the context of one Nigeria.

5. It should make the supporters of Biafra aware that (a) mass starvation in Biafra will overtake the rebellion and (b) that they will bear some measure of responsibility for those deaths.

6. This approach in its methods and its goals (a) keeps in the forefront the humanitarian impetus of our policy yet (b) is consistent with our continuing judgment that the best solution lies with the reunification of Nigeria.

7. Whether it succeeds or fails, this approach entails less risk and less U.S. involvement than any other realistic initiative. It would also enjoy the support of most other concerned western governments, including the UK.


CONS:

1. de Gaulle and the Biafrans might interpret this initiative as a sign of anxiety on our part that the rebellion is succeeding. Seen in that light, our approaches could confirm both Okukwu and de Gaulle in their present policies.

2. However handled, any U.S. initiative runs the risk of alienating the FMG and offending the OAU, both of which are indispensable to any successful settlement.

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TAB A

PROSPECTS

The French, the Biafrans and their African sympathizers show no sign of abandoning their belief in the ultimate success of the rebellion. The prospects are not bright that de Gaulle will be swayed by our approach on humanitarian grounds or by whatever arm-twisting we might do using our knowledge of covert French arms deliveries.

Our chances of success may be only slightly better with the Africans. They might tend to be more shaken by the realization that they as Africans would bear a share of responsibility for the starvation in Biafra. But we should recognize that the African friends of Biafra could do little by themselves if the French held out.

Nevertheless, despite the odds against success, we believe this major diplomatic effort should be made as the next step if we are to exhaust every possibility to end the fighting short of unacceptable direct intervention by the U.S.

THE CEASE FIRE PROBLEM

We should be under no illusions that a cease fire can be anything more than a very partial and very risky element in getting the two sides to the conference table. The U.S. should be prepared for the possibility that de Gaulle and/or the Biafrans may call for a cease fire to allow unimpeded movement of relief supplies and as an indication of their good faith and willingness to negotiate. De Gaulle could cut off the arms to Biafra as part of the cease fire offer. The political problems this would create for the FMG and its supporters are obvious.

But, the hard facts are:

(1) A cease fire will not be acceptable to the FMG for any duration longer than it takes both sides to get to a conference table and allows the Biafrans to declare their readiness to negotiate on the basis of one Nigeria.

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| DECLASSIFIED | |
| Authority | VND 959503 |
| By | MM NARA Date 10/5/05 |

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-5-

TAB A

(2) Gowon could not accept a cease fire under any other conditions. If he did, he would almost certainly be replaced by a regime much less desirable from the point of view of both saving lives and negotiating a lasting peace.

(3) We should support a cease fire proposal long enough to get the parties to the table but give strong support to the FMG in its demands for prompt and serious negotiations towards reunification. At the same time, of course, we should lean equally hard on the FMG to follow through on manifestly genuine guarantees of Ibo protection.

(4) This position will not satisfy all our critics here at home, but we believe it is imperative on foreign policy grounds.

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0578

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| Authority | VND 959503 |
| By | MV NARA Date 10/5/05 |

TAB B

0579

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Authority VND 959503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

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TAB B

PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFENSIVE

The Under Secretary's December 3 speech should:

(a) alert the American people to the magnitude of the tragedy in Biafra and to the hard fact that even intensified airlift relief efforts will fall far short of the need so long as the fighting goes on;

(b) reaffirm strongly to both sides that we continue to stand firmly for the principle of a single Nigeria, but recognize that the key to a lasting settlement is a fair and just reconciliation of the people of Biafra with the rest of Nigeria (read protection of Ibos);

(c) restate clearly the case against direct U.S. involvement in this civil war;

(d) reaffirm our strong and thoroughly-considered support for the OAU or other African peace-making efforts. It would be necessary to go beyond "The U.S. cannot impose a solution," or "The U.S. follows a policy of political and military non-involvement." We should lean hard on the dangers and counterproductive consequences of a direct U.S. political or military commitment to solve this problem.

Simultaneously, high-level backgrounders should be held to underscore the foregoing points and to repeat that all our good will and best efforts cannot prevent a deepening of the tragedy while the fighting continues.

A Presidential statement or speech could (a) stress again those realities; (b) pledge additional large-scale U.S. relief assistance to be given as part of an international relief effort as soon as the fighting ends; and (c) include in this pledge a readiness to join with others in helping post-war economic recovery throughout Nigeria. Since we are already engaging Presidential prestige in our recommended diplomatic initiative, we should hold this statement in reserve for the proper moment during or after our diplomatic approaches in Paris and Africa.

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0580

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SECRET/NODIS

TAB B

-2-

Despite repeated statements and congressional appearances, the public case for our present policy has not been effective. The public has not paid much attention to our printed output, and the statements of ranking U.S. officials have not been made in a sufficiently dramatic forum or manner to carry much weight. Portions of the public have been swayed, of course, by the emotional content of Biafran propaganda and by genuine concern over the starving.

The Department and the White House should use journalistic contacts to encourage full surveys on the Nigerian problem by leading U.S. newspapers. There is great concern in Boston, New York, Washington, Los Angeles, and San Francisco. We should encourage the press to take a thorough look at the extent of the needs in Nigeria-Biafra and at the preponderant contribution the U.S. is already making to the international relief effort. We should hammer home the points that (a) the full relief needs are impossible to meet by airlift while the fighting continues; (b) that the U.S. is already carrying a major share of the international relief burden; (c) that the real fault for the continuation of suffering lies with the politics of the civil war and specifically with Biafran intransigence; and (d) that the only way out of the tragedy is for all nations to work for an immediate end to the fighting and a negotiated settlement.

The full resources of USIA and VOA should be employed in getting this message across.

Special efforts should be made to make the same points with, and gain the support of, the concerned members of Congress. We should seek to enlist the counsel and active support of members such as Senator Kennedy. We should stress this message to the voluntary agencies to gain their cooperation.

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0581

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| Authority | VND 959503 |
| By | MVA Date 10/5/05 |

TAB C

0582

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 954503
By MNARA Date 10/5/05

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-1-

TAB C

EXPANDED FOOD DELIVERIES TO BIAFRA:
POSSIBILITIES AND CONSTRAINTS

Firm data on the numbers in need are not available. It is estimated, however, that 3.5 to 4.5 million in total will require full or partial food rations within the next three months. Possibly a third to half of these are displaced from their villages and have no basis for support other than the relief operations. Assuming minimal relief rations, it is estimated that 60,000 - 70,000 tons of food will be required each month for both sides. Arrangements are underway for assisting those in FMG controlled areas. Of the total needed, about 40,000 tons monthly (over 10,000 tons per week), however, will have to be imported into Biafra to meet requirements for the 3 million needy there. Present airlift deliveries are far below this level. The following analysis provides a summary of the possibilities, limitations and conclusions on expanded relief shipments to Biafra.

I. AIRLIFT

A. The present night-airlift operation from Fernando Po and Sao Tome is delivering a combined average of 100-120 tons per night, not all of which can be food because of space required for gasoline, personnel and other supplies needed for operations within Biafra. It includes a total of 15-18 airplanes of 8-10 tons capacity; those flying from Fernando Po average 2-3 missions per night and those from Sao Tome one mission per night.

Estimated Maximum 1000 tons per week

Principal Limitations: Hazardous and uncertain conditions of night operations owing to the weather, the intermix with arms flights, vulnerability to attack by FMG fighter planes, insufficient air-ground control, and limited capacity of available aircraft. The factors have held deliveries below the estimated maximum delivery capacity.

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0583

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Authority: VND 954503
By: MNA Date: 10/5/05

SECRET/NODIS

TAB C

-2-

B. Step-Up One -- Daylight flights, if agreed upon by the FMG and Biafra, coupled with replacement of present planes with 15 C-130 type aircraft at 10-15 tons each with three flights per aircraft daily, theoretically could triple deliveries.

Estimated Maximum 3000-3300 tons per week

Principal Limitations: It is doubtful that the Uli airstrip can handle this many flights during daylight hours alone; that the runway there can hold up under this load; or that ground operations are capable of handling the increased supply movement at Uli, Fernando Po or Sao Tome without substantially improved airfield maintenance, control facilities and logistic support. For sustained operations provision for jet fuel would be needed.

C. Step-Up One A -- Daylight flights coupled with additional aircraft of types now in use theoretically could double deliveries.

Estimated Maximum 2000 Tons Per Week

Principal Limitations: The Fernando Po field could accommodate increased numbers of planes but logistic support facilities and cargo handling capability would have to be increased. Uli airfield probably would be unable to accommodate much over 30 flights during daylight hours.


D. Step-Up Two -- Add Airdrop to Step-Up One. Assume 10 additional C-130 type aircraft at three flights per day with 10-15 tons each. (If the Uli airstrip became unuseable, this option could be used to replace the current airlift operation.)

Estimated Maximum 2700 tons per week

Principal Limitations: Additional airfields will be required since the Fernando Po and Sao Tome fields may

SECRET/NODIS

0584



SECRET/NODIS

TAB C

-3-

have reached capacity in Step-Up One. Biafra would not likely agree to the use of FMG fields and might impede essential ground control in the delivery area if they were used. The FMG would not agree to the use of fields in Gabon or Ivory Coast from which arms shipments originate and would be likely to oppose use of fields in other countries on the ground that such a relief effort is aiding Biafra's cause. Without explicit FMG approval, agreement from African countries for the use of their fields would open them to the charge of support for Biafra. In any event, there would be a difficult problem of ground control within Biafra to assure that food would get to the needy.

E. Major Constraints

1. If Step-Up One were undertaken, the probable cost would be \$3-4 million per week; Step-Up Two could add another \$3-5 million per week depending on the airdrop techniques and aircraft used.
2. There is no doubt that the airlift and airdrop delivery potential could be greatly increased beyond present capabilities if other airfields (such as Douala) were employed, and if a substantial logistic and maintenance effort were mounted to improve the efficiency of the Fernando Po, Sao Tome and Uli airfields. The magnitude of the effort would appear to the FMG as major support for Biafra. FMG pressures would not only make unlikely the agreement of neighboring countries to allow use of their airfields, however, but could threaten continued agreement by Equatorial Guinea to use of the Fernando Po field. Because of its association with arms shipments, the FMG would adamantly oppose increased use of Sao Tome.
3. Practically speaking, there are no civilian C-130 aircraft available in the US. While we could make available military C-130 aircraft to assist in the build-up of the airlift, finding the crews would be a serious problem. The only readily available crews would be US military. If this approach were undertaken, it would require a decision to use military aircraft

SECRET/NODIS

0585

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|--------------|------------|
| DECLASSIFIED | |
| Authority | VND 959503 |
| By | MVA |
| Date | 10/5/05 |

SECRET/NODIS

TAB C

-4-

and crews in a situation involving a high degree of political risk and danger to both aircraft and crews.

4. A massive airlift to Biafra, moreover, will be looked upon by the FMG as major support for the Biafran cause, and undercut the diplomatic initiatives to bring the war to an end, particularly if the USG were directly involved. This is almost certain to occur if Step-Up Two (airdrop which the FMG has consistently opposed) were undertaken and highly likely to arise during Step-Up One.

II. LAND CORRIDOR

The best means to meet the prospective relief needs within Biafra and the surrounding area are land corridors. A corridor based on Port Harcourt would be the most feasible because it would combine the advantages of large scale sealift and shorter overland movement.

Delivery of 1000 tons daily could be achieved with further increases possible as stocks of relief material and transport equipment are built up. But just to get to 1000 tons daily would take a minimum of a month to six weeks. The major logistical problem which would be involved could be overcome in a US-supported international relief operation at less cost, with greater efficiency, and with a larger volume delivered than in an expanded airlift. This operation could include a further build-up of the sealift pipeline.

This arrangement would require the full support of the FMG which would probably object to it initially as interfering with its military operations. However, the FMG did at one time commit itself to a land corridor arrangement. It might be persuaded to cooperate owing to the enormity of the crisis and a desire to identify itself with a major effort to save lives. Although we think Biafra would continue to oppose such action, its refusal would place it in a very difficult moral position.

Efforts would have to be made to minimize the negative political impact in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa of an

SECRET/NODIS

0586

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| DECLASSIFIED | |
| Authority | VND 954503 |
| By | MMARA Date 10/5/05 |

SECRET/NODIS

-5-

operation which would be vulnerable to the charge of neo-colonialism. To this end, the support of the OAU and the active participation of other Africans should be sought.

This approach would be entirely consistent with concurrent diplomatic efforts to bring about an end to the war and a negotiated settlement.

III. CONCLUSION

We recommend the following actions as providing the best chance of meeting the relief needs in Biafra.

- a. Immediate efforts to work toward an internationally-supported land corridor operation from Port Harcourt, and
- b. Additional financial support for present airlift operations to provide for additional aircraft with larger capacities.

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| Authority | VND959503 |
| By | MNARA Date 10/5/03 |

TAB D

0588

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MVA NARA Date 10/5/05

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TAB D

OTHER OPTIONS

Should other initiatives fail, there are the following options which the Task Force believes are much less promising than the other initiatives outlined at Tabs A, B, and C.

A. GENERAL ARMS EMBARGO -- We could couple our approach to the French with a similar request of the British and the Soviets to halt arms shipments to the FMG. In fact, de Gaulle may respond to our initiative by making this parallel approach a condition of his compliance. If he does so, however, we believe it will nullify the initiative. Both the Soviets and the British are much more heavily committed politically and militarily to the FMG than the French are to Biafra. Moreover, though a peace initiative could survive Biafran displeasure at our approach to the French, it almost certainly could not survive what would be FMG outrage at the parallel approach to its arms suppliers.

B. JOINT U.S. SOVIET RELIEF AIRLIFT -- We have examined once again the merits of an approach to the Soviets to generate a joint humanitarian operation. It can be argued that the Soviets might find this idea attractive as a counterweight to the political embarrassment they have suffered in Africa as a result of their arms supply to the FMG. Moreover, we recognize that the Soviets might have reasons beyond the African context for this kind of cooperative venture with the U.S. Nonetheless, our judgment is that the Soviet investment in the FMG, and the political benefits they apparently hope to derive, would still outweigh the attractions of this offer. Most important, such an approach to the Soviets will run the serious risk that Moscow will tell the tale to Lagos in a manner calculated to do substantial damage to our relations with the FMG. We could make an approach at the UN or in Moscow, but the Task Force cannot recommend that step in the light of this obvious risk.

C. UN RESOLUTION -- We have again examined this option and conclude that time and UN politics would probably not permit UN action to deal successfully with the problem before massive famine sets in. However, we could urgently (1) renew our efforts to obtain useable evidence of French complicity

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0589

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SECRET/NODIS

TAB D

-2-

in arms shipments to Biafra; and (2) then, if the evidence supports it, work with the Nigerians on a UN (Security Council) resolution, which they would introduce themselves, condemning French support of the rebellion. This course, on the other hand, could make it possible for the French to raise the issue in the UN on their own terms and muster additional support for Biafra. It might also risk French recognition of Biafra as a reaction to public disclosure of their complicity in arms supply.

D. UN MEDIATION -- We could appeal unilaterally or in concert with others to the Secretary General to designate a United Nations mediator. We believe this would invite African and Nigerian rejection, and there is little likelihood that the Secretary General would accept the proposal without African support. However, the point may be reached when the food crisis becomes so desperate, and the failure of OAU peace efforts so evident, that the Africans would be receptive to UN action. But we see little chance of success for UN mediation if an OAU effort has failed again. In any case, at some point the U.S. may have to consider going to the UN whatever the African reaction.

E. OTHER POSSIBLE MEDIATORS -- We could quietly generate support for mediation by countries such as Canada or Tunisia which might be acceptable to both sides. The odds are strong, however, that the FMG would oppose such an effort and that they could carry most of the Africans with them. The same reasoning militates against any offer of a U.S. mediator. However, "in extremis," we would have to weigh an offer of U.S. mediation if the OAU and all alternative forms of mediation failed.

F. PROVISION OF U.S. ARMS -- We could offer to provide arms to the FMG to assist it in achieving a quick military victory. FMG reaction to our arms embargo has been bitter, and it may again request at least modest arms help from us, if for no other reason than to test our intentions. If arms help from us would assure a quick end to the fighting it would have a certain attraction. This seems an unlikely result, however, unless major sophisticated equipment were provided along with training or operational help. In any event, we believe the political cost would be prohibitive. Though the

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0590

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| DECLASSIFIED | |
| Authority | VND 959503 |
| By | MW NARA Date 10/5/05 |

SECRET/NODIS

TAB D

-3-

FMG would be pleased, our reversal of policy would be seen in Nigeria as a "band-wagon" move and little real benefit would accrue to us. Our diplomatic efforts to end the war would be undermined. Moreover, the beneficial effect which our existing policy has achieved thus far in the rest of Africa, and domestically as well, would be sacrificed. The Task Force, therefore, cannot recommend this option.

G. INTERDICTION OF ARMS SHIPMENTS -- If the FMG fails to bomb out or capture the Biafran airfields in the near future, Lagos could be assisted covertly, by the British, in obtaining planes, pilots and equipment to intercept incoming arms flights over Nigeria.

This action, if technically feasible and successful, could mean a quick and effective alteration of the military balance and an early end to the hostilities. It avoids direct, overt U.S. involvement. It would reduce Soviet influence while enhancing that of the British. It substantially raises the ante for the French if they intend to continue arms supplies or other support for the Biafrans.

But if we raised this idea with the British, we must be prepared to back our approach with some quid pro quo. The British might not necessarily exact a price from us for doing this operation; it can be argued that this is a logical and only marginal extension of their present military support of the FMG. Yet we must be prepared for any British response.

On the other hand, this course would be difficult to carry out and involves risks of disclosure which rise with the duration of the action. There is always a chance of inadvertent error such as shooting down a relief flight. There is some risk of confrontation with the French and of Biafra acquiring aircraft in response. This is obviously only a partial listing of the potential problems.

The Task Force does not recommend this course of action but feels obligated to set it forth as one of the realistic options available in the final extreme.

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ANNEX 1

0592

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POLICY PAPER ON NIGERIAN RELIEF

November 27, 1968

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0593

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Policy Paper on Nigerian Relief

- I. US Position on Nigeria
- II. Statement of Policy on Nigeria Relief Operations
- III. Discussion and Background
 - A. Dimensions of Relief Problem
 - B. Politics and Attitudes Affecting the Relief Operation
 - C. Projected Costs of Relief Operation
 - D. Special Issues:
 - 1. Access to Biafra
 - 2. Availability of A.I.D. Funds
 - 3. Private U.S. Fund Raising
 - 4. Evacuation of Children

Annex I - Relief Requirements

Annex II - Major Groups Participating and Assistance Provided

0594

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| Authority | VND 959503 |
| By | MV NARA Date 10/5/05 |

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I. Introduction: U.S. Position on Nigeria

Since the outbreak of civil war in Nigeria resulting from the secession of Biafra in May 1967, the United States has successfully followed a policy of not becoming directly involved, either politically or militarily, in this tragic, internal conflict. We warned the Biafrans against secession and worked behind the scenes toward a reconciliation of their differences with Nigeria. After secession, we counseled both parties against a resort to force. When the war broke out, we refused to furnish arms of any kind to either of the parties to the conflict.

We have continued to recognize the Federal Military Government (FMG) in Lagos as the only government of Nigeria and, in common with the great majority of the OAU, sympathize with its desire and determination to preserve the territorial integrity of the nation. Although the African states inherited boundaries from the colonial period that were not drawn in Africa by Africans for African reasons, they have taken a strong position against territorial change by force or subversion, a principle enshrined in the charter of the OAU. They have taken a similarly strong stand against secession, believing that unless ethnic groups can reconcile their differences within the present national boundaries and work towards a national identity, a process may be started which may affect any one of them and may hopelessly fractionalize their continent. It is for this reason that all but four of the forty members of the OAU have refused to recognize the secession of Biafra.

From the beginning of the crisis, we have been in close and frequent touch with African and other nations seeking ways and means to bring the hostilities to an end and to permit a negotiated settlement. As disease and famine have mounted, we have appealed to the parties to set aside the political issues of the war in the interest of reaching an urgent humanitarian agreement which would permit more of the starving to be fed. However, we have not at any point regarded the Nigerian crisis as a unilateral American problem. The United States by itself cannot expect to solve this agonizing and complex problem. We cannot impose a solution. We have been, on the other hand, a voice of conscience and have worked with and through others in an international effort to save lives and to prevent further human tragedy.

We have, from the outset of the Nigerian crisis, regarded it as an internal conflict which in the last analysis only the Nigerians themselves can resolve. It is secondly an African problem, and the OAU has made several efforts, thus far unsuccessful, to bring about a peaceful solution. We have

CONFIDENTIAL

0595

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| Authority | VND 959503 |
| By | MM NARA Date 10/5/05 |

CONFIDENTIAL

2

supported those efforts, both publicly and privately, as well as those of the Commonwealth Secretariat. We have examined the possibility of UN action. Our soundings indicate that because of African and other opposition, there is not sufficient support at the present time among the UN membership for useful consideration of the Nigerian question there.

A fundamental Biafran objective is to continue the struggle long enough, while charging genocide against the FMG, to cause world opinion to become so aroused as to force western nations to pressure the FMG into ending the war on substantially Biafran terms, i.e., sovereignty. A world-wide public relations effort by the Biafrans has had considerable success in this connection. Biafran claims of genocide, atrocities, and numbers of deaths have resulted in heavy domestic pressures on the USG and other western governments to ignore Federal sovereignty if need be to rush aid to the Biafrans.

The Nigerians are painfully aware of Biafran propaganda successes and feel that relief needs of secessionist areas have been overpublicized and those in Federal areas overlooked. They are bitterly resentful that some private humanitarian efforts have in fact served to assist the Biafran political (and military) objectives. There is as a result great Nigerian sensitivity to foreign relief efforts, and the FMG insists that all such relief must be channeled through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) or its own organizations.

Recent military successes, plus the overwhelming African support given the FMG at the Algiers meeting of the OAU heads of state, have greatly strengthened Nigerian self-confidence. The FMG considers itself locked in a death struggle with the rebels and is going to be guided by what it regards as its own vital national interests. It is less concerned than it was with its international reputation and relations.

The recent influx of arms into Biafra and the open French support of the rebel regime has prolonged the war. Even if Biafra survives as a political entity for several more months, however, the FMG continues to enjoy clear military superiority. Temporary Biafran military successes are not likely to change the ultimate outcome, for the rebels' determination to hang on is matched by an equally grim Nigerian determination to end the rebellion at any cost.

While continuing our policy on noninvolvement, humanitarian concerns compel us to do everything possible to bring urgently needed food and relief supplies to the starving victims of the war on both sides of the fighting lines. As will be seen below, we believe the best channel for this assistance is through the ICRC and Nigeria's own organizations. We have strongly supported--both diplomatically and with substantial material assistance--the efforts of the ICRC to bring relief to the suffering civilians. In doing so, we must continue to take account of Nigerian and African sensibilities and

CONFIDENTIAL

0596

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| DECLASSIFIED | |
| Authority | VND 954503 |
| By | MW NARA Date 10/5/05 |

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avoid taking actions which would jeopardize the increasingly successful relief effort now under way on both sides of the battle line.

II. Statement of USG Policy on Nigerian Relief

A. General Policy Goals

In view of the massive suffering of Nigerian people within the Federal and Rebel controlled areas of Nigeria owing to the civil war, the USG will:

1. Since no other solution will make it possible to avoid massive starvation, make every feasible effort to bring about a termination of the hostilities.
2. Assist in mobilizing an international relief operation capable of supplying the essential food, medical and other relief needs of as many of the civilian victims of the Nigerian civil war as can be reached for as long as the critical need exists.
3. Be prepared to provide a major portion of the financial and food requirements and in a manner which will maintain the international and multipublic and private donor character of the relief operation under the ICRC auspices.
4. Assist in strengthening the relief operations of the ICRC, American Voluntary Agencies and Nigerian public and private organizations. At the same time, assist the LICROSS and Nigerian Red Cross and FMG prepare for taking over full responsibility for the relief operation after the ICRC responsibility is concluded.
5. Assist the FMG in restoring normal economic life in the war torn areas as rapidly as possible in order to avoid prolongation of the relief operation beyond what is necessary to meet the most critical needs.


B. Special Policy Matters

1. Access to Biafra for Relief Supplies

The USG will seek to improve access to rebel held territory so that relief supplies in greater quantities can reach the war victims. This action will include support for: building of food stockpiles in FMG territory close to rebel areas, reconsideration of arrangements for land corridors, expansion of airlift operations including support for more aircraft, daytime as well as nighttime flights; and airdrops if no other means is available.

CONFIDENTIAL

0597



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2. Provision of USG Military Aircraft for Relief Shipments

For the present at least, U.S. Government military aircraft will not be made available for airlift operations into rebel held territory owing to the political and operational complexities and danger of the Nigeria-Biafra war. If required to meet urgent needs, and in the absence of a satisfactory alternative, U.S.G. military aircraft may be employed for shipment of relief supplies from overseas to locations within Federally controlled territory.

3. Availability of Funds

U.S. support for Nigeria Relief Programs will be given major consideration in the allocation of funds and resources under the Foreign Assistance Act and Food for Freedom Act, Public Law 480. Preparations will be made, if deemed necessary at the next session of Congress, for a Supplementary Appropriation request.

4. Evacuation of Children

The U.S. should not encourage evacuation of children except as necessary to remove them from direct exposure to military actions; it should stress the importance of maintaining evacuated children in friendly African environments as similar to their own homes as possible and discourage efforts to bring the Nigerian-Biafran children to the U.S. Evacuated children should be maintained by those African countries and private organizations who have agreed to sponsor the evacuation. U.S. assistance may be provided to those private organizations which are concerned with caring for evacuated children and accredited by A.I.D. to receive such assistance.

5. U.S. Domestic Fund Raising

The U.S.G. will encourage and support campaigns for private contributions for relief assistance to civilian war victims on both sides of the conflict.


III. Discussion and Background

A. Dimensions of the Relief Problem

The Nigerian Civil War is creating a massive famine and relief problem affecting great numbers of civilians on both sides of the lines. Only a cease-fire or termination of the war will make it possible to help

CONFIDENTIAL

0598



CONFIDENTIAL

5

all the people affected. It must be assumed, however, for planning purposes that the war will continue for many more months and thus every effort will need to be made to reach those who can be reached.

Firm data on the numbers in need and the quality of the need are not available. Drawing on observations and reports by the A.I.D. Relief Team, ICRC, the VolAgs and others, the following appear to be the principal characteristics and dimensions of the relief problem:

1. The total population in the directly affected areas, i.e., within Biafran territory and in the immediate perimeter of Biafra now under Federal control, may be 8-9 million people. Of this number, possibly 3.5-4.5 million will require a full or partial food ration. Possibly a third to half of those in need are displaced from their villages and have no other basis for support than the relief operation.
2. If the war continues for many more months, the number in need will increase as local food production in the eastern areas approaches its lowest levels during the January-July period. Also, the number of needy will increase substantially as battlelines shift. Reports from those who have visited Biafra indicate a major increase in the numbers of the starving population will begin to occur from December on after the present harvest has been largely consumed.
3. Until recently (October) the primary food need on both sides was for protein supplements as the Eastern area imports almost all of its protein foods from other parts of Nigeria and abroad. During October, it became apparent that substantial quantities of carbohydrates would also be required as local sources are being depleted and the growing number of people have no means to purchase food at local markets. The shortage of protein and food in general hits the young children the hardest and next the women.
4. The dimensions of the food requirement alone can be illustrated by the following estimates:

Assuming 1500 calories minimum ration per day for 4.5 million people, about 70,000 tons would need to be supplied each month; of this 48,000 tons would need to be imported, even if resources are available to purchase local Nigerian foodstuffs. The projected levels of imported and local food for the six-month period (Nov-April) is about 287,000 tons of which 195,000 tons would have to be imported. The principal block to achieving this level of imported food is not its availability but the major political and logistical limitations of the relief effort, primarily access to Biafra. Funds may also be inadequate for purchasing local foods.

CONFIDENTIAL

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| DECLASSIFIED | |
| Authority | VND 959503 |
| By | MV NARA Date 10/5/05 |

CONFIDENTIAL

6

5. The total costs of the relief operation for both sides may reach as high as \$98 million for the period November-April. The ICRC budget calls for an expenditure of \$14 million over six months exclusive of airlifts, most food and medical supplies, transport equipment and some personnel.

6. Even after cessation of hostilities major relief assistance will be required until economic enterprises and social services are reestablished. Substantial rehabilitation and reconstruction programs will need to be undertaken before it will be possible to cutback and terminate relief operations.

Situation in Federal-Controlled Areas

The ICRC relief operation in the Federal-controlled areas surrounding Biafra is now providing food and medical services to 600,000 displaced needy people; about half of this number require full assistance and the remaining 300,000 half assistance. Present estimates indicate that the total number needing assistance will rise to 1.5 million over the next 3-4 months; of this number 1,200,000 will require full assistance. Total food requirements will thus rise from a present level of 9,000 tons per month to 20,000 tons per month. The ICRC now has a capacity to distribute about 5,000 tons per month, using 200 trucks, the Nigerian railroad, two coastal vessels, several helicopters and DC-4 chartered airlifts. The FMG National Rehabilitation Commission is also providing locally purchased food and truck transport; in some areas the Nigerian army is the principal source of local foods for the civilian war victims.

A central problem of the relief operation in the Federal area is transport and logistics and the coordination of the various groups involved (see A.I.D. Relief Team Report, Oct. 1968 for detailed analysis of the Federal area relief operation). After a difficult and clumsy beginning, an essentially sound pattern of operations is emerging. Cooperation is improving between the several groups and most importantly steps are being taken to increase Nigerian participation in all aspects of the relief operation. A.I.D. assistance (\$2.8 million) is being provided to stimulate and give support to this Nigerian involvement. If adequate funds are provided ICRC and competent Nigerian and ICRC personnel are assigned to key positions, the operation should be capable of expanding to meet the need. It will take the full cooperation of all groups and a very determined push to quadruple the operating capacity.

A key transport/logistic matter needing attention is establishing Port Harcourt as the main storage and distribution center. This would reduce the complications and costs of the Lagos to the East trans-shipment bottleneck. Additional trucks are necessary; the railroad lines into the east should be restored as rapidly as possible. Ways will need to be found to encourage and assist the FMG to deal with these transport difficulties.

CONFIDENTIAL

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| DECLASSIFIED | |
| Authority | VND 959503 |
| By | MV NARA Date 10/5/05 |

CONFIDENTIAL

7

A second major problem in the Federal area is the purchase of local food. According to projections some \$10 million of local food will need to be purchased over the next 6-8 months. This requirement should be met by the FMG; the FMG Commissioner for Relief and Rehabilitation has indicated he may have up to £5 million (\$14 million) for the overall relief/rehabilitation operation; how much of this the FMG will be willing to use for local food purchases is not known. Approaches will need to be made to encourage the FMG to provide for a substantial increase in local food purchases and insure their systematic distribution utilizing their own as well as ICRC relief centers. The ICRC has included in its budget \$560,000 per month for local food purchases.

Situation in Biafra

Estimates of the Biafran population range from 5-14 million. The 1963 census reports about 6 million were living in those districts now remaining within the Biafran territory. This census was reputed to be badly inflated however; on the other hand, the return of many Ibos has increased the population substantially. An ICRC estimate reports that 3.5 million are in need of food supplies, not all of whom require fully daily rations. The ICRC is now operating 400 refugee centers serving 700,000-850,000 people principally women and children under 12 years. The Joint Church Group has 800 relief centers and is presently reaching 300,000-400,000 people. From various reports, the relief operation within Biafra appears to be functioning reasonably well. It has been reported that the incidence of kwashikor among the children has been eased somewhat as a result of the supply of protein through the combined airlift of the ICRC and church groups. Some reports indicate that kwashikor may be on an increase among women. There is a possible outbreak of measles (vaccine from US sources will be provided). No other epidemics have been reported. There are no reliable reports on the number of deaths or a basis for comparison with mortality figures in years prior to the civil war. Unquestionably, the number of deaths is high and will increase unless the area is opened up to normal food supplies and medical services.

The central problem for relief operations in Biafra lies in the months ahead. Biafra is now in the midst of its last major harvest period until next June-July; over the next five-six months available stocks of yams and cassava (the basic carbohydrate produced in the area) will be rapidly depleted. Shortages are reported in some areas; prices are high and rising - gari is \$65 per ton in Nigeria and \$300-600 per ton in Biafra. The people hardest hit by this trend will be those living in urban areas and the displaced populations who do not have direct access to food stored on family farms nor the money to pay the price. All groups are and will continue to be faced with severe shortages of protein. Although the picture is mixed and firm

CONFIDENTIAL

0601

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| DECLASSIFIED |
| Authority <i>VND959503</i> |
| By <i>MNARA</i> Date <i>10/5/03</i> |

CONFIDENTIAL

8

numbers of those who will be in need of full rations is unknown, most conservative estimates suggest 3-3.5 million in Biafra will require daily rations from January on. Using a minimum calorie level of 1500, some 40,000 tons of food will be required for distribution to 3 million people each month. It is believed that almost all of this amount will have to be imported after December.

Examination of various means of delivery leads to the conclusion that there is no possible way to deliver 10,000 tons plus of food each week. The present ICRC and Joint Church Group airlift have been making uneven deliveries that range from 300 to 700 tons of food a week from Fernando Po and Sao Tome. This amount is reduced when other supplies and personnel are airlifted. To meet the target of 10,000 tons of food would require over 1,000 flights per week. Airport facilities at Fernando Po and Sao Tome cannot handle this number of flights nor store this quantity of food. The sole Biafran airstrip at Uli could not cope with the 140-150 flights each day if, in fact, it was available for 24 hour use for relief flights alone. (The Biafrans have refused to permit the use of Uli airstrip for daytime relief flights.)

Capacities Biafra Airlift

| | No. Planes | Tonnage Average | Flights per day | Tonnage-Per Week Delivery |
|-----------------------------|---------------|--------------------|--------------------|------------------------------|
| Current ^{1/} | | | | |
| ICRC/F.P.) | 8 | 8 | 2 FP | |
| JCG/ST | 9 | | 1 ST | 300-700 tons |
| If Hercules, assume | 10 | 15 | 3 | 3,150 ton max. |
| If Hercules airdrop, assume | 10 | 13 ^{2/} | 3 | 2,520 |


^{1/} Actual number of available planes, number of flights and tonnage varies considerably.

^{2/} Food capacity drops by 1/3 because of airdrop equipment.

Assuming twenty Hercules aircraft were available and airport facilities in addition to Sao Tome and Fernando Po could be employed, possibly 5000-6000 tons of food could be delivered each week. This would require both use of the Uli airstrip and airdrops by 20 Hercules at three flights per day each. Without considering costs and operational problems, the assumptions on available airport facilities and Hercules aircraft alone are not sustainable.

CONFIDENTIAL

0602



CONFIDENTIAL

9

It must, therefore, be assumed that on the average no more than 1000-1500 tons of food per week can be delivered by an expanded airlift to Biafra. A substantial effort by all groups concerned will be required to maintain even this level of operation as present experience has demonstrated how tenuous an affair it is.

One alternative to the airlift is the land corridor. Prolonged efforts to get agreement on this have failed. Perhaps they should be revived; but again the logistics of moving 10,000 tons each week through a road corridor under wartime conditions are formidable. 10,000 tons per week means 1000, 10 ton loads moving through the corridor each week covering distances of 150-200 miles from the railroad or port terminals. This capacity does not now exist though it could possibly be developed in time. Biafran officials have refused to permit a land corridor which rules it out for the present.

Logistics would be simplified somewhat if, over time, larger stockpiles were built up on the perimeter of Biafra and efforts were made to encourage the people to come out of the bush country to the relief centers. ICRC relief operations in Federal controlled areas are doing this, with the result that they are serving increasing numbers. Plans are being made to build up perimeter stockpiles which will permit assistance to the increasing numbers of displaced, needy persons within Federal territory as well as prepared for rapid delivery once hostilities are terminated.

The famine problem in Biafra that will develop in the next several months if the war is not terminated may overwhelm all means of providing relief assistance. A combination of the airlift, perimeter stockpiling at relief centers and possibly some form of land corridor might, in theory, come close to meeting the requirement but would fall far short in practice. Biafran intransigence presents major problems to any reasonable humanitarian relief program.

III. B. Politics and Attitudes Affecting the Relief Operation

The entire relief operation has been complicated immeasurably by the conflicting attitudes and political views of the various parties involved. These parties resolve themselves into three groups: (1) the immediate antagonists (FMG and Biafra), (2) the international relief organizations and private voluntary agencies (ICRC, UNICEF, CRS, CWS, Nort-Church Aid, etc.), and (3) foreign governments (US, UK, European, African).

CONFIDENTIAL

0603

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|--------------|----------------------|
| DECLASSIFIED | |
| Authority | VND 954503 |
| By | W. NARA Date 10/5/05 |

CONFIDENTIAL

10

(1) FMG and Biafra:

The immediate antagonists view the relief problem as primarily political, not humanitarian. Neither appear to be particularly moved by the plight of the suffering civilian victims of the war and both sides have exploited them. The FMG gives first priority to the war effort but it has allowed relief operations and airlifts under certain conditions. The Biafran regime, by refusing to accept relief for which the FMG could in any way claim credit and by propagandizing the plight of the suffering civilians, has sought to gain through worldwide opinion what it has failed to gain militarily. It is unlikely that any agreement can be reached between the two solely to ameliorate the suffering of civilians caught up in the war. The FMG has grown resentful of what it deems paternalistic attitudes of international relief organizations and of foreign governments which, in its eyes, derogate the FMG's sovereignty. To the FMG, internationally sponsored relief activities smack of colonialism on the implied assumption (based on some truth) that Nigeria is indifferent to or incapable of solving this problem itself. The FMG, in spite of these reservations, has authorized the ICRC to handle all relief operations and is providing some direct support to ICRC relief activities in the Federal controlled areas. For its part, the Biafran regime has shown resentment at the ICRC which has attempted to deal with both sides to the conflict. The Biafrans have cheered on those relief organizations which, in their concern for the real suffering of civilian victims within Biafra, have tended to ignore the FMG and attempted to work directly with the Biafrans.

(2) Relief Organizations

By and large, the international relief organizations and private voluntary agencies have attempted to get on with the relief effort for humanitarian reasons while trying to avoid involvement in the political realities which caused the war. In this they have been unsuccessful. The ICRC umbrella, to be effective at all, had to be divided into two virtually autonomous operations going on simultaneously - one in Nigeria and one in Biafra. Although the ICRC still continues to be acceptable to both sides, it has incurred their obloquy. UNICEF, the only arm of United Nations so far involved in the relief effort, has not been criticized by the disputants. It has provided food for delivery to both sides, but has not chartered planes for the airlift into Biafra nor provided personnel for relief operations on either side.

Other agencies, such as the Caritas International and the World Council of Churches which has helped organize the airlift of relief supplies into Biafra from the Portuguese offshore island of Sao Tome, are linked, as

CONFIDENTIAL

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| DECLASSIFIED | |
| Authority | VND 959503 |
| By | MM NARA Date 10/5/05 |

CONFIDENTIAL

11

far as the FMG is concerned, with the illicit arms traffic into Biafra. These religious groups are also suspect because of the political sympathy given the Biafran cause by the Catholic and Protestant Churches. Similarly, numerous other voluntary agencies based in Europe or the United States have become extremely partisan in their points of view. They consciously perceive the assistance they are bringing to suffering civilians within Biafra as a means of assisting Biafra in its fight for independence. None of this is lost on the FMG, which increasingly views these organizations with hostility.

(3) Foreign Governments

The Governments of the United States, Canada, and some Western European countries, as a result of the emotions aroused over the scale of the suffering, are under pressures to take direct action to prevent mass starvation. While sharing this concern, these governments have found it extremely difficult to do this without exposing themselves to charges of meddling in the internal affairs of Nigeria and possibly ending Nigeria's cooperation in the relief effort. The African countries, acting through the OAU, have made their attitudes abundantly clear. With only four exceptions, they have backed the FMG and warned off outsiders. Attempts to bring relief to Biafra must take into account the anti-colonial and, to some extent, racist attitudes of almost all other African countries on this question. In view of these conflicting attitudes, it is surprising that so much has been accomplished in the relief field.


III. C. Projected Costs of Relief Operation

The funding requirements for the international relief operations in Nigeria fall within five broad categories: 1) the ICRC-coordinated relief operation, 2) the airlift operations approved by international church groups; 3) food requirements to be distributed through the ICRC and church groups active in Nigerian relief; 4) Nigerian relief and rehabilitation program and 5) donations in kind of medical supplies, trucks and personnel not included in ICRC budget.

The total cost for the six months period from November 1968 to April 1969 is estimated to be in the magnitude of \$98 million or an average of \$16 million per month. Food supplies both local and imported account for \$59 million; Biafran airlift costs \$16 million and \$23 million for ICRC operating costs, FMG relief programs and donated personnel and supplies. For planning purposes, it is estimated that the USG will provide about half of the total; the balance, it is assumed, will be provided by the Joint Church Group, the Nigerian Government and other governments and private organizations. As there may well be a substantial shortfall in non-U.S. contributions; it may be necessary to increase the USG share to \$60 million.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

12

III. D. Projected Costs: Nigerian Relief Operation
Estimates for Six Months November 1968 - April 1969

| | | | |
|----|--------------------------------------------------------------|----------|----------|
| 1. | ICRC | | |
| | a. Operating Costs | \$14.0 M | |
| | b. Airlift - Fernando Po | 10.2 | |
| | | | \$24.2 |
| 2. | Joint-Church Group Airlift | \$ 6.0 | |
| | Sao Tome - Biafra | | |
| | Direct A.I.D. Volag Transport Assistance | 2.0 | |
| | | | \$ 8.0 |
| 3. | Food Supplies | | |
| | a) Imported Food | | |
| | PL 480 (141,000 tons) | \$33.0 | |
| | Other Donations (79,000 tons) | 15.0 | |
| | Local Purchases - FMG | 11.0 | |
| | (Excludes \$350,000 - \$560,000 per month in ICRC Budget) | | \$59.0 |
| 4. | FMG Relief Program | | |
| | a) A.I.D. Assistance | \$ 1.5 | |
| | (balance will extend beyond April 1) | | |
| | b) FMG Rehab Commission | 3.0 | |
| | | | \$ 4.5 |
| 5. | Other Donated Medical Supplies, Personnel and Trucks | \$ 2.5 | \$ 2.5 |
| | TOTAL ESTIMATED COSTS | | \$98.2 M |

CONFIDENTIAL

0606

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND959503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

CONFIDENTIAL

13

III. D. Possible Sources of Assistance:

U.S.G.

| | |
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| PL 480 | \$33.0 |
| Contributions to ICRC | 10.0 |
| Support to Volags | 2.0 |
| Support to FMG Program | 3.0 |

\$48.0

F.M.G.

14.0

Joint-Church Group Airlift

5.0

ICRC-European Governments Airlift

10.0

Government and Private Donations

21.0


\$98.0

1. ICRC

Operating and transport expenses associated with the ICRC - coordinated international relief effort have been running at an estimated \$4.0 million per month. This includes about \$2.325 million per month for operating expenses, i.e., personnel costs; office expenditures; communications; transportation costs (air charters from Lagos to primary distribution points at Calabar, Enugu and Port Harcourt; two 500 ton coastal vessels shuttling food from Lagos to Calabar and Port Harcourt; lighters, tugboats and barges to move food further inland; railroad transport costs; and gas, oil and maintenance for about 200 lorries and landrovers); local food purchases (£125,000 - £200,000 per month); medical supplies and storage costs. In addition, this \$4.0 million includes about \$1.7 million per month for the ICRC-sponsored Fernando Po/Biafra airlift which we understand the Scandinavian, German and Dutch governments will be financing outside the ICRC budget. This \$4.0 million figure does not include, however, \$180,000 per month to finance six helicopters being used to deliver food to distribution points near Calabar, which will continue to be financed by UNICEF at least through the end of December. (A.I.D. has been asked to assist in the financing of this operation.)

CONFIDENTIAL

0607



CONFIDENTIAL

14

A.I.D. has provided or pledged a total of \$3.6 million to the ICRC operation to date: In June, \$100,000 was given to the ICRC as a cash donation; \$1.0 million was transferred to ICRC in \$250,000 tranches from July to October, and the U.S. pledged an additional \$2.5 million at a meeting of all donor governments in Geneva in November to help the ICRC cover expenses through December.

The ICRC has outlined a six months budget (September - February) of \$14.0 million. It makes little or no allowance for changes in the situation in Biafra, the possible need for additional transport planes or the expansion of the present operation to allow for daylight flights or airdrops; the timing of ICRC's withdrawal from Nigeria and the conditions under which LICROSS and Nigeria relief agencies assume responsibility.

In addition, the ICRC has not taken into account the great increase in costs which would result from the implementation of any scheme to adequately care for all of the needy inside Biafra. If the war continues and expanded air flights and airdrops remain the only feasible means of preventing starvation in Biafra, the logistics associated with such a contingency would probably more than double current financial needs. Based on current ICRC operations and ICRC projected needs, we estimate that at least an additional \$12 - 15 million will be required from December through April 1969.

2. Joint-Church Group Airlift (Sao Tome/Biafra)

This is a church sponsored relief program to airlift supplies from Portuguese island of Sao Tome to Biafra. Planes were originally provided by Scandinavian countries and financed by a Scandinavian church group. The Netherlands and West Germany have also provided planes and considerable support has been received from British and American charities (CWS and CRS) and International Church groups, such as World Council of Churches, CARITAS and International Jewish Organizations. Part of the P.L. 480 food provided to the CWS, CRS and UNICEF has been or will be offloaded at Sao Tome and airlifted into Biafra.

At the present, there are about 6 to 9 planes being used for nightly flights into Biafra. Because of the distance, 260 miles each way, only one flight per plane (averaging about 8 tons each) is usually possible each night. Assuming each flight costs about \$3500 - \$4000, and between 200 to 250 flights are made per month, the cost of this airlift is estimated at \$1,000,000 per month.

The U.S. Government has not provided any planes for this operation but it has agreed to reimburse the U.S. registered Voluntary Agencies for an equitable share of airlifting P.L. 480 and other donated supplies to Biafra.

CONFIDENTIAL

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| DECLASSIFIED | |
| Authority | VND 959503 |
| By | MMNARA Date 10/5/05 |

CONFIDENTIAL

15

Since it would probably not be feasible to move the Joint-Church operation to the already overcrowded facilities on Fernando Po or to another African country; it will probably have to remain on Sao Tome. Should this group succeed in integrating their Sao Tome operation into the total ICRC-coordinated program, the U.S. Government has agreed to contribute \$500,000 to help cover the cost of chartering aircraft for a three-month period. Probably an additional \$500,000 will be required from the U.S. for additional aircraft charter during the six-month's period ending April 30, 1969, making a total of \$1,000,000 in contributions from the U.S. Government.

3. Food Supplies

The total requirement for food for the six months is projected at a value of \$62.5 million; this includes \$3.5 million which has been provided for within the ICRC budget. P.L. 480 shipments would cover somewhat more than half of the total food requirements - local and imported. Complete information on food shipments from other countries is not available; Canada, Australia, Scandinavian countries, and private groups have been providing food and the World Food Program has recently been authorized to participate as well. An important requirement will be the purchase of local food; the FMG is now providing funds for this purpose but at a level well below what will be necessary. The FMG has allocated, however, \$14 million for relief and rehabilitation programs, some of which is available for food.

4. The F.M.G. Relief Program

This item is limited to efforts to strengthen the FMG's relief/rehabilitation program. A.I.D. assistance (\$2.8 million) is being provided to support the staffing of the Nigerian Red Cross; medical and health relief activities; community rehabilitation and personnel to survey food and transport problems in the war torn areas. (Details and background material are provided in the A.I.D. Relief Team Report of October 1968.)

5. Other Donated Supplies

Although there is certain means of determining future donations in kind and their value, it is assumed that at least \$2.5 million will be provided in the form of medical supplies, vehicles and personnel.

CONFIDENTIAL

0609

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|--------------|----------------------|
| DECLASSIFIED | |
| Authority | VND 959503 |
| By | MV NARA Date 10/5/05 |

CONFIDENTIAL

16

III.

D. Special Issues

(1) Access to Biafra

The problem of actually delivering relief supplies to the needy within Biafra has proved to be the most difficult part of the entire relief operation. The relief organizations have had some success to date through a limited airlift. Proposals have been made to increase the volume entering Biafra by establishing ground corridors, augmenting the airlift, and even using airdrops. The problem of night versus daylight flights has also received considerable attention. It is clear in any case that only the cessation of hostilities and the early revival of internal economic services will make it possible to meet the needs of the massive numbers who will be without food in the coming months.

a. Ground Corridors


About seven months after the civil war had broken out, the relief problem began to make itself felt. It was suggested that a ground corridor be established which would enable relief organizations to deliver food, medicine, and other relief supplies through the lines into Biafra. The FMG agreed to the establishment of such a corridor but the Biafrans refused, insisting that the FMG would derive a military advantage from the establishment of such a corridor. Whatever the merits of this proposal, it is not now receiving serious consideration. In fact, during discussions in Lagos, the Deputy Permanent Secretary for External Affairs told Assistant Secretary Palmer that "the military pace of events has overtaken any realistic possibility of agreement on land corridors".

b. Augmented Airlift

There are two distinct airlifts operating into Biafra. One of these is operated by the ICRC and based on the formerly Spanish island of Fernando Po, now part of newly independent Equatorial Guinea. The other is sponsored by a private group of church affiliated agencies, both European and American, and operates from the Portuguese island of Sao Tome. Both airlifts terminate at the single remaining major airfield in Biafra at Uli, to which arms flights from Libreville and elsewhere also go. All of these flights have been at night.

CONFIDENTIAL

0610



CONFIDENTIAL

17

The FMG has now indicated that it will not only assist but guarantee the safety of daylight ICRC flights into Uli from Lagos and/or Fernando Po. The ICRC will be permitted to continue night flights at its own risk while the new arrangements for daylight flights are worked out. However, the FMG has also stated that other flights to Biafra are liable to interception. This could preclude any further flights from Sao Tome or at least render them extremely hazardous. The FMG has, however, stipulated one condition for its agreement to daylight relief flights; that is that the Biafrans are not to use Uli for arms flights during daylight hours. The Biafrans have refused to accept this arrangement.

If daylight flights become possible, it is likely that a greater number of flights can take place and that additional aircraft may be requested. There are indications too, that the church groups may seek to bring their airlift under the ICRC umbrella.

The United States has been approached before both the ICRC and the church groups to provide aircraft of maximum carrying capacity, such as C-130's. Very few such aircraft are available commercially and civilian crews, in particular, are difficult to find. As a practical matter, such requests could only be met through the use of U.S. military aircraft and crews. Because of the political implications and the actual dangers involved in the utilization of U.S. military aircraft into an active war zone, the U.S. Government has been unwilling to provide these aircraft. However, there are a large number of other types of transport aircraft available on the commercial market for which civilian crews are readily obtainable.

c. Airdrop

Although the FMG remains very suspicious of any type of airdrop, the ICRC is making plans for an airdrop if the remaining airfield in Biafra becomes inoperable. The ICRC may even be considering an airdrop as a form of augmentation of the present airlift. Airdrop equipment has been purchased and expert advice sought.

The feasibility of airdrops would depend on whether daylight flights become possible. Both Biafran and FMG approval would be required if the airdrop operation is to be fully successful. However, widespread guerrilla activity within Biafra could make airdrops impractical.

CONFIDENTIAL

0611

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| DECLASSIFIED | |
| Authority | VND 959/503 |
| By | MM NARA |
| Date | 10/3/05 |

CONFIDENTIAL

18

d. Perimeter Supply

Present plans call for stockpiling relief supplies on the perimeter of the Biafran territory but in the Federal controlled areas. Increasing numbers of "Biafrans" are emerging from the bush to obtain relief assistance and as the shortages increase it can be expected that many more will emerge within the Federal controlled area.

Perimeter stockpiles will also permit rapid assistance when the war ends and the Biafran area is opened up.

(2) Availability A.I.D. Funds for Nigerian Relief

A.I.D. has earmarked \$15 million principally from the FY 1969 Supporting Assistance Appropriation for Nigerian Relief. \$6 million of this has been approved and allocated for the ICRC contribution, the FMG Relief Program, and Volag support costs and airlift. A review of funds available to A.I.D. indicates that an additional \$10 million could be released from other programs if it is established that the Nigeria Relief Program has the highest priority. Any substantial requirements beyond \$25 million would probably require a supplementary appropriation. The overall funding situation and the requirement for a supplementary appropriation can be better evaluated after the first of the year when there is a clearer picture of other A.I.D. program requirements and the funding situation of the Nigerian Relief operation. Owing to the sharp cut in Contingency Funds, only a very small amount is available from this appropriation for the relief program. Contingency Funds and possibly some Technical Cooperation funds will be used in those instances where the use of Supporting Assistance is not feasible.

(3) Private U.S. Fund Raising

According to reports made available to A.I.D., \$4,145,500 have been raised by private U.S. organizations for Nigeria/Biafra relief. Three quarters of this amount represents private donations of food, medical supplies more or less equally divided between Nigeria and Biafra. The balance has been earmarked for relief operations and contributions to the international Joint Church Group airlift. Only \$20,000 has been contributed to the ICRC directly, although personnel and supplies in kind are being made available to the ICRC operation in the Federal areas. The American church groups are the principal contributors.

A number of private fund raising efforts are now underway through the churches; it is too soon to know what the response will be. Reports indicate a fairly steady inflow on contributions, however.

CONFIDENTIAL

0612

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| DECLASSIFIED | |
| Authority | VND 959503 |
| By | MVA Date 10/5/05 |

CONFIDENTIAL

19

Reports from some of the private organizations suggest that the prospects are not good for major increases in private donations. Various reasons are given: competition with fund raising for domestic programs, primary concern of Americans with local problems, and lack of awareness of the Nigerian/Biafran situation and an indifference to the problem except for a few select groups. Moreover, it is apparent that the high cost of the relief operation, particularly support for the airlifts, are placing a severe strain on the private organizations' resources. More and more they are turning to the USG for assistance.

From discussions with the voluntary agencies, there appears to be a general resistance to a joint nation-wide campaign although some consideration has been given to this possibility. Past experience on cost and effectiveness of such campaigns raises doubts as to its feasibility. Also, there is some concern that it would cut into those campaigns now underway or being planned. Each group has its own constituency which it prefers to handle in its own way. The situation should be reviewed with the voluntary agency groups after January to determine whether a joint effort would be more feasible then. For the present, it would appear that support should be given to individual campaigns through the assistance of prominent interested American leaders and through a general effort by the USG to inform the American people of the relief problem and needs.

(4). Assistance to Evacuated Children

Background

During the past three months approximately 1,300 children have been flown to Gabon from Eastern Nigeria. It is possible that many more may follow. The initial confusion which met the first arrivals in Libreville was somewhat alleviated by the formation of a "Committee for the Survival of Biafran Children" under the chairmanship of President Bongo, the President of the Gabonese Red Cross and a representative of Biafra. Two hundred are lodged at a field hospital provided by the French Government, while the rest appear to be located in other hospital facilities and private homes.

In October, Biafran children also began to arrive in the Ivory Coast. The children have been sheltered in Abidjan in prefabricated housing. As of November 18 it was believed that 30 orphans were being cared for in Ivory Coast, but the arrival of several hundred others has long been expected.

U.S. Involvement

The USG has had some knowledge of plans for an orphan airlift since August. However, our substantive involvement dates back to early

CONFIDENTIAL

0613

| | |
|--------------|----------------------|
| DECLASSIFIED | |
| Authority | VND 959503 |
| By | MV NARA Date 10/5/05 |

CONFIDENTIAL

20

October, when the Department was approached by a representative of the Albert Schweitzer Fellowship in New York, who discussed plans to evacuate 150 Biafran children from Libreville to New York by chartered aircraft. The project also had the support of Norman Cousins, Editor of the Saturday Review. As the knowledge of these plans spread, the American Council of Voluntary Agencies issued statements with guidelines for the care of the Biafran orphans. Because of its previous experience of the disastrous effect of care-less planning on evacuated foreign children, the ACVA has recommended that children be kept in their own environment and not taken to other countries. Although detailed plans were made, the project did not materialize because of the opposition of the Gabonese Government and a Biafran policy of sending children only to countries recognizing Biafra.

Until recently the Gabonese have shown little interest in requesting U.S. assistance of any kind. An offer by Embassy wives to help with the children was refused. However, the Gabonese may be coming around to the view that certain types of American assistance may be useful. The Schweitzer Fellowship recently requested the U.S. Government to provide \$100,000 in cash in addition to prefab building materials for enlargement of their facilities for this project in Lanbarene, Gabon.

Mrs. Susan Garth, a British writer, is engaged in a one-woman campaign to evacuate all the children of Biafra to Gabon and Ivory Coast. She states that she was provided with a 20 hectare plot of land by the GOG for hospital space for the Biafran children and a similar lot was set aside by the Government of the Ivory Coast. She is thinking in terms of bringing out 2,000 children by nightly airlift and is attempting to raise millions of dollars for this purpose in the United States. On November 18, she approached Ambassador Wiggins in New York for USG help in providing inflatable shelters for the project. To raise money in the U.S., she has hired the reputable New York fund-raising firm Oram. Since Mrs. Garth does not qualify as a relief agency entitled to USG help, we have suggested she channel her activities through the British Government.

A recent story appeared in the Gabonese press that two American relief committees are cooperating with the Government of the Ivory Coast on the children. According to the story, 30 doctors and 5 nurses from the U.S. are ready to serve in the Ivory Coast for two month periods beginning December 15.

CONFIDENTIAL

0614

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|--------------|----------------------|
| DECLASSIFIED | |
| Authority | VND 959503 |
| By | MV NARA Date 10/5/05 |

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX I.

RELIEF REQUIREMENTS

1. Food:

It is estimated that between 3.5 to 4.5 million people on both sides of the Nigerian conflict will be in need of supplementary food requirements. Until resettlement is possible, allowing the restoration of normal sources of food production and local markets, the number of people in need of food will continue to increase, resulting in a peak recipient population of 4.5 million during March-April.

Biafra:

Food from outside sources to aid the Biafran population in need is limited to what if flown in during night time flights, from the off-shore islands. The ICRC is now capable of flying in from 60-120 tons per night from Fernando Po, or almost 3,000 tons of food and relief supplies per month. This is combined with up to 2,000 tons of food and relief supplies per month being airlifted by international church groups from Sao Tome. It is reported that the French Red Cross from Libreville has flown in relief supplies. Distribution teams in Biafra are estimated to be able to assist up to one million people, or about 1/3 of the number believed to be affected by food shortages. Weather and technical difficulties prevent the airlifts from operating at optimum capacities and frequencies.

FMG:

About 600,000 displaced persons are now being provided with supplementary foods in Federally-controlled territory. It is estimated that this figure will reach a high of 1.5 million by March as more people emerge from the "bush" or find themselves in the Federally-controlled areas as FMG troops advance. Food is stockpiled in three major areas of FMG territory: Enugu, Calabar and Uyo, with advance depots also at Otukyo and Agbor.

Projected Total Food Requirements:

Dr. Foegen, a nutritional expert from the U.S. Public Health Service, has devised a feeding program for use in the ICRC relief operations. He has estimated such a program would require 238,000 tons of food over a ten month period, about half locally purchased and half imported, to feed up to 4.5 million recipients. However, this plan only makes allowances for providing maximum stockpile requirements that would be needed following a possible Biafra capitulation (arbitrarily planned as March), rather than addressing the actual immediate needs

CONFIDENTIAL

0615

| | |
|--------------|----------------------|
| DECLASSIFIED | |
| Authority | VND 959503 |
| By | MM NARA Date 10/5/05 |

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

of those in need of food within Biafra. Imported foods would be mostly cereals, with the remainder (and supplementary portions) made up of non-fat dry milk (NFDM) or a corn-soy-milk blended food product (CEM).


The composition and amounts of any feeding program would, of course, be flexible, depending upon the availability of local food and the nature and magnitude of contributions from all outside donors. For example, maximum efforts should be made to utilize foods that are available locally or in nearby countries, in order to minimize the formidable logistical problems involved in distributing foods from outside sources some of which are unfamiliar to recipients or require special preparation.

Although the ICRC has accepted the feeding program prepared by Dr. Foege, in principle, the ICRC has recommended that this program only be implemented in FMG territory, because of the present political obstacles and tremendous logistical problems involved in any substantial increase of food for distribution in Biafra. Consequently, the ICRC has limited its projections of food distributions in FMG territory to 90,000 tons of which the ICRC proposes to distribute 72,000 tons and the FMG distribute the remainder. There is no provision within the ICRC estimates for increasing imported food inputs into Biafra beyond amounts presently being flown in by the two airlift operations from off-shore islands. These operations can only deliver about 5,000 tons per month even if conditions allow the planes to operate at maximum capacity, or enough to provide supplementary portions for about 1,000,000 people.

Neither of the above plans include food requirements to meet the total expected need within Biafra under present wartime circumstances. Assuming that the airlift operation could be expanded or additional ways found to increase the total input of imported food into Nigeria and to Biafran held areas, approximately 270,000 tons of food would be required over the six months' period November-April, in order to feed 4.5 million people (3 million within Biafra) by March 1. This amount would provide two-three weeks' reserve supply in Federal areas and no reserve provisions inside Biafra territory. This assures a diet of 1500 calories per person, which is considered a minimal human requirement, and which would allow flexibility for providing either supplementary or partial provisions as needed. Based on this level, it would take approximately 13,500 metric tons to feed one million people. This would allow a daily ration of slightly less than one pound per person. We estimate that about 50-60% of the total food needs in Federal territory would be supplied from local sources, while a maximum of 10% would be available locally in Biafra. Imported foods would account for about 2/3's of the total food needs, or approximately 220,500 metric tons through April 30, 1969. Assuming the United States Government would supply 2/3's of this amount, a total of about 141,000 metric tons of this would be provided from P. L. 480 sources. To date, 56,000 tons have been authorized, or

CONFIDENTIAL

0616



CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

are in process, for this period, leaving a balance of 85,000 tons yet to be provided. For a more detailed breakdown, see Table at the end of this section.

Food Requirements (Nov-April)

| | <u>NOV.</u> | <u>DEC.</u> | <u>JAN.</u> | <u>FEB.</u> | <u>MARCH</u> | <u>APRIL</u> | <u>TOTAL</u> |
|-----------------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|---------------|----------------|
| Local Purchases | 7,500 | 10,000 | 13,700 | 17,000 | 22,000 | 22,000 | 94,000 |
| Imports | <u>17,500</u> | <u>26,500</u> | <u>35,500</u> | <u>44,000</u> | <u>48,500</u> | <u>48,500</u> | <u>220,500</u> |
| Total | 25,000 | 36,500 | 49,200 | 61,000 | 70,500 | 70,500 | 314,500 |
| Known Imports U.S. | 8,170 | 8,200 | 18,500 | 21,500 | | | 56,370 |
| Other Donors | <u>9,000</u> | <u>8,000</u> | <u>5,000</u> | | | | <u>22,000</u> |
| Total | 17,170 | 16,200 | 23,500 | 21,500 | | | 78,370 |
| Add't Imported Rqmts | -0- | 10,300 | 12,000 | 22,500 | 48,500 | 48,500 | 141,800 |
| Add'l U.S. Portion | -0- | 7,700 | 5,000 | 7,500 | 32,400 | 32,400 | 85,000 |

CONFIDENTIAL

0617

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND959503
By MMARA Date 10/5/05

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

TITLE II. P.L. 480 Emergency Relief, Nigeria

| | <u>Cereals</u> | <u>NFDM</u> | <u>CSM</u> | <u>Beans</u> | <u>Stockfish</u> | <u>Other</u> | <u>TOTAL</u> |
|------------------|----------------|-------------|------------|--------------|------------------|--------------|--------------|
| <u>Approved</u> | 24,880 | 5,825 | 17,000 | 2,500 | - | 1,000 | 51,000 |
| <u>Requested</u> | 15,000 | - | - | - | - | - | 15,000 |
| <u>TOTAL</u> | 40,000 | 6,325 | 17,000 | 2,500 | - | 1,000 | 66,000* |

*Includes 10,000 tons provided prior to November

To reduce competitive purchasing on local markets, it has been recommended that local purchasing be concentrated in the FMG National Rehabilitation Commission which would provide up to £5 million for its share of local food costs. The ICRC would finance the balance of local food requirements at its projected outlay of £200,000 a month, or 3,000-4,000 tons of local food purchases.

2. Medical Supplies

Medical care is a most urgent need for a great number of displaced and undernourished persons in Nigeria/Biafra. Existing facilities, even if fully staffed and equipped could not handle the greatly increased number of people suffering from the effects of malnutrition. Many of these facilities have been damaged or looted. Consequently, throughout the war zone, most are closed and others are only partly opened or poorly equipped. The ICRC/NRC medical teams in the Federal areas are overwhelmed and can treat only a small percentage of the cases per day. Even so, up to 70,000 were being served by ICRC/NRC medical teams by late September.

The amount of damage to hospitals - and hence, the total medical requirements - has not yet been assessed with any accuracy. The following, however, are known to be needed immediately: cotton blankets, sheets, hospital linen, dressing materials, medicines, medical equipment and surgical instruments.

In devastated regions, mobile field hospital units complete with medical equipment and personnel are required. Improvised clinics established in camps for the civilian war victims are in continuing need of medical supplies and equipment.

USG and other cash contributions to the ICRC, have been used for the provision of medical personnel, drugs, and supplies. The USG has also provided transportation costs for shipping relief supplies donated by U.S. private voluntary agencies. It is planning to help the FMG/NRC expand their medical relief capabilities by providing (1) six U.S. Public Health Service technicians (and necessary local supplies) to train and support Nigerian medical personnel in assessing emergency medical requirements and in establishing field medical centers and (2) field hospital units, equipped and staffed by U.S. personnel (4 technicians for one year and

CONFIDENTIAL

0618

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

CONFIDENTIAL

- 5 -

5 temporary personnel) to work with Nigerian counterparts in treating medical cases identified by Public Health Nutritional teams.

Project HOPE, a private U.S. medical foundation, considered, but rejected, the sending of its hospital ship with staff to Nigeria to assist in the overall medical relief operations. For the present, it is not considered practicable to send the USS HOPE itself.

In mid-October, work resumed in inoculating local populations in the Southeastern State of Nigeria against small pox and measles (part of a regional AID/WHO project in 19 African countries). Measle's vaccines will be shipped to Biafra as needed. The ICRC drug warehouse in Lagos currently carries one month's stock of pharmaceuticals for 20 teams. The drugs are valued at £60,000. As the established cost of medical supplies (less shipping) is £3,000 per month for 25,000 persons -- the actual number served by a medical/relief team -- this would take care of 400,000 people, about two-thirds of the number now being helped in Federal territory. If the number of increases as anticipated, the present drug stockpile will be insufficient. If, for example, the ICRC were to increase the number of teams to 33 as has been recommended, a one-month drug supply for 20 teams would soon be depleted. The ICRC should try to build up at least a 60-day supply for its current teams, which would provide some margin for emergencies. Local drug purchases can replenish some of the stocks.

With regard to drug supplies in Biafra, the church groups have been airlifting in donated items from all over the world. ICRC medical supplies have been flown into Biafra regularly. An assessment is required before stockpiling to meet Biafra's needs is undertaken, but it is reported that the most urgent requirements are being met.

3. Personnel:


As of October 22, 1968, there were over 450 persons (expatriates) involved in the ICRC emergency relief operations in Nigeria and Biafra. Analyses of the composition, function and geographic area of these foreign ICRC personnel are shown in the tables below:

ICRC Personnel, by Area--10/22/68

| | |
|-------------------------------|--------------------|
| Territory under FMG (Nigeria) | 261 persons |
| Biafra | 107 persons |
| Fernando Po | <u>91 persons</u> |
| <u>Total</u> | <u>459 persons</u> |

CONFIDENTIAL

0619



CONFIDENTIAL

- 6 -

ICRC Personnel by Functions--10/22/68

| | <u>Nigeria</u> | <u>Biafra</u> | <u>Fernando Po</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|----------------|----------------|---------------|--------------------|--------------|
| Transport | 83 | 13 | 65 | 161 |
| Medical | 97 | 34 | 5 | 136 |
| Relief (Food) | 35 | 48 | 6 | 89 |
| Administration | 33 | 4 | 9 | 46 |
| Cadres | 12 | 7 | 3 | 22 |
| Transmission | 1 | 1 | 3 | 5 |
| Total | 261 | 107 | 91 | 459 |

IRC Personnel by Organization

| | <u>Nigeria</u> | <u>Biafra</u> | <u>Fernando Po</u> | <u>Total</u> |
|---------------------------------------|----------------|---------------|--------------------|--------------|
| ICRC | 71 | 11 | 45 | 127 |
| Swiss Red Cross | 9 | - | - | 9 |
| Swedish Red Cross | 14 | 69 | 23 | 106 |
| American Red Cross | 3 | - | - | 3 |
| Dutch Red Cross | 3 | - | 8 | 11 |
| Yugoslav Red Cross | 4 | - | - | 4 |
| Danish Red Cross | 1 | - | 2 | 3 |
| Norwegian Red Cross | - | 2 | 12 | 14 |
| Finnish Red Cross | - | 5 | - | 5 |
| French Red Cross | - | 11 | - | 11 |
| German Red Cross (Fed.) | 28 | - | - | 28 |
| Irish Red Cross | 4 | - | - | 4 |
| Magen David Adom | - | 3 | - | 3 |
| SCF | 34 | - | 1 | 35 |
| OXFAM | 7 | 2 | - | 9 |
| Quakers | 2 | - | - | 2 |
| CRS (Catholic Relief Service) | 2 | - | - | 2 |
| WCC (COE) | 30 | - | - | 30 |
| UNICEFA | 12 | - | - | 12 |
| LCSM (Lutheran Church Missouri Synod) | 14 | - | - | 14 |
| RCM (Roman Catholic Church Mission) | 16 | - | - | 16 |
| UIPE | 1 | - | - | 1 |
| Adventistes | 6 | 4 | - | 10 |
| Total | 261 | 107 | 91 | 459 |

ICRC relief teams are now being reorganized into three functional groups as follows:

CONFIDENTIAL

0620

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959/503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

CONFIDENTIAL

- 7 -

1. Epidemiologic teams to survey, assign geographic priorities, establish centers, surveillance and assessment systems and screen patients into treatment groups (made up mostly of expatriates working with Nigerian counterparts when possible).
2. Treatment teams for both inpatient and outpatient nutritional treatment.
3. Food distribution teams for mild and moderate starvation cases. Team members in the two latter groups usually work closely together with heavy local participation.

Based on the assumption that one team of 6 to 10 members can serve up to 25,000 people, it is estimated that about 300 team members (30 teams) of foreign and Nigerian personnel are still required in Federal territory and about three times that number (900 team members of 95 teams) are required to adequately care for the needy in the territory now under Biafran control. Relief teams should, whenever possible, be assigned for six months; specific shorter term schedules with reasonable overlap may be a feasible alternative.

In Biafra, there are now more than 400 ICRC centers, manned by about 25 ICRC relief teams and 800 Joint Church food centers. ICRC personnel in Biafra are now under orders to withdraw further into Biafra when fighting comes within 5 miles of their team location. All members have the option to request evacuation at any time they think risks are too great. The ICRC is now attempting to concentrate team members into two neutralized zones, clearly defined and accepted by both FMG and rebel authorities, and located near small landing strips. Reports from Biafra indicate that personnel is not a problem as there is an employment problem for the many Ibo professionals who returned. There are many Ibo doctors and medical personnel as well.

The FMG has stated that it is prepared to phase into a massive relief operation throughout the Eastern part of Nigeria as organized military resistance draws to a close and the League of Red Cross Societies phases in to the relief operations in conjunction with State and Federal Rehabilitation Commissions and the Nigerian Red Cross. The ICRC is taking steps to encourage the maximum participation of Nigerian personnel in all relief efforts now. The employment of Nigerians should be expanded for both executive positions in the management of relief operations at Federal and State levels and for field relief teams. Nigerian executives should, for example, be assigned to work with Red Cross personnel on all phases of transport and logistics.

An A.I.D. relief team has recommended massive action be taken by outside donors to help build up FMG capabilities in the overall relief operation. A.I.D. is planning to provide a direct contribution of \$220,000 to Nigerian organizations to recruit, employ and train Nigerian technicians

CONFIDENTIAL

0621

| | |
|--------------|----------------------|
| DECLASSIFIED | |
| Authority | VND 959503 |
| By | MV NARA Date 10/5/05 |

CONFIDENTIAL .

- 8 -

and relief workers who will act as counterparts to expatriate personnel in carrying out these programs.

4. Transportation

The management of transportation and logistics represents one of the critical bottlenecks in the relief operation. Proper coordination of such a formidable problem, of course, requires the maximum participation by the FMG since it has authority and control over much of the transportation network, i.e., ports, customs, railroads, roads, etc.

a. FMG Territory

All relief supplies being distributed by the ICRC in Federal territory have been directed through Lagos and then forwarded to advance depots in the East. All available forms of internal transport have been utilized, and transport capacity has been progressively increasing, so that stocks may be adapted to suit distribution requirements, building up a constant supply for at least one month ahead:

(1) Air Transport

- Two to four DC-4's are being operated to shuttle food from Lagos to the Enugu depot (10 tons each).
- Three helicopters are being used to distribute food from the stockpile in the Calabar/Uyo area, with a fourth expected soon (10 to 20 tons per day).

(2) Sea Transport


- Two 535 ton ships are being operated to shuttle food from Lagos to Calabar.
- Barges and ferries are used from Calabar to refugee camps along waterways, i.e., Oron and Nwaniba.
- Boat on the Niger River.

(3) Land Transport

- Over 100 trucks and about 100 landrovers from various sources are being used to distribute food inland, carrying a total tonnage of 600 tons. More trucks are required.

CONFIDENTIAL

0622



CONFIDENTIAL

- 9 -

(4) Rail

-The Nigeria Railroad from Lagos to Oturkpo (120 miles north of Enugu) is providing 600 tons freight free service for the three week journey. Trucks transship the food south to Enugu warehouses and refugee centers. Negotiations are underway to increase this operation.

Supply and transport teams are located at Calabar/Uyo, Enugu, and Agbor/Asaba and vehicle maintenance teams are stationed in Lagos, Enugu and Uyo. Negotiations are underway to transfer the major point of entry for relief supplies from Lagos to Port Harcourt, which will decrease handling expenses and facilitate distribution. The FMG has agreed that this is desirable, as soon as it becomes operationally practicable, and a suitable warehouse has been found in Port Harcourt. Because of silting, Port Harcourt can only handle ships of 20 foot draft or less.

To accommodate the total number of persons in need of food and medical aid, the ICRC, Nigerian Red Cross and LICROSS are preparing a plan for a transfer of operational responsibilities which could be quickly implemented as hostilities cease. The FMG and the NRC should then be in a position to supply military transport or requisition commercial trucks and vehicles for emergency relief use.

In addition to the management of relief transport and logistics, attention must be given to restoring the transport network - roads, bridges, railways, airports and ports. For immediate relief needs, attention should be focused on opening up key routes to carry the burden of heavy truck traffic. It is also important that the railway route south of Oturkpo to Enugu be opened, especially the rebuilding of 2 bridges in order to reduce the need for trucking food between these two places. The A.I.D. relief team has proposed that we assist the Ministry of Works and Housing and/or State Ministries by providing a team of U.S. engineers and specialists and urgently needed road and bridge equipment.

b. Biafra

The distribution capacity in Biafra is limited to the combined payload of the Biafra airlift being operated by the ICRC from Fernando Po, the aircraft used by international church groups now fly from Sao Tome, and French Red Cross flights from Libreville, as shown below (period Oct. - Dec.).

CONFIDENTIAL

0623

| | |
|--------------|------------|
| DECLASSIFIED | |
| Authority | VND 954503 |
| By | MNARA |
| Date | 10/5/05 |

CONFIDENTIAL

- 10 -

| | Plane | Tonnage | Period | Charterer |
|---------------------|---------------|---------|--------------|----------------|
| *ICRC (Fernando Po) | Hercules C130 | 18 | Oct-Dec | Swedish RC |
| (two flights per | DC-7 | 10 | Nov 1-15 | " " |
| night per plane | Transall | 14 | Nov 5-Dec 30 | German RC |
| maximum) | DC6-B | 7 | Oct-Nov 30 | Swiss RC/ICRC |
| | DC6-B | 7 | Nov 1-12 | ICRC |
| | DC6-B | 7 | Nov 11-25 | Dutch RC |
| | DC6-B | 7 | Oct-Nov 15 | ICRC/Norway RC |
| | Hercules C130 | 18 | Oct 28-Nov 6 | Canadian RC |

Total* 60-120
Max per night

*Finnish, Danish and Dutch planes ended charters before October.

| | | | |
|-------------|---------------|----------------|-------------|
| Sao Tome | 9 - DC6 | 7 each Oct-Dec | NORDCHURCH/ |
| (one flight | or equivalent | | Caritas/CWS |
| per night | | | |
| per plane | | | |
| maximum) | | | |

Total 64
Max per night

| | | |
|-------------|--------|-----|
| Europe | 7 each | CWS |
| (two weekly | | |
| flights) | | |

Total 2
Max per night

Maximum Possible Nightly 124 - 186 tons

Bomb explosions at the Biafran airstrip at Uli during the night of November 5-6, damaged the ICRC/Swedish DC-7 and one plane chartered by CARITAS and wounding both pilots. The Canadian C-130 has not flown to Biafra since and is now used for Europe-Fernando Po flights; a second Canadian C-130 at Lagos has returned to Canada as it has not proved feasible for it to land at Eastern airfields. Consideration is now being given to replacing the C-130 with Caribou. The ICRC is attempting to get approval of daylight flights, but has not obtained comment from rebel authorities.

CONFIDENTIAL

0624

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND959503
By MNARA Date 10/5/05

CONFIDENTIAL

- 11 -

c. Voluntary Agency Transport

A.I.D. finances the transport of all P. L. 480 Title II emergency relief food donations for registered U.S. private voluntary agencies and UNICEF from U.S. ports to the terminal location, i.e., Lagos, Sao Tome or Fernando Po. A.I.D. has also agreed to reimburse the VolAgs for an equitable share of the airlift costs from Sao Tome to Biafra.

In order to assist in expanding the airlift operation, A.I.D. is prepared to assist the VolAgs in financing the charter of additional aircraft. Such assistance is to be provided through the ICRC in order to ensure close coordination with the ICRC operation which is the only relief agency with FMG authority to operate over its territory.

CONFIDENTIAL

0625

| | |
|--------------|---------------------|
| DECLASSIFIED | |
| Authority | VND 95/503 |
| By | MMNARA Date 10/3/05 |

TABLE I

Appendix 1
Page 1 of 2FOOD REQUIREMENTS, SUPPLY AND COSTS FOR NIGERIAN/BIAFRA RELIEF

| | November | December | January | February | March | April | 6-months Total |
|---------------------------------------------------------|-----------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------------|
| I. POPULATION TARGETS | | | | | | | |
| FMG | 600,000 | 750,000 | 1,000,000 | 1,250,000 | 1,500,000 | 1,500,000 | |
| Biafra | 900,000 | 1,500,000 | 2,000,000 | 2,500,000 | 3,000,000 | 3,000,000 | |
| TOTALS | 1,500,000 | 2,250,000 | 3,000,000 | 3,750,000 | 4,500,000 | 4,500,000 | |
| II. FOOD REQUIREMENTS (metric tons)^{1/} | | | | | | | |
| A. FMG ^{2/} | 9,050 | 11,300 | 15,200 | 18,850 | 20,250 | 20,250 | 94,900 |
| Biafra ^{3/} | 12,200 | 20,250 | 27,000 | 33,750 | 40,500 | 40,500 | 174,200 |
| TOTAL | 21,250 | 31,550 | 42,200 | 52,600 | 60,750 | 60,750 | 269,100 |
| B. Reserve Supply ^{4/} | | | | | | | |
| FMG | 4,000 | 5,000 | 6,750 | 8,450 | 10,125 | 10,125 | 44,500 |
| TOTAL REQUIREMENTS | 25,250 | 36,550 | 48,950 | 61,050 | 70,875 | 70,875 | 313,550 |
| III. SOURCE (metric tons) | | | | | | | |
| A. Imported | | | | | | | |
| FMG ^{5/} | 6,555 | 8,150 | 11,000 | 13,650 | 12,150 | 12,150 | 63,655 |
| Biafra ^{6/} | 10,980 | 18,225 | 24,300 | 30,375 | 36,500 | 36,500 | 156,880 |
| TOTAL | 17,535 | 26,375 | 35,300 | 44,025 | 48,650 | 48,650 | 220,535 |
| B. Local Purchase | | | | | | | |
| FMG | 6,555 | 8,150 | 11,000 | 13,650 | 18,225 | 18,225 | 75,805 |
| Biafra ^{7/} | 1,220 | 2,025 | 2,700 | 3,375 | 4,050 | 4,050 | 17,420 |
| TOTAL | 7,775 | 10,175 | 13,700 | 17,025 | 22,275 | 22,275 | 93,225 |
| IV. PROJECTED DELIVERIES (metric tons) | | | | | | | |
| A. Imported | | | | | | | |
| 1. Expected | | | | | | | |
| U.S. P.L. 480 10,000 | 8,170 | 8,170 | 18,500 | 21,500 | | | 56,340 |
| Other Known Imports ^{8/} | 9,000 | 8,000 | 5,000 | - | - | - | 22,000 |
| Total Known Imports | 17,170 | 16,170 | 23,500 | 21,500 | | | 78,340 |
| 2. Additional Import Requirements | | | | | | | |
| U.S. P.L. 480 | | | | | | | |
| By Weight (metric tons) ^{9/} | -0- | 7,700 | 5,000 | 7,500 | 32,400 | 32,400 | 85,000 |
| By Cost | -0- | \$1,851,000 | \$1,200,000 | \$1,800,000 | \$7,776,000 | \$7,776,000 | \$20,400,000 |
| Other Donors | -0- | 2,505 | 6,800 | 15,025 | 16,250 | 16,250 | 56,830 |
| TOTAL ADDITIONAL | -0- | 10,205 | 11,800 | 22,525 | 48,650 | 48,540 | 141,830 |

0626

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Authority VVND959503
By MVA Date 10/5/05

| | November | December | January | February | March | April | 6-months Total |
|---------------------------------|----------|----------|---------|----------|--------|--------|-------------------|
| B. Local Purchase | | | | | | | |
| 1. ICRC | 3,000 | 3,000 | 3,000 | 3,500 | 4,000 | 4,000 | 20,500 |
| 2. FMG | 4,775 | 7,175 | 10,700 | 13,525 | 18,275 | 18,275 | 72,725 |
| TOTAL | 7,775 | 10,175 | 13,700 | 17,025 | 22,275 | 22,275 | 93,225 |
| V. DELIVERY PORT | | | | | | | |
| 1. FMG (Lagos or Port Harcourt) | | | | | | | |
| U.S. | 4,470 | 4,170 | 7,500 | 9,000 | 9,000 | 9,000 | 44,620 |
| Other Donors | 2,385 | 3,980 | 3,500 | 4,650 | 3,150 | 3,150 | 21,335 |
| TOTAL | 6,555 | 8,150 | 11,000 | 13,650 | 12,150 | 12,150 | 63,655 |
| 2. Biafra | | | | | | | |
| a. Fernando Po | | | | | | | |
| U.S. | | 8,000 | 10,500 | 13,000 | 15,400 | 15,400 | |
| Other Donors | | 4,000 | 6,000 | 7,000 | 8,900 | 8,900 | |
| b. Sao Tome | | | | | | | |
| U.S. | | 3,700 | 5,500 | 7,000 | 8,000 | 8,000 | |
| Other Donors | | 2,525 | 2,300 | 3,375 | 4,200 | 4,200 | |
| Total | | 18,225 | 24,800 | 30,375 | 36,500 | 36,500 | |
| TOTAL ALL IMPORTS | 17,170 | 26,375 | 35,300 | 44,025 | 48,650 | 48,650 | |

FOOTNOTES:

- 1/ Food Factor based on 13,500 metric tons per month to feed 1,000,000 people @ 1500 calories per day.
- 2/ One month requirement (average of current month and succeeding month)
- 3/ One month requirement (current month)
- 4/ Two week's requirement.
- 5/ 50% of total FMG requirement through February; 40% of total FMG requirement March-April.
- 6/ 90% of Biafran requirement.
- 7/ 10% of Biafran requirement.
- 8/ Canada - 15,000 tons, Australia - 3,000 tons, Stockfish, various sources - 4,000 tons.
- 9/ 2/3 of total import requirement.

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0627

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Authority VND959503
By MNA Date 10/5/05

ANNEX II

MAJOR GROUPS PARTICIPATING AND ASSISTANCE PROVIDED

This section provides a description of the principal groups participating in the Nigeria/Biafra relief operation and summary tables on the kinds and amounts of assistance being provided.

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS (ICRC) AND NIGERIAN RED CROSS (NRC)

Background


The ICRC responsibility for major relief operations began in April 1968. There seems to be some impression that ICRC has been involved for a long duration and perhaps that ICRC could have prevented the present grave conditions among victims of this civil war. As a matter of fact, it was not until April 10, 1968 that the Federal Government asked the Nigerian Red Cross to contact the International Committee of the Red Cross for substantial help in expanding relief operations. A brief history of ICRC presence in Nigeria following the May 30, 1967 announcement of independence by Biafra and subsequent civil war follows:

July 11, 1967 - ICRC delegate Georg Hoffman was in Lagos and medical assistance was being provided under the terms of the Geneva Conventions. During July the ICRC program was to have delegates in Nigeria to oversee prisoners captured on both sides and to give medical aid. It had two medical teams in the country--one in FMG area and one in Biafra. In this connection ICRC sent two standard assortments of medicines and bandages by air--one to Lagos and the other to Enugu. This was considered sufficient for needs of troops and POWs. The League of Red Cross Societies was not asked to make a general appeal, but the Nigerian Red Cross was aware that such an appeal might soon become necessary.

September 25, 1967 - ICRC indicated it would extend its program of medical assistance until the end of November, and replacements for the two medical teams were dispatched to Nigeria and Biafra as well as another consignment of medical supplies, instruments and drugs.

October 1967 - Nigerian Red Cross reported 100,000 persons made homeless by the war and indicated it would need \$140,000 per month to care for them. A relief plan was prepared and the Nigerian Red Cross was given authority by the FMG to expand its activities. The NRC expressed its willingness to work wherever need existed including East Central State. The head of NRC expressed the hope that medical missionaries and others formerly resident in Eastern Nigeria could come back under the Red Cross banner after having been designated as Red Cross personnel. On October 19, the U. S. Mission reported that the Nigerian Red Cross had been commissioned by the FMG to plan for, coordinate and achieve speedy rehabilitation of peoples in war-torn areas. Plans were begun to establish more temporary camps. ICRC representatives were invited to visit the already established relief camps.

0628




November 1967 - The President of the Nigerian Red Cross announced a national appeal for funds and supplies to aid the war victims. The FMG appropriated \$140,000 to finance the initial phase of emergency relief, and also announced that an Ad Hoc National Relief Committee had been formed to coordinate activities of participating voluntary organizations such as OXFAM, CRS, Christian Council of Nigeria and others.

December 1967 - By December 1, an American Red Cross donation of medicines had been airlifted to ICRC in Geneva and flown from there to Port Harcourt by ICRC charter aircraft. British voluntary agencies had made substantial contributions but there had been no general appeal for outside help. On December 8, AID/W received a cable from the U. S. Mission that the Nigerian Red Cross had asked for Food for Freedom PL 480 food commodities. On December 11, 1967, USAID authorized CRS in Nigeria to utilize its current inventory of PL 480 food to carry out an emergency relief program. By December 19, ICRC's role in relief operations was beginning due to increasing relief demands and the need to assist the Nigerian Red Cross. ICRC issued an appeal to other countries for funds and medical personnel to carry out this new development in its role in Nigeria. At that time, ICRC indicated it would try to work in "Biafra," allocating money and personnel to both FMG and Biafra. About the same time the World Council of Churches launched a specific appeal for \$250,000 from its members and a contribution to the ICRC program for Nigeria. Plans were formulated for another ICRC chartered aircraft to fly supplies to Biafra. Church World Service in U. S. made contributions of medical supplies to this shipment.

March 1968 - On March 10, the U. S. Mission reported that the relief situation was entering a new and crucial phase; that the population in Eastern states had been cut off from normal supply of food for seven months. People behind Federal lines were also cut off from their usual internal source of supplies. The Mission reported that ICRC and NRC services would need to be considerably extended for a rapidly increasing number of victims; that available personnel and resources were inadequate and funds nearly exhausted. It was in March that the Nigerian Red Cross with the consent and approval of the FMG appealed to sister societies for immediate assistance with personnel, relief material and cash. Problems were steadily mounting and the movement of supplies into the war-torn areas on both sides was more and more difficult.

April 10, 1968 - The FMG authorized the NRC to contact the ICRC, as a neutral intermediary, to assist with an appeal to all national Red Cross societies for help in meeting the needs of the victims of the seceding province of Biafra. ICRC assumed the major responsibility, in cooperation with the Nigerian Red Cross, for bringing food and medical assistance to both FMG and rebel-held areas. Contributions from other countries and organizations coming into Santa Isabel for Biafra and Lagos for Nigeria were to be funneled through ICRC.

0629



May-June 1968 - ICRC emergency plans were formulated with NRC and operations continued to develop towards a large scale relief campaign.

July to September 30, 1968 - Biafran Areas. Intermittently from July to September 30, the ICRC has flown relief supplies, mostly food and medicine from Fernando Po, Equatorial Guinea, to Biafra. During this time the number of relief personnel under ICRC auspices increased to 145, including 35 relief and medical teams and airport personnel (by October 22, 1968, it was 107). An airfield at Obilago was built in order to operate it for the sole purpose of humanitarian aid. It operated for a short period before being closed when the area was taken by the FMG military forces.

July 1968 - FMG Areas. ICRC was designated by FMG to coordinate relief work in areas under its control, including other non-Red Cross agencies, in an all out relief effort. ICRC established communications networks to facilitate use of human and material resources for relief and undertook major logistics and transportation operations.

August and September 1968 - FMG Areas. ICRC operations are described in Annex I.

September 1968 - FMG Areas. ICRC field teams averaged food distribution of 300 to 400 tons weekly to an estimated 500,000 displaced persons in FMG areas.

October 1968 - FMG Areas. Food distribution by ICRC/NRC reached approximately 600,000 people. Eleven hundred tons of food were distributed in one week during October, but this figure could not be maintained because of the shortage of local foods. ICRC made purchases of some local foods. The major quantities were provided from FMG sources. Shortages of local food and transportation facilities continually hamper the food distribution projects.


ICRC Delegates to Date. From July 1967 to date, the ICRC has maintained its delegates at Lagos and in the Biafran area in accordance with the Geneva Conventions mandates.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA (FMG)

July 10, 1968. The Federal Government of Nigeria announced the establishment of a National Rehabilitation Commission and set aside one million pounds (\$2,800,000) as a first installment of £5 million to carry out an effective program of emergency relief and rehabilitation.

September 1968. As of the end of September, the National Rehabilitation Commission had utilized approximately one-half of its funds on

0630



relief operations and purchase of local foods. Each of the four States affected by the civil war has established a State Rehabilitation Commission. These commissions are working in cooperation with the National Commission on local food procurement. They are organizing local distribution teams, coordinating Nigerian Red Cross staff and volunteers, and opening public and other buildings and areas for use by displaced persons and for relief purposes.

October 1968. Under a joint effort starting the first part of October, two ICRC medical/relief teams moved to areas north of Port Harcourt assisted by 25 members of the Nigerian Red Cross, the State Rehabilitation Commission, and the FMG military forces.

Nigerian Red Cross has inaugurated a series of orientation courses for expatriates and Nigerian relief workers to give realistic training in the overall relief program and to enable Nigerians to take over when the expatriates leave.


UNITED STATES

The U. S. Government has been responsive to requests for assistance to the victims of the civil war in Nigeria. A total of 56,000 metric tons of P.L. 480 food commodities consisting of bulgur, butter oil, CSM, wheat, and NFD milk have been approved for shipment through Catholic Relief Services, UNICEF, and Church World Service, of which 10,411 tons have already been delivered. A total of \$3.6 million in cash has been approved for contribution to the International Committee of the Red Cross - \$1.1 million which has been expended in October, and an additional \$2.5 million offered in November 1968 -- to carry out its assigned relief responsibilities on both sides in Nigeria. Also, \$600,000 was allocated to the U. S. Mission to purchase priority items locally, obtain necessary vehicles, bring in needed personnel, pay airlift costs for shipments by ICRC from Geneva and to assist U. S. voluntary agencies with air freight charges on supplies donated by them. An additional \$500,000 was allocated in November for a contribution to the U. S. Interchurch Group for the charter of aircraft for the Biafran airlift. Assistance is being provided to support the FMG participation in the relief/rehabilitation program - \$2.8 million has been allocated to the USAID Mission/Lagos for this purpose.

U. S. VOLUNTARY AGENCY EMERGENCY RELIEF EFFORTS

From the outbreak of hostilities in the summer of 1967 to the spring of 1968, several American voluntary agencies had relief or development programs in both FMG and Biafran areas. Since then, conditions in the entire eastern area of Nigeria have become so serious that the U. S. voluntary agency relief efforts have expanded markedly.

0631



Previous programs have been altered and expanded, many other long established voluntary agencies have entered the relief effort, and a number of new organizations have been created. The overall effort in Federal Nigerian areas is coordinated under the aegis of the ICRC, along with massive efforts of numerous European voluntary agencies and international agencies.

The U. S. voluntary agencies have contributed sizeable amounts of funds for purchase of supplies in the U. S. or for local purchase in Nigeria/Biafra, have provided donated medical supplies, etc., assisted in a massive airlift program, and have furnished personnel experienced in relief or medical work.

Below is a listing of U. S. voluntary agencies having sizeable emergency relief efforts in Nigeria/Biafra civil strife areas:

American Committee to Keep Biafra Alive

Has contributed \$20,000 to CRS and CWS for emergency relief. Assisted indirectly in financing first Abie Nathan flight to Biafra.

American Friends Service Committee

Working with both sides in conflict, emphasizing work with African local relief programs, provided \$105,000 for local purchase of food, plans to spend \$200,000 a year for 3 to 5 years for 15 medical/relief personnel.

American Jewish Committee

Coordinating efforts of 22 Jewish organizations in fund raising, with over \$100,000 already given to Church World Service and Catholic Relief Services for their programs.

American National Red Cross

Has contributed donated supplies valued at \$182,889, made cash donation of \$15,125 to ICRC. Also provided 3 staff members to ICRC relief program.

Biafra Relief Services Foundation

Raised funds for two Abie Nathan charter flights to Biafra, \$13,000 of the \$40,000 cost of first flight, and entire \$45,000 cost of second flight.

B'nai B'rith Foundation of the U. S.

Has cooperated in financing two Abie Nathan flights, and provided donated medical supplies and foodstuff valued at \$250,000 for relief in Biafra.

0632

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| Authority | VND 959503 |
| By | MV NARA Date 10/5/05 |

CARE

Provided \$153,260 worth of food, soap, and medical supplies, also a cash grant of \$35,607 for local purchase of food.

Catholic Relief Services - USCC

Has shipped from their own resources (excluding USG, PL 480 commodities) 697 tons of food, medicine, and clothing valued at \$1,001,383 for relief in Biafra; and 78 tons of supplies valued at \$161,901 to Lagos for FMG area. Provided equipment for use on Sao Tome Island to improve airlift capability. Medical teams serving in Abakaliki, Afikpo, Obubra, and Obudu. Also contributed \$5,000 to ICRC.

Church World Service

Shipped 553 tons of blankets, food, and medical supplies valued at \$837,385. Also contributed \$160,235 in cash for emergency relief, which does not include cash donations by other voluntary agencies through CWS. A seven-man medical team is working at Enugu in Cooperation with ICRC.

Community Development Foundation

Has sent a representative to Lagos to help with food distribution and to begin training program for African workers in community development techniques. As of October 31, CDF had collected \$55,000 for use in Nigeria/Biafra program, including proposed program of Save the Children Federation.

International Rescue Committee

Contributed \$60,000 worth of donated drugs for November 6 flight to Biafra by Abie Nathan.

Lutheran World Relief

Cooperating with CRS and CWS, has shipped 60 tons of supplies valued at \$337,775, also contributed \$25,000 cash for charter airlift program.


Lutheran Church--Missouri Synod

Providing two medical teams totalling nine persons for work in Eastern Nigeria, also Dr. W. F. Bulle serves as ICRC's chief field coordinator-heading the general relief commissariat. Has provided \$15,000 for medicines, airplane charter, and two trucks.

Mennonite Central Committee

Contributed \$10,000 to CWS for airlift of relief supplies to Biafra, provided two registered nurses working with CWS team in Enugu.

0633



Seventh-Day Adventist Welfare Service

Shipped through CWS approximately \$100,000 worth of donated medical supplies.

U. S. Committee for UNICEF

Has raised \$426,000 for UNICEF relief program.

Other voluntary agencies with emergency relief programs are listed here:

Albert Schweitzer Fellowship, Biafra Association in the Americas, Church of the Brethren, Committee for Nigeria/Biafra Relief, Direct Relief Foundation, Hadassah, IOS Foundation, Meals for Millions Foundation, Salvation Army, Tennessee Relief for Biafran Children, Wheat Ridge Foundation, YMCA-International Committee.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS*

Church-Related Groups

In April 1968, Caritas International and the World Council of Churches initiated an international relief effort to take food and medical supplies into Biafra. In June, working through several agencies, an airlift from the Portugese island of Sao Tome, about 200 miles south of Biafra in the Gulf of Guinea, was set up. Into this effort have been drawn Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish organizations under the new designation of Joint Church Group.

Several Scandinavian organizations formed NORDCHURCHAID which joined with other voluntary agencies to establish the Committee of International Church Relief Organizations which is operating the airlift from Sao Tome to Biafra. In addition to Scandinavian countries, German, Dutch, Finnish and U. S. church groups are participating. The first NORDCHURCHAID airlift began in August.

As of October 30, a total of 500 flights had been made under the auspices of the Committee. Approximately 9 tons were carried each flight for a total of about 3,500 to 4,000 tons delivered into Biafra. By October, the Catholic and Protestant food distribution feeding centers in Biafra were providing more than 400,000 meals per day.

*From these sources have come substantial contributions of supplies, cash, equipment, medical and relief teams and airlift capability (see Table II.)

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| By | MV NARA Date 10/5/05 |

UNICEF

UNICEF has allocated funds to be used both in FMG and Biafra to provide medical supplies, food, vehicles, and several specialists. In addition, UNICEF has chartered helicopters for airlift operations in the Calabar-Uyo areas. Also UNICEF is arranging for delivery of some \$9 million worth of food, medical supplies being provided by the USG and other nations to both sides.

TOTAL RELIEF ASSISTANCE

Following is a summary of all reported assistance as of October 31, 1968 and a more detailed record, listing U. S. voluntary agencies and other nations contributing.

According to reports that have been obtained by AID/DRC, there has been a minimum of 11,244 tons of food and medical supplies shipped for Biafra through October 31; and 19,361 tons to Lagos, from all sources. In addition, the U. S. Government has approved 36,037 metric tons of food which have not yet been shipped. ICRC has a total of 8,926 tons of supplies (including local food purchases) stockpiled at Lagos, Enugu, Calabar, Uyo and Agbor. ICRC also has 2,827 tons at Santa Isabel for airlift to Biafra. The church groups have approximately 3,000 tons stockpiled at Sao Tome for airlift into Biafra. Below is a breakdown on supplies giving source and values, plus other contributions. For more detail on these items see narrative portions of this memo and Tables I and II attached.


0635

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| Authority | VND 959503 |
| By | MMARA Date 10/5/05 |

| | Tons Supplies Shipped | | Value of Supplies & Cash Donations |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------------------|--------|---------------------------------------|
| | Biafra | Lagos | |
| <u>U. S. Government</u> | | | |
| P.L. 480 food already shipped | 2,215 | 12,748 | \$ 5,701,760 |
| P.L. 480 food approved but not yet scheduled for shipment - 36,037 tons | | | 7,000,000 |
| Cash donations to ICRC | | | 3,600,000 |
| USAID/Nigeria Mission Allotments for Logistic Support and Relief Operations | | | 600,000 |
| | | | <u>16,901,760*</u> |
| <u>U. S. Voluntary Agencies</u> | | | |
| Food, medical supplies, already shipped | 719 | 840 | 3,039,593 |
| Cash donations to ICRC | | | 20,125 |
| Other cash donations & funding levels established for relief operations | | | 1,085,842 |
| | | | <u>4,145,560</u> |
| Total Commitments from U. S. | 2,934 | 13,588 | \$ 21,047,320 |
| <u>Other Nations</u> | | | |
| 9,413 tons food & supplies announced of which shipments already made | 4,303 | 4,986 | 3,963,280 |
| Cash to ICRC | | | 1,633,560 |
| Other cash donations & funding levels established for relief pro- grams | | | 2,848,800 |
| | | | <u>8,445,640</u> |
| <u>UNICEF</u> | | | |
| Food & supplies shipped | 226 | 787 | 416,482 |
| Cash to ICRC | | | 110,000 |
| Other cash donations & funding levels established for relief pro- grams | | | 700,000 |
| | | | <u>1,226,482</u> |
| <u>International Organizations</u> | | | |
| Food & supplies shipped (value these included above) | 3,781 | | 1,382,000 |
| Expenditures for Airlift | | | |
| GRAND TOTALS | 11,244 | 19,361 | \$ 32,101,442 |

*Excludes \$3.0 million provided for support FMG relief/rehabilitation programs

0636



REPORTED CONTRIBUTIONS TO NIGERIA RELIEF OPERATIONS FROM ALL SOURCES

Table II

| Announced | Tons of Supplies Already Shipped | | Shipping & Value Total Announced Tonnage | Cash to ICRC | Other Cash Donations or Funding Levels | Total Contributions |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------|---------------------------------------------------|------------------|-------------------------------------------------|------------------------|
| | S. Isabel | Lagos | | | | |
| U. S. Government * | | | | | | |
| P. L. 480 Food through CRS | None | 6,761 | \$1,752,081 | | | \$ 1,752,081 |
| P. L. 480 Food through UNICEF | 2,215 | 5,987** | 3,567,780 | | | 3,567,780 |
| Surface shipping costs for CRS | | | 381,900 | | | 381,900 |
| P. L. 480 food, other supplies | | | | | | |
| Airlift costs \$346,741 for ship- ment supplies by CRS, CWS and CAFE included Mission Allotment level below. | | | | | | |
| Cash to ICRC | | | | \$3,600,000 | | 3,600,000 |
| Allotments to U. S. Mission for relief operations and assist volags with air transport charges | | | | | \$600,000 | 600,000 |
| TOTAL USG ASSISTANCE DELIVERED | 2,215 | 12,748 | 5,701,760 | 3,600,000 | 600,000 | 9,901,760 |
| * In addition the USG has allocated to CRS, CWS and UNICEF 36,037 metric tons of P. L. 480 commodities not yet shipped valued at \$7 million | | | | | | |
| ** Part of a recent 2700 ton shipment may be delivered to Santa Isabel but are presently all placed under Lagos | | | | | | |
| U. S. Voluntary Agencies from own resources: | | | | | | |
| Catholic Relief Services | 697 | 78 | 1,163,284 | 5,000 | | 1,168,284 |
| Church World Service | 22 | 531 | 837,385 | | 160,235 | 997,620 |
| Lutheran World Relief | | 60 | 337,775 | | 25,000 | 362,775 |
| American Friends Service Committee | | | | | 105,000 | 105,000 |
| American Red Cross | | 7 | 182,889 | 15,125 | | 198,014 |

0637

page 2 - Table II

| | Tons of Supplies | | Shipping & Value Total Announced Tonnage | Cash to ICRC | Other Cash Donations or Funding Levels | Total Contributions |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------------------------|------------------------|
| | Announced | Already Shipped S. Isabel S. Tome Lagos | | | | |
| U. S. Volags (Cont'd) | | | | | | |
| Mennonite Central Committee | | | | | \$ 10,000 | \$ 10,000 |
| CAFE | | 164 | \$ 153,260 | | 35,607 | 188,867 |
| American Committee to Keep Biafra Alive | | | | | 20,000 | 20,000 |
| Save the Children Fund, NY | | | | | 1,000 | 1,000 |
| American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee thru CRS and CWS | | | | | 100,000 | 100,000 |
| Biafra Relief Services Foundation | | | | | 88,000 | 88,000 |
| B'Nai B'rith Foundation of US | | ? | 250,000 | | | 250,000 |
| Community Development Foundation | | | | | 55,000 | 55,000 |
| International Rescue Committee | | ? | | | 60,000 | 60,000 |
| Seventh Day Adventist Welfare Service - through CWS | | ? | 100,000 | | | 100,000 |
| Lutheran Church - Missouri Synod - supplies and vehicles support 2 medical teams | | | 15,000 | | | 15,000 |
| U. S. Committee for UNICEF | | | | | 426,000 | 426,000 |
| TOTAL VOLAG ASSISTANCE | 719 | 840 | \$3,039,593 | \$ 20,125 | \$1,085,842 | \$4,145,560 |

0638

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page 3 - Table II

| | Tons of Supplies | | | Value Total Announced Tonnage | Cash to ICRC | Other Cash Donations or Funding Levels | Total Contributions |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------------------|-------|-------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------------------------|------------------------|
| | Announced | Already Shipped S. Isabel S. Tome | Lagos | | | | |
| Other Nations | | | | | | | |
| Australia Govt. & Red Cross | 3,000 | | 3000 | 250,000 | 40,600 | | 290,600 |
| Canada Govt., RC & OXFAM | 3,166 | 1340 | 1826 | 1,018,520 | 172,600 | | 1,191,120 |
| Germany Govt. & RC to ICRC | 66 | | 51 | 223,100 | 86,800 | | 309,900 |
| Germany RC, Diaconical Werk of Protestant Churches and Caritas Germany--direct shipment by sea West Coast Africa (as of August 2, 1968 | 600 | 600 | | 625,000 | | | 625,000 |
| Ireland Red Cross | 586 | 585 | 1 | 151,810 | 36,530 | | 188,340 |
| Iceland RC (Value est. by DRC) | 154 | 84 | 70 | 115,000 | | | 115,000 |
| Italy (to ICRC and UNICEF) | | | | | 344,000 | 241,000 | 585,000 |
| Finland Govt. & RC | 12 | 11 | 1/2 | 10,050 | 73,900 | | 83,950 |
| Netherlands RC | 511 | 500 | 11 | 78,190 | 17,200 | | 95,390 |
| Sweden Govt. & RC to ICRC | | | | | 66,800 | | 66,800 |
| Sweden Govt., Lutheran Aid, and Save The Children Fund - Funding levels for relief programs | | | | | | 1,970,000 | 1,970,000 |
| Switzerland Govt & RC | 101 | 83 | | 50,580 | 137,900 | | 188,480 |
| United Kingdom RC & OXFAM to ICRC | 1,113 | 1,044 | 22 | 408,040 | 55,000 | | 463,040 |
| UK Govt., RC & OXFAM (includes purchase of vehicles, medical teams and money set aside for re- construction and rehabilitation | ? | | | 839,990 | | 637,800 | 1,477,790 |
| Contributions by 27 other Countries | 74 | 26 | 4 | 159,060 | 412,080 | | 571,140 |
| Private Contributions | 30 | 30 | | 33,940 | 190,150 | | 224,090 |
| TOTALS FOR OTHER NATIONS | 9,413 | 4,303 | 4986 | \$3,963,280 | \$1,633,560 | \$ 2,848,800 | \$8,445,640 |

0639

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority: VND 959503
 By: MVA Date: 10/5/05

page 4 - Table II

| Announced | Tons of Supplies Already Shipped | | Value Total Announced Tonnage | Cash to ICRC | Other Cash Donations or Funding Levels | Total Contributions |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------|-------------------------------------|--------------|-------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| | S. Isabel S. Tome | Lagos | | | | |
| UNICEF (non PL 480 food, other supplies Donation to ICRC UNICEF announced allocation for funds to be used for both FFG and Biafra to provide medical supplies, food, vehicles, specialized personnel and helicopter and other transport. (This does not include the \$9 million in supplies from USG and other countries for which UNICEF is arranging or has made shipment. Credit for this is given under appropriate country. Another \$1.5 million is up for UNICEF Board approval, but is not credited here. | 226 | 787 | \$ 416,482 | \$ 110,000 | \$ 700,000 | \$ 416,482 110,000 700,000 |
| TOTAL FOR UNICEF | 226 | 787 | 416,482 | 110,000 | \$ 700,000 | \$1,226,482 |
| International Organizations primarily involved in airlift supplies to Biafra: | | | | | | |
| NORDCHURCH AID - This is a Scandinavian sponsored relief program to airlift supplies from Sao Tome to Biafra. It is being supported by Scandinavian, German, Dutch, English and US churches. NORDCHURCH AID indicated the follow- ing logistical expenses: Airlift operations - Sept. \$370,000 Airlift operations - Oct. 360,000 Radio, airport & handling 25,000 755,000 Subtract from this the CMS contribution for this air- lift already credited under US volag section above. -125,000 630,000 | | | | | 630,000 | 630,000 |

0640

17

| | Tons of Supplies | | Value Total Announced Tonnage | Cash to ICRC | Other Cash Donations or Funding Levels | Total Contributions |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------------------------------|------------------------|
| | Announced | Already Shipped S. Isabel S. Tome Lagos | | | | |
| Caritas, International - paid out for charter airlifts from Sao Tome to Biafra as of 6/25/68. | | | | | \$ 400,000 | \$ 400,000 |
| World Council of Churches - amount used here is just the cash pledged for Biafra relief operations. Although WCC has had contribu- tions from member Protestant churches of \$3 million in supplies and \$800,000 in case, there is no way from present records to break out what has already been reported under Other Nations and US volags, so these figures are not being used—just the cash amount pledged for airlift operations. | | | | | 352,000 | 352,000 |
| In connection with the above airlifts by NORDCHURCHMAID, WCC and Caritas (Caritas flights started in April and NORDCHURCHMAID in August), there have been 500 flights averaging 9 tons per flight for an approximate total of 4,500 tons through 10/31/68. From this we have subtracted the above 719 provided to Biafraby CWS and CRS under US volags for balance of No value has been given to this since it is not known how much of it has already been credited under Other Nations and Organizations. | 3,781 | | | | | |
| TOTALS FOR INTERNATIONAL CHURCH ORGANIZATIONS FOR BIAFRA | 3,781 | | | | \$1,382,000 | \$1,382,000 |
| GRAND TOTALS - KNOWN CONTRIBUTIONS (USG, US Volags, Other Nations and International Organizations | 11,244 | 19,361 | \$13,121,115 | \$5,363,685 | \$6,616,642 | \$25,101,442 |

0641



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

Beafrapelle
12/4/08

IN REPLY REFER TO:

MEMORANDUM TO THE UNDER SECRETARY

I. Unfinished Business

We need your approval on unfinished business stemming from last Friday's meeting (paper at Tab A).

1. To offer the Red Cross additional money (somewhere between \$1 and 4 million) to augment the present airlift to capacity short of introducing U.S. C-130s or getting major new concessions on relief from the FMG.

Yes _____

No _____

2. Begin to probe the Red Cross and the Feds to lay the groundwork for a major surface corridor from Port Harcourt.

Yes _____

No _____

3. A general publicity offensive, including high-level back-grounders, a major Presidential statement to be held in reserve, USIA and VOA action, and Congressional briefings.

Yes _____

No _____


II. Bureaucratic Tools

We would like your formal approval of a general policy guideline (details at Annex 1) which we can use with AID and other agencies as a mandate to muster the needed resources for the relief operation.

SECRET

Lot 70D 83
Box 2878

0642



SECRET

-2-

The USG will:

A. Assist in an international relief operation capable of supplying the essential food and other relief needs of as many victims of the war as can be reached.

B. Be prepared to provide a major portion of the financial and food requirements and assist in strengthening the relief operations of the ICRC, American Voluntary Agencies and Nigerian public and private organizations.

C. Assist the FMG in restoring normal economic life in the war torn areas as rapidly as possible in order to avoid prolongation of the relief operation.

Yes _____

No _____

Roy M. Melbourne
Roy M. Melbourne
Chairman, Nigeria Task Force

December 4, 1968

SECRET

0643

| | |
|--------------|----------------------|
| DECLASSIFIED | |
| Authority | VND 959503 |
| By | MV NARA Date 10/5/03 |

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET
Classification

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
193736

29 JUN 68 00 55z

Origin ACTION: Amembassy KAMPALA PRIORITY

Info: INFO: Amembassy LAGOS
Amembassy LONDON

STATE
LIMDIS

REF: Kinshasa 9970; Kampala 2460

1. Kampala Peace Talks. Kampala talks broke down May 31. May 30 and 31 had been devoted to separate meetings of both delegations with Arnold Smith, Obote and FonMin Odaka. Odaka failed find acceptable middle ground between Biafran demands for an immediate cease-fire and Enahoro's proposal of May 28. This last included cease-fire, rebel renunciation secession and acceptance 12-states 12 hours beforehand, disarmament rebels by mixed force foreign observers and FMG, amnesty to Biafrans leaders as appropriate, general amnesty to other rebels, non-discriminatory recruitment of Ibos into armed forces and police. FMG is believed have dropped 12-state requirement in view FMG control Rivers and Southeast States. Mbanefo May 31 press conference termed FMG cease-fire proposals "program of insulting arrangements for Biafran surrender." Although Federal spokesman said FMG was willing continue talking, Biafrans walked out. Dept thinks FMG demonstrated some flexibility at Kampala, while rebels almost completely intransigent on ~~Enahoro's~~ instructions.

③

Drafted by: DSmith: /km 6/28/68 2619 Ind. Ext. Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: AFW - Mr. Melbourne

Clearances:

AFI - Mr. Wagner (info) ~~XXXXXX~~
km

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8-65

0644

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 959503
By: MVA Date: 10/5/05

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy KAMPALA

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Classification

2. Period June 6-14 Enahoro and Mbanefo held separate talks in London with Commonwealth Secretariat (CS) and Commonwealth Office (CO). Lord Shepherd and Prime Minister Wilson stressed to Enahoro pressure on HMG for halt to arms and need for FMG to improve public image. Wilson said bluntly FMG should take initiative on cease-fire. Shepherd had two secret meetings with Mbanefo, who insisted no substantive negotiations with FMG possible before cease-fire and HMG must halt arms shipments. Mbanefo said following cease-fire Biafrans willing accept peace-keeping force of Scandinavians and Canadians, excluding Brits while arms shipments continue.

3. HMG sent Shepherd, two CO officials to Lagos June 20-24. Shepherd in three meetings with Gowon said HMG arms policy unchanged but public and parliamentary pressure increasing. In British view this constituted "near warning" to FMG strong enough to serve as base for change in policy if events warrant. On return London Shepherd reported to have said HMG view on arms supply might change if war led to "unnecessary loss of life", but he satisfied Gowon wished avoid this.

4. FMG accepted UK suggestion "informal and confidential" talks with Biafrans in London serviced by CS. If successful could lead to resumption substantive talks probably in Kampala or London. HMG not overly optimistic concerning likelihood informal London talks, fearing Mbanefo may be out of favor with Ojukwu and may not return to London to hear HMG latest suggestion. Shepherd gave Arnold Smith's suggestion that latter visit Biafra to persuade Ojukwu resume talks and agree receive relief supplies through Federal territory.

FORM DS-322A
8-63
CONTINUATION SHEET

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Authority VND959503
By MW NARA Date 10/5/05

Page 3 of telegram to Amembassy KAMPALA

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FMG preferred Smith wait until after projected OAU Consultative Committee meeting in Niamey in July. Shepherd could not persuade FMG unilaterally announce cease-fire without prior Biafran renunciation secession. FMG agreed to observer force to satisfy world that Biafrans not being slaughtered, but not to its interposition between hostile forces. Initial Biafran radio reaction to Gowon-Shepherd communique was critical but somewhat mild.

5. Military Situation. FMG captured Awgu, important Biafran military site south of Enugu June 15. Rebel arms shortages believed near critical stage. FMG apparently refraining from concentrated effort to penetrate Ibo heartland while continuing logistic buildup. Seeking improve reputation for discipline, FMG publicized June 27 execution two officers implicated murder civilians near Asaba. Recently no Biafran complaints about FMG bombings in East.

6. US Relief Activities. Participating in ICRC coordinated efforts. Contribution announced June 21 of \$100,000 from AID disaster relief funds to ICRC through ARC. Airlifting by USAF plane and USG-chartered plane more than 68 tons food and medical supplies to Lagos. \$100,000 in contingency funds made available to AID/N. AID purchases include four trucks for internal distribution. \$1.1 million in emergency PL480 food aid. \$1.7^{million} provided by private US sources through volags.

7. ICRC/Geneva instructed Jaggi, its representative in Biafra, to attempt persuade Ojukwu permit land corridor through FMG territory for passage relief supplies. June 25 Radio Biafra said one airport had been designated for receipt relief supplies. Implication airport to be used for civilian purposes only and

FORM DS-322A
8-63
CONTINUATION SHEET

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MW NARA Date 10/5/05

Page 4 of telegram to Amembassy KAMPALA

SECRET
Classification

only in daytime. Shepherd had urged FMG to permit such flights during his visit. Federal officials have indicated informal agreement. ICRC reportedly scheduled to begin on June 26 nightly flight for five nights Fernando Po to Biafra carrying relief supplies.

8. Domestic Politics. Inua Wada and associates believed responsible for instigation anti-Yoruba incidents Kano State June 10-19 by means of handbills threatening Yoruba community. Kano Milgov brought situation under control by arrests and aggressive police patrolling. Western Milgov Adebayo announced as visiting Kaduna July 1-2 meet Northern milgovs on "Coexistence between ethnic groups" West and North.

9. Foreign Relations. No strong indications of further recognitions of Biafra since break-up Kampala talks. Unless circumstances change appears unlikely Senegal or Tunisia prepared to recognize.

10. Radio Biafra probably instigated by Information Commissioner Eke, has recently attacked US ~~xxx~~ and American officials for "complete support of Nigeria's genocide" of the Biafrans.

11. Supplement to talking points pouched Kampala and Lagos May 28 in Septel.

END

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FORM DS-322A
8-63
CONTINUATION SHEET

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Classification

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MWA Date 10/5/05

⑪

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

SECRET
Classification

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA

193735

29 JUN 68 00 55Z

FOR OC/T USE ONLY

Origin ACTION: Amembassy KAMPALA PRIORITY

Info: INFO Amembassy LAGOS

STATE

LIMDIS

POL 27 BIAFRA-NIGERIA
XORG 7 AF

REF: Kinshasa 9970 and Kampala 2460.

Following talking points supplement comprehensive suggestions pouched
Kampala and Lagos May 28:

1. Peace negotiations. We have received reports that FMG might be willing
agree to modify 12-state structure, probably towards greater number of
states, if needed as concession Biafra. Some FMG officials have also
intimated FMG would be willing agree any face-saving measures ~~which~~ which
would enable Biafrans ~~to~~ renounce secession gracefully. You might wish
draw out FMG further and encourage these tendencies. At same time, you
could express gratification at continued FMG willingness negotiate at
London or Kampala and decision of FMG permit observer force. Since ~~Qjukwu~~
is intransigent ~~point~~ point on Biafra side, you might ask Gowon's views
~~acquiescence~~ on some figure active in peaceseeing, such as Arnold Smith,
personally visiting him. You might ~~xxx~~ review in general terms our efforts
encourage states recognizing secessionist regime to induce Biafrans
resume negotiations.

DECLASSIFIED BY 101

②

Drafted by: *akt* 6/28/68 Tel. Ext. 2619 Telegraphic transmission and
AFW/AMHardy:pk classification approved by: AFW - R. M. Melbourne *Rm*

Clearances:

AF - T. H.E. Quimby (subs) *Rm*

AFI - J. Wagner (subs) *info akt*

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8-65 DS-322

0648

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Authority: VND 959503
By: MVA Date: 10/5/03

Page 2 of telegram to Amembassy ~~KAMXXX~~ KAMPATA

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2. Relief. You could express gratification FMG cooperation with ICRC and NRC, re-emphasizing our desire assist all Nigerians in distress and pointing out desirability maximum Nigerian self-help including use FMG resources.
3. In view problems Yorubas face in Kano, it might be useful to discuss measures FMG contemplating to ensure security of non-indigenous peoples in various states.
4. You could raise question of bombing civilians in light recent absence of reports of such bombing.
5. On Conte-Long, hope that discussion will not be necessary other than in atmosphere of mutual understanding. Ambassador told Gowon June 7 of US decision deobligate \$1.8 million from Port Harcourt-~~Unuzuela~~ Road Loan. Gowon regretted but said he did not wish matter become irritant US-FMG relations. Awolowo also calm when informed later by Ambassador.
- X 6. Summary of developments septel.

END

RUSK

FORM DS-322A
8-63
CONTINUATION SHEET

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Authority VND 959503
By MVA Date 10/3/05



Pol/27 Biafra-Nigeria
 Department of State **TELEGRAM**

Q ORG 7 AF (50)

SECRET 037

PAGE 01 KINSHA 09970 260309Z

21
 ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, NSA 02, IO 13, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SPI 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SAH 02, RSR 01, AID 28,

SRI 01, ORM 03, PC 04, /149 W

R 231930Z JUN 68
 FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8281
 INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN
 AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
 AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
 AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE
 AMEMBASSY LAGOS
 AMEMBASSY LONDON
 AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
 AMEMBASSY NIAMEY

SECRET KINSHASA 9970

FROM PALMER

1. AFTER DINNER LAST EVENING IN MOANDA, GABON, I DISCUSSED NIGERIAN SITUATION FOR ABOUT AN HOUR WITH MALEKOU. I EXPLAINED BACKGROUND OF U.S. POLICY AND POSTURE RE CURRENT CIVIL WAR, EMPHASIZING OUR STRONG HOPE FOR PEACEFUL SOLUTION WHICH WOULD PRESERVE UNITY NIGERIA AND AT SAME TIME MINIMIZE POSSIBILITY EXCESSES AGAINST IBOS. I POINTED OUT GENERALLY STRONG MILITARY POSTURE OF FMG AND FACT THAT, AS WE READ KAMPALA TALKS, PRACTICALLY ALL SIGNIFICANT CONCESSIONS SEEM TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY FMG. I SAID IT SEEMED IMPORTANT TO ME THAT EVERYONE SHOULD REALIZE FMG HAS ITS HAWKS AND DOVES AND THAT I THOUGHT INDICATIONS WERE THAT GOWON WISHED AVOID MILITARY SOLUTION. HOWEVER I DOUBTED VERY MUCH THAT FMG PREPARED CONCEDE CENTRAL POINT THAT BIAFRA MUST, THROUGH WHATEVER FORMULATION, GIVE UP SECESSION BEFORE CEASEFIRE COULD BECOME EFFECTIVE. THUS, SEEMED TO ME THAT KEY TO FUTURE PROGRESS IS MORE REALISTIC BIAFRAN

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 Authority VND959503
 By MM NARA Date 10/5/05



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 KINSHA 09970 260309Z


POSITION WITH RESPECT THIS CENTRAL POINT. I CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT WHATEVER TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS WHICH MOTIVATED GABON AND OTHER THREE COUNTRIES TO RECOGNIZE BIAFRA, I THOUGHT THEIR ACTIONS HAD HAD EFFECT OF HARDENING BIAFRAN ATTITUDES AND ENCOURAGING THEM IN UNREALISTIC BELIEF THEY CAN STILL ACHIEVE DIPLOMATICALLY WHAT THEY HAVE FAILED TO ACHIEVE MILITARILY. THIS SEEMED TO ME TO PLACE HEAVY OBLIGATION THOSE COUNTRIES PERSUADE BIAFRA TO FACE UP REALISTICALLY TO ITS TRUE SITUATION.


2. MALAKOU EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR MY ANALYSIS. HE SAID THAT OUR POSITION COINCIDED WITH THAT OF MOST OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRIES, ADDING THAT OUR MUTUAL OBJECTIVES WERE ESSENTIALLY THE SAME. GABON DOES NOT WISH SEE FRACTIONALIZATION OF NIGERIA OR ANY OTHER AFRICAN COUNTRY. PROBLEM IS ONE OF EXCESSIVE KILLINGS OF AFRICANS BY AFRICANS. GABON COULD NOT ACCEPT FMG POSITION THAT THIS ESSENTIALLY AN INTERNAL NIGERIAN MATTER WHICH REST OF AFRICA SHOULD KEEP OUT OF. GABON HAD THEREFORE DECIDED APPLY SHOCK TREATMENT TO AFRICANIZE PROBLEM. HE RECOGNIZED THAT POSSIBLE SIDE EFFECT THIS STRONG ACTION MIGHT WELL BE TO ENCOURAGE THE BIAFRANS ALONG UNREALISTIC LINE SUCH AS I HAD SUGGESTED. AT SAME TIME IT MIGHT PROVIDE GABON AND OTHER LIKE-MINDED STATES WITH SUFFICIENT CREDIBILITY IN BIAFRA TO ENCOURAGE LATTER TO BE REALISTIC AS I HAD SUGGESTED. HE ALSO CONCURRED STATEMENT I HAD MADE EARLIER THAT TASK OF AFRICAN STATES SHOULD BE THAT OF MAKING CRYSTAL CLEAR TO FMG THAT REST OF AFRICA IS HOLDING FMG RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMANITARIAN TREATMENT OF IBOS AND FOR AGREEING TO EFFECTIVE OBSERVER FORCE TO ASSURE SUCH TREATMENT AT SUCH TIME AS CEASEFIRE ARRIVED. HE SAID HE WAS SYMPATHETIC TO MY SUGGESTIONS AND WOULD DISCUSS THEM WITH BONGO IN EFFORT BE HELPFUL. EMPHASIZED HOWEVER THAT IMPORTANT THING IS TO STOP FIGHTING. HE HOPED WE WOULD ALSO WORK ALONG SIMILAR LINES ON IVORY COAST, TANZANIA AND ZAMBIA AND THAT MEAN WHILE WE WOULD USE OUR INFLUENCE IN LAGOS TO ENCOURAGE MAXIMUM POSSIBILITY FLEXIBILITY BY FMG.

3. COMMENT: I DON'T KNOW WHAT, IF ANYTHING, WILL COME OF THIS AND I DON'T SUPPOSE THAT GABON CARRIES MUCH

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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
PAGE 03 KINSHA 09970 260309Z

MORE WEIGHT IN ABA THAN IT DOES IN LAGOS. AT SAME TIME, CONVERSATION MAY BE OF SOME MARGINAL ASSISTANCE. WHILE SIMILAR APPROACH ABIDJAN BY AMB, MORGAN HAS NOT BORNE MUCH FRUIT. IT WAS APPARENT FROM MY TALK WITH DIORI THAT HE IS WORKING ALONG SAME LINES WITH HOUPHET. GIVEN PRESENT STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS, I WONDER WHETHER THERE WOULD BE MERIT IN OUR HAVING FRANK DISCUSSIONS WITH NYEREIE AND KAUNDA ALONG SIMILAR LINES TO FOREGOING. I WOULD ALSO PROPOSE ENCOURAGE OBOTE TO TAKE SIMILAR LINE WITH THESE TWO COUNTRIES IF I SEE EITHER HIM OR ODAKA WHEN I TRANSIT KAMPALA.

4. SINCE I AM HAVING DIFFICULTY IN FOLLOWING NIGERIAN SITUATION AS CLOSELY AS I WOULD OTHERWISE LIKE, I HOPE DEPARTMENT WILL TELEGRAPH TO ME IN KAMPALA A FAIRLY COMPREHENSIVE SUMMARY OF EVENTS SINCE MY DEPARTURE, AS WELL AS PROPOSED TALKING POINTS FOR MY USE IN LAGOS. MCGUIRE

SECRET

0652





59 *Col 27 Biafra - Nigeria*
Department of State

TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL 090

PAGE 01 LONDON 10020 181530Z

43
ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03, NSAE 00, NSC 10,

P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, RSR 01, SA 01, SAH 02, ACDA 16,

IO 13, MC 01, AID 28, /157 W

P 181550Z JUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4252
INFO AMEMBASSY LAGOS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 10020

NOFORN

YAOUNDE FOR PALMER

REF: LONDON 10019.

FOL IS TEXT DRAFT PAPER PROVIDED US BY COMMONWEALTH OFFICE:

" POSSIBLE POINTS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE CONDITIONS FOR
ENDING HOSTILITIES IN NIGERIA WITH VIEW TO REMOVING MUTUAL
DISTRUST AND CREATING CONDITIONS FOR THE NEGOTIATION OF A
LASTING SETTLEMENT. N. B. THESE IDEAS ARE STRICTLY EXPLORA-
TORY AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ANY POLITICAL CONDITIONS WHICH
MIGHT BE NEGOTIATED AS PART OF ENDING OF
HOSTILITIES.

1. THE ESTABLISHMENT FOLLOWING A CEASE-FIRE OF A 'NO-MAN'S
LAND' BETWEEN THE OPPOSING FORCES WITH A VIEW TO FACILITA-
TING A RETURN TO NORMAL CIVILIAN LIFE WITHOUT RISK OF IN-
CIDENTS ARISING BETWEEN CIVILIANS AND TROOPS.

2. THE STATIONING OF AN OUTSIDE FORCE TO PRESERVE LAW AND
ORDER IN THIS 'NO-MAN'S LAND'.

3. AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN BOTH SIDES TO CEASE FURTHER

CONFIDENTIAL

*London 10020
6-18-68*

RECORDED BY 153

0653

DECLASSIFIED
Authority VND 959503
By MN NARA Date 10/5/05



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LONDON 10020 181530Z


IMPORT OF WAR MATERIAL EXCEPT AS REQUIRED FOR PURELY INTERNAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.

4. THE INTRODUCTION OF AN OUTSIDE INSPECTION TEAM TO POLICE AGREEMENT IN PRECEDING PARAGRAPH AND TO PROVIDE A GUARANTEE AGAINST THE RE-GROUPING OF FORCES.

5. THE ASSOCIATION WITH THESE OUTSIDE FORCES OF AN OUTSIDE POLITICAL PERSONALITY WHOSE SERVICES WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO HELP IN NEGOTIATING OF A LASTING SETTLEMENT." BRUCE

CONFIDENTIAL

0654





59 Tol 27 Biafra Nigeria
Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 088

PAGE 01 LONDON 10019 181600Z

54
ACTION AF 15

INFO EUR 15, IO 13, ACDA 16, CIAE 00, DODE 00, GPM 04, H 02, INR 07, L 03,

NSAE 00, NSC 10, P 04, RSC 01, SP 02, SS 20, USIA 12, SA 01, SAH 02,

RSR 01, MC 01, /129 W

P 181515Z JUN 68
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4251
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 10019

NOFORN

YAOUNDE FOR PALMER

SUB: LORD SHEPHERD TO VISIT LAGOS

REF: LONDON 9900


1. COMMONWEALTH OFFICE'S MOBERLY (WEST AND GENERAL AFRICAN DEPT) TELLS US THAT BRITISH GOVT HAS DECIDED TO SEND THREE-MAN MISSION, HEADED BY CO MINSTATE LORD SHEPHERD, TO LAGOS TO DISCUSS WITH GOWON AND OTHER RANKING MEMBERS FMG PROSPECTS FOR RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH BIAFRANS. SHEPHERD, ACCOMPANIED BY CO'S SIR LESLIE MONSON (DEPUTY UNDER SECY) AND DONALD TEBBIT (HEAD, WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA DEPT) EXPECT ARRIVE LAGOS THURSDAY MORNING, JUNE 20. THEY ARE WAITING FOR BRIT HICOMER HUNT TO CLEAR VISIT WITH FMG BEFORE MAKING PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT. SINCE SHEPHERD MUST BE BACK IN LONDON BY JUNE 24 VISIT WILL BE NO LONGER THAN 3-4 DAYS.

2. ONE OF PRINCIPAL REASONS FOR SHEPHERD'S TRIP IS TO DELIVER PRIMIN WILSON'S REPLY TO GOWON'S RECENT LETTER (REFTEL) AND TO REINFORCE PM'S ARGUMENTS. MOBERLY NOTED THAT GOWON'S LETTER TO WILSON WAS ALMOST ENTIRELY DEVOTED TO

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PAGE 02 LONDON 10019 181600Z

QUESTION OF ARMS SUPPLY AND CONTAINED PLEA FOR BRITISH NOT TO WAVER IN SUPPORT OF FMG. WILSON'S REPLY SAYS, IN EFFECT, "WE ARE DOING OUR BEST, BUT PRESSURE TO HALT SHIPMENTS INCREASES (AS ENAHORO CAN TESTIFY) AND YOU MUST HELP US BY MORE VIGOROUS EFFORT TO ACHIEVE NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT".

3. RE CEASE-FIRE, SHEPHERD WILL PUT STRONGLY TO FMG BRITISH VIEW THAT LAGOS HAS LITTLE TO LOSE BY OFFERING CEASE-FIRE SINCE, FROM THEIR OWN STATEMENTS, IT APPEARS FMG DOES NOT WISH TO PLUNGE INTO IBO HEARTLAND. HE WILL TRY TO CONVINCE GOWON THAT FMG SHOULD NOT HOLD OUT FOR IRON-CLAD RENUNCIATION OF SECESSION, BUT OUGHT TO BE WILLING ACCEPT AS BASIS FOR CEASE-FIRE AND NEW ROUND OF TALKS SOME OTHER, LESS SPECIFIC FORMULA. THIS MIGHT BE IBO STATEMENT THEY WERE WILLING TO WORK FOR CREATION NEW NIGERIAN UNION (AS PROPOSED BY ARNOLD SMITH AT KAMPALA), OR OTHER FORM OF VERBAL WINDOW-DRESSING.


4. SHEPHERD WILL ALSO REPORT TO GOWON ON HIS TALKS WITH MBANEFO. THESE, ACCORDING TO MOBERLY, DID NOT RESULT IN ANY SIGNIFICANT MOVEMENT ON BIAFRAN SIDE, ALTHOUGH THEY LEFT BRITISH WITH IMPRESSION SOMETHING MIGHT BE WORKED OUT IF FMG WAS MORE FORTHCOMING ON QUESTION OF IBO SECURITY. THUS, IN ADDITION TO PRESSING FOR CEASE-FIRE, SHEPHERD WILL URGE FMG TO BE FLEXIBLE ON QUESTIONS OF (A) PEACEKEEPING FORCE OR "OBSERVERS", (B) MUTUAL HALT (OR REDUCTION) IN IMPORT OF ARMS WHILE TALKS CONTINUE.

5. MOBERLY PROVIDED US, IN CONFIDENCE, WITH COPY OF STATEMENT DRAFTED BY CO SETTING FORTH "POSSIBLE POINTS TO BE INCLUDED IN CONDITIONS FOR ENDING HOSTILITIES IN NIGERIA". THESE "EXPLORATORY IDEAS" (ON PEACE FORCE AND RELATED SUBJECTS) HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED WITH MBANEFO AND WOULD ALSO BE TAKEN UP WITH GOWON, THOUGH PERHAPS NOT IN EXACTLY SAME FORM. (TEXT BEING TRANSMITTED SEPTEL.) MOBERLY WAS CAREFUL TO SAY MBANEFO HAD NEITHER ACCEPTED NOR REJECTED IDEAS CONTAINED IN PAPER.

6. COMMENT: GOVT IS STILL UNDER CONSIDERABLE PRESSURE TO SHOW THAT IT IS ACTIVELY PROMOTING RESUMPTION KAMPALA TALKS. THIS DOUBTLESS CONTRIBUTED TO DECISION TO SEND SHEPHERD TO LAGOS. MOBERLY SAID GOVT WAS ALSO CONSIDERING NEW AND PRESUMABLY LARGER DONATION TO BRITISH RED CROSS FOR RELIEF SUPPLIES AND PUBLIC INDICATION OF WILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN PEACE-KEEPING FORCE IF BOTH SIDES ACCEPTED IDEA AND OTHER

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
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CW COUNTRIES ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO FORCE.

7. MOBERLY ALSO VOLUNTEERED THAT ENAHORO HAD SPOKEN OF GOING TO US AFTER PLANNED VISIT TO GENEVA. BRITS GATHERED THIS WOULD BE JUNE 20-21. ENAHORO HAD NOT TOLD THEM PURPOSE OF VISIT AND WE TOLD MOBERLY THIS WAS FIRST WE HAD HEARD OF IT.
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SUBJ: LONDON PRESS COMMENT ON LORD SHEPHERD'S MEETING WITH
SIR LOUIS MBANEFO

1. MOST LONDON PAPERS THIS MORNING (JUNE 11) REPORT THAT "SECRET" TALKS WERE SCHEDULED TAKE PLACE LAST NIGHT BETWEEN COMMONWEALTH MINSTATE LORD SHEPHERD AND BIAFRAN REP. SIR LOUIS MBANEFO. PRESS ASSOCIATION (REUTER) TICKER ITEM, WHICH IS CHARACTERISTIC OF GENERAL COVERAGE, REPORTS STORY AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE. "SECRET TALKS ARE TAKING PLACE IN LONDON TONIGHT BETWEEN LORD SHEPHERD, MINSTATE FOR COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS, AND SIR LOUIS MBANEFO, REPRESENTATIVE OF THE BREAKAWAY BIAFRAN REGIME IN THE RECENT ABORTIVE NIGERIAN PEACE TALKS. IT WAS HOPED THAT THIS INITIAL ENCOUNTER BETWEEN A MEMBER OF THE BRITISH GOVT AND THE BIAFRANS WOULD LEAD TO A SERIES OF MEETINGS AT WHICH WAYS AND MEANS COULD BE EXPLORED OF BRINGING TWO SIDES IN NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR BACK TO CONFERENCE TABLE," WRITES A DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT. NEW TALKS DO NOT REPRESENT A FRESH INITIATIVE BY BRITISH GOVT, BUT ARE TAKING PLACE UNDER AUSPICES OF COMMONWEALTH SECY-GEN'L. MR. ARNOLD SMITH. MOVE WAS IN NO WAY A RECOGNITION BY BRITAIN OF BIAFRAN GOVT. NOR DID IT MEAN THAT INITIATIVE WAS BEING TAKEN AWAY FROM MR. SMITH, WHO HAS ALREADY PLAYED LEADING PART IN TRYING TO BRING PEACE

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TO NIGERIA. BRITISH GOVT HAVE PLACED, AND CONTINUE TO PLACE
UTMOST CONFIDENCE IN MR. SMITH. NEW TALKS FOLLOW RECENT
BREAKDOWN IN KAMPALA, UGANDA, OF PEACE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN
REPRESENTATIVES OF TWO SIDES LED BY CHIEF ENAHORO, FOR NIGERIAN
FEDERAL GOVT, AND SIR LOUIS MBANEFO FOR BREAKAWAY BIAFRAN
REGIME. BOTH ARE AT PRESENT IN LONDON WHERE THEY HAD
PRELIMINARY TALKS LAST MONTH UNDER MR. SMITH'S CHAIRMANSHIP.
WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF BOTH SIDES BACK IN LONDON AFTER
KAMPALA BREAKDOWN, BRITISH GOVT FELT IT WOULD BE WRONG FOR
THEM NOT TO MAKE SOME EFFORT TO BRING FEDERAL AND BIAFRAN
DELEGATES BACK TO CONFERENCE TABLE. IT IS KNOWN THAT LORD
SHEPHERD MET CHIEF ENAHORO ON FRIDAY. CHIEF FEDERAL
REPRESENTATIVE WAS NOT ATTENDING TONIGHT'S TALKS, BUT
HE KNEW THAT MEETING WAS TAKING PLACE. LORD SHEPHERD
HAD NOT MET SIR LOUIS MBANEFO BEFORE. IT WAS EXPECTED
TO BE VERY MUCH A CASE OF "PLAYING BY EAR IN A VERY
DENSE FOG". HOPE WAS THAT BOTH SIDES WOULD RECOGNISE THAT
THERE WAS NO MILITARY SOLUTION TO WAR. VENUE OF TONIGHT'S
TALKS WAS NOT DISCLOSED. IDEA WAS THAT THEY SHOULD BE
INFORMAL AND EXPLORATORY, AIMED AT FINDING A WAY TO BRING
BOTH SIDES BACK TO CONFERENCE TABLE. THEY WERE NOT AIMED
AT SEEKING FINAL SOLUTION OF PROBLEM. BRITISH GOVT IS UNDER
CONSIDERABLE CRITICISM FOR CONTINUING SUPPLY OF ARMS TO
NIGERIAN GOVT. FEELING IN WHITEHALL IS THAT BRITAIN, ONCE CIVIL
WAR HAD BROKEN OUT, HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO SUPPORT LEGAL
AND RECOGNIZED GOVERNMENT OF NIGERIA. A VERY CAREFUL
GOVERNMENTAL EYE HAS BEEN KEPT ON QUANTITIES AND TYPES OF
EQUIPMENT AND ARMS BEING SENT TO NIGERIA AND THIS WATCH WILL
BE CONTINUED. END QUOTE.

2. THIS MORNING'S GUARDIAN CARRIES SIMILAR STORY AND
ADDS THAT BRITISH GOVT HAS THREE OBJECTIVES IN PRESENT
SITUATION: (A) TO GET AGREEMENT ON CEASE FIRE, (B) TO
HELP RESTORE CONFIDENCE AMONG NIGERIANS IN ALL PARTS OF
THEIR COUNTRY, AND (C) TO GIVE BIAFRA "A ROLE AND A
FUTURE" ALTHOUGH THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION OF BIAFRA
SECEDING AND FORMING SEPARATE STATE. PAPER ALSO COMMENTS
THAT SHEPHERD'S MEETING WITH SIR LOUIS IS INFORMAL AND
IMPLIES NO RECOGNITION BY BRITAIN OF BIAFRAN REGIME.
TELEGRAPH, QUOTING WHITEHALL SOURCES WHO EMPHASIZED MEETING
WAS "INFORMAL AND EXPLORATORY" CALLED BRITISH MOVE "DISTINCT
CHANGE OF POLICY" MOTIVATED BY GOVERNMENT'S KEEN DESIRE TO

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SUBJ: NIGERIAN PEACE TALKS

1. COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT'S ADU (DEPUTY SYG), WHO RETURNED LONDON JUNE 3, HAS GIVEN US HIS IMPRESSIONS OF KAMPALA PEACE TALKS. VIEWS EXPRESSED ON PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL BASIS AND ADU SHOULD BE PROTECTED AS SOURCE.

2. WHILE WORN OUT AND DEEPLY DISAPPOINTED BY BREAKDOWN OF TALKS, ADU THINKS SOMETHING CAN BE SALVAGED FROM EXPERIENCE. HE IS ENCOURAGED THAT UGANDA HAS GOTTEN INTERESTED IN NIGERIAN SITUATION AND BELIEVES OBOTE AND ODAKA PLAYED EXTREMELY EFFECTIVE ROLE IN KAMPALA MEETINGS. HE HOPES OBOTE WILL STAY ACTIVE BEHIND SCENES, PERHAPS PERSUADING NYERERE AND KAUNDA TO USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH BIAFRANS TO GET ANOTHER ROUND OF TALKS STARTED. ADU UNDERSTANDS BOTH ARE SCHEDULED BE IN KAMPALA SHORTLY (HE THOUGHT FOR OBOTE'S PARTY CONGRESS) AND THIS COULD PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY FOR THREE LEADERS TO WORK SOMETHING OUT THAT COULD BE PUT TO BOTH SIDES.

3. ADU IS ALSO GRATIFIED THAT COOPERATION BETWEEN UGANDANS AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT WAS GOOD IN KAMPALA AND THAT BOTH ENAHORO AND MBANEFO WENT ON RECORD TO PRAISE ARNOLD SMITH'S EFFORTS TO GET TALKS

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PAGE 02 LONDON 09573 051658Z

STARTED, AS WELL AS JOINT UGANDAN-CS CONFERENCE ARRANGEMENTS.

4. ON SUBSTANCE OF TALKS, ADU OBSERVES THAT UNBRIDGEABLE SPLIT IN KAMPALA TALKS WAS ON QUESTION OF CEASE-FIRE. FMG WOULD NOT AGREE TO CEASE-FIRE WITHOUT, AT MINIMUM, PRIOR AND EXPLICIT ABANDONMENT OF SECESSION BY BIAFRANS. LATTER ARGUED THEY COULD NOT BE EXPECTED MAKE FUNDAMENTAL CONCESSION OF THIS KIND WITHOUT KNOWING WHAT NIGERIANS PROPOSED IN WAY OF POLITICAL SETTLEMENT. FURTHERMORE, CONDITIONS WITH WHICH FMG SURROUNDED ITS OFFER OF CEASE-FIRE AMOUNTED TO DEMAND FOR BIAFRAN SURRENDER.


5. CS AND UGANDANS WORKED OUT COMPROMISE FORMULA WHICH THEY HOPED WOULD BRIDGE THIS GAP AND AVERT BREAKDOWN IN FINAL DAYS OF MEETING. THIS CALLED FOR TWO SIDES TO AGREE TO ESTABLISHMENT OF "NEW NIGERIAN UNION", CONSTITUTION OF WHICH "WOULD BE DRAFTED BY CONSTITUTIONAL CONGRESS AFTER CEASE-FIRE". IMPLICIT IN THIS FORMULA WAS UNDERSTANDING THAT DURING INTERVAL BETWEEN CEASE-FIRE AND PROMULGATION OF NEW CONSTITUTION BIAFRA WOULD BE TECHNICALLY "SOVEREIGN". IT WAS THIS ELEMENT THAT CS AND UGANDANS HOPED WOULD MAKE COMPROMISE ACCEPTABLE TO BIAFRANS. AS THINGS TURNED OUT, HOWEVER, IT ONLY HAD EFFECT OF MAKING FORMULA UNACCEPTABLE TO FMG. BIAFRANS OBJECTED TO OTHER FEATURES, NOTABLY THAT THEY WERE BEING ASKED TO COMMIT SELVES TO NEW NIGERIAN UNION WITHOUT KNOWING WHAT IT ENTAILED. THEY ALSO ASSERTED FORMULA DID NOT RECOGNIZE CONFLICT WAS BETWEEN TWOSIDES (NOT TWELVE).

6. IN CONCLUSION, ADU THOUGHT BOTH SIDES HAS NEGOTIATED IN GOOD FAITH, ALTHOUGH BIAFRAN DELEGATION TENDED TO ADOPT JURIDICAL, TAKE-IT-OR-LEAVE-IT POSITION ON KEY ISSUES, PARTLY, HE ASSUMED BECAUSE IT WAS COMPOSED OF LAWYERS RATHER THAN DIPLOMATS. FMG DELEGATION, FOR ITS PART, HAD BEEN OUTWARDLY FLEXIBLE, BUT DILATORY TACTICS IN EARLY STAGES OF DISCUSSION HAD ALMOST CAUSED TALKS TO STALL AT OUTSET.

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| USIA | NSA | CIA | NSC | | | | | | | | |
| SUGGESTED DISTRIBUTION PASS-3 | | | | <p>Attached are two copies of President Obote's opening address for the Nigerian peace talks and one each copies of Chief Enahoro's reply thereto and his opening statement.</p> <p>We consider this speech of President's to be another statesmanlike and straightforward expression of his views and recommend it to addressees.</p> <p>Enclosures: <i>[Signature]</i> STERRINS <i>[Signature]</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Opening Address by President Obote at Kampala peace talks 2. Reply to President Obote's Opening Address by Chief Enahoro 3. Opening Statement by Chief Anthony Enahoro | | | | | | | |
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Uganda News

No. 1375/68.

(B.C.F)

May 23, 1968.

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KAMPALA

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Whether the war was just or unjust was no longer the question. The principal and overriding demand was to bring it to an end, the President of Uganda, Dr. A. Milton Obote, said when opening the Kampala peace talks on the Nigerian issue in Parliament Building this morning.

He was introduced by the Secretary General of the Commonwealth, Mr. Arnold Smith, whose Secretariat is responsible for servicing the talks.

Dr. Obote said to the two delegations, the Federal Government - seated to his right, and the Biafra delegates to his left, - that he considered that the first and most important service which they could render to their people through those talks, was to find a broad formula which would lead to peace among their people.

Such formula, he added, should include an early agreement on cessation of hostilities and a cease-fire as a basic preliminary stage for a broader understanding on the nature of Institutions which would heal the wounds of the current misunderstanding and conflict.

Dr. Obote observed that the current war was, in his view, contrary to the African nature and the one characteristic which distinguished the African from other peoples - namely, the remarkable attachment of the living African to the dead, and the bitterness and sorrow which death generates in him.

Urging.../2.



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Kampala

Urging that the talks called for goodwill and a measure of give and take on both sides, Dr. Obote said the goal of those talks remained agreement on institutions which would give new hope to and advance the welfare of the people.

The road to that goal, said the President, was in his view, a political solution that would accommodate views on both sides, remove existing fears, ensure security of life and property, and inspiring the confidence of their people.

Saying that the basic issue which divided them was perhaps rigidity of what was regarded as not negotiable on the one hand, and what they should relax both stands so as to give opportunity for them to re-examine the possibility of either marrying the two stands or finding a substitute for both.

A political approach of that nature, said the President, would perhaps afford the necessary compromise which would bring about security and confidence among their people, and provide an honourable solution.


He said, he extended to them the well-wishes of the people of Uganda in their endeavours, and he prayed for the success of their talks.

The two leaders of the delegations, Chief Anthony Enahoro for the Federal Government, and Sir Louise Mbanefo of Biafra both thanked the President of Uganda, his Government and the people of Uganda for affording them the facilities for the peace talks.

After a short adjournment, they returned to the conference hall with their delegations to each give a background history of events in Nigeria, both sides outlining briefly conditions for peace talks.

To hear them, were present observers and advisers of the two sides, the Vice-President of Uganda, Mr. J.K. Babiha; Ministers, senior Uganda Government officials, members of the

Commonwealth.../3.



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Commonwealth Secretariat, and television, radio and newsmen
from many parts of the world.

THE FOLLOWING IS THE FULL TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
OPENING ADDRESS:-

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Page 1 of 17
Encl. 1
Kampala's A 265

AN OPENING ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY
THE HON. DR. A.M. OBOTE, M.P., PRESIDENT
OF UGANDA, AT THE KAMPALA PEACE TALKS
ON THURSDAY, 23rd MAY, 1968

October 1st 1960 was a great day for Nigeria and Nigerians. On that day one of the most enlightened countries in Africa was born and the Independence of Nigeria gave to the African Continent in general a new hope and pride.

I believe that you who are now meeting here, together with the other leaders who are not here and the people you represent, positively contributed to that great achievement. I do also believe that all who made that contribution did so in the hope and belief that they were building a happy home for all Nigerians. In the same way the services rendered by all Nigerians after Independence for the good and welfare of the people of Nigeria were an inspiration to the other African countries and a definite example that size and diversity were not a barrier to National Unity.

This meeting is being held because that hope, inspiration and example have for the last two years all been under serious and most disturbing trial to the extent that you are now engaged in a military conflict. The fact that you are now meeting here is a most welcome development. By agreeing to

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Page ~~11~~
Encl. 1
Kampala's A 265

met in London and now here, you have given hope to many who have suffered in the conflict and those who must be living in daily fear of death for so long as the conflict lasts.

I wish, therefore, to record on behalf of the Government and people of Uganda our relief that you are now taking the first hopeful steps on the road to resolve the issues which have divided you and brought about armed hostilities.

It is in this spirit that I welcome you to Kampala. When we heard of your decision to make Kampala the venue of these talks, we were exceedingly happy and I trust that you will not regret having made the choice. For here, in this most friendly of African cities, you will be in the capital city of a people who are wholly resolved in their hearts and have never wavered in the opinion that the new approach which you have now initiated to resolve the crisis should be encouraged and supported as the only channel for a permanent solution.

I take this opportunity to register our gratitude to the Commonwealth Secretary General, Mr. Arnold Smith, and his colleagues for all the efforts they have made to enable these talks to open today.

0669

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May I also express my appreciation to you all for inviting me to open these talks. In my remarks I shall attempt to put to you the cardinal issue of these talks as seen by Uganda.

I have vivid memories of the beginning of the subject matter of your talks as I was in Lagos in January 1966 at the end of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference where we discussed another problem of our Continent - Rhodesia. Little did I think at the time that you were going to experience what you have gone through during the last two years, or that it would be necessary for you to be here and that I should be addressing you.

Since that January day we in Uganda have closely followed the events and it is our view that the current tragic situation - namely, the armed conflict - demands highest priority in these talks. Whether the war is just or unjust is no longer the question. The principal and overriding demand is to bring it to an end. I consider that the first and most important service which you can render to your people through these talks is to find a broad formula which will lead to peace among your people. Such formula

0670



- 7 -

~~Page 14~~
Encl. 1
Kampala's A 265

should include an early agreement on cessation of hostilities and a cease-fire as a basic preliminary stage for a broader understanding on the nature of Institutions which would heal the wounds of the current misunderstanding and conflict.

I recommend this approach to you in the belief that none of you would like to deny to your people a chance to live. You are all leaders of tested and tried ability, which ability you have exemplified elsewhere most successfully. That being so, I am convinced that you have been selected for these talks with the prime object that you will remember the interests of those people that you now represent and all of us know that those people are suffering and are yearning for a chance to live in peace and security. We know that there has been a lot of bloodshed. We know that there has been also a lot of fears on all sides, and we know that this bloodshed and these fears still continue, and must stop.

This tragedy has come about essentially because of a loss of confidence in the Institutions which you all set up for Nigeria. Once confidence in Institutions is lost, there is always a serious problem of how to regain it. Simultaneously there is the problem of fear, and how to remove it.

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The current armed conflict is an indication of a loss of confidence in the Nigerian Institutions as established on Independence Day in 1960. To that extent some of you have made it clear that they no longer want to be in Nigeria on the grounds that they are unwanted and unwelcome in a Federation which they helped to bring about and which was their home until the tragic events of the last two years. Accordingly they have made a move to find a new home for themselves outside the Federation and they have called it Biafra.

While noting this stand we should not perhaps ignore altogether a possibility of difficulties which have occasioned these talks occurring in the new home they seek.

As regards those of you who - though aware of the bitter experience of Nigeria in the last two years - still repose your confidence in Nigeria and wish to re-establish confidence in the Federation, I would say that you have great and grave responsibilities in these talks. You stand for the one-ness of Nigeria. The current armed conflict to you is a civil war. It would follow, therefore, that all those who have lost their lives in this conflict are to you fellow citizens of one Nigeria. In the same way, whatever property has been

0672



~~Page 9 of 11~~
Encl. 1
Kamukala's A 265

destroyed can only be regarded by you as the property of fellow Nigerians. It is with this basic consideration that I would urge you to be magnanimous and to take the lead in initiating immediate agreement on the cessation of hostilities and a cease-fire.

To both Delegations I would say that the Federation of Nigeria before the conflict was the king-pin of African freedom. In numbers, wealth and education the country held a position which was pre-eminent among African States. It is often said that it is the privilege and duty of the strong to produce a sense of security among those who are less strong. I believe it is the desire and hope of other African States that Nigeria will resolve her problems and assume her unique position in African affairs and thereby give these other States a sense of pride and security.

Just in the same way as we cannot discount a possibility of difficulties that occasioned these talks occurring in what one side calls Biafra, we should not perhaps place too much hope that Nigeria will be rebuilt to the extent that it stands four square to the winds blowing from all corners on the basis of a military victory. Political

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solutions are fundamental in these talks and should be given more emphasis than the military aspect. Political decisions and understanding are useful and necessary and it is possible to guarantee their permanency through mutual confidence. Such confidence can only be generated when there is mutual respect and genuine appreciation of the fears which groups entertain. I am of the opinion that you are capable of inspiring the necessary degree of confidence among yourselves for the success of these talks.

For the last eleven months, the civil war has given the impression that you have sought to shut your eyes and hearts upon one another. My appeal today is that you open your hearts and minds, and retrace your steps. The prayer of all your well-wishers is that the painful process of the last eleven months be reversed if you are to find a lasting solution. The current war, in my view, is contrary to the African nature and the one characteristic which distinguishes the African from other peoples - namely, the remarkable attachment of the living African to the dead, and the bitterness and sorrow which death generates in him. Such bitterness and sorrow must be mounting daily in your Region of Africa, more particularly as the nature of modern warfare

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extends death far beyond the fighting soldier to all people who happen to be within the firing line. The call of the hour and the essential need is that you and the other leaders at home now resolve this supreme crisis in the affairs of your people through these talks. Difficult as this task is, I would urge no despair for that would represent failure which in turn would prolong agony, bitterness and sorrow.

Your present bitter experience is not unique in the affairs of nations. Others have had the same experience. We must however be cautious in giving credence to attempts to draw too many similarities and parallels about situations which have arisen out of different circumstances. For instance, some commentators have attempted to draw a parallel between Nigeria and Uganda of 1966. Whatever are similarities and parallels between your situation and those of other countries, there can be no doubt that the solution to your situation must come from you. This calls for goodwill and a measure of give and take on both sides.

History will not condemn those of you assembled here or those at home for lack of courage or for weakness if you show some flexibility in your approach to the task before you.

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
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Incl. 1
Kampala's A 265

Indeed, history will pass a verdict of valour and statesmanship if in showing a spirit of compromise, these talks succeed. The price of failure would be too much for all of you, the people you represent, and for Africa. Success, however, will not be judged by debating ability but by an attempt to be constructive and a willingness to understand and appreciate each other's points of view. This is a human problem and a solution is not automatic. It will need patience, heart-searching and perseverance - all in the interests of your people.

Finally I would say that the goal of these talks remains agreement on institutions which will give new hope to and advance the welfare of your people. The road to that goal, in my view, is a political solution that will accommodate views on both sides, remove existing fears, ensure security of life and property, and inspire the confidence of your people. The basic issue which divides you is perhaps rigidity of what is regarded as not negotiable on the one hand, and what is regarded as final on the other. I would suggest and appeal to you to relax both stands so as to give opportunity for you to re-examine the possibility of

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either marrying the two stands or finding a substitute for both. A political approach of this nature would perhaps afford the necessary compromise which would bring about security and confidence among your people, and provide an honourable solution.

You are all leaders, and leaders cannot afford to forget the people they lead. While you talk here, your people are dying. While you sit here, a mother is losing her only child; wives are losing their beloved ones; an old man whose only hope was his son is losing that hope; and the front line takes its toll, and Africa may be losing not only a valiant son but perhaps a genius.

Much of this is well-known to you and I am confident that you have started this dialogue in order to find a lasting solution.

I extend to you the well-wishes of the people of Uganda in your endeavours and I pray for the success of your talks.

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Kampala-265

Chief Enahoro in his opening speech, said that it was the tradition in Africa for their countries to give assistance to one another in times of need, and there was nothing in their past to suggest that Africans thought of gratitude as a mark of weakness, or ingratitude as a display of strength.

They had come to Kampala, he said, hopeful that the old tradition of brotherliness would prevail.

They were proud, he said, to see the President and his country playing such a noble role of host to their talks.

Here, Chief Enahoro said he wanted to make one thing clear. That was, that the Federal Government was willing and ready to order a halt to its military operations once the Peace Talks in Kampala agreed on the conditions for ending hostilities.

In that respect, he added, their foreign friends, and others less well-meaning, were as far as he was concerned, - knocking at an open door when they called for an end to the fighting in their country.

That, he said, was why they had come to Kampala to try to solve the problem that had plagued their nation almost from its inception.

"We have come fully prepared to seek peace and unity,
he declared.../15.

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he declared, "and fully empowered to make peace with honour."

He added: "If we achieve our objective, as many delegations is determined to ensure, there will be no greater tribute to Your Excellency's generosity and brotherly interest in the future of our country than that the names of Obote and Kampala should hold an honoured place in the history of a re-united Nigeria".

A similar sentiment of appreciation to the President of Uganda, his Government and people, was expressed by Sir Louis Mbanefo. Their presence in Kampala, he said, showed the confidence in the goodwill and warm welcome they had received, and a sympathy in their quest for peace.

They had come to the conference, he said, because they had believed from the beginning that the dispute was incapable of a military solution.

It was a human problem, he said, which had to be resolved round a conference table.

There were some supposed military experts, mostly from outside Africa, who thought that the war would be over in a matter of a month, and that that would bring the dispute to an end and solve all the problems.

The war had gone on for nearly a year, he went on, and those foreign experts with interests in the two conflicting sides, still believed that there had to be a military solution, and they were doing everything possible to promote the war.

That was a solemn and serious occasion, he said, and those of them charged with the task of finding a solution were very conscious of the problem ahead of them.

But, said Sir Louis, they could not find a solution unless they were prepared to face facts - facts of life and facts of history.

He went on.../16

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A 265

He went on to give a lengthy account of the political history of Nigeria leading up to the present day events, citing various incidents during the present conflict, and giving his delegation's formula for an end to hostilities.

He proposed that there should be an immediate cessation of fighting on land, sea and air; immediate removal of the economic blockade mounted by Nigeria against Biafra; and the withdrawal of troops to behind the pre-war boundaries.

With regard to cessation of fighting, he said, Biafra was willing to agree to the policing of the cease-fire line by an international force, the composition of which had to be agreed to by both sides.

A supervisory body, the composition and power of which were to be agreed, which would be stationed in the areas from which troops were withdrawn to ensure that the local population were not in any way victimised.

On the removal of the blockade, Sir Louis said they would be ready if it was agreed, to accept the supervision at points of entry into Nigeria and Biafra to ensure that there was no arms build-up by either side while talks on arrangements for a permanent settlement - continued.

The aim should be, he said, to restore civilian life and administration back to normal in the war-ravaged areas as soon as possible.

"We believe", he said, that given agreement on those points, peace talks can proceed in an atmosphere conducive to success".

Once the cessation of hostilities was achieved, the conference would, with confidence, examine whatever arrangements might be suggested for a permanent settlement.

"We believe that sovereignty is the only possible way of ensuring that Biafrans have exclusive control of the protection.../17.

0680

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Authority VND 95953
By MVA Date 10/5/00

protection of their own lives, liberty and property", he declared.

Granted that, the Biafran Delegation would propose for discussion, the maximum economic co-operation and common services with Nigeria; problems relating to the sharing of the assets and liabilities (including the external public debt) of the former Federation of Nigeria; problems relating to the payment of compensation for the life and property of Biafrans which were lost during the pogrom and as a result of the war; and the holding of a plebiscite in disputed areas in and outside Biafra.

After also giving an outline of political events in Nigeria, and the latest information on the Nigeria-Biafra war, Chief Enahoro said the Federal Government welcomed the Kampala Peace Talks, and placed the greatest importance to the item on their agenda concerning conditions for ending hostilities.

He believed that that conference could bring the hostilities to an end if they approached those talks with absolute sincerity and in the spirit of give and take.

"Whatever else we may do here in Kampala, and whatever we may fail to do, we must at least try to find ways and means of ending the hostilities by agreeing on satisfactory conditions which will ensure that the hostilities, once ended, are not resumed by either side", he said.

His delegation, he said, were determined that those talks succeeded in producing a basis for peace and for a lasting settlement in Nigeria.

It was necessary for both sides to talk frankly among themselves in order to base their settlement on a truthful and realistic appreciation of their problems.

If that conference dwelt too much on the past, they would be in danger of missing the opportunities of the present.

The significance.../18.

0681

- 18 -

Encl. 1
Kampala's A265

The significance of that occasion for their people, he said, was that they were at last at that Peace Conference.

"We sincerely hope", said Chief Enahoro, "that the necessary lessons have been learnt and that we can now honestly address ourselves to realistic solutions to our crisis."

In military terms, said Chief Enahoro, Biafra was now dead.

He suggested, therefore, that they should address themselves at that meeting to the need to lay a sound foundation for a political solution at a later stage.

Three principles were of paramount importance in any genuine attempt to find a lasting solution to the Nigerian crisis, he continued.

They were that any solution adopted must be conducive to the maintenance of lasting peace.

That demanded that the solution must be to preserve one sovereign Nigeria and its territorial integrity.

The solution adopted should not allow "tribal apartheid" through any specious theory of tribal protection, but had rather to guarantee equal economic opportunities as well as the same political and other rights for all Nigerian citizens regardless of ethnic origin.

He also said that Nigeria had to be re-structured administratively in order to remove once and for all the root cause political discontent - the fear of domination (or blackmail) by one large Region or ethnic group over the others.

There can be no doubt now, said Chief Enahoro, that Nigeria had to be preserved as one united country if they were serious about achieving lasting peace which would allow their part of Africa to resume its orderly process of social and economic development.

It was imperative that the first step in any honest attempt.../19.

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attempt to solve the Nigerian problem was to remove the genuine fear of Northern domination through size, or of Ibo domination through their tightly-knit organisations and the exploitation of the agricultural and oil wealth of the minorities in the East.

Or, of Yoruba domination through the preponderance of the Western Region were only the North and the East split.

Thus, he said, the only possible solution was to re-organise Nigeria into a minimum of twelve States as promulgated by the Federal Government at the end of May, 1967.

Those States, except the East-Central, were now fully established and functioning.

Saying that throughout that crisis, the Federal Government had been gratified that many thousands of Ibos had continued to live and work as loyal citizens in Lagos and other parts of the Federation, he said, those positive developments encouraged the Federal Government to make its proposals for arrangements which would lead to the end of fighting and guarantee the security of Ibos and all other Nigerians in the East Central State and throughout the Federation.

They would wish to discuss, he said, arrangements for summoning a body representative of the twelve states and the Federal Government to prepare a new Constitution.

The form of the Constitution, including the degree of state autonomy and safeguards against electoral irregularities and against abuse of Governmental powers, would be decided by that body.

They also intended to discuss arrangements for setting up a Revenue Allocation Commission to review revenue allocation in the new circumstances.

Chief..../20.

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Chief Enahoro urged that they should endeavour to overcome, even if they could not yet forget, the tragedies of the last two years.

It was fitting, he said, that they should hold that conference in the capital of a Sister African country which, without interference in their internal affairs, had shown understanding, sympathy and a genuine desire that Nigeria should rediscover peace and remain a united country.

He declared: "We have come to Kampala to discuss peace because we firmly believe that we can, through discussion, find lasting peace. Working together and with God's help and guidance, we can rediscover our unity and Nigeria can yet emerge as the land of hope and glory for 56 million peoples."

After the two speeches by the leaders of the delegations, they adjourned until later in the day.

A message to the conference was today received by the President of Uganda from the President of Kenya, Mzee Jomo Kenyatta, which read: "I would like to take this opportunity to convey to you, and through you to the participants at the talks on Nigeria which start today in Kampala, my sincere wish for the successful conclusion of the talks.

"We in Kenya and indeed the entire world, are waiting with great hope that the talks will be successful."

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0684



Page 1 of 10
Ead 1
Kampala's A 265

AF

AN OPENING ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY
THE HON. DR. A.M. OBOTE, M.P., PRESIDENT
OF UGANDA, AT THE KAMPALA PEACE TALKS
ON THURSDAY, 23rd MAY, 1968


October 1st 1960 was a great day for Nigeria and Nigerians. On that day one of the most enlightened countries in Africa was born and the Independence of Nigeria gave to the African Continent in general a new hope and pride.

I believe that you who are now meeting here, together with the other leaders who are not here and the people you represent, positively contributed to that great achievement.

I do also believe that all who made that contribution did so in the hope and belief that they were building a happy home for all Nigerians. In the same way the services rendered by all Nigerians after Independence for the good and welfare of the people of Nigeria were an inspiration to the other African countries and a definite example that size and diversity were not a barrier to National Unity.

This meeting is being held because that hope, inspiration and example have for the last two years all been under serious and most disturbing trial to the extent that you are now engaged in a military conflict. The fact that you are now meeting here is a most welcome development. By agreeing to

0685



meet in London and now here, you have given hope to many who have suffered in the conflict and those who must be living in daily fear of death for so long as the conflict lasts.

I wish, therefore, to record on behalf of the Government and people of Uganda our relief that you are now taking the first hopeful steps on the road to resolve the issues which have divided you and brought about armed hostilities. It is in this spirit that I welcome you to Kampala. When we heard of your decision to make Kampala the venue of these talks, we were exceedingly happy and I trust that you will not regret having made the choice. For here, in this most friendly of African cities, you will be in the capital city of a people who are wholly resolved in their hearts and have never wavered in the opinion that the new approach which you have now initiated to resolve the crisis should be encouraged and supported as the only channel for a permanent solution.

I take this opportunity to register our gratitude to the Commonwealth Secretary General, Mr. Arnold Smith, and his colleagues for all the efforts they have made to enable these talks to open today.

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DECLASSIFIED
Authority: VND 959503
By: M. A. R. A. Date: 10/5/00

- 3 -

Page 3 of 10
Encl. 1
Kampala's A265

May I also express my appreciation to you all for inviting me to open these talks. In my remarks I shall attempt to put to you the cardinal issue of these talks as seen by Uganda.

I have vivid memories of the beginning of the subject matter of your talks as I was in Lagos in January 1966 at the end of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference where we discussed another problem of our Continent - Rhodesia. Little did I think at the time that you were going to experience what you have gone through during the last two years, or that it would be necessary for you to be here and that I should be addressing you.

Since that January day we in Uganda have closely followed the events and it is our view that the current tragic situation - namely, the armed conflict - demands highest priority in these talks. Whether the war is just or unjust is no longer the question. The principal and over-riding demand is to bring it to an end. I consider that the first and most important service which you can render to your people through these talks is to find a broad formula which will lead to peace among your people. Such formula

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should include an early agreement on cessation of hostilities and a cease-fire as a basic preliminary stage for a broader understanding on the nature of Institutions which would heal the wounds of the current misunderstanding and conflict.

I recommend this approach to you in the belief that none of you would like to deny to your people a chance to live. You are all leaders of tested and tried ability, which ability you have exemplified elsewhere most successfully. That being so, I am convinced that you have been selected for these talks with the prime object that you will remember the interests of those people that you now represent and all of us know that those people are suffering and are yearning for a chance to live in peace and security. We know that there has been a lot of bloodshed. We know that there has been also a lot of fears on all sides, and we know that this bloodshed and these fears still continue, and must stop.

This tragedy has come about essentially because of a loss of confidence in the Institutions which you all set up for Nigeria. Once confidence in Institutions is lost, there is always a serious problem of how to regain it. Simultaneously there is the problem of fear, and how to remove it.

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The current armed conflict is an indication of a loss of confidence in the Nigerian Institutions as established on Independence Day in 1960. To that extent some of you have made it clear that they no longer want to be in Nigeria on the grounds that they are unwanted and unwelcome in a Federation which they helped to bring about and which was their home until the tragic events of the last two years. Accordingly they have made a move to find a new home for themselves outside the Federation and they have called it Biafra.

While noting this stand we should not perhaps ignore altogether a possibility of difficulties which have occasioned these talks occurring in the new home they seek.

As regards those of you who - though aware of the bitter experience of Nigeria in the last two years - still repose your confidence in Nigeria and wish to re-establish confidence in the Federation, I would say that you have great and grave responsibilities in these talks. You stand for the oneness of Nigeria. The current armed conflict to you is a civil war. It would follow, therefore, that all those who have lost their lives in this conflict are to you fellow citizens of one Nigeria. In the same way, whatever property has been

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destroyed can only be regarded by you as the property of fellow Nigerians. It is with this basic consideration that I would urge you to be magnanimous and to take the lead in initiating immediate agreement on the cessation of hostilities and a cease-fire.

To both Delegations I would say that the Federation of Nigeria before the conflict was the king-pin of African freedom. In numbers, wealth and education the country held a position which was pre-eminent among African States. It is often said that it is the privilege and duty of the strong to produce a sense of security among those who are less strong. I believe it is the desire and hope of other African States that Nigeria will resolve her problems and assume her unique position in African affairs and thereby give these other States a sense of pride and security.

Just in the same way as we cannot discount a possibility of difficulties that occasioned these talks occurring in what one side calls Biafra, we should not perhaps place too much hope that Nigeria will be rebuilt to the extent that it stands four square to the winds blowing from all corners on the basis of a military victory. Political

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For the last eleven months, the civil war has given the impression that you have sought to shut your eyes and hearts upon one another. My appeal today is that you open your hearts and minds, and retrace your steps. The prayer of all your well-wishers is that the painful process of the last eleven months be reversed if you are to find a lasting solution. The current war, in my view, is contrary to the African nature and the one characteristic which distinguishes the African from other peoples - namely, the remarkable attachment of the living African to the dead, and the bitterness and sorrow which death generates in him. Such bitterness and sorrow must be mounting daily in your Region of Africa, more particularly as the nature of modern warfare

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Your present bitter experience is not unique in the affairs of nations. Others have had the same experience. We must however be cautious in giving credence to attempts to draw too many similarities and parallels about situations which have arisen out of different circumstances. For instance, some commentators have attempted to draw a parallel between Nigeria and Uganda of 1966. Whatever are similarities and parallels between your situation and those of other countries, there can be no doubt that the solution to your situation must come from you. This calls for goodwill and a measure of give and take on both sides.

History will not condemn those of you assembled here or those at home for lack of courage or for weakness if you show some flexibility in your approach to the task before you.

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Indeed, history will pass a verdict of valour and statesmanship if in showing a spirit of compromise, these talks succeed. The price of failure would be too much for all of you, the people you represent, and for Africa. Success, however, will not be judged by debating ability but by an attempt to be constructive and a willingness to understand and appreciate each other's points of view. This is a human problem and a solution is not automatic. It will need patience, heart-searching and perseverance - all in the interests of your people.

Finally I would say that the goal of these talks remains agreement on institutions which will give new hope to and advance the welfare of your people. The road to that goal, in my view, is a political solution that will accommodate views on both sides, remove existing fears, ensure security of life and property, and inspire the confidence of your people. The basic issue which divides you is perhaps rigidity of what is regarded as not negotiable on the one hand, and what is regarded as final on the other. I would suggest and appeal to you to relax both stands so as to give opportunity for you to re-examine the possibility of

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DECLASSIFIED
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By MVA Date 10/5/09

either marrying the two stands or finding a substitute for both. A political approach of this nature would perhaps afford the necessary compromise which would bring about security and confidence among your people, and provide an honourable solution.

You are all leaders, and leaders cannot afford to forget the people they lead. While you talk here, your people are dying. While you sit here, a mother is losing her only child; wives are losing their beloved ones; an old man whose only hope was his son is losing that hope; and the front line takes its toll, and Africa may be losing not only a valiant son but perhaps a genius.

Much of this is well-known to you and I am confident that you have started this dialogue in order to find a lasting solution.

I extend to you the well-wishes of the people of Uganda in your endeavours and I pray for the success of your talks.

0694

Page 1 of 2
Encl. 2
Kampala's A 265

KAMPALA PEACE TALKS:
REPLY TO PRESIDENT OPOTE'S OPENING ADDRESS
BY CHIEF ANTHONY KWAHORO

Mr. President,

I wish on behalf of the Nigerian Government and the entire people of Nigeria to thank Your Excellency and your Government for agreeing at such short notice to provide the setting for our talks. We trust that the promptness of Your Excellency's decision and the willingness of your Government to accept the inconvenience of providing facilities for this meeting will be an example and guide to all participants at our discussions.

Mr. President, it is our tradition in Africa for our countries to give assistance to one another in times of need and there is nothing in our past to suggest that Africans think of gentitude as a mark of weakness or ingentitude as a display of strength. The Federal Government of Nigeria have always acted in this spirit. We have recently witnessed several regrettable departures from this laudable tradition. Yet we have come to Kampala hopeful that the old tradition of brotherliness will prevail. All Nigerians are proud to see Your Excellency and your country playing this noble role of host to our talks.

This is not the occasion for discussing, in detail, the issues which we are here to resolve, but I consider it appropriate to make one thing clear at this time.

The Federal Government of Nigeria is willing and ready to order a halt to its military operations once the Peace Talks here agree on the conditions for ending hostilities.

In this respect, our foreign friends, and others less well-meaning ^{are} as far as we are concerned, knocking at an open door when they call for an end to the fighting in our country.

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Page 2 of 2
Encl. 2
Kampala's A 265

-2-

This, Mr. President, is the reason why we have come to your famous city to try to solve the problems which have plagued our nation almost from its inception. We have come fully prepared to seek "peace and unity" and fully empowered to make "peace with honour". And if we achieve our objective, as my delegation is determined to ensure, there will be no greater tribute to Your Excellency's generosity and brotherly interest in the future of our country than that the names of Obote and Kampala should hold an honoured place in the history of a re-united Nigeria.

Again, Mr. President, my delegation and I thank you for your generosity and the warm hospitality with which we have been received.

0696



KAMPALA PEACE TALKS

Page 1 of 23
Excl 3
Kampala's A 265

OPENING STATEMENT BY CHIEF ANTHONY ENAHORO

Gentlemen,

The Federal Government has consistently responded to peace initiatives and our delegation has come to the Kampala Peace Talks to work for a just and lasting solution to the Nigerian conflict.

The Federal Government responded fully to the peace moves by the historic Consultative Mission of six Heads of State appointed last year by the Kinshasa Summit of the Organisation of African Unity. The work of the O.A.U. Mission was neither welcomed nor appreciated in certain quarters.

The Commonwealth Secretary-General started his peace initiative as far back as July 1967 before the outbreak of hostilities. The Federal Government has always responded favourably and cooperated fully with Mr. Arnold Smith in his efforts. Last October, the Federal Government sent three high ranking representatives to London for preliminary peace talks organised by Mr. Arnold Smith, but after waiting in London for a whole week, they had to return to Lagos because representatives of the other side failed to turn up.

Again in November 1967, there was another invitation from the Commonwealth Secretary-General indicating that the other side were ready for talks and the Federal Government responded promptly by instructing its representatives to get ready to leave for London only to be informed by Mr. Arnold Smith at the last minute that the representatives of the other side were no longer available.

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I have given this resume to show the willingness of the Federal Government all along to engage in peace talks. It was thus in character for the Government to respond within twenty four hours to the latest invitation from the Commonwealth Secretary-General which resulted in the London preliminary peace talks on venue and agenda. As a matter of fact, I arrived in London within forty-eight hours of the message from Mr. Arnold Smith that the other side was ready to talk at last.

The Federal Government therefore welcomes the Kampala Peace Talks. The principal task of the peace talks here is to try to resolve our basic differences and arrive at a peace settlement. From this point of view, the Federal Government attaches the greatest importance to item III of the Agenda, "Conditions for Ending Hostilities". We shall be circulating a memorandum on this important subject. We can bring the hostilities to an end if we approach these talks with absolute sincerity and in the spirit of give and take.

As soon as the talks get off the ground, we must find ways and means of ending the hostilities by agreeing on satisfactory conditions which will ensure that the hostilities once ended are not resumed by either side.

It is running away from the problem to suggest that hostilities should be ended before we discuss the conditions for ending hostilities. The Evian Agreement which ended the Algerian War, was negotiated while the fighting was going on. The Vietnam Peace Talks are proceeding without a ceasefire.

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Both sides in the Nigerian conflict are convinced that they are fighting over great issues. We cannot stop the war without discussing the great issues we have been fighting for.

The delegation of the Federal Government has come to Kampala determined that these talks must succeed in producing a basis for peace and a lasting settlement in Nigeria. It should be clear to the whole world by now that the Head of the Federal Military Government, Major-General Yakubu Gowon and his colleagues on the Supreme Military Council and the Federal Executive Council did everything within their power to arrive at a peaceful solution of the Nigerian crisis and to avoid war. Regrettably, every concession offered to Ojukwu and his group was rejected. As the secessionists' demands were met, they immediately demanded more. They claimed to be convinced that the people in the part of Nigeria over which they had temporary control could no longer live with the rest of the country of which they had formed an integral part for more than half a century. Thus Nigeria found herself in the present situation where thousands of innocent youngmen have been goaded into rebellion. The Federal Government is determined that everything must be done to stop this strife without further delay.

This is why throughout the course of the war, the Federal Military Government has devoted a great deal of time and energy to working out plans for reconciliation and reconstruction. We will therefore make concrete and sincere suggestions at this conference for a settlement with

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honour satisfied on all sides to the current conflicts in Nigeria. They will include arrangements for restoring law and order in the East Central State and for guaranteeing security of life and property for Ibos and all other Nigerians with which they and impartial world observers should be satisfied. We must, on the other hand, insist that those representing the group who are unfortunately in rebellion against the Federal Government should adopt a constructive approach to the discussions upon which we are about to embark.

It is necessary for us on all sides to understand the full and accurate background to our crisis. Regrettably, Ojukwu and his group had the field unchallenged for more than two years, engaging in lying propaganda and slander abroad and incitement of tribal hatred at home. In the propaganda which they put out to mislead world opinion and to sustain rebellion at home, Mr. Ojukwu and his group have never addressed themselves to the basic problems which led to the current crisis in Nigeria. On the other hand, the Federal Government, conscious of its responsibilities for the safety of all the citizens of Nigeria, has refrained from matching the tendentious stories put out by Ojukwu regarding the so-called persecution of the Ibos, so as to prevent the possibility of reprisals against that section of the Nigerian community. But at this conference it is necessary for us to talk frankly amongst ourselves in order to base our settlement on a truthful and realistic appreciation of our problems.

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


One of the root causes of our present difficulties has been the acute regionalism which developed in Nigerian politics from the late 1940s onwards. During that period, with the introduction of the representative system of government, the British and unfortunately many Nigerians began to emphasise the separateness of the three sections into which they divided Nigeria. At Independence, we inherited a very unstable structure. This consisted of three very large Regions with very extensive powers. One of the Regions, the Northern Region, had three-fourths of the total area of the country and more than half of the population. Each Region had one dominant tribal group and numerous smaller tribes. This situation was inherently unstable because:-

- (a) Each Region was large enough to attempt to dominate the country or at least to blackmail the others during any dispute.
- (b) The minority elements within each Region clamoured incessantly for their own States within the Federation and resented the manoeuvres of the dominant tribes to maintain their hegemony. This in turn led to suspicion and abuse of electoral processes by those eager to keep themselves in office.
- (c) More than half of the country was dissatisfied with the constituent units of the Federation since the Hausas, the Ibos and the Yorubas were together less than 50 per cent of the Nigerian population.

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The leaders of the three "majority" ethnic groups pursued an increasingly acrimonious policy of regional confrontation regardless of the true needs of the people of the country as a whole. They carefully avoided the essential reform of the country's political structure. There were a succession of crises - the split within the Action Group and the Western Region Government in 1962, the Treason trials of some leaders of that party, the census disputes of 1963, the Federal Election of 1964 and the widespread disturbances following large scale irregularities during the Western Region elections of 1965.

The late Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, struggled with all sincerity to accommodate all interests in the country. He led a coalition of the Northern Peoples Congress, the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (the majority of whose leaders were Ibos from the East) and the Nigerian National Democratic Party, which was a breakaway faction of the Action Group. From early 1965, Nigeria had a broad-based Government, in a territorial sense, in which all sections of the country were represented. But towards the end of 1965, as the cumulative result of the crises already mentioned, the country was in a ferment. It was in this delicate situation that the coup of 15th January, 1966 was staged. The Prime Minister of the Federation, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, two Regional Premiers, the Sardauna of Sokoto in the North and Chief Akintola in the West, the Federal Minister of Finance and about a dozen of the most senior Army Officers, all but one non-Ibos, were killed.

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A Military Regime under General Ironsi was installed. In spite of the pattern of these killings (only non-Ibos being killed) there were no immediate hostile reactions in any part of the country and military rule was generally welcomed as people hoped that a just and honest administration would result.

However, suspicions were soon aroused in many parts of the country. The coup was described as a mutiny by General Ironsi but he did nothing to bring the mutineers to trial and re-establish discipline in the Army. Many committees were set up to review and make recommendations on various aspects of the administration of the country. The regime promised to review the Constitution only after extensive consultations with the people. Despite all these promises, matters were soon being rushed to the surprise and irritation of many sections of Nigerian society. Incautious behaviours by certain individuals and the promotion of 23 senior Army officers, of whom 19 were Ibos, all accentuated the fear that the event of 15th January was a coup to pave the way for Ibo domination of the country. This was the first time in the history of Nigeria that assassination was used to eliminate political opponents and there was widespread apprehension. Then suddenly, without any warning, and without allowing the Constitution Review Committee which he had himself set up to complete its work and report, General Ironsi promulgated a decree on 24th May 1966, abolishing Nigeria's Federal structure and imposing a unitary system on the country. Within a few days, widespread riots erupted in the Northern Region and many people, mostly Ibos, were killed.

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On July 29th, 1966, there was another military coup which overthrew General Ironsi's regime. Major-General Gowon then assumed the position of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and Head of the Federal Military Government with the agreement of all members of the Supreme Military Council with the sole exception of Ojukwu. General Gowon at once promised to restore Nigeria to its Federal structure and to seek an agreed basis for resolving the country's crisis and return the country to civilian rule at the earliest possible opportunity.

Mr. Ojukwu would not accept this. He preached defiance and vengeance. Over the Eastern Region radio, he continuously threatened revenge. He sabotaged all efforts to reach agreement through the conference table. Only reluctantly did a delegation from the former Eastern Region come to the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference in Lagos in September 1966 which General Gowon summoned only six weeks after assuming office. At that conference it was soon obvious that agreement could be reached but for the intransigence of the Eastern delegates who did not want any effective Central Government to be preserved. Indeed, just before the conference, terrorist bomb outrages organised by Ojukwu's Government occurred in Lagos and at the Ore Bridge on the main road link between Lagos and the Mid-West and East. Some people under his instructions were caught in parts of the North trying to blow up bridges and public installations.

When the Constitutional conference in Lagos adjourned for two weeks, the Eastern delegates refused to return to continue the discussions.

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Meanwhile, the Eastern radio continued its campaign, inflaming the passions of the citizens of the Eastern Region against the rest of Nigeria. By threats and tricks, Ibos outside the East were inveigled into returning home. All these could not but increase tension. Then some elements in the Eastern Region embarked on widespread, organised killings of the people of Northern origin resident in that region. News of this was first broadcast by foreign radios. In these terrible circumstances, riots erupted in the North in which about 5,000 people lost their lives. A majority of those killed were Ibos, but many others were police personnel and Northerners. These tragic and regrettable killings have since been grossly exploited by Mr. Ojukwu to compel the Ibos in the East to rebel and take up arms against their country. But it is important to understand the facts.

In his impromptu address to the Ad Hoc Constitutional Conference on October 3, 1966, General Gowon, reacted to the October tragedy in the following words reproduced from the verbatim record:

"... certainly there has been a damage. I think that is what we never seem to admit when there is something like that. There is a damage and I am very, very sorry about it. I regret it and I am doing everything I can..... As I said, for God's sake, don't lose hope. If we are alive and if we are determined, we can get this country back to its proper shape. I am

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determined to do that even if it means my life. I give you my word for it..... To our Eastern friends, for God's sake, please don't lose hope. Let us try and see what we can do to mend up what has happened. Give me a chance and I am quite convinced I will be able to do something very shortly."


Mr. Ojukwu himself at the Aburi Conference in January 1967 put the number of those killed in the Northern riots at 10,000 and insisted then that he had fool-proof evidence to support his claim. When it suited his plans later, he raised the figure to 30,000, accused the Federal Government of organising the killings of Ibos, and distributed many malicious publications on the alleged program. The Federal Government does not seek to justify the killings which occurred in the Northern and Eastern Regions. We have always condemned them and regretted those tragedies. But it is clear nonetheless that the circumstances were most unusual.

It is also clear that:-

- (a) the riots were due to mob reaction in very trying circumstances when the Army and Police were fully stretched;
- (b) the vast majority of Ibos resident in the North were saved from the mobs by their Northern friends and neighbours who could not have been party to any plan for a "pogrom"; and
- (c) country-wide communal riots were prevented.

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I have spent so much time to set the record straight on the tragedies of 1966 because false and short-sighted significance has deliberately been given to them by Mr. Ojukwu to justify secession. Immediately after law and order was restored, General Gowon and the Federal Government resumed in earnest their efforts to find a peaceful solution to our country's basic problems. For this reason, great restraint was shown even when Mr. Ojukwu went from one act of defiance to another. At that time it will be recalled that Mr. Ojukwu closed the Eastern Section of the Nigerian Railways to traffic from the North. He seized more than one-third of the entire rolling stock of the Nigerian Railways. He confiscated goods in Port Harcourt consigned to the Northern Region. He even hindered the transit of goods to neighbouring countries such as the Chad and the Cameroun Republics. He refused petroleum products from the Port Harcourt Refinery jointly owned by all the Governments of Nigeria and Shell-BP being sent by railway from Port Harcourt to the North. He disrupted the flights of the Nigerian Airways. His agents even hi-jacked a plane of the Nigeria Airways bound for Lagos from Benin. He expelled all non-Easterners from the Eastern Region. All this was at a time when the East had no military capacity whatsoever. Because General Gowon was determined on a peaceful solution, none of the normal sanctions available to a Central Government was invoked against Ojukwu; the watch-word was appeasement in the hope that he would stop short of completely disintegrating Nigeria.

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To this end, a conference was held in Aburi, Ghana. The so-called Aburi agreement, it must be emphasised, formally reaffirmed the "workability of the existing Federal institutions". It allowed that Nigeria would continue to have one Federal Government. Mr. Ojukwu then agreed to accept the authority of General Gowon as Head of the Federal Military Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It was also agreed that the Army should be re-organised into four area commands. These were all attempts to reassure Mr. Ojukwu and the Ibos whom he has misled. Unfortunately, Mr. Ojukwu falsely and deliberately interpreted these agreements to mean that there was no longer to be a Central Government in Lagos and that the regions were, to use his words, "to pull apart".

Subsequently, the agreements at Aburi were embodied in a Decree (No.8 of 1967) which would really have turned Nigeria into a confederation. But Mr. Ojukwu rejected this decree because it did not contain any clause which would allow for secession. He then proceeded to seize Federal revenues collected in the East and to cut off all communications with the rest of the country. In the middle of May, 1967, Mr. Ojukwu informed General Gowon in a letter that he had severed all relations with the rest of the country and that the next meeting place would be the battle field. Even at that late stage, efforts to find a peaceful solution continued. Delegations were sent to Mr. Ojukwu to dissuade him from secession. One was led by Chief Awolowo who returned to Lagos with conditions for a settlement dictated by Mr. Ojukwu himself. These were accepted

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and implemented but again, Mr. Ojukwu rejected them because he had set his heart upon secession, which he declared on May 30th. He later plunged the country into the tragic war on July 6th, 1967. This is how it happened. It was Mr. Ojukwu's initiative all the way. There was no plan to attack the Ibos. There is no war against the Ibos as a people. We have passed through ten bitter months of fighting since then.

However, all this is in the past, and while the past is useful in determining the nature of our real problems, I suggest that if this Conference dwells too much on the past, we will be in danger of missing the opportunities of the present. The significance of this occasion for our people is that we are at last at this Peace Conference. We sincerely hope that the necessary lessons have been learnt and that we can now honestly address ourselves to realistic solutions to our crisis.

As regards possible solutions, much has been said by secessionist leaders about the so-called Republic of Biafra. They claimed that the Ibos can no longer live with the other ethnic groups in Nigeria and that only the so-called State of Biafra which is sovereign and with its own Army can protect the Ibos. At the same time, however, they seek to include the non-Ibos of the former Eastern Region in the so-called Biafra. But our brothers on the other side will agree that this concept of a Biafra is unrealistic and untenable.

To begin with, if the argument is that 7 million Ibos in the eastern part of Nigeria must enjoy the right of self determination, surely this same right

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must be accorded to the 5 million Efiks, Ibibios, Ekois and Ijaws whom the secessionist leaders wish to force into the so-called State of Biafra. They cannot deny the long-standing demands of these articulate minorities for their own State. There is overwhelming evidence of mass intimidation and brutality conducted by the Ojukwu regime against these people. Hundreds of them have been killed for asserting their separate identity. The liberation of the entire South Eastern State was accomplished with the enthusiastic support of the Ibibios and Efiks who inhabit that State. The same enthusiastic support for the continued existence of the Federation of Nigeria has been shown in the areas of the Rivers State liberated from rebel control. People from these parts of the former Eastern Region form the bulk of the Nigerian Navy which has distinguished itself in the operations which liberated Bonny, Calabar, and Port Harcourt. We are quite sure too that the majority of the Ibos themselves, when peace is restored, will see that their well-being would be better assured in a State within the Nigerian Federation in which they enjoy equality of consideration and with all the other tribes and are able to continue their work and business all over the country.

The secessionist leaders know, however, that they were deceiving the world with their stories about the need for an Ibo State called "Biafra". They know that there is no way of wrenching the East peacefully out of Nigeria, thereby destroying the social and economic intergration that has gone on for more than 50 years. They know that the

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railways, the telecommunications net work, the numerous other assets cannot be divided amongst successor States if Nigeria were to disintegrate. Captured documents now confirm that the intention of Mr. Ojukwu and his supporters was first to conquer the former Mid-Western and Western Regions and then later to subdue the Northern Region and so dominate Nigeria. Indeed, during their six-week control of the Mid-West, their slogan was "Southern Nigeria Solidarity" not "Ibo survival". Any attempt to preserve the so-called State of Biafra will only be a staging post and as soon as the rebel leaders have recovered, they will resume their campaign.

It is instructive that many of the agents of Mr. Ojukwu concede in private, that an independent Ibo apartheid State will be unviable. This is why they insist on retaining the territories of the South-Eastern State and Rivers State. They sometimes disguise this by talking about the need for an outlet to the sea, ignoring the fact that eight of the twelve States in Nigeria are not on the sea coast.

In order to make the so-called State of Biafra sound plausible, they suggest that a sovereign "Biafra" can have a Customs Union, Common Currency, Common Services including Railways, Posts and Telecommunications, Ports, Dual Citizenship and extensive economic relations with the rest of Nigeria as sovereign equals, but they know that this is a specious suggestion because:

- (a) Sovereign countries resulting from the disintegration of a larger unit and separating in war cannot negotiate, administer, or sustain a Customs Union.

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- (b) Extensive economic relations involve human contact and unhindered travel throughout the territory of Nigeria and this is precisely what the secessionist leaders say is impossible. More than that, they expelled all non-Easterners from their region in October, 1966.
- (c) Any "Central Organisation" endowed with adequate powers to legislate over and administer common customs tariffs, currencies, establishment and control of industries, Railways, Air Lines, Ports, Posts and Telecommunications, etc., becomes an effective Central Government. These are the business of a Federal Government and these are precisely what the secessionist leaders have so far said that they do not want.

Previous contacts between Federal Government representatives and rebel agents on these matters have shown them to be thus far insincere in their protestations in this regard.

In military terms, the concept of Biafra is now dead. Enugu, Port Harcourt, Calabar, Onitsha are all under Federal control. The rebel regime is now confined to 2 or 3 towns and their environs in the interior of the so-called Ibo heartland. In these circumstances, the concept of Biafra no longer constitutes a serious military threat. We should therefore address ourselves at this meeting to the need for a political solution.

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We have always maintained that three principles are of paramount importance in any genuine attempt to find a lasting solution to the Nigerian crisis.


These are:

- (i) that any solution adopted must be conducive to the maintenance of lasting peace. This demands that the solution must be to preserve one sovereign Nigeria and its territorial integrity. To allow the country to be broken up would be to condemn the successor states to the status of military, political and economic protectorates of different power blocks. Such states would be goaded into internecine wars with the supply of arms, and economic and social progress towards genuine independence would be arrested; the support which the enemies of Africa have given to Ojukwu illustrates this clearly;
- (ii) that the solution adopted must not allow "tribal apartheid" through any specious theory of tribal protection but must, rather, guarantee equal economic opportunities as well as the same political and other rights for all Nigerian citizens, regardless of ethnic origin: there are more than 200 ethnic groups in Nigeria!
- (iii) that Nigeria must be re-structured administratively in order to remove once and for all the root cause of political discontent - the fear of domination (or blackmail) by one large Region or ethnic group over the others.

Hence we insist on the present minimum of twelve states.

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
There can be no doubt now that Nigeria must be preserved as one united country if we are serious about achieving lasting peace in order to allow our part of Africa to resume its orderly process of social and economic development. After consulting extensively with the Federal Government on November 23, 1967, the O.A.U. Consultative Mission which consists of eminent Heads of State of African countries stated in its communique:

"The O.A.U. Consultative Mission agreed that as a basis for return of peace and normal conditions in Nigeria, the secessionists should renounce secession and accept the present administrative structure of the Federation of Nigeria as laid down by the Federal Military Government of Nigeria in Decree No. 14 of 1967".

It is also important to stress why, having renounced secession, those now in rebellion must also accept the twelve State structure. As I said at the beginning, one of the root causes of the Nigerian problem was the fear of domination by one Region or one ethnic group. There is also the long history of the demand for the creation of States in Nigeria. One of the most consistent advocates of this has been no less a person than Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, the former President of Nigeria. In his "Political Blue Print of Nigeria", in 1945, he advocated the division of Nigeria into eight states. Chief Awolowo in his "Path to Nigerian Freedom" in 1947 urged the creation of a larger number of States. This demand for the creation of

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States has formed the Electoral platform of many Nigerian Political parties since then. In 1963, the Mid-West Region was carved out of the former Western Region.

It was imperative therefore, that the first step in any honest attempt to solve the Nigerian problem was to remove the genuine fear of Northern domination through size, or of Ibo domination through their tightly-knit organisations and their exploitation of the agricultural and oil wealth of the minorities in the East, or of Yoruba domination through the preponderance of the Western Region were only the North and the East split. Thus the only possible solution was to re-organise Nigeria into a minimum of twelve States as promulgated by the Federal Government at the end of May 1967. These states, except the East-Central, are now fully established and functioning. There are more than 100 tribes in the former Northern Region. The present re-organisation of that Region into six states removed once and for all the bogey of Northern domination. Similarly, stability can only be guaranteed in the East with the consolidation of the present South-Eastern and Rivers States which have satisfied the long standing aspirations of the 5 million non-Ibos in that part of the country. These are the underlying factors in the States programme of the Federal Government.

Our brothers who are in rebellion should consider that, in fact, it is only with the success of this exercise that all tribes in the former Eastern Region can co-exist peacefully, continue

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and even extend their previous level of integration, because they would now be free from the threat of Ibo domination, real or feared, and the resentment it engenders. To insist on denying 5 million people their right of self-determination is to make the problem of reconciliation more difficult. This important aspect of our work will be dealt with in greater detail when we come to the relevant agenda item. I must stress however that there is provision for a machinery - the State Delimitation Commission - which will work out necessary adjustments of States boundaries in order to enhance inter-state harmony.

Throughout this crisis, the Federal Government has been gratified that many thousands of Ibos have continued to live and work as loyal citizens in Lagos and other parts of the Federation. They still serve in the Police, the Prisons Service and even the Armed forces. I believe we have succeeded in educating all Nigerians, except those in rebellion, on the issues at stake in our current crisis and on the real possibilities for lasting settlement and peace. We are also gratified to note that scores of thousands of Ibos who previously fled their towns and villages during the fighting are returning to their homes in areas of the East Central State under Federal control. They are being cared for by Mr. Asika, the Administrator of the State, and his officials.

These positive developments encourage the Federal Government to make its proposals for arrangements which will lead to the end of fighting and guarantee the security of Ibos and all other Nigerians in the East Central State and

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throughout the Federation. We intend at the appropriate stage to disclose the details of our proposals because despite the military victories of the Federal Government, we recognise that certain basic fears of the Ibos have to be allayed. Already, large numbers of people from the East Central State have been recruited and are being trained in Lagos for the Police Force whose primary responsibility it will be to perform normal police functions in the East Central State once the rebel Army has laid down its arms. The reinstatement of Ibo civil servants, corporations and company officials who fled from their posts, the rehabilitation of self-employed citizens from the Eastern States who have suffered as a result of the crisis of the last two years, the re-integration of these people into the communities from which they fled, the reconstruction of damaged roads, bridges, power houses and the restoration of production in factories closed down as a result of the current operations, are priority items for which the Federal Government has prepared plans. I hope that these plans can be improved by constructive proposals from our brothers on the other side.

We wish to discuss arrangements for summoning a body representative of the twelve states and the Federal Government to prepare a new Constitution. The form of the Constitution, including the degree of state autonomy, will be decided by that body. We intend also to discuss arrangements for setting up a Revenue Allocation Commission to review revenue allocation in the new circumstances. We expect that in future safeguards against electoral irregularities and against abuse of Governmental

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powers will be more clearly spelled out in the new Constitution.

The crisis which has shaken the country since the beginning of 1966 and the war which we are about to end have been an extraordinary phase in the history of Nigeria. The re-organisation of Nigeria into twelve States has removed one of the root causes of discontent, mutual fear and instability. The equality of the new states is emphasised repeatedly by General Gowon, the Head of the Federal Military Government, and is confirmed in the appointment of civilian members of the Federal Executive Council. The bonds of economic and social integration which bind together all sections of the country; the valuable human bridge represented by the loyal Ibos who have worked and struggled together with the Federal Government and other Nigerians throughout this crisis; the new leadership which is emerging; the fact that in national politics, the issues will no longer be controversies between Hausas, Ibos and Yorubas or between a giant North, a giant East and a giant West - these are the grounds for our hope and confidence that we are now at the point of working out a lasting basis for continued progress and harmony in Nigeria. It is in this spirit therefore that we appeal to our brothers that we should jointly approach this historic Reconciliation Conference. We must all endeavour to overcome, even if we cannot forget, the tragedies of the last two years.

Before concluding, I must on behalf of the Head of the Federal Military Government, General Gowon, and the entire people of Nigeria say how grateful

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Page 23 of 29
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Kampala A 265

We are to the President of Uganda, His Excellency Dr. Milton Obote and his Government for providing the facilities in Kampala for us to rediscover the national peace which has eluded us Nigerians for nearly two years. It is fitting that we should hold this Conference in the capital of a Sister African country which has, without interference in our internal affairs, shown understanding, sympathy and genuine desire that Nigeria should rediscover peace and remain a united country.

Gentlemen, I would like to put the Nigerian conflict, tragic as it is, in its proper historic perspective. The civil war in Nigeria is not the first tragic conflict in human experience. Many countries have had to fight much bloodier civil wars for causes even less worthy than that of national unity. Many African countries which today, appear to condone or rejoice at the misfortune of Nigerians, may tomorrow find themselves fighting their fellow countrymen and the forces of secession in their midst.

We have to come to the Kampala Peace Talks because we believe Nigeria will be saved. We have come to Kampala to talk peace because we firmly believe that a negotiated settlement will enhance lasting peace.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SYSTEMATIC REVIEW WITHDRAWAL CARD NO. POL 50-14

DATE: 3/24/68 MSG NO.: A-507 TYPE: AI
FROM: Lagos TO: State
SUBJECT: Nigeria: Peace Negotiations? et. al.
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BASIS FOR WITHDRAWAL:

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| | | | <p>In call February 17 on the FMG Commissioner for External Affairs, Dr. Okoi ARIKPO, the Ambassador asked whether various private initiatives to bring about a peaceful settlement (Dr. Johnson of the Canadian Presbyterians; the Papal Mission now in "Biafra"; Theodore Brown of the American Negro Leadership Conference; Quakers, etc.) had any effect on the FMG attitude toward the proposals made recently by Arnold Smith on behalf of the Commonwealth Secretariat.</p> <p>Arikpo replied that many Nigerians resented the well-meaning but futile religious and/or private efforts, and this resentment inevitably colored attitudes toward the Smith mission. Arikpo deplored this development because he continues to believe that, despite recent setbacks, the Commonwealth Secretariat is the best mechanism to use in trying to reach an eventual settlement with the rebels.</p> <p>The World Council of Churches also wants to send a "peace mission" to Nigeria and "Biafra," according to the Commissioner, who added that the FMG was dragging its feet, but could not refuse outright to receive the mission.</p> <p>Replying to the Ambassador's question on the role of the OAU, Arikpo said there were no new developments of significance of which he was aware. The FMG had heard that some East African states (Tanzania?) were urging Kenyatta to ask Emperor Haile Selassie what the OAU Conciliation Commission was doing. It was Arikpo's understanding that Ankrah had never been able to establish useful communication with</p> <p>Enclosure <i>att</i> GROUP 3 Downgraded at 12 year intervals not automatically declassified CONFIDENTIAL</p> | | | |
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Page 2
Lagos A-448

Ojukwu.

Comment. Arikpo has been flexible, moderate, and generally "dove-ish" in his approach to finding a peaceful settlement of the civil war. It seems clear that the unfortunate press speculation about a Commonwealth "peace force" did much to force him, and his like-minded colleagues, to adopt a harder line for dealing with the secessionist "Biafra". While there are different views within Nigeria as to how to settle the rebellion, there is no doubt that the offers of "outside" intervention have provoked a widespread negative reaction among all regions, classes and religions. Nigerian national pride has reacted strongly against any suggestion that they need outside assistance because they are not capable of solving their own problems. An example of the kind of thinking that currently motivates many Nigerians is enclosed--it is a news talk first given over Radio Lagos, and then printed in at least two leading papers (the Lagos Morning Post and Kaduna New Nigerian) on February 19 and 20. The point is not whether objective observers would agree with everything in it, or even the main thrust of the argument; rather, this is a reasonably accurate reflection of how Nigerians view the recent series of well-publicized "peace missions" from private groups.

MATHEWS



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Enclosure
Page 1
Lagos A-448

EXCERPTS FROM ARTICLE:
REBELLION AND SO-CALLED PEACE MAKERS
NEW NIGERIAN, TUESDAY, 20 FEBRUARY 1968

The imminent collapse of the rebellion in the three eastern states has brought with it a new wave of activities by peacemakers and missionary dogooders. The missionary peacemakers either come to Lagos to see General Yakubu Gowon or try to use the BBC to blackmail the Federal Military Government.

The latest example of blackmail is the recent special report on the alleged bombing raids on a missionary hospital in Itu. It was claimed in the report that the hospital was marked with two red crosses and an enormous Red Cross flag to keep away the planes of the Nigerian Air Force.

The basic question is: Was there any attempt to keep rebel forces away from the hospital premises?

The BBC special reporter will not say so as not to appear to be taking sides with the Federal Government.

The pattern in the areas liberated by the federal forces has been quite clear. Schools, churches and hospitals have been used as hide-outs by the rebels when under attack by federal forces. When missionaries go to rebel-held areas they usually keep mute. They do not try to persuade the rebel leaders to give up secession when they know that this is the only way that peace can return to rebel-held territories.

There is no single instance when missionaries have told the BBC or any foreign news agency that they had ever asked Ojukwu to sue for peace.

Yet before they even see General Gowon in one of their usual peace missions, they conveniently disclose to the BBC their abiding love for peace as if they were looking for a Nobel peace prize.

Yet they are most anxious to persuade General Gowon not to crush the rebellion by force. How else can you end a rebellion?

When the rebel forces came to the Mid-West, the BBC man was on the spot. Not once did the BBC ever carry a special report on the atrocities by the rebels against innocent

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Enclosure
Page 2
Lagos A-448

civilians in the Mid-West. No. Instead their Frederick Forsythe went to Ofusu where he heard gunshots at Owo, 40 miles away and saw a column of rebel forces near Lokoja one hundred miles away poised to pounce on the vital junction city.

The BBC is always anxious to put out all the nonsensical claims on the rebel radio without any attempt at objective reporting even where this is feasible. It is very revealing that when the rebel radio claimed recently that the British Government had despatched one thousand troops to Nigeria, the BBC did not just repeat it as usual, but it carried, at the same time, the British Government's denial and then went on to produce all sorts of evidence to show the truth--that they were one thousand schoolboys on a holiday cruise to Freetown.

Why does not the BBC adopt similar methods to report the truth when relaying lies put out by the rebel radio? Let the BBC and the missionary peace-makers know that only those who subscribe to one. Nigeria can bring peace to the diminishing rebel-held areas of the three eastern states.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 1286

SUBJECT: AZIKIWE'S PEACE PROPOSALS

REF LONDON'S 1242


1. FORMER PRESIDENT AZIKIWE THIS AFTER GAVE US
ADVANCE TEXT OF ADDRESS HE WILL DELIVER TONIGHT (FEB 16) ON
OXFORD PUTTING FORWARD DETAILED PLAN FOR ENDING NIGERIAN
CONFLICT. ESSENTIAL FEATURE OF PLAN IS FOR U.S. TO ASK SECURITY
COUNCIL TO ESTABLISH "COMMITTEE OF 19" WHICH WOULD THEN BE
GIVEN ONE WEEK TO STUDY SITUATION AND REPORT TO SC ON WAYS
AND MEANS TO BRING ABOUT CEASE-FIRE, ARMS EMBARGO, PLEBISCITE
IN WAR ZONES AND FINALLY, SETTLEMENT BASED ON WISHES OF
EASTERN POPULATION. FULL TEXT OF ADDRESS RUNS TO 25 LEGAL-
SIZED PAGES, INCLUDING 3-PAGES BIBLIOGRAPHY, AND IS BEING
POUCHED TO ADDRESSES. AZIKIWE HAS ALSO PROVIDED US WITH HIS
OWN, MUCH SHORTER SUMMARY OF SPEECH, WHICH WE ARE TRANSMITTING
SEPTEL.

(1) 2. SUMMARY HOWEVER OMITTS CERTAIN POINTS OF SPECIAL INTEREST
AND DOES LESS THAN JUSTICE TO SPEECH AS WHOLE. AZIKIWE FOR
EXAMPLE ARGUES AT LENGTH THAT U.N. HAS AMPLE PRECEDENTS FOR
INTERVENING IN NIGERIA AND THAT OAU, LARGELY BECAUSE OF
"BUNGLING" BY OAU SECRETARIAT, IS NOT COMPETENT TO DEAL WITH
PROBLEM OF SUCH MAGNITUDE. IN ONE PASSAGE AZIKIWE REMARKS,

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PAGE 02 LONDON 01286 161728Z


"WHILST I AGREE WITH SECRETARY-GENERAL (U THANT) THAT IT WAS UP TO THE MEMBER STATES OF U.N. TO RAISE CIVIL WAR ISSUE IN FORM OF UN, YET I MUST CONFESS MY ASTONISHMENT AT WAY AND MANNER THE RESPONSIBILITY OF U.N. WAS SHIFTED TO OAU, AN EMBRYONIC INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION WHOSE SECRETARIATHAS YET TO PROVE ITS COMPETENCE FOR TACTFULLY HANDLING DELICATE ISSUES AFFECTING THE DESTINY OF MILLIONS OF HUMAN BEINGS".

3. PASSAGE IN WHICH HE URGES US TO RAISE ISSUE READS AS FOLLOWS: "AS POSITIVE AND PRACTICAL MOVE TOWARDS PERMANENT SETTLEMENT OF WAR, I PROPOSE THAT U.S. AS CONFIRMED NEUTRAL, SHOULD TAKE INITIATIVE, WITHOUT FURTHER DELAY, AND CALL ATTENTION OF SECURITY COUNCIL OF UN TO DETERIORATING SITUATION IN NIGERIAN CRISIS, WITH VIEW TO COUNCIL TAKING EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO BRING ARMED CONFLICT TO SPEEDY END. THIS DONE, U.S. SHOULD MOVE SECURITY COUNCIL TO CONSTITUTE COMMITTEE OF 19 TO STUDY AND RECOMMEND WAYS AND MEANS".

4. THIS COMMITTEE, HE CONTINUES, SHOULD INCLUDE PERMANENT AND NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS OF SECURITY COUNCIL PLUS FOUR STATES WITH "PARTICULAR" INTEREST IN NIGERIAN PROBLEM, GABON, IVORY COAST, PORTUGAL AND TANZANIA. ITS TERMS OF REFERENCE ARE THEN SET OUT IN SOME DETAIL UNDER 14 SEPARATE POINTS. THESE INCLUDE RECOMMENDING TO SC HOW TO BRING ABOUT, (1) TOTAL ARMS EMBARGO, (2) ARMISTICE AND CEASE-FIRE (3) INTERNATIONAL PEACE FORCE, (4) ADMINISTRATION OF WAR ZONES, (5) DEMOBILIZATION OF NIGERIAN AND BIAFRAN TROOPS IN WAR ZONES, (6) ACCEPTANCE BY BIAFRA "OF PRINCIPLE OF CREATION OF STATES, PROVIDED IT ACCORDS WITH WISHES OF 60 PERCENT OF INHABITANTS OF AREA OR AREAS CONCERNED, WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO FUTURE MODIFICATION OF PRESENT 12-STATE STRUCTURE, AS FAR AS PORT HARCOURT IS CONCERNED" (7) CONDUCTING OF PLEBISCITE, (8) SIGNATURE BY NIGERIA OF APPROPRIATE UN CONVENTIONS AGAINST GENOCIDE ETC., IF VOTE FAVORS ON NIGERIA, (9) MEMBERSHIP OF BIAFRA IN UN IF VOTE GOES OTHER WAY, (10) ORDERLY TRANSFER TO TERRITORIES AS NECESSARY, (11) RESUMPTION OF CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT, (12) CONVOKING BY FMG OF CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY TO DRAFT NEW CONSTITUTION IF PLEBISCITE ENDORSES ON NIGERIA, (13) INTERNATIONAL PEACE FORCE TO REMAIN IN NIGERIA TO SUPERVISE FEDERAL AND REGIONAL ELECTIONS, AND (14) PEACE FORCE TO REMAIN IN EXISTENCE ONE YEAR, WITH EXPENSES PAID BY U.N. AND NIGERIA.

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PAGE 03 LONDON 01286 161728Z

5. WHEN AZIKIWE GAVE US COPY OF ADDRESS WE ASKED HIM WHETHER HE DID NOT FEAR THAT HIS PROPOSALS WOULD ANTAGONIZE BOTH NIGERIAN AND BIAFRAN LEADERSHIP AND DAMAGE HIS FUTURE USEFULNESS AS NATIONAL LEADER POTENTIALLY ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH SIDES. HE RECOGNIZED RISK BUT SAID HE BELIEVED IT WAS TIME TO SPEAK OUT. THERE WERE, HE WAS SURE, MODERATES ON BOTH SIDES WHO NEEDED PUBLIC ENCOURAGEMENT. HIS SPEECH MIGHT PROVIDE STIMULUS THEY NEEDED TO BEGIN THINKING IN TERMS OF COMPROMISE. HE ALSO RECOGNIZED THAT HIS PROPOSALS FOR ACTION BY SECURITY COUNCIL COULD BE STYMIED BY SOVIET VETO AT INSTANCE OF NIGERIANS. HE REGARDED SPEECH AS SERIES OF IDEAS RATHER THAN IMMUTABLE PACKAGE AND HOPED THAT IF US AND OTHERS OBJECTED TO CERTAIN FEATURES OF HIS PLAN WE WOULD NEVERTHELESS CONSIDER HIS IDEAS CAREFULLY AND NOT REJECT PLAN OUT OF HAND. BRUCE

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SUBJ: NIGERIA: PEACE INITIATIVE BY COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT

1. BECAUSE COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT PROPOSALS FOR AGREED
SETTLEMENT AND CEASEFIRE IN NIGERIA ARE MORE DEFINITE THAN
PREVIOUS SUGGESTIONS, AND BECAUSE SOME IBO LEADERS ARE WILLING

ACCEPT CS PACKAGE, FMG WILL PROBABLY BE WILLING TO DISCUSS CS

PAGE 2. RUTALS 6515CC S E C R E T
INITIATIVE WHEN ARNOLD SMITH IS IN LAGOS. GOWON, BY HIS TALKS
WITH DR. JOHNSON OF CANADIAN PRESBYTERIAN MISSION AND WITH
MR. CURLE, AN ENGLISH QUAKER, HAS DEMONSTRATED INTEREST IN
PEACE INITIATIVES.

2. ALTHOUGH FMG MAY BE WILLING TALK ABOUT FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS,
WE SUGGEST SMITH SHOULD BE AWARE THAT:
A. GOWON AND HIS ASSOCIATES ARE LIKELY TO INSIST ON

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PAGE 02 LAGOS 06515 071355Z

CONTINUING TO PROSECUTE CIVIL WAR UNTIL SECESSION RENOUNCED.
B. FMG WILL PROBABLY REGARD CS PROPOSALS AS LITTLE MORE
THAN REVISED VERSION OF ABURI DECISIONS WHICH GOWON TRIED TO
IMPLEMENT WITH HIS DECREE NO. 8 IN MARCH 1967. BECAUSE OJUKWU
REJECTED THAT DECREE AND TOOK OTHER STEPS LEADING TO SECESSION
AND CIVIL WAR, FMG WILL NOT BE IN MOOD TO ACCEPT THOSE PRO-
POSALS. THEY MAY ARGUE THAT FMG DID NOT FIGHT CIVIL WAR AT GREAT
EXPENSE IN ORDER TO RETURN TO WHAT OJUKWU REJECTED NEARLY ONE
YEAR AGO. THEY ARE VERY SUSPICIOUS OF IBO ABILITIES TO TALK
AND STALL.
C. FMG WILL INSIST ON ALL PROPOSALS BEING DETAILED
AND SPECIFIC. WE WOULD EXPECT FMG TO INSIST THAT "BIAFRA"

PAGE 3 RUTALS 6515CC SECRET
LEADERS RENOUNCE SECESSION AND ACCEPT TWELVE STATES (OR MORE)
FORMULA. CS PROPOSALS STEP IN THIS DIRECTION BUT IMPLY
SPECIAL POSITION FOR "BIAFRA" WHICH FMG UNLIKELY ACCEPT.
D. FMG, ESPECIALLY GOWON, WOULD PROBABLY BE AGREEABLE
TO STATIONING OF COMMONWEALTH OBSERVERS OR FORCES TO ASSURE
IMPLEMENTATION OF CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS. HOWEVER, RELATION-
SHIP BETWEEN SUCH COMMONWEALTH PERSONNEL AND FMG ARMED FORCES
WOULD HAVE BE SPOILED OUT CLEARLY IN ADVANCE.

GROUP-1.

MATHENS

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SUB: NIGERIA: PEACE INITIATIVE BY COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT

1. COMMONWEALTH SECRETARIAT SYG ARNOLD SMITH CONVOKED MEETING THIS MORNING (FEB. 6) TO DISCUSS PACKAGE PROPOSAL CS HAS PUT TOGETHER AND WHICH IT HOPES WILL LEAD TO CEASE-FIRE AND PEACE NEGOTIATIONS IN NIGERIA (LONDON'S 5377). TEXT OF MEMORANDUM PREPARED BY CS SUMMARIZING PROPOSAL BEING TRANSMITTED SEPTEL (LONDON 6223). PARTICIPANTS IN MEETING WERE

PAGE 2 RUDTCR 6224 SECRET
CHARGE AND EMBOFF FOR US; CANADIAN DEPUTY HICOMER AND CANADIAN EMBOFF; ASST. UNDER SECTY OF COMMONWEALTH OFFICE (ERIC NORRIS) AND HEAD, WEST AND GENERAL AFRICA DEPT. (DONALD TEBIT); SYG SMITH, DEPUTY SYG ADU AND OTHERS FROM CS.

2. SMITH EXPLAINED TO GROUP THAT PACKAGE PROPOSAL HAD BEEN SUBMITTED TO IBO REPS (OKPARA, DIKE AND MOJEKWU) WHO IN TURN HAD SHOWN IT TO OJUKWU AND BIAFRAN "CABINET". SMITH HAD JUST THIS WEEKEND RECEIVED WORD THAT OJUKWU AND REST

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OF IBO LEADERSHIP HAD ACCEPTED CS PACKAGE AS REASONABLE BASIS ON WHICH TO BEGIN DIRECT TALKS WITH FMG.

3. NEXT STEP, SAID SMITH, WAS TO PRESENT PACKAGE TO FMG AND OBTAIN ITS REACTION. HE INTENDED FLY TO LAGOS THURSDAY, FEB. 8 OR FRIDAY, FEB. 9 AND HOPED BE ABLE TO DISCUSS CS PROPOSAL DIRECTLY WITH GOWON, ARIKPO AND OTHER FMG LEADERS SOON THEREAFTER. (PUBLIC PURPOSE OF SMITH'S TRIP, HE EXPLAINED, WOULD BE IN CONNECTION WITH UPCOMING COMMONWEALTH EDUCATION CONFERENCE).

PAGE 3 RUDTCR 6224 S E C R E T

4. GOING OVER PACKAGE POINT BY POINT, SMITH EMPHASIZED CS HAD PUT FORWARD BROAD LINES OF SETTLEMENT, EMBODYING WHAT IT INTERPRETED AS ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES REQUIRED BY BOTH SIDES, BUT HAD LEFT MANY DIFFICULT ISSUES FOR LATER NEGOTIATION. (OBVIOUS EXAMPLES: TERRITORIAL DELINEATION OF IBO STATE; ALLOCATION OF OIL REVENUES; SECURITY GUARANTEES AND COMPOSITION OF INTERNATIONAL FORCE.)

5. SMITH SAID HE BELIEVED IBO'S WERE IN MOOD TO TALK AND THAT OKPARA, WHOM SMITH RESPECTED, HAD, AS HE CLAIMED, GOTTEN DEFINITE AGREEMENT FROM IBO LEADERS TO TALK WITH FMG ON BASIS CS PACKAGE. OKPARA HAD IN FACT INITIAL-LED CS MEMORANDUM. SMITH FEARED THAT DIFFICULTIES MIGHT NOW ARISE IN LAGOS SINCE "WIND BLOWING IN FACE OF IBOS IS AT FMG'S BACK". THIS WAS REASON HE HAD CALLED TOGETHER US, UK AND CANADIAN REPS TO ACQUAINT THEM WITH PACKAGE IN ADVANCE. DEPENDING ON RESPONSE HE GOT FROM FMG WHEN HE WAS IN LAGOS, IT MIGHT PROVE USEFUL FOR THREE GOVTS TO URGE FMG TO BEGIN DIRECT TALKS WITH IBOS UNDER CS AUSPICES. WHILE SMITH COULD

PAGE 4 RUDTCR 6224 S E C R E T

NOT PREDICT FMG REACTION TO PACKAGE, AND DID NOT ANTICIPATE IT WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR THREE GOVTS TO EXPRESS SELVES ON DETAILS, IT MIGHT ALSO PROVE HELPFUL FOR THEM AT SOME

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LATER TIME TO TELL FMG THAT THEY CONSIDERED PACKAGE "REASONABLE BASIS FOR TALKS". ALL THIS, HOWEVER, WOULD DEPEND ON RESULTS OF SMITH'S TALKS WITH FMG.

6. IN RESPONSE CHARGE'S QUESTION WHETHER CS WAS ALSO THINKING IN TERMS OF GETTING AFRICAN STATES, AND ESPECIALLY AFRICAN CW STATES, TO SUPPORT INITIATIVE, SMITH SAID THIS WAS VERY MUCH IN HIS MIND. FOR MOMENT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO LIMIT NUMBER OF GOVTS WITH KNOWLEDGE OF PROPOSAL TO GUARD AGAINST LEAKS. AT RIGHT TIME, HOWEVER, IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL FOR DEPUTY SYG ADU TO VISIT PRINCIPAL AFRICAN CW COUNTRIES AND ACQUAINT THEM WITH PROPOSAL.

7. MEETING CONCLUDED WITH SMITH REQUESTING CHARGE AND OTHERS REPS TO COMMUNICATE CONTENTS OF CS PACKAGE TO THEIR GOVTS, ALERTING THEM TO LIKELIHOOD CS MAY REQUEST THEIR INTERVENTION WITH FMG IN NEAR FUTURE. SMITH ADDED

PAGE 5 RUOTCR 6224 S E C R E T
THAT CS WOULD BE HAPPY TO RECEIVE ANY COMMENT GOVTS OR THEIR REPS IN LAGOS WOULD CARE TO MAKE ON LIKELY FMG REACTION AND POINTS SMITH HIMSELF MIGHT STRESS WHEN HE DISCUSSES PACKAGE WITH FMG LEADERS. NATURALLY, TO BE MOST HELPFUL, SUCH COMMENTS OUGHT TO BE RECEIVED PROMPTLY AND IN ANY CASE, BEFORE SMITH DEPARTS, PROBABLY THURSDAY EVENING, FEB. 8. KAISER

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